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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed Special Civil Suit No. 510 of 2010 on 4th October 2010 seeking a mandatory injunction relating to an agreement of reconveyance dated 21st June 2005. The appellant claimed that the sale deed executed by him in favor of respondent No. 1 was actually a loan security arrangement, supported by a Kararnama executed on the same date, obliging respondent No. 1 to reconvey the property. The appellant alleged that respondent No. 1 subsequently sold the property to respondent No. 2 in August 2010 and forcibly dispossessed the appellant. The appellant sought recovery of possession and a perpetual injunction restraining respondent No. 2 from creating third party interests.

Following the suit, the appellant obtained an ex parte ad-interim injunction on 6th October 2010 restraining respondent No. 2 from alienating the property. Respondent No. 2 denied the existence of the Kararnama and contended the transaction was an outright sale. The trial court rejected the appellant's application for temporary injunction on 17th June 2011 but extended the interim injunction order till 24th June 2011. The appellant challenged this extension order by filing the present Appeal from Order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant is entitled to a temporary injunction restraining respondent No. 2 from creating third party rights over the suit property during the pendency of the suit.
  2. Whether the protection under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is adequate to protect the appellant’s rights or if the case falls under the category of ‘rare cases’ warranting additional interim relief.
  3. The applicability of precedent judgments, particularly regarding the interplay between section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the power of the Court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant temporary injunctions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant submitted an affidavit of an attesting witness to the Kararnama dated 21st June 2005, which the trial court failed to properly consider.
  • The appellant argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the case did not fall under ‘rare cases’ where section 52 protection is inadequate, emphasizing that the respondents must prove irreparable loss to deny injunction.
  • The appellant contended that even if the claim was found baseless ultimately, respondent No. 2 could claim damages, so interim relief should not be denied on that basis.
  • Since respondent No. 2 was restrained from creating third party rights during the pendency of the application, and this Court had directed maintenance of status quo, the interim order should be continued until the suit’s disposal.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents argued that the trial court’s rejection of the temporary injunction application was based on proper appreciation of evidence and rival contentions.
  • The sale deed dated 21st June 2005 was an outright sale with no mention of any Kararnama, and mutation was effected accordingly.
  • Even if the Kararnama is considered, the appellant failed to repay the loan amount within the stipulated three-year period, which ended in 2008, before the property was sold in 2010.
  • The respondents relied on the decision in Kacchi Properties, Satara v. Ganpatrao Shankarrao Kadam, asserting that section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act provides adequate protection and there is no need to invoke powers under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kacchi Properties, Satara v. Ganpatrao Shankarrao Kadam (2010)(5) Mh.L.J 903 Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act provides adequate protection to parties pendente lite; temporary injunctions under Order 39 are not necessary unless 'rare cases' arise. The trial court relied on this decision to conclude that the appellant’s case did not fall within ‘rare cases’ requiring injunction beyond protection under section 52; this Court acknowledged the reliance but found trial court’s observation contrary to Supreme Court precedent.
Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot v. Baldev Dass, 2005(1) Mh.L.J (S.C) 1043 : (2004) 8 SCC 488 Irreparable loss or damage must be shown by the party opposing injunction; section 52 protection alone may be inadequate in certain circumstances. The Court held that the trial court’s findings were contrary to this precedent, emphasizing that respondents must demonstrate irreparable harm to justify denial of injunction.
Pralhad Jaganath Jawale v. Sitabai Chander Nikam, (2011)(4) Mh.L.J 137 Section 52 does not restrain alienation pendente lite but provides legal effect to such transfer; temporary injunctions offer prohibitory protection not available under section 52. This Court referred to this judgment to clarify the distinction between section 52 protection and the additional protection granted by temporary injunctions under Order 39.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the impugned order and the rival submissions. It noted that the trial court primarily relied on the decision in Kacchi Properties, Satara v. Ganpatrao Shankarrao Kadam to hold that section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act provides adequate protection, thereby justifying rejection of the appellant’s temporary injunction application.

However, the Court observed that the trial court’s conclusion that the appellant failed to demonstrate ‘rare cases’ where section 52 protection is inadequate was contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maharwal Khewaji Trust v. Baldev Dass. According to that precedent, the respondents must prove irreparable loss or damage to justify denial of an injunction.

The Court also referred to the judgment in Pralhad Jaganath Jawale v. Sitabai Chander Nikam, which clarified that while section 52 does not prohibit alienation pendente lite, temporary injunctions provide prohibitory protection and consequences for breach under Order 39 Rules 2A and 11.

In the present case, the respondents failed to demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable loss or damage if restrained from creating third party rights during the suit. The Court reasoned that protecting the appellant’s interest during the suit’s pendency was necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and preserve the status quo.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the Appeal from Order to the extent of continuing the interim injunction restraining respondent No. 2 from creating any third party rights or interests in the suit property until the disposal of the suit.

The direct effect of this decision is that the status quo regarding the suit property is maintained, protecting the appellant’s claimed interest during litigation. No new precedent was set; rather, the Court aligned the order with established Supreme Court principles requiring demonstration of irreparable harm to deny injunctions beyond section 52 protection.

    Sunil v. Jawaharlal

    1. This Appeal from Order is filed challenging the order passed below Exh.21 in Special Civil Suit No. 510 of 2010, dated 17th June, 2011.

    With the consent of the parties Appeal from Order is taken up for final hearing.

    2. Background facts for filing this Appeal from Order are as under:

    On 4-10-2010, appellant herein filed Special Civil Suit No. 510 of 2010 for mandatory injunction regarding agreement of reconveyance dated 21st June, 2005, executed by respondent No. 1 in favour of appellant and for recovery of possession of the suit property from respondent No. 1 and further for perpetual injunction restraining respondent No. 2 from creating any sort of third party interest in the suit property.

    3. It is contention of the appellant that financial condition of respondent No. 1 is good, therefore, appellant in the year 2005 on or about second week of June, 2005 approached to the respondent No. 1 for an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand) for his household and domestic needs. Accordingly, registered sale deed was executed by the appellant in favour of respondent No. 1 on 21st June, 2005 registered at Serial No. 3438.

    On 21st June, 2005 sale deed came to be executed and the said sale deed according to the appellant was for security of the loan amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand) and as transaction was loan transaction, a Kararnama was executed on the date of execution of the aforesaid sale deed by respondent No. 1 in favour of appellant and thereby respondent No. 1 has agreed to reconvey the suit property in favour of the appellant. It is further case of the appellant that respondent No. 1 thereafter changed his mind and deprived the appellant of his property by selling the suit property for consideration of Rs. 4,21,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs Twenty One Thousand) to respondent No. 1 vide sale deed dated 31st August, 2010. The appellant got knowledge regarding execution of the sale deed on or before first week of September, 2010 when respondent No. 1 came to the suit property with 10 to 15 persons and by force unlawfully dispossessed the appellant from the suit property.

    It is further case of the appellant that on 6th October, 2010, appellant moved an application for temporary injunction in the pending suit. The trial Court was pleased to grant ad-interim ex parte injunction against present respondent No. 2 vide order dated 6th October, 2010 and thereby restrained respondent No. 2 from creating third party interest over the suit property and further restrained from alienating the suit property till further orders.

    4. It is further case of the appellant that in response to the suit summons and show cause notice issued by the trial Court, respondent No. 2 filed written statement and thereby contended that sale deed executed by appellant in favour of respondent No. 1 is out and out sale and further denied execution of Kararnama dated 21st June, 2005 and thereby prayed for dismissal of the suit and Rejection of the application Exh. 5.

    5. On 17th June, 2011 after hearing arguments of parties, the trial Court was pleased to reject the application filed by the appellant at Exh. 5 by his judgment and order dated 17th June, 2011. On the same day, the appellant herein, after rejection of the application at Exh. 5 by the trial Court, moved an application at Exh. 21 and thereby prayed for extension of ad-interim order. The trial Court was pleased to pass the order on the said application and thereby continued ad-interim ex parte order passed on 6th October, 2010, .till 24th June, 2011. Hence, Appeal from Order challenging the order dated 17th June, 2011 passed below Exh. 21 in Special Civil Suit No. 510 of 2010.

    6. Learned counsel appearing for appellant submits that appellant has placed on record affidavit of one of attesting witness of the Kararnama dated 21st June, 2005 executed by respondent No. 1 in favour of appellant. According to the learned counsel for appellant, the lower Court ought to have taken into consideration the affidavit of attesting witness of the Kararnama dated 21st June, 2005, however, the trial Court failed to appreciate the said affidavit. It is submitted that, an application filed by the appellant for temporary injunction ought to have been allowed by the trial Court.

    7. It is further submitted that trial Court while passing impugned order observed that, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that this case falls under the caption of ‘rere cases’ where the protection under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, is inadequate to protect his right and interest. However, trial Court while making such observations has not considered the fact that the respondents have to make out the case that there is irreparable loss or damage to them in case interim relief is granted in favour of the plaintiff. It is further submitted that the trial Court ought to have taken into consideration that in the event of appellant's claim being found baseless ultimately, it is always open to respondent No. 2 to claim damages, or in appropriate case the Court itself can award for damages for the loss suffered, if any.

    8. Learned counsel appearing for appellant invited my attention to grounds in the Appeal from Order and submitted that since respondent No. 2 was restrained from creating third party right during pendency of the application and the said order has been continued by the trial Court even after rejection of application and thereafter this Court on 21st June. 2011, while issuing notice in Appeal From Order and on Civil Application has directed the parties to maintain status quo as to the suit property as on today, therefore, according to learned counsel for appellant, said interim order needs to be continued till disposal of the suit.

    9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondents submits that reasons recorded by the trial Court, while rejecting the application for temporary injunction are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and after appreciating rival contentions, therefore, this court may not interfere in this Appeal from Order. It is further submitted that, the appellant herein failed to establish his case. He invited my attention to the sale deed dated 21st June, 2005 and submitted that said sale deed is registered and executed on 21st June, 2005 and nothing has been mentioned in the said sale deed about any Kararnama. After execution of the said sale deed mutation entry is taken in the name of defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 has sold the property to original defendant No. 2 in the year 2010. It is further submitted that, even if Kararnama at Exh. “C” of this petition is considered, in that case also within three years from 21st June, 2005, the appellant should have returned the entire amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees one Lakh Fifty Thousand) with interest @ 24%, however, the appellant has not taken any steps, therefore, such period of three years come to an end on 21st June, 2008. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for respondents, original defendant No. 1 has sold the property to original defendant No. 2 in the year 2010 by executing sale deed, therefore no interference in the impugned order is warranted.

    10. Learned counsel appearing for respondents invited my attention to impugned order passed by the trial Court and submitted that the Court has taken into consideration all the aspects of the matter including possession and also Kararnama, hence he prays that application filed by original plaintiff/appellant may not be entertained.

    Learned counsel further invited my attention to the reported judgment of this Court in the case of Kacchi Properties, Satara v. Ganpatrao Shankarrao Kadam, reported in (2010)(5) Mh.L.J 903, and submitted that provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act provides adequate protection to parties to lis. Therefore, there is no occasion for invoking powers under order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the learned counsel for respondents, the Court has rightly placed reliance on the aforesaid judgment and rejected the application of the original plaintiff/appellant, therefore, this Court may not interfere in this Appeal from order.

    11. I have given due consideration to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the entire compilation placed on record and also other documents and judgments cited by the counsels appearing for respective parties.

    On careful perusal of the impugned order, it appears to me that, the trial Court mainly placed reliance upon the reported decision of this Court in the case of Kacchi Properties, Satara v. Ganpatrao Shankarrao Kadam, reported in (2010)(5) Mh.L.J 903 and has come to the conclusion that provisions under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act provides adequate protection to the appellant, and therefore it is not necessary to entertain the application filed by the appellant for temporary injunction. On reading of para No. 22 of the impugned judgment/order, it appears that the trial Court has recorded finding that, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his case falls under the caption of ‘rare cases’ where the protection under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is inadequate to protect his rights and interest. In fact, such observation/findings recorded by the trial Court are contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot v. Baldev Dass., reported in 2005(1) Mh.L.J (S.C) 1043 : (2004) 8 SCC 488. In fact, as per aforementioned Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, respondents have to make out case that there is irreparable loss or damage to them if such injunction is granted to the plaintiff.

    12. This Court had an occasion to consider the judgment in Kacchi Properties, Satara v. Ganpatrao Shankarrao Kadam reported in (2010)(5) Mh.L.J 903, in the case of Pralhad Jaganath Jawale v. Sitabai Chander Nikam, reported in (2011)(4) Mh.L.J 137. This Court in para No. 14 held that, “as far as section 52 of the said Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is concerned, it is apparent that the same does not put any restraint on a party to the suit from alienating the suit property, but it provides for legal effect of the transfer pendente lite. Such pendente lite without permission of the Court is neither illegal nor void.”

    In para No. 17, it is further held that, “the order of prohibitory injunction grants protection which is not available under section 52 in the event of transfer pending a suit. Moreover, the party who breaches the order of temporary injunction may have to face the drastic consequences provided in Rules 2A and 11 of Order XXXIX of the said Code. The consequences are in the nature of an order of detention or striking out the defence.”

    (emphasis added)

    13. In para No. 24 of the said Judgment, this Court has considered the Judgment of Apex Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot v. Baldev Dass., cited supra, in which it is observed that. “A defendant is required to make out a case that irreparable loss or damage will be caused to him during the pendency of the suit if he is not allowed to alter the status quo.”

    (emphasis added)

    14. In para Nos. 25 and 26, it is further observed that, “where there is apprehension established that defendant may create third party rights and all three ingredients are satisfied, if temporary injunction is not granted, it may result into multiplicity of proceedings inasmuch as the alienee pendente lite may apply for impleadment, which will result in delay in proceedings of the suit.”

    (emphasis added)

    15. In the present case defendants i.e respondents herein have not made out any case that irreparable loss or damages will be causcd to them during pendency of the suit if they are not allowed to alter the status quo.

    16. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, during pendency of the suit interest of the appellant is required to be protected, therefore, interim order granted by the trial Court during pendency of the application and which was continued even after rejection of the application of the appellant deserves to be continued till disposal of the suit.

    17. In the result, respondent No. 2 herein is restrained from creating third party rights/interest in the suit property till disposal of the suit bearing Special Civil Suit No. 510 of 2010. Appeal From order and Civil Application are allowed to above extent and same stand disposed of accordingly.

    Appeal allowed.
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    Comments

    Sunil v. Jawaharlal
    (Aug 20, 2011)