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  • section 41, Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act No. 11 of 1960) and the provisions of Chap. XXXI, Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960
  • provisions of section 51 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956,
  • Rules and section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act,
  • section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960,
  • section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 41, Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act No. 11 of 1960) and the provisions of Chap. XXXI, Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960
  • provisions of section 51 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956,
  • Rules and section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act,
  • section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960,
  • section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act,
Smart Summary

Concise Summary of the Opinion (S.A. Bobde, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners challenged a tender process initiated by respondent No. 1, Maharashtra State Electricity Transmission Company Limited, and the award of the contract to respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 1 raised a preliminary objection that the cause of action did not arise within the territorial jurisdiction of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court and that the petition should have been filed at the Principal Seat in Bombay. The court heard counsel on this preliminary jurisdictional objection and considered the place of filing under Article 226 of the Constitution, section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960, and Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960.

Relevant undisputed facts: the tender notice was published in Bombay; bids were submitted in Bombay; scrutiny of documents and fire tests were conducted in Bombay; and a letter dated 27-8-2009 was issued at Bombay. The petitioners relied on three communications received at Nagpur (a corrigendum to the tender notice, communication of date/time of opening, and a communication querying the validity of a certificate) to contend that part of the cause of action arose at Nagpur.

The court considered submissions by both sides and relevant authorities, and concluded that the petition ought not to be entertained by the Nagpur Bench. The papers were directed to be returned to the petitioner for filing before the Principal Seat at Bombay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition challenging the tender process and award when the principal events (publication of tender, submission of bids, scrutiny, tests, and issuance of letters) occurred in Bombay.
  2. Whether the mere receipt at Nagpur of certain communications (a corrigendum, notice of date/time of opening, and a query about a certificate) constitutes part of the cause of action sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Nagpur Bench.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent No. 1 (Maharashtra State Electricity Transmission Company Limited) — Arguments

  • The place of filing of a writ petition is governed by Article 226(2) of the Constitution, which limits a High Court's jurisdiction to territories in which the cause of action, whole or in part, arises.
  • Section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960, and Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, delineate the districts in respect of which the Nagpur Bench may exercise jurisdiction; only matters arising in those specified districts may be filed before the Nagpur Bench except by order of the Chief Justice.
  • In the present case no part of the cause of action arose in any of the districts specified in the statutory provisions or rules; therefore the petition was liable to be returned for presentation at the Principal Seat in Bombay.
  • Relied on Supreme Court authorities (including State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties and Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu) to support the principle that a court should not assume jurisdiction where the cause of action has not arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.

Petitioners — Arguments

  • Relied on the decision in Nitin Industrial Associates, Khamgaon v. State of Maharashtra (1986 Mh. L.J. 474) to contend that the Nagpur Bench could validly exercise writ jurisdiction in this case because the matter arose within the State of Maharashtra and Article 226(1) confers jurisdiction with reference to the State.
  • Asserted that receipt at Nagpur of communications pertaining to the tender (corrigendum, date/time of opening, and a query about certificate validity) constituted part of the cause of action sufficient to bring the matter within the Nagpur Bench's territorial jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 Supreme Court deprecated a High Court (Calcutta) entertaining a writ when the cause of action arose in another State (Jaipur), holding that the remedy should be pursued in the High Court where the cause of action arose. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that jurisdiction should not be assumed by a Bench (Nagpur) where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction.
Oil And Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 Reiterated the principle that a High Court should not assume jurisdiction merely because some acts or communications occurred outside the territorial locus of the substantive events giving rise to the cause of action. The court cited this authority as a reinforcement of the principle applied in the present matter to conclude that Nagpur Bench lacked jurisdiction.
Chand Kaur v. Partab Singh, ILR (1989) 16 Cal 98 : 15 IA 156 Defines "cause of action" as referring to the grounds set forth in the plaint and not to the defence or the nature of relief; used to determine whether particular events constitute part of the cause of action. The court used this definition (as relied upon by the Supreme Court) to determine that the three communications received at Nagpur did not amount to part of the cause of action.
(2000) 5 SCC 30 : AIR 2000 SC 1812 and (2008) 3 SCC 456 Later decisions in which the Supreme Court reiterated the same territorial-jurisdiction principles previously laid down. The court observed these later decisions reiterated the same principles; it considered that they supported the conclusion that Nagpur Bench lacked jurisdiction, though it stated detailed discussion of them was unnecessary.
Re: Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956 Referenced as an authority on the limits of legislative or administrative provisions to abridge jurisdiction conferred by Article 226. The court noted that the Division Bench in Nitin Industrial Associates relied on Re: Kerala Education Bill to observe that section 41 and Chapter XXXI could not abridge Article 226; the present court considered that observation but treated the Nitin decision as having been applied in a particular factual context only.
Nitin Industrial Associates, Khamgaon v. State of Maharashtra, 1986 Mh. L.J. 474 Division Bench decision holding that section 41 and Chapter XXXI cannot be read as abridging the jurisdiction under Article 226, but observing that those provisions are primarily administrative and for convenience. The court relied on the description of section 41 and Chapter XXXI as administrative measures but held that the Nitin decision was decided on peculiar facts and cannot be taken as authority to entertain matters arising outside the districts specified for the Nagpur Bench.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in stages, strictly following the material and authorities before it:

  1. Legal framework: The court began by identifying the statutory and constitutional framework governing the place of filing. It noted that Article 226(2) permits a High Court to exercise jurisdiction in relation to territories within which the cause of action, whole or in part, arises. It then examined section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960, and Rule 1 of Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, which specify the districts over which the Nagpur Bench ordinarily exercises jurisdiction and provide that the Chief Justice may direct exceptions.
  2. Facts material to jurisdiction: The court recorded the undisputed sequence of principal events relevant to the tender: publication of the tender notice in Bombay, submission of bids at Bombay, scrutiny and fire tests in Bombay, and issuance of a material letter dated 27-8-2009 at Bombay. The petitioners relied only on three communications received at Nagpur (corrigendum, opening date/time, and a query about a certificate) to claim part of the cause of action arose at Nagpur.
  3. Application of precedent: The court reviewed Supreme Court authorities (including State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties and Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu) holding that a court should not assume jurisdiction on the basis of trivial or peripheral events occurring within its territory when the cause of action principally arose elsewhere. It quoted Chand Kaur on the nature of "cause of action" to emphasize that the cause of action refers to the grounds on which relief is sought, not incidental events or defenses.
  4. Analysis of the petitioners' factual claims: Applying the authorities, the court concluded that the mere receipt of the three communications at Nagpur did not constitute even part of the cause of action. Those communications were peripheral and did not transform the locus of the dispute from Bombay to Nagpur.
  5. Consideration of contrary authority: The court considered the Division Bench decision in Nitin Industrial Associates, which held that section 41 and Chapter XXXI do not abridge Article 226 and described those provisions as administrative conveniences. However, the present court read that decision as having been decided on its peculiar facts (including admission of the matter long prior) and therefore not as a precedent for entertaining matters that arise outside the districts specified for the Nagpur Bench.
  6. Conclusion on jurisdiction: On the combined basis of the statutory delineation, the factual locus of the substantive events in Bombay, and the controlling precedents, the court concluded that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Nagpur Bench. Accordingly, the petition should not be entertained at Nagpur.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court held that the writ petition ought not to be entertained by the Nagpur Bench. The papers were directed to be returned to the petitioner for filing before the Principal Seat at Bombay.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is procedural: the petition must be filed at the Principal Seat in Bombay because the substantive events giving rise to the cause of action occurred in Bombay and no part of the cause of action was found to have arisen within the districts allocated to the Nagpur Bench.
  • The court followed established Supreme Court authority on territorial jurisdiction and emphasized that trivial or peripheral events occurring within a Bench's territory do not justify that Bench entertaining a petition where the cause of action principally arose elsewhere.
  • No broader precedent was announced by this opinion beyond applying and reaffirming existing principles on territorial jurisdiction; the decision directed the return of papers to the petitioner with instructions to approach the Principal Seat in Bombay.

Order: Papers to be returned to the petitioner for filing before the Principal Seat at Bombay. Order accordingly.

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    Vsp Acqua Mist Fire Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur v. Maharashtra State Electricity Transmission Company Ltd., Mumbai And Others

    S.A Bobde, J.:— Rule returnable forthwith. Heard by consent.

    2. The petitioners have challenged the tender process initiated by the respondent No. 1 Maharashtra State Electricity Transmission Company Limited and the award of the contract to the respondent No. 3. According to the respondent No. 1 the entire cause of action has not arisen within the normal territorial jurisdiction of the Bench at Nagpur, and same has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat at Bombay, hence a preliminary objection has been raised to the filing of this petition at Nagpur. We have accordingly heard the learned counsel on this issue.

    3. Shri K.H Deshpande, Senior Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that the place of filing of a writ petition is controlled by Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India which empowers a High Court to exercise jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which cause of action, whole or any part thereof. Further, according to learned counsel, as far as this Bench of the Bombay High Court is concerned, Parliament has specially delineated the territorial jurisdiction while reorganizing the State of Maharashtra by enacting section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960, which reads as follows :

    “41. Permanent Bench of Bombay High Court at Nagpur — Without prejudice to the provisions of section 51 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, such Judges of the High Court at Bombay, being not less than three in number, as the Chief Justice may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Nagpur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Buldana, Akola, Amravati, Yeotmal, Wardha, Nagpur, Bhandara, Chanda and Rajura:

    Provided that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, order that any case arising in any such district shall be heard at Bombay.”

    4. Learned counsel further relies on the Chapter XXXI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 which governs presentation of the matter at Nagpur, Aurangabad and Goa, in particular Rule 1 which reads as follows :

    “1. Presentation of matters at Nagpur, Aurangabad and Goa. — All appeals, applications, references and petitions including petitions for exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution arising in the Judicial Districts of Akola, Amravati, Bhandara, Buldhana, Chandrapur, Nagpur, Wardha, Yavatmal and Gadchiroli which lies to the High Court of Bombay shall be presented to the Additional Registrar of that High Court at Nagpur and shall be disposed of by the Judges sitting at Nagpur:

    Provided that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, order that any case arising in any such District shall be heard at Bombay;

    Provided further that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, order that any case presented at Bombay be heard at Nagpur.”

    5. According to learned counsel for the respondent only writ petitions where the cause of action has arisen within districts specified in Rule 1 of Chapter XXXI and under section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, alone can be filed before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. In the present writ petition since no part of the cause of action has arisen in any of the districts specified by any of the provisions, the present petition is liable to be returned for being presented before the Principal Seat at Bombay.

    6. The relevant facts in relation to the cause of action are not disputed namely that, the tender notice was published at Bombay, bids were submitted at Bombay, the scrutiny of documents, fire tests were conducted at Bombay. Eventually the letter dated 27-8-2009 was issued at Bombay. According to the petitioner the following events give rise to the part of the cause of action at Nagpur - a communication pertaining to tender notice, communication of date and timing of opening and communication regarding a query about the validity of a certificate, all received at Nagpur. Indeed no other events are relied upon for asserting that the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Bench at Nagpur.

    7. Shri Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has relied on several decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his objection on behalf of respondent No. 3. The learned counsel has relied on the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217 where the Calcutta High Court had entertained a writ petition in respect of a cause of action which has arisen in Jaipur in the State of Rajasthan, ostensibly on the ground that a notice had been served on the petitioner at Calcutta. The Supreme Court deprecated assumption of jurisdiction at Calcutta and held that if the petitioners had felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situated at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the authority of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under section 152 of the Act, by petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents was to file such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action, wholly or in part arose. Thereafter, in Oil And Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711, the Supreme Court reiterated the same view in respect of a petition entertained by the Calcutta High Court on the basis that the petitioner had contended that it had come to know about the tender at Calcutta, had submitted the tender and revised bids from their registered office at Calcutta and had made demands for justice by communications which were addressed from Calcutta. The tender was issued by the CIL at New Delhi on behalf of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. The Supreme Court relied on an earlier statement of law in Chand Kaur v. Partab Singh, reported in ILR (1989) 16 Cal 98 : 15 IA 156, where the Court had observed as follows :

    “The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”

    8. In parting, their Lordships observed the importance of why a Court should not exercise jurisdiction unless the cause of action has arisen wholly or partly within its territorial jurisdiction as follows :

    “It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a Court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, certain members of the Court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said Court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.”

    9. Though their Lordships expressed a hope that they would not have another occasion to deal with such a situation, it appears occasions arose again and the decisions are reported in (2000) 5 SCC 30 : AIR 2000 SC 1812, 2006 Mh. L.J Vol.-1184, and (2008) 3 SCC 456. It is not necessary to discuss the later decisions because the Supreme Court reiterated the same principles laid down earlier. Applying these decisions to the present case, it is clear that no part of the cause of action has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of this Bench as delineated by the Bombay Appellate Side rules and the re-organization act. aforesaid rules and reorganization act clearly requires that Nagpur Bench will have jurisdiction and powers only in those matters arisen which have in the districts specified therein.

    10. Shri Parchure, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on 1986 Mh. L.J 474, Nitin Industrial Associates, Khamgaon v. State of Maharashtra, in order to contend that this Bench would be well within its power to exercise its writ jurisdiction in this case, since the matter has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court as understood under Article 226 Clause (1) of the Constitution of India namely the State of Maharashtra. We find from the decision that the Division Bench specifically negatived arguments that Chapter XXXI of the Bombay Appellate Side Rules and section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, in any way can be taken to have abridged the jurisdiction and power conferred on this High Court by Article 226 in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Re: Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956. The Division Bench has observed as follows :

    “In view of this, the contention must be negatived. But be that as it may, although the said two provisions cannot abridge the jurisdiction, the said two provisions need to be looked at in their proper perspective. The said two provisions namely, section 41, Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 (Act No. 11 of 1960) and the provisions of Chap. XXXI, Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 are designed to meet administrative requirements and administrative convenience. Hence it is not that every petition under Article 226 which is presented to this Bench at Nagpur that needs to be entertained and regard must be had to these two provisions in the filing of writ petitions so that the petitions can be dealt with by an appropriate Bench.”

    11. Having said so, the Division Bench, however considered and decided the petition before it in the peculiar circumstances of the case, since the matter has already been admitted as back as on 25-9-1984, and therefore decided to hear and decide this matter while sitting at Nagpur. That decision cannot be considered as authority for the proposition that the matter arising outside the specified districts should be entertained by this Bench at Nagpur.

    12. We thus find that mere receipt of three communications dated 23-12-2008, 9-1-2009 and 16-6-2009, by the petitioner at Nagpur pertaining to a corrigendum to the tender notice, the date and time of the opening of the tender and whether a certificate submitted by the petitioner is appropriate, do not furnish even part of the cause of action and thus, the petitioner is not entitled to move this Bench at Nagpur.

    13. In the result, we are of the view that this petition ought not to be entertained by this Bench at Nagpur. Papers are therefore, directed to be returned to the petitioner for filing before the Principal Seat at Bombay. Order accordingly.

    Order accordingly.
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