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Judgment Summary — V.C. Daga, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition challenges the order dated 15 January 1993 (exhibit G) passed by the Appropriate Authority, Bombay, under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for compulsory purchase of a house (BUA 1,991.10 sq.ft. with garage) in Mandar Co-operative Housing Society, Juhu Village, Mumbai.

Key factual and procedural points drawn from the opinion:

  • The petitioners were intending purchasers who entered into an agreement dated 30 October 1992 with respondent No. 6 to purchase the property for Rs. 64,00,000 and filed Form No. 37-I the same day.
  • The Appropriate Authority issued a show-cause notice dated 17 December 1992 expressing intention to exercise the option to purchase the property but did not furnish material or reasons in support of that intention.
  • The petitioners sought disclosure of the material relied upon (letters/replies dated 23 December 1992, hearing 24 December 1992, and letter dated 6 January 1993). The impugned order dated 15 January 1993 was received by the petitioners on 28 January 1993 without a substantive reply to their demands.
  • The petitioners filed a writ petition on 8 February 1993 under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was admitted; no interim relief was granted on admission but liberty to move for interim relief on changed circumstances was reserved.
  • The Appropriate Authority offered to make payment before taking possession (letter dated 4 March 1993). The petitioners sought interim stay on 30 April 1993; the court passed an interim order (dated 30 April 1993) directing the matter to be put up after vacation and restraining creation of third-party interest until further orders.
  • A sequence of interim applications and orders followed: auction fixed for 18 May 1993; certain interim orders vacated and later modified (orders dated 11 June 1993 and 9 July 1993). Respondents were at one stage restrained from auctioning the property till disposal of the petition. Respondents also moved to vacate interim orders in 1997 (Notice of Motion No. 185 of 1997) but were not granted the relief sought.
  • Meanwhile, the Union of India paid Rs. 56,13,227 to respondent No. 6 on 26 February 1993.
  • The petition was ultimately heard by this court, which delivered the impugned judgment set out in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable at the instance of intending purchasers challenging an order of compulsory purchase under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act.
  2. Whether the show-cause notice dated 17 December 1992 (and the subsequent order dated 15 January 1993) complied with minimal principles of natural justice by disclosing the basis and material on which a tentative conclusion of significant undervaluation was reached.
  3. Whether the Appropriate Authority correctly determined market value and the rate per sq. ft. (including whether the Authority was justified in treating additional FSI as belonging to the transferor when, on the date of the agreement, the FSI belonged to the society).
  4. Whether the Appropriate Authority erred by failing to consider comparable sale instances relied upon by the petitioners and by relying on improper calculations to conclude understatement of consideration.
  5. Whether, as a matter of law, the Appropriate Authority could assume jurisdiction under section 269UD without a positive finding that there was an attempt to evade tax (including consideration of the threshold of a more-than-15-per-cent difference between apparent effective consideration and market value).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • There was no understatement of consideration; the impugned order was based on wrongly determined data.
  • The Appropriate Authority ignored comparable sale transactions relied upon by the petitioners.
  • The rate determined by the Appropriate Authority (resulting in a determination of Rs. 2,044 per sq. ft. in one aspect) was improper and incorrect.
  • The show-cause notice dated 17 December 1992 was illegal and invalid because it did not disclose the material basis for the tentative conclusion of significant undervaluation.
  • The percentage difference in valuation had been wrongly calculated by the Appropriate Authority.
  • The petitioners offered to perform the agreement (were willing to make payment as per the agreement dated 30 October 1992) and sought interim relief accordingly.
  • Reliance was placed on judgments of this court and the apex court (specific cases were cited in the petitioners' submissions as recorded in the opinion).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 contended that the petition by intending purchasers was not maintainable because an agreement to purchase does not create any interest in immovable property; reliance was placed on the Division Bench judgment in Smt. Vimla Devi G. Maheshwari v. D.D. Mohindra ([2004] 268 ITR 102).
  • Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 also supported the impugned order on merits (as recorded succinctly in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Vimla Devi G. Maheshwari v. D.D. Mohindra, [2004] 268 ITR 102 (Bom) Authority for the submission that intending purchasers lack locus to challenge compulsory purchase because an agreement to purchase does not create interest in immovable property (as relied upon by respondents). The court held the case was decided on its peculiar facts and did not lay down the broad law urged by respondents; it therefore distinguished and did not accept it as a bar to maintainability in the present petition.
C.B. Gautam v. Union of India, [1993] 199 ITR 530 (SC) Historical basis for Chapter XX-C provisions: pre-emptive purchase intended only in cases of attempt to evade tax by significant undervaluation; also that completed transactions and accepted compensation need not be upset. The court relied on C.B. Gautam for the principle that recourse under section 269UD should be in clear cases of gross undervaluation and that unless difference exceeds 15% the Authority cannot assume jurisdiction; the court applied the threshold principle to find the Authority lacked basis to act.
Mrs. Nirmal Laxminarayan Grover v. Appropriate Authority (Income-tax Dept.), [1997] 223 ITR 572 Show-cause notice for pre-emptive purchase must disclose how the tentative/prima facie conclusion of significant undervaluation was reached; minimal principles of natural justice apply even in summary inquiry. The court applied this principle to conclude the show-cause notice in the present case was defective for not disclosing reasons/material and thus violated natural justice.
Shreyas Builders v. M.D. Kodnani, [2000] 242 ITR 320 A defective notice is one which does not disclose the basis on which it is issued. The court relied on this authority to support the view that the show-cause notice here was defective for failing to disclose the basis of the tentative conclusion.
Jagdish Electronics (India) (P.) Ltd. v. Appropriate Authority, Income-tax, [2000] 242 ITR 326; Appropriate Authority of Income-tax v. Jagdish Electricians India P. Ltd., [2003] 264 ITR 468 (SC) Where no reasons or material are disclosed for issuing the show-cause notice, orders of pre-emptive purchase based on such defective notices are liable to be set aside. The court applied these authorities to quash the impugned order, holding it invalid for being founded on a defective notice that did not disclose material or reasons.
Appropriate Authority v. Vijay Kumar Sharma, [2001] 249 ITR 554 (SC) Where there is gross breach of principles of natural justice in passing order of purchase, the High Court may quash proceedings instead of remitting for reconsideration. The court cited this authority to justify setting aside the order (rather than remitting) because of the breaches identified (non-disclosure and denial of material/opportunity).
Sona Builders v. Union of India, [2001] 251 ITR 197 (SC) Denial of opportunity and non-furnishing of documents used to hold consideration to be low warrant setting aside order of purchase. The court invoked this authority in support of the proposition that non-disclosure of materials and denial of opportunity vitiated the impugned order.
Ch. Kamala v. Appropriate Authority, [1999] 240 ITR 63 (Mad) Non-disclosure of material used against parties and denial of opportunity vitiates order under section 269UD(1). The court relied on this precedent to reinforce that the show-cause notice must disclose reasons/material and that non-disclosure vitiates the order.
Musthafa Ummer v. Appropriate Authority, [2002] 254 ITR 134 (Ker) Where reports/documents relied upon by Appropriate Authority are not furnished to affected parties, orders of purchase may be set aside for want of proper opportunity. The court cited this case to support the finding that failure to supply relied-upon materials justified setting aside the impugned order.
Union of India v. Chiranji Estate P. Ltd., [2001] 251 ITR 7 (SC) Just as comparison of incomparable properties is fallacious, non-comparison of comparable properties is equally fallacious. The court used this principle to criticize the Appropriate Authority's failure to consider comparable sale instances submitted by the petitioners.
Vimal Agarwal v. Appropriate Authority, [1994] 210 ITR 16 An order based solely on sale instances furnished by the Authority without considering sale instances submitted by the aggrieved parties, and without reasons for rejecting them, is not proper; pre-emptive purchase is to be exercised only in clear cases of significant undervaluation to evade tax. The court applied this precedent to hold that the Appropriate Authority's failure to deal with petitioners' comparable instances and absence of finding that undervaluation aimed at tax evasion rendered the order invalid.
Hunaida Jamnagarwala v. Appropriate Authority, [1996] 217 ITR 679 (Guj); Chokhawala Associates v. Appropriate Authority, [1999] 238 ITR 653 (Guj) If comparable sale instances cited by parties have not been dealt with by the Appropriate Authority, the order of purchase cannot be sustained. The court cited these cases to support quashing the order for failure to consider comparable sales relied upon by the petitioners.
Himmatlal Vadalia v. Union of India, [1998] 232 ITR 854 (MP) Where the Appropriate Authority fails to determine fair market value clearly and to specify that undervaluation was intended to evade tax, its action is vitiated. The court invoked this authority to support the finding that absence of a positive finding of attempt to evade tax rendered the order invalid and void ab initio.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following principal steps (as recorded in the opinion):

  1. Preliminary objection on maintainability: The court rejected the objection that intending purchasers lack locus merely because an agreement to purchase does not create an interest; the Division Bench decision relied upon by respondents (Smt. Vimla Devi) was found to be fact-specific and distinguishable. The court noted that C.B. Gautam itself involved an intending purchaser and therefore maintainability was not defeated by the mere status of the petitioners.
  2. Assessment of understatement: The court examined the calculations presented by the parties and concluded that there was no understatement of consideration. The opinion reproduces comparative figures supplied by the parties and the Appropriate Authority and concludes that the difference between the rates determined and the parties' figures was less than 15 per cent.
  3. Error in reliance on FSI: The Appropriate Authority's determination was impeached because it treated an additional FSI of 1,249.75 sq.ft. as relevant to the calculation although, on the date of the agreement (30 October 1992), the FSI belonged to the society and the transferor had no authority to transfer that FSI. The Authority's use of a resolution dated 3 January 1993 (after the agreement) as the basis for its calculations was held to be impermissible; the correct approach is to decide based on material and facts as on the date of the agreement.
  4. Comparison with auction data: The court reviewed auction particulars from 28 July 1993 (property auctioned with additional FSI) and showed that even on the Authority's own method the implied rate would exceed Rs. 3,000 per sq.ft., undermining any conclusion of significant undervaluation in the petitioners' transaction.
  5. Defective show-cause notice and breach of natural justice: The court held that the show-cause notice dated 17 December 1992 was illegal and invalid because it did not disclose how the tentative conclusion of significant undervaluation was reached, nor did it furnish the materials relied upon. Precedents were applied to emphasize that even though the inquiry under section 269UD(1) is summary, minimal principles of natural justice require disclosure of the basis and materials.
  6. Failure to consider comparable sales: The Appropriate Authority failed to consider comparable sale instances furnished by the petitioners. The court stressed established authorities that non-comparison of comparables (or failing to deal with comparables submitted by aggrieved parties) vitiates the Authority's order.
  7. Absence of positive finding of intent to evade tax: The court noted that there was no positive finding in the impugned order that the undervaluation (even if any) was with the motive to evade tax; the jurisprudence requires such a finding (and the 15% threshold as a jurisdictional indicator). The court held that the Authority could not assume jurisdiction under section 269UD in the absence of that finding.
  8. Conclusion on legality: For the cumulative reasons—no understatement within the 15% threshold, improper inclusion of FSI occurring after the agreement date, defective show-cause notice, failure to supply materials and consider comparables, and no finding of tax-evasion motive—the impugned order was found to be illegal, in breach of natural justice, and bad in law.
  9. Relief and consequential directions: The court quashed and set aside the impugned order under section 269UD(1). It directed the petitioners to pay Rs. 56,13,227 to the Income-tax Department within four weeks, failing which interest at 12% per annum would apply. The petition was allowed and rule made absolute with no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. The impugned order dated 15 January 1993 passed by the Appropriate Authority under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act is quashed and set aside.

Direct consequences for the parties (as directed by the court):

  • The petitioners are directed to pay Rs. 56,13,227 to the Income-tax Department within four weeks from the date of pronouncement; failing which the amount shall carry interest at 12% per annum.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Implications beyond the parties:

The opinion applies established principles: (a) a show-cause notice under Chapter XX-C must disclose the basis and material for the tentative conclusion of significant undervaluation; (b) the Appropriate Authority must consider comparable sale instances relied upon by affected parties and make positive findings as to tax-evasion motive before exercising powers under section 269UD; and (c) facts relevant for valuation should be those existing on the date of the agreement. The judgment does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent but applies and synthesizes existing authorities to the facts of this case.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or assume facts beyond those explicitly stated therein.

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    Mrs. Amarjit Thapar And Others v. S.K Laul And Others

    V.C Daga, J.:— This petition is directed against the order dated January 15, 1993 (exhibit G), passed by the appropriate authority, Bombay, under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act” for short), for compulsory purchase of house No. D-1 (BUA), 1991 sq. ft. with garage located in Mandar Co-operative Housing Society, Juhu Village, Mumbai (“the said property” for short).

    Facts:

    2. The relevant facts lie within a narrow compass. The petitioners are the intending purchasers of the said property; who agreed with respondent No. 6 to purchase the said property vide agreement dated October 30, 1992, for a consideration of Rs. 64 lakhs. The petitioners on the very same day filed statement in Form No. 37-I of the Act with the appropriate authority. The said authority issued a show-cause notice dated December 17, 1992, expressing its intention to exercise option to purchase the said property, however, without furnishing any material or reason in support of its intention to purchase.

    3. The petitioners, on December 23, 1992, replied to the show-cause notice and requested the appropriate authority to furnish material relied upon by them in support of their belief. The petitioners at the time of hearing on December 24, 1992, reiterated their contention and, thereafter, again wrote a letter to the said authority dated January 6, 1993, requesting for disclosure of the reasons and grounds on which the property was proposed to be acquired. On January 28, 1993, the petitioners received the impugned order dated January 15, 1993, without any reply to their repeated demands seeking reasons and grounds for proposed action.

    4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners filed this writ petition on February 8, 1993, under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition was admitted, but no interim relief was granted. However, liberty in favour of the petitioners, to move for any other appropriate interim order, in the event of changed circumstances, was reserved.

    5. The appropriate authority appears to have issued letter dated March 4, 1993, offering to make payment of the amount prior to taking possession of the said property.

    6. The petitioners, on April 30, 1993, applied to this court for interim stay on the ground that the petitioners were willing to make the payment as per the agreement dated October 30, 1992. However, this court was pleased to pass the order dated April 30, 1993, reading as under:

    “Put up before the appropriate Bench after vacation on June 9, 1993. No third party interest to be created until further orders.”

    7. The auction of the said property was fixed on May 18, 1993. At the instance of the Revenue, this court, vide order dated June 11, 1993, was pleased to vacate the aforesaid order giving liberty to the petitioners to take out separate motion for relief in the case of changed circumstances. The petitioners again moved notice of Motion No. 258 of 1993 to seek stay of the auction and offered to pay balance consideration against possession. This court, vide order dated July 9, 1993, was pleased to dismiss the notice of motion. However, the respondents were directed not to auction the said property till the disposal of the petition. The respondents had also taken out Notice of Motion No. 185 of 1997 on May 23, 1997, for vacating interim order dated July 9, 1993, with a prayer to allow them to auction the said property. However, no relief in that behalf was granted in favour of the respondents. However, in the meantime, it appears that the respondents-Union of India made payment of Rs. 56,13,227 to respondent No. 6 on February 26, 1993. With these facts on record the petition was finally heard by us.

    Preliminary objection:

    8. At the outset Mr. Ashokan, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition contending that the petition at the instance of the intending purchasers of the immovable property is not maintainable since the agreement to purchase does not create any interest in the immovable property. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on the Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Smt. Vimla Devi G. Maheshwari v. D.D Mohindra, [2004] 268 ITR 102.

    9. The preliminary objection raised, in our considered view, is misplaced. The said case of Smt, Vimla Devi, [2004] 268 ITR 102 (Bom) was decided on its own peculiar facts. The said judgment does not lay down any law as sought to be widely canvassed by Mr. Ashokan. This decision basically revolves around the peculiar facts found in that particular case; wherein the petitioners were not in a position to deposit the purchase price as such no interim relief was granted in favour of the petitioners at the time of admission of the petition. The vendor had accepted the consideration without any demur or protest. The vendor made the statement before the court that he did not desire to challenge the acquisition. The transaction in question was completed much prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C.B Gautam v. Union of India, [1993] 199 ITR 5301 The Division Bench basically relied on the paragraph of the said judgment delivered in the case of C.B Gautam, [1993] 199 ITR 530, which reads as under (page 110):

    “We may clarify that, as far as completed transactions are concerned, namely, where, after the order for compulsory purchase under section 269UD of the Income-tax Act was made and possession has been taken over, compensation was paid to the owner of the property and accepted without protest, we see no reason to upset those transactions and hence, nothing we have said in the judgment will invalidate such purchases. The same will be the position where public auctions have been held of the properties concerned and they are purchased by third parties. In those cases also, nothing which we have stated in this judgment will invalidate the purchases.”

    10. That after the compulsory purchase of the property, the property was put to public auction. The auction sale was confirmed in favour of respondent No. 4 therein, though subject to the decision of the writ petition. The cumulative effect of all these facts led the court to dismiss the petition holding it to be not tenable at the instance of the petitioners therein on the peculiar facts found by the court. Thus, the said judgment cannot be a guide to hold that the intending purchasers of the property have no locus to challenge the order of acquisition. At this juncture, it will be relevant to note that in the case of C.B Gautam v. Union of India, [1993] 199 ITR 530 (SC), the petitioner before the Supreme Court was also an intending purchaser. The preliminary objection raised by Mr. Ashokan is, thus, without any substance and stands overruled.

    Submissions on the merits:

    11. Mr. Bhujle, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that there was no understatement of consideration. That the impugned order is based on wrongly determined data as such the same is bad in law. That the comparable sale transactions relied upon by the petitioners were not considered and ignored by the appropriate authority. That the determination of rate by the appropriate authority in the sum of Rs. 2,044 per sq. ft. is improper and incorrect. That the show cause notice issued by the appropriate authority dated December 17, 1992, is illegal and invalid.

    12. Mr. Bhujle taking us through the show-cause notice and order under challenge submitted that in the show-cause notice no comparable instances were brought to the notice of the petitioners on the basis of which the said property was being acquired compulsorily.

    13. Mr. Bhujle also urged that on proper calculation the percentage of difference has also been wrongly calculated by the appropriate authority as such the impugned order on all counts suffers from illegality and liable to be quashed and set aside holding it to be erroneous and bad in law. He relied upon some judgments of this court as well as that of the apex court to bring home the aforesaid contentions urged by him, which we propose to refer at the appropriate stage of the judgment.

    14. Mr. Ashokan, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 tried to support the impugned order on the merits.

    Consideration:

    15. Having heard the, rival parties, the petitioners, in our considered view, deserve to succeed on all counts.

    16. Firstly, there is no understatement of consideration, which would be clear from the following data:

    “The appropriate authority has determined the market value at Rs. 3,400 per sq. ft. of which 85 per cent would constitute Rs. 2,890 per sq. ft. The total consideration agreed was Rs. 64,00,000 as such actual BUA is 1991.10 sq. ft. with a garage. The value of the garage as per the petitioners is Rs. 1,00,000; whereas Rs. 2,00,000 as per the appropriate authority. The consideration of house as per the petitioners is Rs. 63,00,000; whereas Rs. 62,00,000 as per the appropriate authority. The discounted consideration as per the petitioners is Rs. 61,88,227; whereas Rs. 60,88,227 as per the appropriate authority. The calculations, if made, the rate of consideration as per the petitioners would be Rs. 3,164; whereas Rs. 3,114 as per the appropriate authority. Based on this, the discounted rate as per the petitioners is Rs. 3,108; whereas Rs. 3,058 as per the appropriate authority.”

    17. Thus, the difference in the rates and the market value determined by the appropriate authority by any means is less than 15 per cent., as such there is no undervaluation of consideration.

    18. Apart from the above, the determination of rate by the appropriate authority in the sum of Rs. 2,044 per sq. ft. is improper and incorrect. The consideration of Rs. 64,00,000 was for transfer of house of BUA 1991.10 sq. ft. with a garage and nothing more. There was no question of transfer of FSI of 1,249.75 sq. ft. The basic assumption in this behalf is misplaced. The agreement dated October 30, 1992, was for the transfer of house with garage only. It did not contemplate transfer of any FSI of 1,249.75 sq. ft., as considered by the appropriate authority while calculating the rate. The FSI was owned by the society and not by the member or transferor. The transferor had no authority to transfer any FSI at least on the date of the agreement, i.e, October 30, 1992, in view of the specific resolution adopted by the society.

    19. Even the circular issued by the society dated November 21, 1992, clearly stipulated that the FSI belonged to the society and not to the members. The resolution passed on January 3, 1993, by the special general meeting of the society for distribution of the additional FSI amongst the members could not and did not alter the position as on October 30, 1992. The decision of the appropriate authority ought to have been based on the material and the facts as existing on the date of agreement, i.e October 30, 1992, and not on the basis of any subsequent events. Even the letter of the Executive Engineer, Building Proposals, (W.S), H and K/West wards dated October 5, 1993, clarifies that there was no fresh proposal in that respect.

    20. Let us consider it from another angle, that too through the glasses of the appropriate authority. On July 28, 1993, the said property was put to auction along with an additional FSI of 1,249.75 sq.ft for a reserve price of Rs. 73,60,000 which one has to presume to be a reasonable market value. Using the method adopted by the appropriate authority in its order dated January 15, 1993, the rate per sq. ft. would be as under:

    Rs. Reserve price: 73,60,000 Less : Value of garage : 2,00,000 71,60,000 Add : Estimated cost of construction of 1,249 sq. ft. FSI 5,62,388 77,22,388

    21. Therefore, the rate per sq. ft. of BUA would be—

    22. If this rate is considered by the appropriate authority for auctioning the said property as reasonable, then there can be no justification for the appropriate authority to hold that there was understatement of the consideration in the case of the petitioners; where the rate fixed was more than Rs. 3,000 per sq. ft. Thus, there is absolutely no justification to conclude that there was understatement of consideration.

    23. Apart from the above the show-cause notice dated December 17, 1992, issued by the appropriate authority on the face of it, is illegal and invalid as it does not disclose as to how the tentative or prima facie conclusion was arrived at by the appropriate authority that the said property was significantly undervalued. The show-cause notice ought to be self-contained; containing all material facts and particulars.

    24. In spite of the repeated demands by the petitioners, the appropriate authority did not furnish the basis for issuing the show-cause notice. In the case of Mrs. Nirmal Laxminarayan Grover v. Appropriate Authority (Income-tax Department), [1997] 223 ITR 572, this court has held that show-cause notice issued by the Department for pre-emptive purchase by the Central Government under Chapter XX-C of the Act must disclose how the tentative or prima facie conclusion was arrived at by the appropriate authority that the property sought to be compulsorily purchased was significantly undervalued. It was further observed that an enquiry envisaged by section 269UD(1) of the Act is summary in nature in the sense that no elaborate procedure of enquiry, i.e leading elaborate evidence, etc., is contemplated by it but it cannot mean that because enquiry is summary in nature its very basic requirement, viz., observance of the minimal principles of natural justice is dispensed with.

    25. As held by this court in the case of Shreyas Builders v. M.D Kodnani, [2000] 242 ITR 320, a defective notice is one which does not disclose basis on which it is issued. As held by this court in Jagdish Electronics (India) (P.) Ltd. v. Appropriate Authority, Income-tax, [2000] 242 ITR 326 and upheld by the apex court in Appropriate Authority of Income-tax v. Jagdish Electricians India P. Ltd., [2003] 264 ITR 468 where no reasons were disclosed for issuing the show-cause notice nor any material that was considered by the appropriate authority to reach that tentative conclusion was disclosed in the notice, order of pre-emptive purchase based on such defective notice would be liable to be set aside.

    26. In the case of Appropriate Authority v. Vijay Kumar Sharma, [2001] 249 ITR 554, the apex court was of the view that, where there was gross breach of the principles of natural justice, in passing the order of purchase of the property, the High Court was justified in quashing the proceedings instead of remitting it back for reconsideration. In Sona Builders v. Union of India, [2001] 251 ITR 197 the apex court held that denial of opportunity and non-furnishing of documents for holding consideration to be low would warrant setting aside of order of purchase.

    27. The reasons on the basis of which a tentative finding has been arrived by the appropriate authority together with all relevant materials must be disclosed in the show-cause notice by the appropriate authority, in consonance with the principles of natural justice. Non-disclosure of material to be used against the concerned parties in the matter of compulsory purchase of property and denial of opportunity to the concerned parties result in vitiating the order under section 269UD(1) of the Act [see Ch. Kamala v. Appropriate Authority, [1999] 240 ITR 63 (Mad)].

    28. In the case of Musthafa Ummer v. Appropriate Authority, [2002] 254 ITR 134 (Ker), the property of the petitioners was sought to be purchased by the Government on the ground that its apparent consideration for transfer was less than the real consideration but the report of the engineering department as well as the documents relied upon by the appropriate authority were not furnished to the petitioners, as such the order of purchase of the property was set aside for want of proper opportunity to the petitioners.

    29. The impugned order passed by the appropriate authority dated January 15, 1993, is solely based on the calculation of additional FSI of 1,249.75 sq. ft. as per the resolution of the society dated January 3, 1993. As already held hereinabove, this could not have been the basis for the show-cause notice dated December 17, 1992. In the circumstances, there was no question of understatement of consideration at least at the stage of show-cause notice as discussed herein. It is, therefore, clear that the said notice was issued arbitrarily without any evidence as to the understatement of consideration as such illegal and invalid.

    30. The impugned order of the appropriate authority passed under section 269UD(1) of the Act is also illegal and invalid. It is clear that there is no understatement of consideration as observed hereinabove. The order of the appropriate authority is bad in law as it was passed on the basis of the rate wrongly determined by it. Even the comparable transaction relied upon by the petitioners were not considered by the appropriate authority. The Supreme Court has clearly observed in Union of India v. Chiranji Estate P. Ltd., [2001] 251 ITR 7 that just as comparison of incomparable properties is fallacious, non-comparison of comparable properties is equally fallacious. This court in the case of Vimal Agarwal v. Appropriate Authority, [1994] 210 ITR 16 held that an order passed merely on the basis of sale instances given by the appropriate authority without considering sale instances referred to by the aggrieved parties and setting out cogent reasons for not acting upon them is not a proper and valid order.

    31. Where the comparable sale instances cited by the parties have not been dealt with by the appropriate authority, its order of purchase could not be sustained and is liable to be quashed [see Hunaida Jamnagarwala v. Appropriate Authority, [1996] 217 ITR 679 (Guj); Chokhawala Associates v. Appropriate Authority, [1999] 238 ITR 653 (Guj).

    32. Where the appropriate authority has failed to clearly determine the fair market value and to specify that undervaluation was intended to evade tax and refused to consider the comparable sale instances submitted by the affected party, its action stands vitiated on the face of it [see Himmatlal Vadalia v. Union of India, [1998] 232 ITR 854 (MP).

    33. The order of the appropriate authority is invalid and void ab initio as there is no positive finding that there was an attempt to evade tax. The apex court in the case of C.B Gautam v. Union of India, [1993] 199 ITR 530 held that the very historical setting in which the provisions of this Chapter were enacted indicates that it was intended to be resorted to only in cases where there is an attempt to evade tax by significant undervaluation of immovable property agreed to be sold. In the case of Mrs. Nirmal Laxmi-narayan Grover, [1997] 223 ITR 572, this court held that recourse to compulsory purchase of the immovable property; under Chapter XX-C of the Act should be taken only in clear cases of gross undervaluation from which the inference must clearly flow that it is done for evasion of taxes.

    34. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in C.B Gautam, [1993] 199 ITR 530, unless the difference in the apparent effective consideration and the market value is more than 15 per cent., the appropriate authority cannot assume jurisdiction under section 269UD of the Act. The same does not mean that the mere fact that such difference is more than 15 per cent will, automatically, lead to the conclusion that there has been undervaluation of property with the motive of evading tax. In Vimal Agarwal's case, [1994] 210 ITR 16, this court has reiterated that the right of pre-emptive purchase under section 269UD is not a right of pre-emption simpliciter but is a right which can be exercised only in the cases where there is significant undervaluation in agreement of sale with a view to evade tax. The onus of establishing that undervaluation is with a view to evade tax is on the Revenue. No such finding is to be found in the impugned order.

    35. In the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the appropriate authority is liable to be quashed and set aside holding it to be in breach of the principles of natural justice and bad in law. The view taken by the appropriate authority is palpably erroneous and cannot stand to the scrutiny of law even on the merits. The petitioners shall pay to the Income-tax Department Rs. 56,13,227 within four weeks from the date of pronouncement of the judgment, failing which, the same shall carry interest at 12 per cent per annum.

    36. In the result, the petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in terms of this order with no order as to costs.

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