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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were filed by the Complainant and are disposed of by a common judgment. The background facts presented in the opinion are:

  • The Complainant had prosecuted the accused (the Respondent) under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in two separate cases for bouncing of two cheques — one for Rs. 25,500/- and the other for Rs. 30,000/-.
  • In each case the accused was convicted and sentenced by judgments dated 31-1-2003. In each case the accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,500/- and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months. Out of each fine of Rs. 2,500/-, Rs. 2,000/- was ordered to be paid to the Complainant.
  • The accused did not challenge the convictions. The Complainant did file revision petitions before the Court of Sessions. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panaji, disposed of those revision petitions by judgments dated 10-7-2006 and referred to the case of Suganthi S. Kumar v. Jagdeeshan (2002) 2 SCC 420 : AIR 2002 SC 681 in his reasoning.
  • The cheques were dated 20-5-1997 (for Rs. 25,500/-) and 15-5-1997 (for Rs. 30,000/-). At the relevant time the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was punishable with imprisonment for a term which could extend to one year or with fine which could extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both. The imprisonment term was subsequently increased to two years with effect from 6-2-2003.
  • The present petitions challenge aspects of the sentences imposed and seek relief under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as reflected in the text of the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sentences imposed by the trial Magistrate (fine of Rs. 2,500/- and default RI two months) and upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge represented a "flea bite" or inadequate sentence in the context of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act when the cheque amounts remained unpaid.
  2. Whether the lower courts erred in not ensuring that the Complainant was compensated at least to the extent of the cheque amounts, having regard to the statutory punishment (fine which could extend to twice the cheque amount) and relevant Supreme Court authorities on awarding compensation under Cr.P.C.
  3. If interference with the sentence is warranted, whether the appropriate course is to set aside the sentence and remit the matter to the trial Magistrate to hear both parties and pass appropriate sentence in accordance with law.

Arguments of the Parties

Complainant's Arguments

  • While imposing sentence the learned Magistrate ought to have ensured that the Complainant was compensated at least to the extent of the cheque amount.
  • The cheques were issued in May 1997 but conviction was recorded six years later (31-1-2003), and the Complainant has been deprived of receiving the cheque amounts.
  • The learned Magistrate did not disclose any reasons showing leniency in favour of the accused when imposing what the Complainant contends were insignificant fines.

Accused's Arguments

  • The revisions filed by the Complainant before the Court of Sessions related only to the inadequacy of sentence and not to the absence of an order for compensation.
  • Prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not a substitute for civil recovery; the Complainant could pursue a civil suit to recover the cheque amounts.
  • If this Court finds interference necessary, it would be proper to remit the cases to the learned Magistrate to hear both parties and pass appropriate sentence, as was done by the Supreme Court in Suganthi Suresh Kumar.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suganthi S. Kumar v. Jagdeeshan ((2002) 2 SCC 420 : AIR 2002 SC 681) The Court observed that where the cheque amount remained unpaid, trial Magistrates should ensure that sentence under Section 138 is of such a nature as to give effect to the object of the legislation; a "flea bite" sentence is not justified unless the amount was paid to the complainant (or the accused paid during pendency). The present Court relied on this authority to hold that the lower courts should not have imposed meagre fines when the cheque amounts remained unpaid and that the sentences imposed could be characterized as "flea bite" sentences. This supported setting aside the sentences and remitting for re-sentencing.
Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh ((1988) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1988 SC 2127) Referring (in the opinion) to Section 397(3) of the Code, the Supreme Court observed that quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of the crime, the justness of the claim by the victim and the ability of the accused to pay; courts may allow reasonable periods or instalments and may enforce orders by imposing sentence in default; the Court emphasized liberal use of Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. The present Court invoked this principle to stress that criminal courts have power to order compensation and to fashion payment terms and enforcement, and that such powers should be used to ensure victims are compensated—reinforcing the view that the lower courts should have ensured adequate compensation to the Complainant.
K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan ((1999) 7 SCC 510 : AIR 1999 SC 3762) The Supreme Court held that magistrates can make liberal use of Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. to award compensation out of fines without a specified upper limit in that subsection; while fixing compensation the court must consider a reasonable amount payable to the complainant. The present Court relied on this authority to emphasize that the trial Magistrate could and should have awarded compensation (potentially exceeding limits of fine distribution) by resort to Section 357(3) and to criticize the lower courts for not doing so in these cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from statutory context and Supreme Court precedents, applied to the facts before it:

  1. Statutory framework and object: The Court notes the legislative purpose behind Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act (introduced by the 1988 Amendment) to encourage cheque usage and enhance credibility of cheques. The statutory penal consequences (imprisonment and fine which could extend to twice the cheque amount) indicate the Legislature intended that fines could be used to recover cheque amounts.
  2. Relevant sentencing power and timing: The cheques were issued in May 1997; convictions were recorded on 31-1-2003. At the time the offence carried imprisonment up to one year (later increased to two years from 6-2-2003) and fines up to twice the cheque amount.
  3. Binding guidance from higher courts: The Court synthesizes authorities — particularly Hari Singh and K. Bhaskaran — to show criminal courts have power under provisions of the Cr.P.C. (referred to in the opinion as Section 397(3) and Section 357(3)) to award compensation after considering nature of crime, justness of the claim, and ability to pay; such compensation can be enforced and need not be capped by the maximum distributable share from a fine. Suganthi S. Kumar is used to underline that a "flea bite" sentence is inappropriate where the cheque amount remains unpaid and that sentencing should give effect to the object of Section 138.
  4. Application to the present facts: The Court finds the cheques' amounts remained unpaid and that the accused could have paid the small fines imposed and thereby escaped payment of the cheque amounts. Both the trial Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge are criticized for disregarding the law laid down by the Supreme Court; no reasons were provided by them for imposing lenient sentences or for not ordering compensation to cover the cheque amounts.
  5. Conclusion on sentencing discretion: The Court concludes that sentencing discretion in the lower courts was perverse in the circumstances. Given the statutory scheme and precedent, the least the courts ought to have done was ensure compensation at least equal to the cheque amounts unless good reasons existed to depart, and such reasons were not given.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petitions are allowed; the impugned orders of both the Courts below are set aside.

Consequent directions and immediate effects on the parties:

  • The order imposing sentence against the accused is set aside and the cases are remitted to the learned Magistrate to pass appropriate sentence in accordance with law after hearing both the Complainant and the accused.
  • Both parties are directed to remain present before the learned Magistrate on the 22nd instant at 10.00 a.m., and the Magistrate is directed to dispose of the proceedings within 15 days thereafter.
  • The applications (petitions under Section 482) are allowed and the Court records "Applications allowed."

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reiterates existing Supreme Court authorities on the need to award compensation and to avoid "flea bite" sentences where cheque amounts remain unpaid. The judgment does not assert creation of a new precedent; it directs fresh sentencing consistent with established principles.

    Shri Basavraj D. Allayyanavar v. Shri Santosh Kapadi.

    1. Admit. By consent, heard forthwith.

    2. These petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), can be conveniently disposed of by this common Judgment. The petitions have been filed by the Complainant who had prosecuted the accused (Respondent herein), under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for bouncing of two cheques, in two cases. In one case, the cheque involved was for Rs. 25,500/- and in the other case the cheque involved was for Rs. 30,000/-. In both the cases, the accused came to be convicted and sentenced by Judgments dated 31-1-2003. In each of the cases, the accused came to be sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,500/- and in default to suffer RI for two months. Out of the fine amount of Rs. 2,500/-, Rs. 2,000/- were ordered to be paid to the Complainant. The accused did not challenge the said conviction/sentence but the Complainant did by filing revision petitions before the Court of Sessions, and, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panaji, who disposed of the said revision petitions by Judgments dated 10-7-2006, referred to the case of Suganthi S. Kumar v. Jagdeeshan ((2002) 2 SCC 420 : AIR 2002 SC 681), and noted that that was a case where the cheque amount involved was Rs. 4,50,000/-, for which the learned Magistrate had awarded imprisonment till the rising of the Court and fine of Rs. 5,000/- and that, in that background, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had found that it was a flea bite sentence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also noted that the Magistrate in these cases, had directed that from the fine imposed, a sum of Rs. 2,000/- were to be paid to the Complainant by way of compensation and therefore the sentence/s imposed could not be termed as flea bite.

    3. The cheque for Rs. 25.500/- was dated 20-5-1997 and the cheque for Rs. 30.000/- was dated 15.5.1997 At the relevant time, the offence under Section 138 of the said Act was punishable with imprisonment for a term which could extend to one year or with fine which could extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both. The imprisonment provided was subsequently increased to two years with effect from 6-2-2003.

    4. On behalf of the Complainant, learned Advocate submits that whilst imposing the sentence, the learned Magistrate ought to have ensured that the Complainant was compensated at least to the extent of ensuring that the Complainant got the amount of the cheque. Learned Advocate further submits that the cheques were issued in May 1997 and the conviction came to be recorded six years later and yet the Complainant has been deprived of receiving the amount due on the cheques issued by the accused. Learned Advocate further submits that the learned Magistrate has not at all disclosed any reasons to show leniency in favour of the accused by imposing insignificant sentences by way of fine.

    5. On the other hand, learned Advocate on behalf of the accused, submits that the revisions filed by the Complainant before the Court of Sessions were only against the inadequacy of sentence imposed and not against compensation being not ordered to be paid. Learned Advocate further submits that prosecution under Section 138 of the said Act is not a mode of recovery of the amount due to the Complainant and in case the amount of the cheque is required to be recovered, the Complainant can always file a Civil Suit. Learned Advocate further submits that in case this Court finds that the sentence imposed requires to be interfered with, then it would be proper that the cases are remanded back to the learned Magistrate to hear both the parties and pass appropriate sentence as was done by the Apex Court in the case of Suganthi Suresh Kumar : ((2002) 2 SCC 420 : AIR 2002 SC 681) (supra).

    6. The object behind introduction of Chapter XVII in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. by virtue of the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988, is now well known. The said provisions were incorporated with a view to encourage the culture of use of cheques and enhancing the credibility of the instrument, and subsequently, when the punishment provided was found to be deficient, the same was increased from one year to two years. The punishment provided namely that the offence was made punishable with imprisonment or with fine, which could extend to twice the amount of the cheque clearly shows the intention of the Legislature that the amount could be recovered by way of imposing a fine, which could extend twice the amount of the cheque, but that the Legislature did not carry out necessary changes in Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is a different matter. The Apex Court in Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh ((1988) 4 SCC 551) : (AIR 1988 SC 2127), referring to Section 397(3) of the Code, held that the quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of crime, the justness of claim by the victim and the ability of accused to pay. If there are more than one accused they may be asked to pay in equal terms unless their capacity to pay varies considerably. The payment may also vary depending upon the acts of each accused and reasonable period for payment of compensation, if necessary by instalments, may also be given. The Supreme Court also observed that the Court may enforce the order by imposing sentence in default. In other words, the Supreme Court reminded all concerned in the aforesaid decision that it was well to remember the emphasis laid down for making liberal use of Section 357(3) of the Code.

    7. In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan ((1999) 7 SCC 510) : (AIR 1999 SC 3762), the Supreme Court observed that if a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class were to order compensation to be paid to the Complainant from out of the fine realised, the Complainant will be the loser when the cheque amount exceeded the said limit. In such a case a Complainant would get only the maximum amount of Rs. 5,000/- but the Magistrate in such cases can alleviate the grievance of the Complainant by making resort to Section 357(3) Cr. P.C The Supreme Court emphasized the need for making liberal use of that provision. No limit is mentioned in the sub-section and therefore, a Magistrate can award any sum as compensation. Of course, while fixing the quantum of such compensation the Magistrate has to consider what would be the reasonable amount of compensation payable to the Complainant. Thus, even if the trial was before the Court of the Magistrate of the First Class in respect of a cheque which covers an amount of Rs. 5,000/-, the Court has power to award compensation to be paid to the Complainant.

    8. In Suganthi Suresh Kumar: ((2002) 2 SCC 420 : AIR 2002 SC 681) (supra), the Apex Court again observed that if the amount had been paid to the Complainant, there perhaps would have been justification by imposing a flea bite sentence as had been chosen by the trial Court in that case but in a case where the amount covered by the cheque remained unpaid, it should be the look out of the trial Magistrates that the sentence for the offence under Section 138 should be of such a nature as to give proper effect to the object of legislation. No drawer of the cheque can be allowed to take dishonour of the cheque issued by him light heartedly. The very object of enactment of provisions like 138 of the Act would stand defeated if the sentence is of the nature passed by the trial Magistrate. It is a different matter if the accused paid the amount at least during the pendency of the case.

    9. In the case at hand, though the cheques were issued by the accused in May 1997, and the cases ended on 31-1-2003, the amount due on the said cheques has remained unpaid and the accused must have certainly had had the last laugh by paying the meagre fine imposed by the learned Magistrate i.e Rs. 2,500/- in each case. It is obvious that both the Courts below have disregarded the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases cited hereinabove. Sentencing discretion has been perverse. Since Section 138 of the said Act provides for imprisonment or fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque or both, the least both the Courts below ought to have done whilst imposing sentence is to ensure that the Complainant was compensated at least with the amount due by the accused on the cheque issued by him to the Complainant. That should be the rule unless there are good reasons to depart from the same. The learned Magistrate as well as learned Additional Sessions Judge, have given no reason why this course was not adopted or why a lenient sentence was imposed, as rightly contended on behalf of the Complainant. On the face of the punishment provided, the accused was let off with a meagre sentence which certainly could be termed to be a flea bite sentence. Though no formula of a fool-proof nature is possible to be laid down in awarding appropriate sentences they should be proportionate to the crime committed and the same should be awarded by taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not only the rights of the criminals which are required to be looked into at the time of imposition of sentence, but also of the victims of the crime and the society at large, also by considering the object sought to be achieved by the particular legislation. Sentence to be imposed should also have a deterrent effect. As George Saville would say ‘men are not hanged for stealing horses but that horses may not be stolen.’

    10. Consequently, the order imposing the sentence against the accused deserves to be set aside and the case remitted to the learned Magistrate to pass appropriate sentence in accordance with law after hearing the Complainant as well as the accused.

    11. As a result, the petitions are allowed, The impugned orders of both the Courts below are hereby set aside and the learned Magistrate is directed to hear both the parties on the point of sentence and pass appropriate sentence in accordance with law.

    12. Both the parties are directed to remain present before the learned Magistrate on 22nd instant at 10.00 a.m and the learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of the proceedings within 15 days thereafter.

    13. Applications allowed.

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    Shri Basavraj D. Allayyanavar v. Shri Santosh Kapadi.
    (Jan 11, 2007)