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citation codes
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  • Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
  • SECTION 6 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Section 22-A inserted by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1994
  • sub-section (4) of Section 21 (hereinafter referred
  • sub-section (1) of Section 31. Sub-section (1)
  • clauses (b) to (1) of Section 22,
  • fact, Section 31, Section 22-A
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
  • SECTION 6 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Section 22-A inserted by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1994
  • sub-section (4) of Section 21 (hereinafter referred
  • sub-section (1) of Section 31. Sub-section (1)
  • clauses (b) to (1) of Section 22,
  • fact, Section 31, Section 22-A
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.A. Bobde, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitions concern two parcels of land situate at Yeravada, Pune, within the limits of the Pune Municipal Corporation. Motibagh Co-operative Housing Society Limited owns land measuring 83 ares (survey No. 152/1, final plot No. 70/3). Udaysinh Narayanrao Borawake (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2890 of 1993) owns an adjoining piece of land measuring 46.304 sq. ft. (survey No. 152/2). Both plots fall under the same Town Planning Scheme and are in a residential zone.

Chronology and procedural events stated in the opinion:

  • 1966: The lands were classified in a green zone.
  • 18-9-1982: In the Draft Development Plan the lands were shown as reserved for parking.
  • 1-6-1983: The Town Planning Scheme for Pune was sanctioned under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (the “Act”), showing the lands as residential.
  • Respondents invited objections in respect of the parking reservation in 1983; the petitioners submitted objections. The petitioner Borawake pointed out an available dhobighat area that could be used for parking.
  • The co-operative society (petitioners in Writ Petition No. 347 of 1993) submitted development plans and began construction; the Municipal Corporation issued a stop work notice dated 6-10-1984.
  • 5-1-1987: The State Government sanctioned the development plan under Section 31 of the Act, and the land was shown as reserved for a bus depot (bus terminus). The opinion records that no notice inviting objections or suggestions was issued for this change in reservation.
  • 6-4-1992: Respondents issued a Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 126(4) of the Act.
  • 25-1-1993: Writ Petition No. 347 of 1993 filed; 27-7-1993: Writ Petition No. 2890 of 1993 filed. The Court, by interim order, allowed acquisition proceedings to proceed but restrained declaration of the award. While petitions were pending, the co-operative society surrendered 3124 sq. mtrs. for road widening to respondent No. 1.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the modification of reservation from "parking" to "bus depot/terminus" effected while sanctioning the Development Plan under Section 31 of the Act amounts to a "modification of a substantial nature" within the meaning of Section 31 (second proviso) and, if so, whether the State Government was bound to publish notice and invite objections and suggestions before making such modification.
  2. Whether the definition of "modification of a substantial nature" provided by Section 22-A (inserted by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1994) can be used to construe the meaning of that phrase for modifications made prior to the insertion of Section 22-A.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The reservation having been published as "parking" in the Draft Development Plan, its alteration to a reservation for a bus depot/terminus is a modification of a substantial nature.
  • Under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act, such substantial modifications require publication of notice in the Official Gazette and invitation of objections and suggestions; no such notice was issued, rendering the modification invalid.
  • Where a site is designated for parking, under the Development Control Rules an owner surrendering required land for parking could obtain additional FSI; such rights and opportunities are not available where the reservation is for a bus depot, demonstrating a qualitative impact on owners' rights and development potential.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Mr. Ketkar, counsel for the respondent Corporation, argued that the reservation for a bus depot or terminus could not be regarded as a "new reservation" and thus should not be treated as a modification of a substantial nature under Section 22-A, on the basis that an "existing reservation" already existed (i.e., parking).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Bihar v. S.K. Roy, AIR 1966 SC 1995 That a later statute may be used as an aid to construction of an earlier Act when the earlier statute is ambiguous or capable of more than one interpretation. The Court relied on this principle to justify using Section 22-A (inserted later) to construe the meaning of "modification of a substantial nature" as occurring in Section 31 when that phrase appeared to be ambiguous.
Thiru Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1977 SC 518, para 11 Support for the proposition that a subsequent statute can aid interpretation of an earlier ambiguous provision. Used with other authorities to support the approach of applying a clarificatory later provision to interpret an earlier provision.
Assam Sillimanite v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1417 Illustrates that later enactments can clarify earlier provisions and be used in interpretation. Relied upon to reinforce that a later definitional provision (Section 22-A) may be read into the earlier Section 31 where ambiguity existed.
Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, AIR 1995 SC 1428 That a provision added subsequently can be viewed as clarificatory and held applicable to pending proceedings. The Court relied on this authority to apply the definition in Section 22-A to modifications made prior to the insertion of Section 22-A, treating the later provision as clarificatory and applicable to pending matters.
Bombay Environmental Action Group v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 Mah LJ 139 Single-judge view that a modification is not of a substantial nature unless it affects the totality of the plan or a significant part thereof. The Court distinguished this decision, observing it predates Section 22-A and holding that "modification of a substantial nature" can be qualitative (affecting rights and environment) and not merely quantitative or affecting totality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the short question as whether the change from reservation for parking to reservation for a bus depot/terminus amounted to a "modification of a substantial nature" which would trigger the requirement in the second proviso to Section 31 to publish notice and invite objections.

Key steps in the Court's analysis as stated in the opinion:

  1. Interpretation approach: The phrase "modification of a substantial nature" was present in Section 31 when the development plan was sanctioned on 5-1-1987 but was not defined in the Act at that time. The Court accepted that the later insertion of Section 22-A (by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1994, effective 17-8-1994) defined that phrase and that a later clarificatory provision can be used to construe an earlier ambiguous provision, citing authorities to support this method of interpretation.
  2. Application of Section 22-A: The Court examined Section 22-A and its sub-clauses. It emphasized clause (e) of Section 22-A which defines "any new reservation made in a Draft Development Plan which is not earlier published under Section 26, 29, or 31" as a modification of a substantial nature.
  3. Factual application: The Court found, on the admitted facts, that there was no earlier reservation for a bus terminus or depot at the time the Draft Development Plan was published under Section 26 and up to the final sanction under Section 31 on 5-1-1987. Therefore, the reservation for a bus depot constituted a "new reservation" within the meaning of clause (e) of Section 22-A.
  4. Rejection of respondents' contention: The Court rejected the respondent's argument equating "new reservation" with only a reservation made where no reservation previously existed at all (i.e., a "fresh" reservation). The Court observed that interpreting "new" in that narrow sense would conflict with the statutory scheme which contemplates modifications and changes rather than only first-time reservations.
  5. Qualitative impact assessment: The Court held that "modification of a substantial nature" is not restricted to quantitative change affecting the totality of the plan. It can include qualitative changes that affect owners' rights, the lifestyle of residents, and the ecology and environment of the area. The Court referenced Development Control Rules showing that a designation for parking carries different development rights (for instance, surrender and entitlement to additional FSI) compared with a designation for a bus depot, which lacks such provisions.
  6. Conclusion on legality: Since the modification (parking to bus depot) was of a substantial nature and no notice inviting objections was published as required by the second proviso to Section 31, the modification was illegal.

The Court therefore proceeded to make the writ rule absolute and quashed and set aside the Government Resolution dated 5-1-1987 (Exh. 'V' to Writ Petition No. 347 of 1993) insofar as it sought to reserve the petitioners' land for the PMC bus depot shown in the Development Plan.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The Court made the writ rule absolute and quashed and set aside the Government Resolution dated 5-1-1987 insofar as it seeks to reserve the petitioners' land for the PMC bus depot/terminus as shown in the Development Plan.

Immediate consequences and implications described in the opinion:

  • Direct effect: The specific Government Resolution of 5-1-1987, insofar as it operates to reserve the petitioners' land for the alleged public purpose of a PMC bus depot, is quashed and set aside as illegal for having been made without the statutory notice and consultation required by the second proviso to Section 31.
  • Interpretive implication: The Court applied the definition introduced by Section 22-A (Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1994) to comprehend what constitutes a "modification of a substantial nature" for the purposes of Section 31, treating that later provision as clarificatory and applicable to modifications made prior to its insertion (consistent with authorities cited in the opinion).
  • On substantive rights: The Court identified that a change from parking to a bus depot/terminus can have qualitative effects on owners (for example, differing rights related to surrender and FSI under Development Control Rules) and on the local environment and lifestyle, supporting the classification of such change as substantial under the statutory definition adopted.

The order concludes with the formal direction: "Order accordingly."

Order accordingly.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

    Motibagh Co-Op. Housing Society Ltd. Pune And Another Etc. v. Pune Municipal Corporation And Others

    S.A Bobde, J.:— The petitioners in both these petitions are owners of land situate at Yeravada, Pune, within the limits of Pune Municipal Corporation. Motibagh Co-operative Housing Society Limited is owner of land admeasuring 83 ares bearing survey No. 152/1 and final plot No. 70/3.

    Udaysinh Narayanrao Borawake, the petitioner in Writ. Petition No. 2890 of 1993, is the owner of an adjoining piece of land admeasuring 46.304 sq. ft., bearing survey No. 152/2.

    2. Both the plots of lands are covered by the same Town Planning Scheme. They are in the residential zone. They are reserved for parking. The Planning Authority has changed the reservation of both these plots. That reservation has been changed for the purpose of a bus terminus of the Pune Municipal Transport Corporation. This change of reservation is challenged in these petitions. These petitions, therefore, have been taken up together for disposal by this judgment.

    3. The lands belonging to the petitioners have undergone various changes in reservation. In 1966 they came under a green zone. On 1-6-1983 the Town Planning Scheme for Pune was sanctioned under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, hereinafter referred to as the “Act”. In the scheme, the said lands, hereinafter referred to as the “said lands”, was shown as a residential zone. On 18-9-1982 the said land was reserved for the purpose of parking in the Draft Development Plan. The petitioners inquired from the Pune Municipal Corporation as to how much area is required for parking. The Corporation wrote stating that 40 hectares of land was needed for a bus station and the rest could be used as a residential. The respondents invited objections in respect of the reservation for parking sometime in the year 1983. The petitioners submitted their objections. Udaysinh Narayanrao Borawake, the petitioner in writ petition No. 2890 of 1993, pointed out that he has already surrendered an area of 7185 sq. ft. for the purpose of a dhobighat. That land was lying unutilised and suggested that it could be used for parking.

    4. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 347 of 1993, which are a co-operative society, submitted plans for development of their land and wrote to respondent No. 1 that they were commencing construction. The Municipal Corporation issued a stop work notice on 6-10-1984.

    5. Then came the change in reservation, which is challenged. On 5-1-1987 the State Government sanctioned the development plan under Section 31 of the Act. While sanctioning this plan, the land was shown as reserved for a bus depot. Admittedly, no notice inviting objections or suggestions was issued by the respondents for a change in reservation from the purpose of parking to the purpose of a bus depot.

    6. On 6-4-1992 the respondents issued a Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 126(4) of the Act.

    7. On 25-1-1993 Writ Petition No. 347 of 1993 was filed whereas Writ Petition No. 2890 of 1993 was filed on 27-7-1993. By an interim order, this Court allowed the acquisition proceedings to proceed, but restrained the declaration of the award. While the petitions were pending, the co-operative housing society has surrendered an area of 3124 sq. mtrs. for road widening to respondent No. 1.

    8. The principal challenge of Dr. Tulzapurkar, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 347 of 2003 and Ms. Kiran Bhagalia, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2890 of 1993, is the same. According to the learned counsel, the land having been reserved for the purpose of parking in the Draft Development Plan as published in the Official Gazette, the change in its reservation for a bus depot and terminus is a modification of a substantial nature. Such a modification made while sanctioning the Draft Development Plan under Section 31 could only have been made after publishing a notice of the proposed modification and after inviting objections and suggestions from those affected thereby, in accordance with the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 31. Sub-section (1) reads as follows:—

    “31. Sanction to draft-Development Plan—

    (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, and not later than one year from the date of receipt of such plan from the Planning Authority, or as the case may be, from the said Officer, the State Government may, after consulting the Director of Town Planning by notification in the Official Gazette sanction the draft-Development Plan submitted to it for the whole area, or separately for any part thereof, either without modification, or subject to such modifications as it may consider proper, or return the Draft Development Plan to the Planning Authority or as the case may be, the said Officer for modifying the plan as it may direct, or refuse to accord sanction and direct the Planning Authority or the said Officer to prepare a fresh Development plan.

    Provided that, the State Government may, if it thinks fit, whether the said period has expired or not, extend from time to time, by a notification in the Official Gazette, the period for sanctioning the Draft Development Plan or refusing to accord sanction thereto, by such further period as may be specified in the notification:

    Provided further that, where the modifications proposed to be made by the State Government are of a substantial nature, the State Government shall publish a notice in the Official Gazette and also in local newspapers inviting objections and suggestions from any person in respect of the proposed modification within a period of sixty days from the date of such notice.

    (2) to (6) ……………………………………….

    9. The short question that arises, therefore, is whether the modification in question, of reservation for parking to reservation for a bus depot or terminus amounts to a modification of a substantial nature. If the answer is in the affirmative, then clearly the impugned Notification is not in accordance with law, because admittedly, in the Draft Development Plan and in the Town Planning Scheme, the said land was reserved for the purpose of parking and while sanctioning the development plan on 5-1-1987, it has been changed to reservation of a bus depot without inviting any objections or suggestions.

    10. We, therefore, proceed to consider whether the modification in the reservation from the purpose of parking to a reservation for the purpose a bus terminus is one of a substantial nature. Even though the phrase “modification of a substantial nature” existed in Section 31 as originally enacted and when the development plan was sanctioned on 5-1-1987, its meaning had not been defined by the Act. This phrase was defined by the introduction of Section 22-A inserted by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1994 with effect from 17-8-1994. The Statement of Objects and Reasons by which Section 22-A was introduced shows that the Legislature considered the earlier provision to be vague. It states that the introduction of Section 22-A “would eliminate any vagueness in respect of the nature of the modifications carried out to the draft development plan by the Planning Authorities………” We are of view that the phrase has been defined ex majori cautela to make things abundantly clear. It is settled law that a latter statute may be used as an aid to construction of an earlier Act, if the earlier statute is ambiguous, or readily capable of more than one interpretation, vide State Of Bihar v. S.K Roy., AIR 1966 SC 1995 at p. 1998, Thiru Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1977 SC 518, para 11 and Assam Sillimanite v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1417 at p. 1422. As with statutes, so with the provisions of a statute. A phrase occurring in a provision may be construed as defined by a subsequent provision enacted by the same Legislature in the same Act. More so, when it is defined in order to clarify or remove an ambiguity as in this case. We are, therefore, of view that the phrase “modification of a substantial nature” must be given the meaning as defined in Section 22-A even while construing its meaning under Section 31 of the Act as originally enacted and even while considering modifications to the Development Plan made prior to the insertion of Section 22-A, vide Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G Industrial Institute, AIR 1995 SC 1428, where a provision added subsequently was viewed as clarificatory and was held applicable to all pending proceedings.

    11. In the present case, the modification is said to be of a substantial nature because it provides for a new reservation as contemplated by clause (c) of section 22-a which reads as follows:—

    “22A. Modifications of a substantial nature.— In Section 29 or 31, the expression “of a substantial nature” used in relation to the modifications made by the Planning Authority or the officer appointed by the State Government under sub-section (4) of Section 21 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Officer”) or the State Government, as the case may be, in the draft Development Plan means.—

    (a) reduction of more than fifty per cent or increase by ten per cent in area of reservations provided for in clauses (b) to (1) of Section 22, in each planning unit or sector of a draft Development Plan, in sites admeasuring more than 0.4 hectare in the Municipal Corporation area and “A” Class Municipal area and 1.00 hectare “B” Class and “C” Class Municipal areas;

    (b) all changes which result in the aggregate to a reduction of any public amenity by more than ten per cent or the area provided in the planning unit or sector in a draft Development Plan prepared and published under Section 26 or published with modifications under Section 29 or 31, as the case may be.

    (c) reduction in an area of an actually existing site reserved for a public amenity except for marginal area upto two hundred square meters required for essential public amenity or utility services;

    (d) change in the proposal of allocating the use of certain lands from the zone to any other zone provided by clause (a) of Section 22 which results in increasing the area in that other zone by ten per cent, in the same planning unit or sector in a Draft Development Plan prepared and published under Section 26 or published with modifications under Section 29 or 31, as the case may be;

    (e) any new reservation made in a Draft Development Plan which is not earlier published under Section 26, 29, or 31, as the case may be;

    (f) alterations in the Floor Space Index beyond ten per cent of the Floor Space Index prescribed in the Development Control Regulations prepared and published under Section 26 or published with modifications under Section 29 or 31, as the case may be.”

    12. We are clearly of view on a plain reading of clause (c) above, that the change in reservation for parking to that for a bus depot or terminus amounts to a modification of a substantial nature since it is a new reservation not earlier published under Section 26, 29 or 31. Admittedly, there was no reservation for a bus terminus or a depot when the Draft Development Plan was published under Section 26 and, in fact, right upto the time when the Development Plan was finally sanctioned under Section 31.

    13. Mr. Ketkar, learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation, however, strenuously urged that the reservation for a bus depot or terminus cannot be construed to be a new reservation and, therefore, a modification for that purpose cannot be considered to be one of a substantial nature under Section 22-A. According to the learned counsel, it cannot be construed to be a new reservation because there was already an existing reservation. We are unable to accept this contention. The contention suffers from the fallacy of confusing ‘new’ with ‘fresh’ i.e, as if for the first time. It is clear that the phrase “new reservation” has been used as opposed to an “old” or “existing reservation”. If the contention on behalf of the respondents were to be accepted, it would mean that a modification of a substantial nature would only mean a “fresh reservation” i.e, one made where the land had not been reserved at all for any purpose. In fact, Section 31, Section 22-A and related provisions deal with “modifications” or “changes” and not with something done for the first time.

    14. A judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Bombay Environmental Action Group v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1990 Mah LJ 139 was brought to our notice. In that case, the learned single Judge has held that modification cannot be considered to be of a substantial nature unless it affects the totality of plan or a significant part thereof. That judgment was rendered when the Act had not been amended to define the term “modification of a substantial nature”. Section 22-A containing clause (e), supra, had not been introduced. Moreover, even de hors Section 22-A, the phrase “modification of a substantial nature” does not refer merely to a quantitative modification in the sense of a significant part of the plan. It is also referable to a qualitative change in the reservation which affects the rights of the land owner and of those living in the vicinity. In the present case, it is clear that the change in reservation from the purpose of parking to the purpose of a bus depot or terminus would have an impact on the lifestyle of those living in the vicinity, and the ecology and the environment of the area. Qua the owners, it certainly has an impact, having regard to the Development Control Rules framed by the Pune Municipal Corporation. If the area is reserved for parking, the owners can potentially develop and retain part of the land for themselves.

    15. Ms. Bhagalia, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2890 of 1993 referred to the fact that under the Development Control Rules, if a site was designated for parking, an owner was required to surrender 50% of the land merged in the road area to be utilised for parking free of cost to the Corporation. On such surrender, he was entitled to avail the benefit of additional FSI in lieu of the surrendered area. This was the position as on 5-1-1987 under the amended regulations. Thereafter, on 5-6-1997 when the development plan was sanctioned, if the site is reserved for parking the Municipal Corporation had the option to (i) acquire, develop, operate and maintain the parking zone, or (b) allow the owner to develop the parking lot in accordance with the specification as prescribed by the Commissioner and thereupon utilise the full built-up area equal to the FSI available on the plot for the purpose of providing a parking space. Admittedly, if the land is reserved for a bus depot, there is no provision whereby the Corporation may offer or the owner may seek, the right to utilise the FSI available on such a plot. This fortifies the view that the modification of the reservation from the purpose of parking to the purpose of a bus depot or terminus is a modification of a substantial nature within the meaning of Section 31 of the Act.

    16. In this view of the matter, the modification having been effected without inviting any objections or suggestions in the Official Gazette as required by the 2nd proviso to Section 31 of the Act, is illegal. We, therefore, make the rule absolute and quash and set aside the Government Resolution dated 5-1-1987 issued by the State of Maharashtra at Exh. ‘V’ to Writ Petition No. 347 of 1993, insofar as it seeks to reserve the said land of the petitioners in both the Writ Petitions for the alleged public purpose of PMC bus depot as shown in the Development Plan of Pune city.

    Order accordingly.
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    Motibagh Co-Op. Housing Society Ltd. Pune And Another Etc. v. Pune Municipal Corporation And Others
    (May 3, 2005)