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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents (original plaintiffs) initiated a suit for declaration and permanent injunction seeking a declaration that a gift deed dated 7-11-1983 by which defendant No. 1 had gifted the suit property in favour of defendant No. 2 be declared null and void, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the suit property. The defendants appeared and filed a written statement. Issues relevant to pleadings were struck and the parties were called to lead evidence; the suit proceeded to final hearing.

While the matter was being finally heard, the plaintiffs filed an application to amend the plaint to add an additional relief seeking restoration (recovery) of possession of the suit property. No written reply was filed to the amendment application, although the defendants orally opposed it at the hearing on grounds that the new relief was barred by limitation, belated, and that allowing it at a late stage would require framing an issue and further evidence, thereby prolonging litigation and potentially demolishing rights accrued to the defendants.

The trial court allowed the amendment by order dated 13th March, 2002 (the impugned order). The defendants filed the present Revision Petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revision under Section 115 CPC is maintainable to challenge the trial court's order allowing amendment of the plaint, particularly where it is contended that such an order does not decide any case (preliminary objection relying on Prem Bakshi v. Dharam Dev).
  2. Whether the trial court's exercise of discretion in allowing the amendment (which introduces a claim that may be barred by limitation) was perverse, illegal or liable to be interfered with on revision.
  3. If amendment is allowed at a late stage raising a potentially time-barred claim, whether the amendment should be permitted subject to limitation being kept open for trial (i.e., making the limitation question an issue for trial) or whether amendment would effectively relate back and revive a barred claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (original defendants') Arguments

  • The impugned order allowing amendment is perverse and suffers from material illegality and irregularity.
  • The claim for possession introduced by amendment was barred by limitation and therefore should not have been allowed.
  • If the amendment is upheld, the relief claimed would relate back to the date of the suit and a claim otherwise barred by limitation would be revived, thereby demolishing rights accrued to the defendants; hence the impugned order should be quashed and set aside.
  • Relied upon the 3-Judge Bench decision Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and related authorities on the effect of an order allowing amendment.

Respondents' (original plaintiffs') Arguments

  • Raised a preliminary objection that the Revision is not maintainable in view of Prem Bakshi v. Dharam Dev — arguing that the impugned order is not an order having the effect of deciding any case and therefore not open to revision at this stage.
  • On the merits, contended that question of limitation is a relevant factor for the court's discretion when ordering amendment but does not oust the court's power to allow amendment in the interest of justice; relied on L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner & Co.
  • Argued that where it is arguable whether a claim would be barred by limitation, the amendment can still be allowed and the limitation question made a subject of trial; relied on Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan.
  • Maintained that the trial court exercised its discretion and that exercise should not be disturbed on revision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prem Bakshi v. Dharam Dev, 2002 AIR SCW 140 Cited by respondents to contend that a Revision challenging an order allowing amendment is not maintainable because such an order cannot be said to have the effect of deciding any case. The court considered this submission but rejected it by reference to later authorities relied on by petitioners; the preliminary objection based on this case was overruled.
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786 Relied upon by petitioners regarding the effect of an order allowing amendment; the decision discussed whether an order allowing amendment which removes a defence based on limitation can be 'judgment' within Letters Patent. The court accepted the relevance of this authority in overruling the preliminary objection and in evaluating whether the revision was maintainable and whether interference was warranted.
Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. The Home Insurance Co. of New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719 Discussed by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji concerning when an order allowing amendment affects the merits (limitation) and can be treated as a decision affecting rights. Used by the court as part of the chain of authority to conclude that the preliminary objection (that revision is not maintainable) could not be accepted.
L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner & Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 Cited by respondents for the proposition that limitation is a factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion to allow amendment, but does not by itself prevent the court from allowing amendment in the interest of justice. The court acknowledged this principle as part of the respondents' submissions on the proper exercise of discretion but ultimately balanced it with other authorities in reaching its conclusion to uphold the trial court's discretionary order.
Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan, (2001) 2 SCC 472 Relied upon to support the proposition that where it is arguable whether an amendment would be barred by limitation, amendment can be allowed and the dispute about limitation can be left for trial (i.e., made a subject-matter of trial). The court applied this as a permissible course: it upheld the amendment but directed that the question of limitation be kept open and decided by the trial court after framing a proper issue.
Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros., Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 249 Stated the appellate principle that courts are generally slow to interfere with a trial court's exercise of discretion under procedural provisions unless it appears the trial court acted unreasonably, capriciously or ignored relevant facts. The court applied this principle to justify not interfering with the trial court's exercise of discretion in allowing the amendment, unless it was shown to be perverse or unreasonable.
Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan (dead) through LRs., (2001) 6 SCC 163 Dealt with facts similar to the present case and considered whether amendment could revive a time-barred claim; held that if relief was barred by limitation at the time of amendment, amendment could not rescue the plaintiff. The court relied on this authority to hold that even if the amendment is allowed, it will not automatically relate back to the date of the plaint and revive a barred claim; the limitation question must be examined at trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in distinct stages:

  1. Preliminary procedure: The petition was heard finally with consent of parties; the respondents waived service; the Revision challenged the trial court's order dated 13th March, 2002 allowing amendment to the plaint.
  2. Preliminary objection on maintainability: Respondents relied on Prem Bakshi to contend revision was not maintainable because the impugned order did not decide any case. The petitioners countered with Shah Babulal and related authority indicating that where amendment removes a defence of limitation it can be a decision affecting rights. The court found it was not possible to accept respondents' contention and overruled the preliminary objection.
  3. Merits — discretion and limitation: The petitioners argued that the amendment introduced a limitation-barred claim and that the order was perverse; respondents argued limitation is only a consideration in exercising discretion and the amendment could be allowed with the limitation issue left for trial, relying on L.J. Leach and Ragu Thilak.
  4. Appellate deference to trial court: The court invoked the principle from Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation v. Sunder Bros. that appellate or revisional courts should be slow to interfere with a trial court's reasonable exercise of discretion unless it was capricious or unreasonable.
  5. Balancing approach and protective direction: Applying those authorities, the court concluded it could not hold the impugned order to be perverse. However, to protect petitioners' interests it adopted the approach of making the disputed claim a subject of trial: the question of limitation was to be kept open and decided by the trial court after framing a proper issue. The court referred to Vishwambhar to support the proposition that an amendment does not automatically relate back and revive a claim found to be barred by limitation on trial.
  6. Evidence and further steps: The court noted the respondents' counsel stated no fresh evidence was necessary; the evidence on record was sufficient to decide the issue of possession. The court therefore confirmed the amendment while directing that the limitation question be determined on trial (after framing an issue) and clarifying that the amendment will have no effect of reviving a claim found to be time-barred.

Holding and Implications

REVISION DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The trial court's order dated 13th March, 2002 allowing the amendment to the plaint is confirmed and the Revision Petition is dismissed.
  • The court preserved the petitioners' rights by keeping open the question of limitation: the trial court must frame a proper issue on limitation and decide whether the relief claimed by amendment is barred by limitation on the date it was introduced.
  • The opinion clarifies that allowing the amendment at this stage will not automatically revive a claim that is found on trial to be barred by limitation — any such revival will not occur if the trial court finds the relief barred.
  • No fresh evidence is required per the respondents' statement; the existing evidence on record is deemed sufficient to decide the possession issue.
  • No order as to costs was made.
Revision dismissed.

    Dattaram V. Dharwadkar And Another v. Ghanashyam G. Bhende And Another

    1. Rule returnable forthwith. Respondents waive service. Heard finally with the consent of parties. This Revision Petition is directed against the Order dated 13th March, 2002 passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pemem, in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 11 of 2002 in Regular Civil Suit No. 49 of 2000; whereby the Trial Court allowed amendment to the plaint subject to costs.

    FACTS-IN-BRIEF:

    2. The facts in nutshell are as under:—

    3. The respondents/original plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction seeking declaration that the gift deed dated 7-11-1983 by which the defendant No. 1 had gifted the suit property in favour of defendant No. 2 be declared null and void and also sought permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the suit property.

    4. On being summoned, the defendants appeared and filed their Written Statement. The issues relevant to the pleadings were struck. The parties to the suit were asked to lead their rival evidence. The suit went for final hearing. While the matter was being heard finally an Application for amendment to the plaint came to be filed claiming additional relief seeking restoration of possession of the suit property.

    5. No reply was filed to oppose application seeking amendment to the plaint. The aforesaid amendment was orally opposed by the defendants at the time of hearing of the application on the ground that the relief sought in the proposed amendment was clearly barred by limitation and that the same is belated. It was further opposed on the ground that if the amendment was allowed to be introduced at such a late stage of the suit, then, the issue would be required to be framed and the matter will have to be set down for further evidence. This would result in protracting litigation. It was also urged that if the amendment was allowed, it would result in demolition of the right accrued in favour of the petitioners/original defendants because of omission to claim relief of possession of the suit property.

    6. In rejoinder, the plaintiffs urged that the seeds of the amendment are already in the plaint and no new relief is being claimed and in the interest of justice the order should be maintained.

    7. The Trial Court after hearing the parties, was pleased to allow the amendment application vide its Order dated 13th March, 2002. This Order is the subject-matter of challenge in this Revision filed under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code.

    PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

    8. At the outset, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Revision and contended that in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Bakshi v. Dharam Dev, 2002 AIR SCW 140, the Revision Petition challenging the Order allowing the amendment is not maintainable. In his submission, impugned Order cannot be said to be an order having effect of deciding any case. In his submission this Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed at this stage giving an option to the petitioners to challenge the impugned Order in the event they are ultimately required to carry appeal; if at all they suffer adverse decree in the suit.

    9. In order to counter the above submission, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners pressed into service 3-Judges Bench Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786 wherein the Apex Court relied upon the case of Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. The Home Insurance Co. of New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719 wherein the Apex Court was considering the effect of an Order allowing amendment of the plaint. The question at issue was whether such an order would be ‘Judgment’ within the meaning of Letters Patent. The Apex Court in the said Judgment made following observations:—

    “Where an amendment takes away from the defendant the defence of immunity from any liability by reason of limitation, it is a ‘Judgment’ within Cl. 15. It is a decision affecting the merits of the question between the parties by determining the right or liability based on limitation. It is the final decision as far as the trial Court is concerned. ……..”

    10. Considering the aforesaid Judgment of the Apex Court, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondents that the Revision is not maintainable. The preliminary objection stands overruled.

    SUBMISSIONS ON MERIT:

    11. The learned Counsel for the petitioners took me through the text of the amendment and the Order passed by the Trial Court and urged that the claim which was barred by limitation could not have been allowed by the Trial Court so as to permit the plaintiffs to claim possession of the property. In his submission the impugned Order is perverse and suffers from material illegality and irregularity. He further submits that if the Order allowing the amendment is upheld then in that event the relief claimed will relate back to the date of the suit and the claim which is barred by limitation would fall within limitation and the right accrued in favour of the petitioners would get demolished. Hence the impugned Order in his submission is liable to be quashed and set aside.

    12. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the question of limitation is a factor to be taken into account while exercising discretion as to whether or not the amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interest of justice. He relied upon a Judgment of the Apex Court in L.J Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 in support of this proposition. He thus submits once having exercised discretion in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs it should not be disturbed. Alternatively, he contended that where it is arguable whether the claim sought by the amendment would be barred by law of limitation, the amendment could still be allowed making the disputed issue a subject-matter of trial. He relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan, (2001) 2 SCC 472 in support of this proposition and prayed dismissal of revision petition with costs.

    CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS:

    13. Having heard the parties at length, I feel that the impugned Order being discretionary need not be disturbed. The Apex Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros., Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 249 observed as under:—

    “Where the discretion vested in the Court under section 34 has been exercised by the lower Court, the appellate Court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of their discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage, the appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage, it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify such interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. If it appears to the appellate Court that in exercising its discretion the trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts, then it would be open to the appellate Court to interfere with the trial Court's exercise of discretion.”

    14. Thus applying the above principle, it is difficult to hold that the impugned Order is perverse or could not have been passed by the Trial Court. However, the impugned amendment can be saved by protecting the interest of the petitioners by making the disputed subject-matter of an issue of trial as held by Apex Court in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan (supra). The Apex Court in the case of Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan (dead) through LRs., (2001) 6 SCC 163 had an occasion to deal with similar case. The facts of the case before Apex Court were more or less close to the facts of the present case. In that case the suit filed by V was filed within the prescribed period of limitation but without the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds. Since the claim for recovery of possession of the properties alienated could not have been made without setting aside the sale deeds the suit as initially filed was not maintainable. By the date the defect was rectified (December 1985) by introducing such a prayer by amendment of the plaint the prescribed period of limitation for seeking such a relief had elapsed. In the circumstances it was held that the amendment of the plaint could not come to the rescue of the plaintiff.

    15. In the facts of the case on hand if the petitioners/defendants are right, then, the claim of the plaintiffs sought to be introduced would be dismissed. If on trial relief claimed is found to be barred by limitation, in that event, such amendment cannot relate back to the date of plaint. The order allowing amendment even if held to be proper still it will not relate back to the date of plaint if trial Court on merits finds that the relief claimed by way of amendment was barred by limitation on the date it was introduced. In this view of the matter, I do not see any difficulty in maintaining the said impugned order subject to keeping the question of limitation open. The Revision Petition is thus dismissed. The order of the Trial Court is confirmed keeping the question of limitation open for being decided by the Trial Court after framing a proper issue. In view of the statement made by learned Counsel for respondents, no further fresh evidence is necessary. The evidence on record is sufficient to decide the issue of possession. It is thus made clear that the impugned amendment will have no effect of reviving the claim if it is found by the trial Court on trial of the suit that relief claimed by way of amendment was barred by limitation on the date when it was moved by the plaintiffs.

    16. In the result, the Revision is dismissed with the aforesaid observations, with no order as to costs.

    Revision dismissed.
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    Comments

    Dattaram V. Dharwadkar And Another v. Ghanashyam G. Bhende And Another
    (Jun 20, 2002)