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  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • S. 4-K of the U.P Act
  • provisions of S. 4-K of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • rejected.6. S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • record.2. Rule
  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • S. 4-K of the U.P Act
  • provisions of S. 4-K of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • rejected.6. S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • record.2. Rule
  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Delivered by R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an award dated 15-9-1998 passed by the Labour Court in Reference No. 71 of 1992. The dispute arose from termination of services of Respondent 1, who had been engaged on daily wages by the petitioner from April 1979 until termination with effect from 30-5-1982. A reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was made to the Labour Court to decide whether Respondent 1 was entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages with effect from 30-5-1982. The petitioner objected before the Labour Court on the grounds that Respondent 1 had not rendered continuous service for 240 days (being only a daily wager), no permanent post was available for employment, and that the reference was barred by delay as it was made approximately nine years after the alleged termination. The Labour Court rejected the limitation plea, drew an adverse inference from the petitioner's failure to produce muster rolls, found that Respondent 1 had completed 240 days' service in a year prior to termination and directed reinstatement with continuity (but rejected the claim for back wages). The petitioner challenged that award in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Labour Court was required to answer the reference in the petitioner's favour because of an unexplained or inordinate delay (approximately nine to ten years) in making the reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  2. Whether the Labour Court could direct reinstatement with continuity of service of a person employed as a daily wager (Respondent 1) on the basis that she had completed 240 days in a year, in the absence of any evidence that she had rendered service in relation to a permanent post or that a permanent vacancy existed and she was denied regular employment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The award should be set aside because there was an unexplained delay of about ten years from termination to the reference, and the Labour Court failed to consider this delay.
  • The Labour Court could not have ordered reinstatement solely on the basis that Respondent 1 had completed 240 days in a year when she had been a daily wager and had not rendered service in relation to a permanent post before termination.
  • Reliance was placed on precedent (including the decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Rakmaji Aher and Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty) to support the submission that references made after inordinate delay and without explanation are not permissible.
  • The petitioner specifically objected that Respondent 1 did not render continuous 240 days of service, was only a daily wager, and that no post was available to employ her.

Respondent 1's Arguments

  • Respondent 1 asserted she was engaged as a daily wager from 1-4-1979 until 29-5-1982 (and relatedly up to 30-5-1982) working on road projects (Patoda-Pargaon and Daskhed-Pachangri roads).
  • She contended that her continuous employment and attendance for the relevant period could be established from the muster rolls, which would demonstrate completion of 240 days of service in a year prior to termination.
  • The record indicates that Respondent 1 sought reinstatement with continuity of service from the date of termination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Rakmaji Aher (1998) 2 Mah LJ 135 Requires explanation for inordinate delay by claimant when stale demands are referred; adjudicator may reject reference if explanation unsatisfactory. Cited by petitioner; court held this decision concerned necessity of justification for delay but was not helpful because the present issue centered on whether the dispute was alive on the date of reference.
Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty 2 SCC 455; AIR 2000 SC 839 Section 10 has no time-limit but power must be exercised reasonably; a stale dispute generally cannot be the subject-matter of reference; whether stale depends on facts. Cited by petitioner; court considered it, reiterated that power must be exercised reasonably but held mere lapse of time does not bar reference if dispute remained alive.
Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji 2 SCC 107; AIR 1987 SC 1353 Principles relied upon regarding limitation in certain contexts (as applied by Labour Court when rejecting limitation plea). Labour Court relied on this case to reject limitation contention; this Court held Katiji was not applicable to the present matter.
Shalimar Works Limited v. Workmen AIR 1959 SC 1217 Although no limitation prescribed for reference, disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they arise, especially for wholesale discharges. Cited to underscore reasonableness in timing of references; considered in the general discussion about delay.
Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 6 SCC 82; AIR 1999 SC 1351 Industrial disputes adjudication must advance social justice; relief should not be denied merely on procedural grounds; delay must be shown to cause real prejudice. Used to support the proposition that relief should not be denied solely because of delay and that courts should mould relief where delay exists.
National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan 1 SCC 371 High Court can entertain writ when there is allegation that no industrial dispute existed or was apprehended, since existence of dispute is a jurisdictional pre-condition for reference under Section 10. Cited to note that existence of an industrial dispute is necessary to clothe Government with power to make a reference.
Workmen v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. 4 SCC 392 Section 10(1) permits reference of an existing or apprehended industrial dispute; dispute must exist to enable reference. Cited for the elemental proposition that a reference presupposes an existing or apprehended industrial dispute.
Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Raghuvar (India) Ltd. 5 SCC 299; AIR 2000 SC 2027 Limitation that creates or destroys rights must be specifically enacted; courts should not imply a limitation period though exercise of power affecting rights should be within a reasonable period. Cited to support that courts should not import limitation but may require reasonable exercise of power where rights are affected.
Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workers Union 1 SCC 225; AIR 1970 SC 1205 The phrase "at any time" is context-governed; reference can be made only if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended; reference is not contemplated when the dispute no longer exists. Cited to explain that "at any time" does not render the power unbounded and must be read with requirement of existence of a dispute.
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy 7 SCC 123 Court's primary function is to advance substantial justice; rules of limitation are meant to prevent delay, not to destroy rights. Cited to emphasize that limitation rules should not frustrate substantive justice and that delay per se should not bar relief.
Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. SEB 6 SCC 222 The real test for reference is whether the industrial dispute existed on the date of reference; if it did, reference is valid irrespective of the time since inception. Relied upon to hold that if a dispute was alive on the date of reference, the Government could validly refer it and delay alone did not warrant quashing the reference.
State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma 7 SCC 562 Daily-wage appointments cannot be a conduit for regular appointments; recruitment to vacancies must follow rules; work-charged/temporary employees serve in transitory roles. Applied to conclude that reinstatement with continuity for a daily-wage worker, without evidence of a permanent vacancy and denial of regular appointment, would amount to an improper "back-door" entry.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the dispute in two distinct parts corresponding to the petitioner's challenges.

1) On the delay/limitation point:

  • The Court noted that Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act expressly allows the appropriate Government to refer a dispute "at any time" and that the statute contains no prescribed period of limitation for making such a reference.
  • However, the Court recognised the established line of authority that the power to refer must be exercised reasonably and in relation to an existing or apprehended industrial dispute. The phrase "at any time" is context-governed and does not render the power unbounded.
  • The Court surveyed relevant precedents (including Nedungadi Bank, Western India Match Co., Sapan Kumar Pandit, Ajaib Singh and others) and distilled the following governing propositions from them: (a) mere lapse of time will not, by itself, require rejection of a reference; (b) the vital question is whether the industrial dispute existed on the date of reference; (c) where delay is shown, the adjudicating authority may mould relief (for example, by refusing back wages for part of the period) if prejudice or other equitable considerations require it.
  • Applying these principles, the Court observed that the record showed the dispute was alive on the date of reference; therefore, mere delay did not justify answering the reference in the petitioner's favour. The Court distinguished the Dnyaneshwar Rakmaji Aher decision as addressing the need for justification for delay (i.e. the claimant's explanation), not the present factual question of whether the dispute was alive at the date of reference. The Court also found the Labour Court's reliance on Katiji inapplicable to the facts here.

2) On the reinstatement/240-days point:

  • The Labour Court found, on the basis of evidence and an adverse inference (because the petitioner failed to produce the muster rolls despite being directed to do so), that Respondent 1 had rendered daily-wage service on the specified road works from 1-4-1979 to 30-5-1982 and had completed 240 days of service in the year preceding termination.
  • The Court accepted that these findings showed Respondent 1 was engaged as a daily wager during the period in question. However, the Court emphasised that the record contained no material to show that Respondent 1 had been serving in relation to any permanent vacancy, or that she had been denied regular appointment to such a vacancy.
  • The Court relied on the principle (from State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma and similar authority) that appointments on daily wages cannot be used as a back-door entry to regular employment; legitimate appointment to permanent posts must follow recruitment rules and procedure. Reinstatement with continuity that would amount to a back-door regularisation is impermissible in the absence of evidence that a permanent vacancy existed and that the person was entitled to be absorbed into it.
  • Consequently, although the Labour Court was entitled to draw an adverse inference and to find that Respondent 1 had been engaged as a daily wager and had completed 240 days' service, there was no justification in the record for directing reinstatement with continuity of service.

3) Relief previously denied by the Labour Court: The Labour Court had rejected Respondent 1's claim for back wages. The present Court's reasoning and order did not disturb that particular aspect of the Labour Court's award.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition succeeded on the second ground of challenge. The Court quashed and set aside the portion of the impugned Labour Court award that directed reinstatement in service with continuity of service to Respondent 1. The Rule was made absolute with no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct, operative consequence is that the Labour Court's direction to reinstate Respondent 1 with continuity of service is invalidated and has been set aside by this Court.
  • The Labour Court's factual findings that Respondent 1 had been engaged as a daily wager and that the petitioner failed to produce muster rolls (leading to an adverse inference) remain relevant factual findings, but those findings do not, in the absence of evidence of a permanent vacancy or entitlement, justify regularisation by reinstatement with continuity.
  • The claim for back wages had already been rejected by the Labour Court and this judgment does not revive that claim; the Court's order specifically quashes only the reinstatement-with-continuity direction.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities: it affirms that mere delay in making a reference under Section 10 is not, by itself, a ground to invalidate a reference if the dispute was alive on the date of reference, but also affirms that reinstatement with continuity cannot be granted as a back-door regularisation of daily-wage employment in the absence of material showing entitlement to a permanent post.

    Chief Executive Officer Petitioner v. Shahezadbee And Another S

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    R.M.S Khandeparkar, J.— Heard learned advocates for the parties. Perused the record.

    2. Rule made returnable forthwith by consent.

    3. The petitioner challenges the award dated 15-9-1998 passed by the Labour Court in Reference No. 71 of 1992 on two grounds, namely, that there was unexplained delay of 10 years from the date of termination of services and the same was not at all considered by the Labour Court while deciding the matter and secondly that the Labour Court could not have ordered reinstatement of Respondent 1 merely on the ground of completion of 240 days in an year in the absence of service having been rendered by Respondent 1 in relation to a permanent post before her termination. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Rakmaji Aher (1998) 2 Mah LJ 135 and another of the Apex Court in the matter of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P Madhavankutty 2 SCC 455 , 2000 SCC (L&S) 283 , AIR 2000 SC 839 contending that even though there is no specific limitation provided for a reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the reference cannot be made after inordinate delay and that too without any explanation.

    4. The facts, in brief, relevant for the decision are that Respondent 1 herein was engaged on daily wages since April 1989 by the petitioner till 30-5-1982. Her services were terminated with effect from 30-5-1982 and consequently a dispute was raised and the same was referred for adjudication under S. 10 of the said Act to the Labour Court to decide whether Respondent 1 was entitled for reinstatement with full back wages and continuity in service with effect from 30-5-1982. The claim of Respondent 1 was objected to by the petitioner on the ground that Respondent 1 did not render service for continuous 240 days and that she was only a daily wager, besides there was no post available where she could be employed. The issue regarding bar of limitation was also raised by the petitioner as the reference was made about 9 years after the alleged termination.

    5. The Labour Court rejected the contention regarding bar of limitation mainly on the basis of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji 2 SCC 107 , 1989 SCC (Tax) 172 , AIR 1987 SC 1353 and two other decisions of different High Courts. On merits, it has been held that Respondent 1 was working in relation to the work of roads Patoda-Pargaon and Daskhed-Pachangri road, during the period from 1-4-1979 to 30-5-1982 on daily wages and in the absence of any evidence being produced by the petitioner, an adverse inference has been drawn against the petitioner to hold that Respondent 1 had completed continuous service of 240 days in an year prior to the date of termination of her services and that, therefore, she has been held to be entitled for reinstatement in the service from the date of termination with the continuity in service. The claim for back wages, however, has been rejected.

    6. S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides that where the appropriate Government is of opinion that industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by an order in writing refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication. Apparently the provisions contained in S. 10 do not prescribe any period of limitation for reference of any industrial dispute for its adjudication by the Labour Court. On the contrary, it specifically provides that it can refer the industrial dispute “at any time”. In the circumstances, therefore, the point for determination which arises as to whether the reference made by the Government for adjudication can be answered in negative only on the ground of delay in referring the dispute to the Labour Court under S. 10(1)(c) of the said Act.

    7. The learned Single Judge of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Rakmaji (1998) 2 Mah LJ 135 has held that: (Mah LJ p. 143, para 17)

    “It is well settled that the competent authority under the Industrial Disputes Act would be justified in rejecting the reference for adjudication in respect of demands which are over-stale. At the same time when the demands which are stale are referred for adjudication, the claimant employee is necessarily required to explain the reasons for inordinate delay in approaching the Conciliation Officer or his inaction for such a long period. If such an explanation does not come forward or if adjudicator is not convinced by the reasons given in respect of such delay or inaction on the part of the claimant employee, the adjudicator has powers to reject the reference.”

    8. The petitioner has also referred to, as already stated above, a decision of the Apex Court in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. case 2 SCC 455 , 2000 SCC (L&S) 283 , AIR 2000 SC 839 in support of the contention that in the absence of explanation for delay, the Labour Court ought to have answered the reference in negative. However, before referring to the said decision, it would be appropriate to refer to some other decisions relevant for the decision on the point in issue.

    9. In Shalimar Works Limited v. Workmen AIR 1959 SC 1217 it was held that: (AIR p. 1221, para 13)

    “It is true that there is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal; even so it is only reasonable that disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale, as in this case.”

    10. In Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 6 SCC 82 , 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054 , AIR 1999 SC 1351 it was held that: (SCC pp. 87-88, para 5)

    “In dealing with industrial disputes, the courts have always emphasized the doctrine of social justice, which is founded on basic ideal of socio-economic equality as enshrined in the Preamble of our Constitution. While construing the provisions of the Act, the courts have to give them a construction which should help in achieving the object of the Act.”

    It has been further held: (SCC p. 87, para 6)

    “The object of the Act, therefore, is to give succour to weaker sections of the society which is a prerequisite for a welfare State. To ensure industrial peace and pre-empt industrial tension, the Act further aims at enhancing the industrial production which is acknowledged to be the lifeblood of a developing society. The Act provides a machinery for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes ignoring the legal technicalities with a view to avoid delays, by specially authorised courts which are not supposed to deny the relief on account of the procedural wrangles. The Act contemplates realistic and effective negotiations, conciliation and adjudication as per the need of society keeping in view the fast-changing social norms of the developing country like India.”

    In the said case, the Apex Court has further held thus: (SCC p. 90, para 10)

    “10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or Board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages.”

    It is also ruled that: (SCC pp. 90-91. para 10)

    “It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding over the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature.”

    11. In Nedungadi Bank case 2 SCC 455 , 2000 SCC (L&S) 283 , AIR 2000 SC 839 the Apex Court has held that: (SCC p. 459-60, para 6)

    “6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one.”

    12. Considering the fact that the State Government before making the reference had not considered all the relevant considerations which could clothe it with the powers to make reference under S. 10 of the said Act, the Apex Court in National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan 1 SCC 371 has observed thus: (SCC p. 393, para 24)

    “24. It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference.”

    Apparently, the reference “existence of the industrial tribunal” in the last but one sentence has to be read as “existence of industrial dispute” as it appears to be a typing mistake in that regard.

    13. Before making the above observation, the Apex Court had also taken note of its earlier decision in Workmen v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. 4 SCC 392 , 1985 SCC (L&S) 6 wherein it was held that: (SCC p. 395, para 4)

    “4. Section 10(1) confers power on the appropriate Government to refer an existing or apprehended industrial dispute, amongst others, to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The dispute therefore, which can be referred for adjudication, of necessity, has to be an industrial dispute which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference, and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it.”

    14. In Collector Of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Raghuvar (India) Ltd. . 5 SCC 299 , AIR 2000 SC 2027, the Apex Court has ruled that: (SCC p. 308, para 13)

    “13. Any law or stipulation prescribing a period of limitation to do or not to do a thing after the expiry of period so stipulated has the consequence of creation and destruction of rights and, therefore, must be specifically enacted and prescribed therefor. It is not for the courts to import any specific period of limitation by implication, where there is really none, though courts may always hold when any such exercise of power had the effect of disturbing rights of a citizen that it should be exercised within a reasonable period.”

    15. While dealing with the provisions of S. 4-K of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is in tune with S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Apex Court in Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workers Union 1 SCC 225 , AIR 1970 SC 1205 has held that: (SCC p. 231, para 8)

    “Therefore, the expression ‘at any time’, though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report. But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can ‘at any time’, i.e even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression ‘at any time’ thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed. As already stated, the expression ‘at any time’ in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence.”

    16. At this stage, it is also necessary to note the ruling of the Apex Court dealing with the issue relating to the sufficient cause for delay in approaching the Court or Tribunal, in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy . 7 SCC 123 wherein it is held that: (SCC p. 127, para 10)

    “The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.”

    It is further held thus: (SCC p. 127, para 11)

    “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury.”

    17. Lastly, the Apex Court in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P SEB 6 SCC 222 , 2001 SCC (L&S) 946 has held that: (SCC p. 226, para 8)

    “Though no time-limit is fixed for making the reference for a dispute for adjudication, could any State Government revive a dispute which had submerged in stupor by long lapse of time and rekindle by making a reference of it to adjudication? The words ‘at any time’ as used in the section are prima facie indicator to a period without boundary. But such an interpretation making the power unending would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this sub-section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words ‘where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended’ have to be read in conjunction with the words ‘at any time’. They are, in a way, complimentary to each other. The Government's power to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be done only so long as the dispute exists. In other words, the period envisaged by the enduring expression ‘at any time’ terminates with the eclipse of the industrial dispute. It, therefore, means that if the dispute existed on the day when the reference was made by the Government it is idle to ascertain the number of years which elapsed since the commencement of the dispute to determine whether the delay would have extinguished the power of the Government to make the reference.”

    18. The Apex Court has further held that: (SCC p. 226, para 9)

    “9. Hence, the real test is, was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Government's power to make a reference would have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer is in positive terms the Government could have exercised the power whatever be the range of the period which lapsed since the inception of the dispute. That apart, a decision of the Government in this regard cannot be listed (sic) on the possibility of what another party would think whether any dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if in the opinion of the Government the dispute existed then the Government could make the reference. The only authority which can form such an opinion is the Government. If the Government decides to make the reference there is a presumption that in the opinion of the Government there existed such a dispute.”

    19. Considering the earlier decisions of the Apex Court, it has been further ruled therein that: (SCC p. 228, para 15)

    “15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or the union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case when the Government have chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under S. 4-K of the U.P Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether.”

    20. Considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in relation to the interpretation of S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act and more particularly in the matter of limitation for reference of industrial dispute for adjudication, it is now well settled that mere lapse of time would not be a justification for answering the reference in negative. In cases, where the disputes are alive, nothing prevents the Government from referring the same for adjudication merely because there is a delay from the date of dismissal till disposal of reference. Viewed from this angle, therefore, no fault can be found with the impugned award rejecting the contention regarding delay in making reference to the Court once it is apparent from the record that the dispute was very much alive on the date of reference and it had not become a stale dispute as such. The existence of dispute on the day of reference thereof for adjudication by the Labour Court was, in fact, never in dispute. The decision of learned Single Judge in Dnyaneshwar Rakmaji Aher case (1998) 2 Mah LJ 135 is of no help to decide the issue in the matter, as the same is only the point of necessity of justification for the delay and not on the point in issue in the matter. Likewise the decision of the Apex Court in Katiji 2 SCC 107 , 1989 SCC (Tax) 172 , AIR 1987 SC 1353 is also not applicable to the matter in issue.

    21. As regards the second ground of challenge the findings arrived at by the Labour Court are to the effect that Respondent 1 was engaged as daily wager for the road work of Patoda to Pargaon and Daskhed to Pachangri road during the period from 1-4-1979 to 20-5-1982. It was also the contention of Respondent 1 that she was employed as daily wager from 1-4-1979 till 29-5-1982 and the said fact could have been very well established by perusal of the muster roll in which her attendance was recorded. It is a matter of record that the petitioner was directed to produce the muster roll for the period from April 1979 till May 1982 yet the petitioner did not produce the same for inspection by the Labour Court and therefore the Labour Court has drawn adverse inference as regards the employment of Respondent 1 on daily wages for the said period and has held that she had rendered service for the period of 240 days in the year preceding to her termination. These findings apparently disclose that Respondent 1 was engaged as daily wager by the petitioner. However, the record nowhere discloses that Respondent 1 was employed in any permanent vacancy as such or that inspite of any vacancy being available, Respondent 1 was denied the employment by the petitioner. As regards the persons who are employed on daily wages, one cannot forget the observations of the Apex Court in the matter of State of H.P v. Suresh Kumar Verma 7 SCC 562 , 1996 SCC (L&S) 645 , (1996) 33 ATC 336 wherein it has been observed thus: (SCC p. 563, para 4)

    “The vacancies require to be filled up in accordance with the Rules and all the candidates who would otherwise be eligible are entitled to apply for when recruitment is made and seek consideration of their claims on merit according to the Rules for direct recruitment along with all the eligible candidates. The appointment on daily wages cannot be a conduit pipe for regular appointments which would be a back-door entry, detrimental to the efficiency of service and would breed seeds of nepotism and corruption. It is equally settled law that even for Class IV employees recruitment according to Rules is a pre-condition. Only work-charged employees who perform the duties of transitory nature are appointed not to a post but are required to perform the work of transitory and urgent nature so long as the work exists. One temporary employee cannot be replaced by another temporary employee.”

    22. Any direction for reinstatement with continuity of service which amounts to a “back door entry” cannot be upheld. In the absence of any material being placed on record that Respondent 1 had been employed on a permanent vacancy and admitted position being that Respondent 1 was employed for specific work for specific period, there was no justification for the Labour Court to issue the direction of the nature issued by it under the impugned award.

    23. In the result, therefore, the petition succeeds on the second ground of challenge. The impugned award as far as it directs reinstatement in service with continuity of service to Respondent 1 is hereby quashed and set aside.

    24. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.

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    Chief Executive Officer Petitioner v. Shahezadbee And Another S
    (Sep 28, 2001)