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  • act and plead.6. Section 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act
  • Code of Civil Procedure under Order III. Order III, rule 2
  • S. 9(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946,
  • provisions of S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • Section 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act
  • PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT
  • Bombay Industrial Relations Act, an Act
  • S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P, Act.
  • act in Order III, Rule 1
  • rule 2, Order III
  • TRADE MARKS ACT
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • act and plead.6. Section 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act
  • Code of Civil Procedure under Order III. Order III, rule 2
  • S. 9(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946,
  • provisions of S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • Section 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act
  • PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT
  • Bombay Industrial Relations Act, an Act
  • S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P, Act.
  • act in Order III, Rule 1
  • rule 2, Order III
  • TRADE MARKS ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner-company sought to quash and set aside an order dated 30th June, 1955 passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 1044 of 1988. The complaint was brought by respondent 2 (a trade union) alleging that the petitioner engaged in an unfair labour practice under item (9) of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act by deducting wages of union office-bearers who had gone to attend proceedings before Courts. The union's contention was that the deductions contravened Section 23 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, were made without giving the office-bearers an opportunity (breaching principles of natural justice), and were not in accordance with the Payment of Wages Act.

The Industrial Court, by the impugned order, held that the petitioner violated the provisions of Section 23 and that the wage deductions were illegal. The Industrial Court also found that the petitioner committed an unfair labour practice under item (9) of Schedule IV and awarded relief to respondent 2. The Industrial Court's findings recorded a long-standing practice of permitting union office-bearers to attend proceedings without wage deduction and that such office-bearers would, where possible, report back for duty the same day. The Industrial Court rejected the petitioner's contention that Section 23 required proof that office-bearers had "appeared" or "acted" in the technical sense of pleading or arguing before the Court, holding instead that Section 23 entitles such office-bearers to be paid salary for the entire day.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the meaning of the expressions "appear" and "act" as used in Section 23 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act?
  2. Whether the certificate produced by the office-bearers was sufficient proof that they had "appeared" or "acted" within the meaning of Section 23 for the days in question?
  3. Whether the deduction of wages under the facts amounted to an unfair labour practice under item (9) of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Sri Naik)

  • The terms "appear" or "act" in Section 23 must mean representing or putting in an appearance on behalf of the party in a way that involves active representation (e.g., pleading or addressing the Court), and should not be taken to include mere assistance to lawyers. For support, reliance was placed on the Gujarat High Court Division Bench judgment in Girish Kanjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (1995 II C.L.R. 964).
  • The certificates produced by the union office-bearers did not show that they had "appeared" or "acted" in the sense necessary to avail Section 23 benefits; therefore deductions did not amount to unfair labour practice.
  • The permission for office-bearers to represent the union arose from a long-standing practice (not Section 23). That practice allowed office-bearers to report back to work if time permitted; where they failed to report back (as alleged here), deduction of wages was justified and would not constitute unfair labour practice. Reliance was placed on Blue Star Ltd. v. Blue Star Workers' Union, [1996 (1) L.L.N 520].

Respondent-Union's Arguments

  • The deduction of pay without notice was arbitrary and amounted to an unfair labour practice. Reliance was placed on Bhagwan Shukla v. Union of India, [1994 (2) L.L.N 1074].
  • Reference was also made to D. Jayabalakrishnan v. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board, Madras, [1996 (1) L.L.N 843] in support of the need for a hearing prior to deductions.

The opinion notes that the two authorities relied on by the union (Bhagwan Shukla and D. Jayabalakrishnan) concern government employees and Article 14 considerations and, as such, are of limited relevance to the present dispute under the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Girish Kanjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (1995 II C.L.R. 964) Held that assistance to lawyers did not amount to "appearing" for purposes of S.9(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act; concerned whether someone had "regularly appeared" as a trade union member. The Court observed this judgment addressed only "appear" (not "act") and arose under a different statutory context (qualification for Labour Court Judge). It was considered but distinguished and not treated as controlling for the interpretation of "act" in Section 23 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act.
Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel v. National Rayon Corporation Ltd., [A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 262] Interpreted Order III (recognised agents) and distinguished "appearance"/"acting" from "pleading"; held that a recognised agent may "appear" or "act" but not plead (i.e., no right of audience). The Court relied on this authority to show a distinction between appearing/acting and pleading, using it to inform the interpretation of "appear" in Section 23 as including audience/pleading while leaving scope for "act" to have a different (broader or different) meaning.
Krishnammal v. Balasubramania Pillai, [A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 937] Authority cited in Aswin judgment regarding the scope of a recognised agent's rights and distinction between agents and advocates. Referred to as background authority in the discussion of Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel; used indirectly to support the distinction between appearing/acting and pleading for statutory interpretation purposes.
Harchand Ray Gobordhun Das v. B.N. Rly Company, [A.I.R. 1916 Cal. 181] and In re: Eastern Ravoy Minerals Corporation, Ltd., [A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 563] Decisions holding that an agent with a power of attorney has no right of audience in Court (cited in Aswin). Referred to via Aswin to support the principle that "appearance" and "pleading" are distinct concepts for some statutory contexts; used to help delimit the meaning of "appear" as opposed to "act".
Anglo French Drug Company (Eastern) Private Ltd. v. R.D. Tinaikar, [A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 21] Interpreted the word "act" (in the Trade Marks Act) broadly to include making applications, filing affidavits, leading evidence, and pleading before the Registrar; observed that meaning may vary by statute. The Court considered this authority to show that "act" can have a wide meaning in some statutes, but also to emphasize that meanings in one statute need not be imported wholesale into another; used to support a statutory-contextual approach to interpreting "act" in Section 23.
Blue Star Ltd. v. Blue Star Workers' Union, [1996 (1) L.L.N 520] Relied on by the petitioner (context provided in the petitioner's submissions). The opinion records reliance on this judgment by the petitioner, but the Court's reasoning does not rest on this case and does not analyze it in depth within the available text.
Bhagwan Shukla v. Union of India, [1994 (2) L.L.N 1074] Held that reduction of basic pay for a Government employee attracts Article 14 and civil consequences; requires following procedure prescribed by law. The Court held this authority to be of no relevance to the present dispute because it concerns Government employment and Article 14 considerations, unlike the present private/employer-union context under the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act.
D. Jayabalakrishnan v. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board, Madras, [1996 (1) L.L.N 843] Single Judge decision dealing with deduction of wages and Article 14 (government employment context). The Court observed this judgment likewise proceeds on Article 14 grounds and is not of assistance in deciding the present controversy under the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the central interpretive task as determining the meaning of the expressions "appear" and "act" in Section 23 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act. It proceeded by examining authorities and the statutory language, and by applying principles of statutory construction:

  1. The Court reviewed precedents that interpreted "appear" and "act" in other statutes (Order III CPC, Trade Marks Act, decisions from Bombay and other High Courts). It emphasized that prior decisions in different statutory contexts (for example, the Gujarat Division Bench decision about S.9(2) Bombay Industrial Relations Act) addressed only the meaning of "appear" and related qualifications for judicial office, not the meaning of "act" under Section 23.
  2. The Court noted the distinction drawn in Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel between appearing/acting and pleading: recognised agents may "appear" or "act" but do not have the right to plead (i.e., right of audience remains distinct). Anglo French Drug was noted for construing "act" broadly in another statute but the Court observed that meanings may vary by statute.
  3. The Court reasoned from the statutory text that the Legislature used two alternative expressions—"appear" or "act"—and that if the two expressions meant the same thing, it would have been redundant to use both. Accordingly, "appear" and "act" must be given distinct senses within Section 23.
  4. Drawing upon the object and historical practice underpinning Section 23 (the long-standing practice of employers permitting office-bearers to represent unions and the statutory recognition of such practice), the Court concluded that:
    • "Appear" should be read to encompass activities associated with pleading: right of audience, addressing the Court, examining and cross-examining witnesses, i.e., active courtroom advocacy;
    • "Act" should be given the ordinary meaning of "acting for" or "acting on behalf of" and include acts necessary to present a union's case other than courtroom advocacy—for example briefing lawyers, verifying pleadings, filing affidavits, presenting applications, leading procedural steps, remaining present so the matter is not dismissed for non-appearance, and other actions in furtherance of the union's representation.
  5. The Court observed there is no prohibition in the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act against lawyers appearing before the relevant authorities; many office-bearers are not legally trained and commonly instruct advocates to represent the union. Accordingly, "act" must be read to protect such representative functions by office-bearers.
  6. On the evidentiary issue, the Court held that the Act does not prescribe a specific form of certificate under Section 23; therefore the threshold is proof that the office-bearer was present on the day the proceedings actually took place and that they "appeared or acted" on behalf of the union. The certificate produced in the case was held to be sufficient proof for the relevant days.
  7. Given the above interpretation and findings, the Court concluded that the petitioners' deductions contravened Section 23 and constituted an unfair labour practice under item (9) of Schedule IV of the Act; thus the Industrial Court's order was sustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is without merit; the rule is discharged and there shall be no order as to costs.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The Industrial Court's order (which found that the petitioner violated Section 23 and committed an unfair labour practice under item (9) of Schedule IV) stands and is not quashed by this Court.
  • Under Section 23 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, office-bearers of a recognised union who "appear" or "act" on behalf of the union in proceedings are entitled to be deemed on duty for the days such proceedings actually take place and are entitled to salary and allowances for those days; "act" includes a range of representative acts (briefing lawyers, filing papers, presenting applications, remaining present, etc.) short of courtroom advocacy, which is captured by "appear".
  • The deductions of wages in the factual circumstances were held illegal and to constitute an unfair labour practice; the employer's reliance on prior practice and on the office-bearers' failure to return to duty did not defeat the statutory entitlement once the office-bearers were shown to have acted on the union's behalf for the day in question.
  • The Court's decision rests on statutory interpretation of Section 23 and the facts of the case. The opinion applies those interpretive conclusions to the present dispute; the text does not expressly state that it creates a broadly framed precedent beyond the interpretation of Section 23 in this context, and the order confines relief to the issues raised (the writ petition was dismissed and no costs were ordered).

    Madura Coats Ltd., And Another v. S.L Mehendle, Member, Industrial Court, And Another

    1. The petitioner-company has approached this Court to quash and set aside the order, dated 30th June, 1955 passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 1044 of 1988. The complaint was preferred by respondent 2-trade union alleging that the petitioner had engaged in unfair labour practice under item (9) of Sch. IV of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act in short the contention of the respondent 2 was that the wages of the office-bearers of the Union, who had gone to attend the proceedings before the Courts had been deducted contrary to the provisions of S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act and even otherwise it is contended that the deduction was made without giving an opportunity to the office-bearers of respondent 2 and it was, therefore, clearly in breach of the principles of natural justice and fair play and even otherwise it was not as contemplated by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act.

    2. The Industrial Court by the impugned order was pleased to deal with various contentions of the petitioner and was pleased to hold that the petitioner herein had violated the provisions of S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act and that the deduction of wages by the petitioners was illegal. It also held that the petitioner had committed unfair labour practice under item (9) of the Sch. IV of the Act and that respondent 2 was entitled to the relief prayed for. The order of the Industrial Court shows that there was a long standing practice by which the petitioners would permit the office-bearers of respondent 2 to attend the proceedings filed by or against respondent 2 or its members and for that purpose would not deduct wages. It also shows that the office-bearers of respondent 2 after doing their work used to report back for duty if time permitted. It has also dealt with the argument that for the purpose of giving effect to S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act it must be shown that the office-bearers appeared or acted. It also dealt with the argument that the Certificate produced by the office-bearers did not show that they appeared or acted and consequently no unfair labour practice had been committed by the petitioners. The Industrial Court has rejected the contentions of the petitioners and held that in terms of S. 23 the office-bearers are entitled to be paid wages for the entire day and there is no question of the office-bearers reporting back to duty and hence the petition.

    3. Sri Naik on behalf of the petitioners has submitted as under:

    The word ‘appear’ or ‘act’ appearing in S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act must mean to represent or put in an appearance on behalf of the party and not mere assistance to lawyers. For that purpose he has relied on a Division Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Girish Kanjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, [1995 II C.L.R 964].

    The second submission is that the certificate produced by the office-bearers of respondent 2 did not show that they have appeared or acted, to avail of the benefits of S. 23 and consequently if the petitioners had made deduction in the wages it could not be said that the petitioners had committed an act of unfair labour practice as it is normally understood.

    The third submission is that the permission to the office-bearers to represent the union is based on a long standing practice and not based on S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. It is contended that the practice as understood was that the office-bearers would represent the petitioners in proceedings before various forums and after the proceedings stood adjourned or disposed of for the day would report back to the establishment if time was still available. In the instant case the deduction had to be made, as even though, the proceedings had been adjourned in the morning itself the office-bearers had failed to report back for duty and consequently the deduction of wages. This, it is pointed out, would not amount to an act of unfair labour practice. Counsel has also relied on the judgment in the case of Blue Star, Ltd. v. Blue Star Workers' Union, [1996 (1) L.L.N 520].

    4. On behalf of the respondent-union it was contended that the deduction of pay without notice was arbitrary and this by itself amounts to an act of unfair labour practice. For that purpose reliance has been placed on the judgment in the case of Bhagwan Shukla v. Union of India, [1994 (2) L.L.N 1074]. At the outset it may be pointed out that this judgment would be of no relevance as it is in respect of a Government employee covered by Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Reduction of basic pay has been held to visit a person with civil consequences which cannot be resorted to without following the procedure prescribed by law. The other judgment is a judgment of a Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of D. Jayabalakrishnan and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board, Madras, [1996 (1) L.L.N 843]. There also the matter proceeded based on Art. 14 namely that deducting wages would result in visiting the petitioner with civil consequences and in that context a hearing had to be given before making any deductions. This judgment would also be of no assistance to decide the controversy in issue in this case.

    5. Considering the submissions of the parties, the main question to be decided is, what is the meaning of expression “appear” and “act” as contained in S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. Counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court in support of his contention. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the judgment referred to earlier was considering whether a person appointed as a Labour Court Judge who was assisting lawyers engaged by the Union before the Industrial Court could be said to have “regularly appeared” for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of appointment to the post of Judge of the Labour Court. On consideration of the evidence which was recorded through a Commissioner, the Division Bench held that such assistance to lawyers could not be said to be appearing in a Court. The Division Bench also referred to some judgments to hold that such assistance to lawyers who represented the union in proceedings before the Labour Court could not mean that the person assisting appeared. Furthermore, it may be noted that the said judgments was based on the interpretation of S. 9(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, wherein it is provided that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court unless he has practised as an Advocate or pleader for not less than 3 years or has regularly appeared as a member of a trade union for not less than 7 years in proceedings before the Labour Court, Industrial Court or Tribunal. Therefore, what is material to be seen is that the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court was faced only with the issue of to “appear”. The question of “act” did not at all arise for consideration though in the body of the judgment there is also a reference to acting. Several judgments of some other High Courts were referred to hold that mere assistance would not amount to putting in appearance and as such the respondent therein whose appointment as Labour Court Judge was challenged by various organisations and lawyers could not have been appointed as Judge of the Labour Court. In so far as the word “act” is concerned, in Para. 45 of the said judgment it is observed that no appear before the Court would mean to appear or act and plead.

    6. Section 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act reads as under:

    “Employees authorised by recognised union to appear or act in certain proceedings to be considered as on duty.— Not more than two members of a recognised union duly authorised by it in writing who appear or act on its behalf in any proceeding under the central act or the bombay act or under this Act shall be deemed to be on duty on the days on which such proceedings actually take place, and accordingly, such member or members shall, on production of a certificate from the authority of the Court before which he or they appeared or acted to the effect that he or they so appeared or acted on the days specified in the certificate, be entitled to be paid by his or their employer his or their salary and allowances which would have been payable for those days as if he or they had attended duty on those days.

    Explanation.— For the purpose of this section “recognised union includes a representative union under the Bombay Act”.

    6-A. The word “act” or “appear” also appears in the Code of Civil Procedure under Order III. Order III, rule 2 while speaking of recognised agents, speaks of recognised agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done. This order came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel v. National Rayon Corporation, Ltd., [A.I.R 1955 Bom. 262], which judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Chagla, and the expression “appearance, application or act has been considered. The learned Chief Justice observed as under:

    “In my opinion it is clear that ‘pleading’ would not be included in any of these expressions. The right of audience in Court, the right to address the Court, the right to examine and cross examine witnesses, are all parts of pleading with which O. III does not deal at all. It deals with restricted class of acts in connection with the litigation in Court and it is with regard to that restricted class of act that Order III permits recognised agents to be appointed. If authority was needed for this proposition, there is ample authority. There is the decision of the full bench of the Madras High Court in Krishnammal v. Balasubramania Pillai, [A.I.R 1937 Mad. 937] and there is also two decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Harchand Ray Gobordhun Das v. B.N Rly Company, [A.I.R 1916 Cal. 181] and In re: Eastern Ravoy Minerals Corporation, Ltd., [A.I.R 1934 Cal. 563] Both the Madras High Court and the Calcutta High Court held that an agent with a power of attorney has no right of audience in Court”.

    Thereafter in Para. 8 the learned Chief Justice proceeded to observe as under:

    “Therefore the proviso makes a distinction between appearing, pleading or acting and appearing or acting. Whereas a party may not only appear or act but he may also plead, a recognsied agent as defined in rule 2, Order III can only appear or act and not plead”.

    This judgment was considered by another Single Judge of this Court in the case of Anglo French Drug Company (Eastern) Private, Ltd. v. R.D Tinaikar, [A.I.R 1959 Bom. 21], What was under consideration, there was the word “act” under the Trade Marks Act. The learned Single Judge considering the meaning of word act” in the Trade Marks Act held as under:

    “A narrow meaning need not be given to the word “act” in S. 80. There is nothing to control the meaning of the word “act” as used in that section. It is referable to all kinds of acts which any person is required to do by or under the Trade Marks Act. It may be the act of making an application; it may be the act of filing an affidavit; it may be the act of leading evidence; it may be the act of pleading before the Registrar in support of the application. As the word used there is wide enough to cover all these activities and it is intended to exclude the act of making an affidavit, the words ‘other than the making of an affidavit’ have been inserted in that section”.

    Thus the word “act” as used in S. 80 is wide enough to cover pleadings. Referring to the judgment of Chief Justice Chagla the same has been dealt with in Para. 4 of the judgment. In Para. 5 the learned Judge on a perusal of Order III and provisions of other legislation observed thus:

    “The word ‘act’ appearing there was not such as would include the act of pleading, and was intended to cover only such acts as are capable of being done in the act of acting for a litigant. The word ‘act’ in Order III, Rule 1 is preceded by the words ‘appearance and application’. The term ‘act’ there appears to have been used in the technical sense and not in the ordinary sense as being referable to any action by any party”.

    The learned Single Judge thereafter has proceeded to observe that interpretation of the expression in some other enactment could not be relied upon to construe that the word ‘act’ must have a similar meaning in the Act under consideration.

    7. The objects and reasons clause of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act does not also throw any light on the expression to “appear” and “act”. It may he noted that the word “appear” and “act” is also used under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, an Act which came into force much before the enactment of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. Earlier the expression used was to appear. Thereafter by amendment the word “act” has also been included. The only question is whether the expression “appear” or “act” in S. 23 of the Act must be so read so as to mean to plead, argue and/or conduct the proceedings and excludes assistance by office-bearers of a trade union to legal practitioners. Section 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act is nothing but a recognition of the long standing practice whereby the employers and unions either as a matter of practice or by settlement have been permitting office-bearers to represent the union in various proceedings wherein disputes of collective nature and/or disputes connected with the rights of the members or unions. Such practice has been existing for a long time and has been understood as a necessary part of collective bargaining inasmuch as it would be the office-bearers of the union who would be best equipped to represent the interests of the members of the union by themselves or instruct pleaders and advocates to appear on their behalf. Section 23 of the Act, therefore, is a statutory recognition of this prevailing practice whereby the office-bearers used to act for the union in the proceedings.

    8. Thus on the one hand in the case of Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel, [A.I.R 1955 Bom. 262] (vide supra), it has been held that the act of pleading would include the right of audience, the right to address the Court, the right to examine and cross-examine the witnesses. Further it has been noticed in the same judgment that there is a distinction between appearing, pleading or acting and appearing or acting. In the case of Anglo French Drug Company (Eastern) (Private) Ltd., [A.I.R 1959 Bom. 21] (vide supra), the word “act” has been construed as including an act of making an application, the act of leading evidence or an act of pleading before the Registrar. At the same time it has been pointed out in the said judgment that merely because the expression “act” is construed in a particular manner in one legislation does not mean that the same meaning should be assigned while construing another legislation. In the case of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court the word “appearance” has been construed as to mean to appear or act and plead. Considering the above judgments what is the meaning that can be assigned to the word “act” under the Act for the purpose of construing S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P, Act. Two different expressions had been used namely to appear or act. If the words had the same meaning there would have been no need to use the words in the alternative. Therefore, the word “act” would have to be considered bearing in mind that S. 23 of the Act also uses the expression to appear and further that there is no provision in the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act barring the appearance of lawyers before the Courts constituted under the Act. If the word appear is to be construed in the manner as construed by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court then the word “appear” has to be read into the word “act”. However, as S. 23 use both expressions “appear” and “act” the word appear should necessarily exclude the word “act”. If the word “appear” includes to plead as construed in the case of Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel (vide supra), that would include all acts including the act of audience, the right to address the Court and the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses. In that even the word “act” would mean to construe acts which do not form part of pleading. However, in the case of Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel (vide supra), the word act has also been construed to mean the act of making an application, the act of leading evidence and the act of pleadings, in which event the same meaning as assigned to the word appearing would have to be assigned to the word act. When a Legislature uses two different expressions the legislative intent must be given effect to and the two expressions will have to be so considered. The terminology in S. 23 is “appear” or “act”. In this context the word “act” will have to be given its general meaning of acting for and/or on behalf of. Acting on behalf of, would mean doing such acts on behalf of a party, in the instant case a trade union. The word “act” in S. 23 of the Act, would therefore, contemplate that the office-bearers of the union can do such acts in pursuance of complaints filed before the Industrial Court and/or before the other authorities. This necessarily need not include addressing the Court, examining, cross-examining the witnesses, etc., which would be covered by the expression “appear”. Therefore, all such other acts which are not contemplated by the expression “appear” would form part of the work “act”. In these circumstances “act” would include briefing lawyers, appearing in the Court like any other litigant when the matter is placed for hearing. It need not mean arguing the matter, examining or cross-examining the witnesses. It can include verification of pleadings, filing of affidavits, presenting of applications and all such acts that a party does in proceeding with a suit including remaining present in a Court when the matter is fixed before the Court so that the matter is not dismissed for non-appearance or proceeded with ex parte.

    8-A. Thus considering the expression “act” and the object for which the section has been enacted it must be necessarily held that the expression “act” would include the acts of representing, act of instructing and such other acts as are required for the purpose of presenting the case of the trade union or members of the trade union before the relevant authorities. It has to be borne in mind that the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act as given recognition to what is called “recognised union”. The Legislature cannot be said to be unaware or the fact that most union office bearers themselves are not well versed in laws and further unlike the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 wherein representation by legal practitioners is excluded except with the permission of the other party, there is no such provision in M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. In the light of this the word “act” must mean the ordinary expression of acting on behalf of the party. Once the word “act” is so considered then under S. 23 of the Act the office-bearers who represent the union in such proceedings are entitled for the salary for the entire day. In these circumstances the action of the petitioners was clearly in contravention of item (9) of Sch. IV of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act.

    9. Further contention is that the deductions made though the certificate produced did not show that the office-bearers had acted or appeared. There is no form provided for by the Act or the rules to indicate in what manner under S. 23 of the act a certificate has to be issued. In the absence of that, all that is required is proof of the fact that the office-bearers were present on the day when the proceedings were pending before the Court. The certificate produced by the office-bearers of the respondent 2 in these circumstances was sufficient to hold that on the particular-day for which the deduction has been made they had in fact acted on behalf of the union.

    10. In the light of the above the other arguments pertaining to previous practice, etc., need not be considered. Once it is held that respondent 2 is a recognised union, the office-bearers in terms of S. 23 were entitled to act and appear on behalf of the union. Therefore, the case clearly falls under S. 23 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act.

    11. For all the aforesaid reasons there is no merit in the writ petition. Rule discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Madura Coats Ltd., And Another v. S.L Mehendle, Member, Industrial Court, And Another
    (Aug 13, 1997)