1. By this petitioners seek to challenge the order passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (the CEGAT) insofar as it relates to the rate of duty of excise applicable to the product known as Vernatan R-7.
2. The learned Counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this writ petition on the ground that under Section 35L of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, (the Act) appeal has been provided against such order to the Supreme Court. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, in view of the specific provision for appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of the CEGAT regarding determination of the question relating to excise duty, the proper remedy is to go to Supreme Court and not to challenge the order in this Court by way of writ petition. The learned Counsel for the petitioners fairly conceded before us that the impugned order of the Tribunal is appealable before the Supreme Court in view of Section 35L of the Act. He, however, stated that in view of the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others - , the order can also be challenged in the High Court by way of writ petition. According to the learned Counsel, availability of alternate remedy to the Supreme Court is no bar to exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Counsel further submits that in the instant case, appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 35L is barred by limitation and that being so, the only remedy available to the petitioners is to challenge the order by way of writ petition before this Court.
3. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. We however, do not find any force in the same. The admitted position in this case is that an appeal is provided against the impugned order of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Act. Since the Legislature has provided appeal against certain orders only to Supreme Court, in our opinion, it is not open to the aggrieved person to by pass the remedy provided by the Legislature by way of appeal to the Supreme Court and come to the High Court and try to challenge the same before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We are of the clear opinion that in such a situation, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition challenging the order against which appeal is provided only to Supreme Court because it would amount to usurping the powers of the Supreme Court in the guise of exercise of writ jurisdiction. In view of the above, we do not find any reason to entertain this writ petition of the petitioners.
4. So far as the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners should be allowed to challenge the order by way of writ petition because the appeal to Supreme Court under Section 35L is barred by limitation is concerned, we find the same to be totally misconceived. If the appeal is barred by limitation, the remedy available is to move the Supreme Court for condonation of delay if there are sufficient grounds to do so. Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the appropriate remedy.
5. In view of the above, this writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.