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  • provisions of Order 7, Rule 10-B of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two appellants — Shri Balaji Traders and Suraj Salt Traders (referred to as "the plaintiffs") — filed Special Civil Suit No. 110 of 1995 and Special Civil Suit No. 109 of 1995 respectively before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Amravati. The suits were instituted against (i) Maharashtra State Electricity Board (defendant No. 1) and (ii) Indian Bank (defendant No. 2). The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and prohibitory injunctions to restrain defendant No. 1 from invoking bank guarantees (each for Rs. 5,00,000) and to restrain defendant No. 2 from making payment under those guarantees. The background facts pleaded were that the plaintiffs' tenders for supply of common salt (Industrial Grade-2) to various Thermal Power Stations were accepted, work orders were issued (contract values quoted as Rs. 81,61,600 and Rs. 89,41,800 respectively), and because of unforeseen sharp increases in market prices the plaintiffs claimed entitlement to price adjustments. The plaintiffs feared that defendant No. 1 would invoke the bank guarantees executed by them with defendant No. 2 at Amravati. Applications under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC accompanied the plaints and an ex parte ad interim injunction was granted by the trial Court.

Defendant No. 1 objected to the territorial jurisdiction of the Amravati Court, relying on clause 11 of Section II of the tender/contract that provided that "The Court of Bombay shall have exclusive jurisdiction on all matters and disputes, if any, arising under the said contract." The trial Court held that it had no territorial jurisdiction and returned the plaints for institution in the proper Court. The plaintiffs appealed from that order; these two appeals were heard together and are the subject of the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Court at Amravati had territorial jurisdiction to try the suits in view of clause 11 of Section II of the contract between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1, which stated that "The Court of Bombay shall have exclusive jurisdiction on all matters and disputes, if any, arising under the said contract."
  2. Whether the bank-guarantee agreements between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 2 (which contain a clause that "the Court in Bombay will have jurisdiction") are the relevant documents for deciding territorial jurisdiction or whether the primary contract between plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 governs the question of forum.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Shri V.C. Daga)

  • The trial Court erred in holding it had no territorial jurisdiction; the judge misread the relevant ouster clause.
  • The relevant clause for determining jurisdiction is the clause in the bank-guarantee agreements executed at Amravati with defendant No. 2, not the clause in the contract between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1.
  • The bank-guarantee contract is independent of the main supply contract; because the bank-guarantee agreements were executed at Amravati and did not use words that would amount to a specific ouster of Amravati jurisdiction, the Amravati Court retains jurisdiction.
  • The phrase used in the bank-guarantee agreements — "the Court in Bombay will have jurisdiction" — does not, according to the appellants' counsel, necessarily oust the jurisdiction of the Amravati Court without explicit words like "only" or "exclusive".
  • Reliance was placed on several authorities (e.g., National Starch and Chemicals v. Weikfield Products Co. (India), Sponge Iron India Ltd. v. Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd., East India Transport Agency v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., A.B.C Leminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, Abdulla Bin Ali v. Galappa) to support the contention that ouster clauses must be specific and that the plaint's allegations determine forum.

Defendant No. 1's Arguments (Maharashtra State Electricity Board)

  • There is a clear and unambiguous clause in the tender agreement (clause 11 of Section II) making the Courts at Bombay exclusively competent: "The Court of Bombay shall have exclusive jurisdiction on all matters and disputes, if any, arising under the said contract."
  • The tender was floated at Bombay, the plaintiffs submitted tenders at Bombay and completed formalities there, and bank-guarantees were furnished at Bombay. Hence no part of the cause of action arose within Amravati's territorial jurisdiction.
  • On this basis the trial Court lacked jurisdiction and the ad interim injunction should be vacated.

Defendant No. 2 / Bank

  • The record shows no substantive contest by defendant No. 2 on the jurisdiction issue in opposition to the transfer application; counsel for respondent No. 2 (Indian Bank) had no objection to the plaintiffs' application to file the plaints in the proper Court at Bombay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Starch and Chemicals v. Weikfield Products Co. (India), AIR 1990 Ker 291 Ouster clause must be specific to exclude jurisdiction of another Court; absence of words like "only" or "exclusively" may not constitute an ouster. The court acknowledged the rule but held the authority inapplicable on the facts of this case (it observed that the facts in that case differed from the present dispute).
Suresh Arjundas Bakhtiani v. Union of India, 1991 Bank Journal 618 Authority referenced by appellants in support of their submissions about forum and ouster clauses. The court treated this authority as not consequential for the present facts and therefore not helpful to the appellant's case.
Sponge Iron India Ltd. v. Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd., AIR 1989 AP 206 Where a clause states "subject to jurisdiction of the Bangalore Courts" without specific ouster language, other Courts may also have jurisdiction. The court noted the principle but found it did not support the appellant because clause 11 of Section II in the present contract expressly used "exclusively" in relation to Bombay Courts.
East India Transport Agency v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 AP 53 Referenced by appellant; concerned different factual/legal questions (not interpretation of an ouster clause). The court held that this authority was not relevant to the facts of the present dispute.
A.B.C. Leminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163 : AIR 1989 SC 1239 General authority referenced by counsel on forum and clauses; appellant relied on this among others. The court mentioned this authority in the list of cases relied on by the appellant but did not apply it directly to alter the court's conclusion on jurisdiction.
Abdulla Bin Ali v. Galappa, (1985) 2 SCC 54 : AIR 1985 SC 577 Principle that the allegations in the plaint are decisive for determining the appropriate forum. The court expressly agreed with and followed this principle: since the plaint framed the dispute as arising under the contract between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1, the contract's jurisdiction clause was determinative.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in the following steps (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Identify the real controversy pleaded in the plaints: The court examined the plaints and concluded that the substantive dispute was the right to price adjustment and alleged contractual liability between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 (the Board). The plaintiffs' principal contention related to the contractual relationship with defendant No. 1 and not to any dispute with defendant No. 2 (the Bank) regarding the bank-guarantee agreements.
  2. Determine the relevant document for deciding jurisdiction: Because the substantive dispute arose out of the main contract between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1, the court held that the terms of that contract (including clause 11 of Section II) were the relevant source for deciding territorial jurisdiction. The bank-guarantee agreements between the plaintiffs and the bank were held to be irrelevant for that determination because there was no dispute recorded between the plaintiffs and the bank about the guarantees, nor had the bank repudiated its obligations.
  3. Interpretation of the ouster clause (clause 11, Section II): The court read clause 11 of Section II which stated that "The Court of Bombay shall have exclusive jurisdiction on all matters and disputes, if any, arising under the said contract." The court placed weight on the use of the word "exclusively" and concluded that this language indicated an intended exclusion of other Courts' jurisdiction (including Amravati).
  4. Assessment of authorities relied on by the appellants: The court considered the authorities cited by the appellants. It accepted the general propositions from cases like National Starch (that an ouster must be clear and specific) and Abdulla Bin Ali (that plaint allegations decide the forum), but concluded that many of the cited authorities were factually distinguishable or inapplicable to the present case. The court found Abdulla Bin Ali's principle directly applicable and followed it: the plaint framed the dispute as arising under the contract with defendant No. 1, invoking the contract's forum clause.
  5. Consequence: On the basis above, the court held that the trial Court correctly concluded it had no territorial jurisdiction and was therefore justified in returning the plaints for institution in the competent Court (Bombay). The trial Court's order dated 26th June, 1995 (below Exhibit 21) was confirmed.
  6. Ancillary matters: The court noted that the trial Court had, on its own, observed that the bank was not a necessary party; the appellate court did not consider or decide that finding on merits because the trial Court had decided the matter on territorial jurisdiction grounds only.
  7. Practical directions under Order 7, Rule 10-B CPC: On the appellants' application under Order 7, Rule 10-B CPC, and with no objection from counsel for respondent No. 2, the court directed that the plaints be collected from the Amravati Court on 1st September, 1995 and presented before the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Bombay, on 4th September, 1995, with both parties to appear before that Court on 4th September, 1995.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals were dismissed and the order of the trial Court (holding it had no territorial jurisdiction and returning the plaints) was confirmed. The operative orders directed re-presentation of the plaints in the City Civil Court, Bombay, on specified dates. The final operative line of the opinion states: "Appeals dismissed."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The plaintiffs' suits cannot be tried in the Amravati Court; the plaints were to be transferred (collected and presented) to the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Bombay, with parties to appear on the specified date. The trial Court's return of the plaints was upheld.
  • On precedent and broader law: The court applied settled principles about forum selection clauses and the emphasis that the plaint's averments determine the forum (citing Abdulla Bin Ali). The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent; it applies existing principles to the particular facts and contractual language before the court.
  • Costs: Both appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Balaji Traders, Amravati v. Indian Bank, Amravati And Another

    1. Admit. Heard finally with the consent of the parties.

    2. Both these appeals can be disposed of by this common judgment since the facts and grounds raised therein are common.

    3. The present two appeals are against the order passed by the trial Court, holding that it has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suits and on that count directing the return of the plaints for institution in the proper Court.

    4. The appellant in Appeal from Order No. 44 of 1995 — Shri Balaji Traders and the appellant in Appeal from Order No. 45 of 1995, Suraj Salt Traders (hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiffs’) have filed Special Civil Suit No. 110 of 1995 and Special Civil Suit No. 109 of 1995 respectively, before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Amravati, impleading therein the first respondent-Indian Bank (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendant No. 2’) and the second respondent-Maharashtra State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendant No. 1’). These were the suits for declaration and injunctions and the plaintiffs had sought a declaration that unless and until request of the plaintiffs about variations and escalation in the price is decided by the defendant No. 1, either way, the defendant No. 1 cannot be allowed or permitted to fasten any liability or allege any breach as against the plaintiffs under any pretext and that on such contentions the defendant No. 1 be declared as not entitled to invoke the bank-guarantee or claim amount from the defendant No. 2 under any pretext. In that, the injunction of a prohibitory nature was prayed for against the defendant No. 1 restraining it from invoking the bank-guarantee, and by a further prayer, even an injunction was claimed against the defendant No. 2-Bank restraining it from making payment to the defendant No. 1 under the garb of the bank-guarantee.

    5. Shortly stated, the case of the plaintiffs was that the defendant No. 1 had invited the tender from the reputed businessmen for supply of the common salt Industrial Grade-2 to the various Thermal Power Stations. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs had submitted the tender forms and ultimately their tenders were accepted and the work-orders were issued to them. The total value was to the tune of Rs. 81,61,600/- in respect of the plaintiff Shri Balaji Traders and Rs. 89,41,800/- in respect of plaintiff Suraj Salt Traders, and the supply of the same salt was to be made to various Thermal Power Stations under the defendant No. 1. It is pleaded that there was a clause for the bank-guarantee which was to be given in lieu of the security deposit, for the contract. The giving of the bank-guarantee would have saved the plaintiffs from depositing any cash, the earnest money or the security deposit. The bank-guarantee was for Rs. 5,00,000/- invokable at the instance of the defendant No. 1, in case of any breach of the contract on the part of the plaintiffs. It was contended by the plaintiffs further in their plaints that because of the unforeseen circumstances, the rates of the said goods zoomed up, thereby making the contract completely non-feasible for them and inviting great financial debacle for them. In that view of the matter, it is further contended that they represented to the authorities of the defendant No. 1 to consider these aspects of the unprecedented zoom in the prices. In short, it has been spelt out in the plaints that the plaintiffs were liable to get the prices adjusted. The further part of the plaints is rather interesting. It says that on account of the plaintiffs' request for the adjustment in prices having made to the defendant No. 1, the defendant No. 1 was likely to proceed ahead and invoke the bank-guarantees issued by the defendant No. 2, which they had executed at Amravati with the defendant No. 2-Bank, and the defendant No. 2-Bank was likely to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- each to the defendant No. 1, in pursuance of those hank-guarantees, for which separate agreements were entered into by the plaintiffs with the defendant No. 2. The plaintiffs pleaded that this invoking of the bank-guarantee at the instance of the defendant No. 1, the beneficiary, should be restrained by the Court. In order to spell out the jurisdiction, in para-16 of both the plaints, the plaintiffs averred that the said bank-guarantees have been issued at Amravati, where they could be invoked by lodging the claim with the defendant No. 2-Bank. Since the defendant No. 2-Bank was operating within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Amravati, the trial Court had the necessary jurisdiction to try the suit. In short, though tacitly the plaintiffs have almost admitted the breach of contract on their part, they averred that the bank-guarantees should not be allowed to be invoked.

    6. Along with the suits, applications under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, were also filed and the trial Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiffs.

    7. At the outset, the defendant No. 1 came out with an objection, vide Exhibit 15, whereby it objected to the territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court and on that count sought the vacation of the ad interim injunction order. In its application, the defendant No. 1 averred that in the tender agreement under clause 11 of section II, there was a specific clause regarding the jurisdiction, in case of the disputes between the parties regarding the contract, and the clause was as under:—

    “The Court of Bombay shall have exclusive jurisdiction on all matters and disputes, if any, arising under the said contract.”

    8. It was claimed that since the tender was floated at Bombay by the defendant No. 1, since the plaintiffs gave their tender forms at Bombay; since all other formalities regarding the tenders were completed at Bombay and since the bank-guarantees issued from defendant No. 2 was furnished by the plaintiffs to the defendant No. 1 at Bombay itself, there was no part of cause of action which had arisen in the territorial jurisdiction of Amravati Court, and it was on that account, the Court at Amravati had no jurisdiction to try the suits, let apart issuing any injunction order. It was averred in the said application that the language of the ouster clause of the jurisdiction was absolutely clear and unambiguous and, therefore, there was no question of any injunction being issued by the Amravati Court, particularly because of lack of its territorial jurisdiction. There are other averments made in the reply regarding the merits of the injunction order, but that will not deter me here and I do not consider it necessary to reproduce the same, since the matter was disposed of only on the question of territorial jurisdiction.

    9. The trial Court came to the conclusion, on the basis of the averments in the plaintiffs and other documents produced before it, that it had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suits. The trial Court, therefore, passed the order below Exhibit-21, holding that it had no jurisdiction and, therefore, returning the plaints to the plaintiffs for the institution in the competent Court. It is this order which is challenged by the appellants in these two appeals.

    10. Shri V.C Daga, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in both the appeals, strenuously contended that the trial Court had committed an error of law in holding that it had no jurisdiction. According to him, the trial Court had not read the ouster clause properly and, in that, he contended that, in fact, the clause on which the trial Court relied, being clause 11 of section II, was not the relevant clause but, according to him, the relevant clause was in the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 2-Bank for the bank-guarantees. He contended that, as a matter of fact, the contract of the bank-guarantees was an independent contract of the original contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 and, therefore, since the agreements of bank guarantees were executed at Amravati and since those agreements did not in any manner have a specific ouster clause, it should have been held that the Amravati Court had the jurisdiction. According to Shri Daga, for the purposes of deciding as to whether the trial Court had the jurisdiction or not, the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 was irrelevant. His case is that since the trial Court has not relied upon proper documents and has not properly read the document on which it has relied there is an error committed by the trial Court.

    11. At the outset, Shri Daga takes me to the contract of bank-guarantee and points out the concerned clause regarding the jurisdiction which runs as under:—

    “In case of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the extension or encashment of Bank Guarantee, the Court in Bombay will have jurisdiction.”

    12. Shri Daga vehemently contends that this clause may create a jurisdiction in Bombay Court, but it nowhere ousts the jurisdiction of the Amravati Court and, therefore, the trial Court has completely erred in misreading this clause. According to Shri Daga, the ouster of jurisdiction clause has to be definite and conclusive and the Court, before dealing with an ouster clause, must come to a definite opinion that the parties to the contract agreed that the jurisdiction of a particular Court was completely ousted. Unless there is such a finding, there could not be any ouster of jurisdiction of the Court, which ordinarily has jurisdiction. In order to buttress his contention, Shri Daga relied upon National Starch and Chemicals v. Weikfield Products Co. (India), AIR 1990 Ker 291. The learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court has held in this case that unless the language of the ouster clause is specific so as to exclude the jurisdiction of a particular Court expressly, the ouster cannot be held. In that case, the dispute was whether the jurisdiction of the Trivandrum Sub Court was excluded specifically. In that ease, the language was in the following form:

    “Transactions are subject to Poona jurisdiction.”

    13. There was no specific ouster of Trivandrum Sub-Court's jurisdiction, inasmuch as there was no mention of the words, ‘only’, ‘exclusively’ etc., while restricting the jurisdiction to Poona Court. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge held that it could not be said that there was an ouster of Trivandrum Sub Court's jurisdiction which also have jurisdiction to try the suit. There can be no dispute with the law laid down in this judgment.

    14. However, the question is as to which clause is to be considered while considering the ouster of jurisdiction. Shri Daga also relied on three other cases, viz., AIR 1989 AP 206, Sponge Iron India Ltd. v. Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd., Bangalore; AIR 1991 AP 53, East India Transport Agency, Hyderabad v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., and (1989) 2 SCC 163 : AIR 1989 SC 1239, A.B.C Leminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P Agencies, Salem. I shall deal with these cases a little later. However, before dealing with these cases, it will have to be seen as to which particular clause is relevant to the present case for deciding the jurisdiction of the Court.

    15. In order to decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration sought for by him, the Court will have to consider the terms of agreement and contract between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1.Board. The bank guarantee agreements between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 2 are wholly irrelevant for deciding the controversy in the suits. A mere reading of the plaints clearly brings out that position wherein it has been averred that under the terms of the contract in between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1, the defendant No. 1 was not justified in invoking the bank-guarantees. Indeed nothing depends upon the clause of furnishing bank-guarantees, while deciding the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 arising out of the contract agreement. Now, this contract agreement does have the ouster clause in shape of clause 11 in section II. The very language of that clause, if it is to be read, suggests that there is a complete ouster of the jurisdiction of any other Courts, except the Courts at Bombay. The use of the word ‘exclusively’ would unhesitatingly point out such intended ouster of jurisdiction. Indeed, Shri Daga was also not able to suggest that there could be any other language and there could be any other interpretation of this clause suggesting no such ouster. However, his contention is that it is not that clause which is liable to be read for deciding as to whether the jurisdiction of the Court at Amravati was intended to be ousted. He relied upon the bank-guarantee agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 2 and suggested that in those agreements, there is a clause which does not specifically spell out any ouster or jurisdiction. He suggested that in the bank-guarantee agreements, though it is said that the Court at Bombay will have the jurisdiction, it need not necessarily oust the jurisdiction of the Amravati Court where the bank-guarantee agreements have been executed. The argument is absolutely incorrect. In the present case, there is no dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 2-Bank in respect of the bank-guarantees, in the sense, once the plaintiffs have furnished the bank-guarantees, it has not come on the record that the defendant No. 2-Bank in any manner tried to avoid its responsibility to pay the amount agreed under the bank-guarantees, to the defendant No. 1. It is also not that the defendant No. 2-Bank has in any manner repudiated the bank-guarantee agreements in any manner. Now, therefore, merely because there is a formality of a bank-guarantee agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1, it cannot be said that the present suits involve any question regarding the bank-guarantee agreements between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1. The whole tenor of the plaints shows that it is the contention of the plaintiffs that the only substantial agreement which is in question is the agreement of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1, and not the other bank-guarantee agreement. Therefore, these two are distinct and separate agreements. Yet, it cannot be said that in the present suits what is being averred is the breach of the bank-guarantee agreements, in any manner. The relevant document, therefore, would be, not the bank-guarantee agreement regarding which there is no dispute at all, but the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1. If this view of the matter is taken, then there is no question of the jurisdiction clause in the bank guarantee-agreements, being either read or considered. According to me, that clause would be wholly irrelevant for the purposes of the present controversy.

    16. Now, for this precise reason, the other authorities relied upon by Shri Daga, viz., National Starch and Chemicals v. Weikfield Products Co. (India), AIR 1990 Ker 291 and Suresh Arjundas Bakhtiani v. Union of India, 1991 Bank Journal 618, would be of no consequence, inasmuch as in these two matters, the ouster clauses, which were considered, were the part and parcel of the contract agreement. Such is not the case here. As regards the other authority relied upon by Shri Daga, viz., East India Transport Agency, Hyderabad v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 AP 53, really speaking this authority is not relevant to the facts of the present dispute, at all. There is no question of the interpretation of any ouster clause in this case. Another authority relied upon by Shri Daga is Sponge Iron India Ltd. v. Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd., Bangalore, AIR 1989 AP 206. Here also the purchase order included the condition — “subject to jurisdiction of the Bangalore Courts”. There was no specific ouster of the other Courts. Holding that there was no such specific ouster, and in order to exclude the jurisdiction of any Court, the ouster clause must be specific, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that not only the Bangalore Court but the other concerned Court had also the necessary jurisdiction to try the suit. I do not see how Mr. Daga takes support from this case, particularly because of the finding that in clause 11 of section II of the relevant agreement, there is a specific mention of the Bombay Courts having the jurisdiction exclusively. Last, but not the least, Shri Daga relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Abdulla Bin Ali v. Galappa, (1985) 2 SCC 54 : AIR 1985 SC 577. In fact, the gravamen of this case is that it is the allegations in the plaint which really decide the forum. I undoubtedly agree and respectfully follow the same. If the contents of the plaints in the present case are to be seen, that it would be clear that for reading the ouster clause, one has to go to the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 only, and not to the bank-guarantee agreements. The said case, therefore, does not help Shri Daga. The other judgments, according to Shri Daga, follow the same view expressed by the Apex Court in Abdulla Bin Ali's case and, therefore, they need not be referred to.

    17. In short, it is found that the only clause which could have been read would be the clause in the agreement dated 4-1-1995, at serial No. 11, in section II, which clearly spells out the ouster of Amravati Court's jurisdiction and, therefore, it will have to be held that the trial Court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In that view of the matter, the order of the trial Court dated 26th June, 1995, below Exhibit 21 in Special Civil Suit No. 110 of 1995 and 190 of 1995 is confirmed.

    18. Shri Daga points out that the trial Court has on its own held that the bank is not a necessary party to the suits and if the order is confirmed as it is, that finding may adversely affect him in further stage of litigation. He is not right in his submission. The finding given regarding the bank not being a necessary party is not considered in this appeal on merits, as the trial Court could not have considered that question because of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

    19. At this stage, Shri V.C Daga, learned Counsel for the appellants in both the Appeals, files an application under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 10-B of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein he prays that this Court should direct the plaints to be filed in the proper Court at Bombay and fix a date for the appearance of the parties in that Court. Shri K.H Deshpande, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 in both the Appeals, has no objection to this prayer. In that view of the matter, the application is allowed. The appellants in both the appeals are directed to present the plaints in question before the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court at Bombay, after collecting them (plaints) from the 3rd Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division), Amravati. The plaints shall be collected from the Amravati Court on 1st September, 1995 and shall be presented in the Court of the Principal Judge. City Civil Court, Bombay, on 4th September, 1995. The parties are directed to appear before the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Bombay, on 4th September, 1995. With these observations, both the appeals are dismissed with no order as to the costs.

    20. Hamdast of the operative part of the order is granted.

    Appeals dismissed.
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    Balaji Traders, Amravati v. Indian Bank, Amravati And Another
    (Aug 30, 1995)