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  • section 394(e)(i) read with Schedule M, Part IV of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (the Act)
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  • section 394(e)(i) read with Schedule M, Part IV of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (the Act)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners, including a Sports Club, challenged the requirement to obtain a licence under section 394(e)(i) read with Schedule M, Part IV of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, on the ground that the Club does not carry on any activity of an Eating House as defined under the Act. The Club promotes yachting and maintains a Dining Room exclusively for its members and their guests, without engaging in trade or profit-making activities related to food service. Despite lacking the requisite licence, the petitioners were prosecuted under section 394(1)(e)(i) read with section 471 of the Act. The Metropolitan Magistrate convicted the Club and imposed a fine of Rs. 250/-. The Club appealed, and the appellate court upheld the conviction, relying on precedents that held profit motive or accessibility to the public are not necessary attributes of trade or business.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Club’s Dining Room activity constitutes an "Eating House" under section 394(e)(i) read with Schedule M, Part IV of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, thereby requiring a licence.
  2. Whether the absence of a profit motive or public accessibility exempts the Club’s Dining Room from the licensing requirement under the Act.
  3. Whether the conviction and fine imposed on the Club for carrying on the trade without a licence should be upheld or set aside.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Club’s principal activity is promoting yachting, and the Dining Room is maintained solely as a facility for members and occasionally their guests, not as a trade or business.
  • The Dining Room is managed internally by the Club without engaging any contractor and is not operated for profit or gain.
  • The definition of "Eating House" under section 3(ff) of the Act requires that food be supplied for consumption on the premises for profit or gain, which does not apply to the Club’s Dining Room.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor Of Delhi and the principle that absence of profit motive and public accessibility exempts such premises from licensing requirements.
  • The Club’s Dining Room is a domestic arrangement incidental to the sporting activity and does not exhibit characteristics of trade or business.

Respondent/Appellate Court's Reasoning

  • The appellate court relied on precedents including Boots Company (India) Ltd. v. B.M.C and State of Maharashtra v. M.P Kamat, which held that profit motive or public accessibility are not necessary attributes of trade or business for the purpose of licensing.
  • The appellate court confirmed the conviction and fine imposed by the Metropolitan Magistrate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Boots Company (India) Ltd. v. B.M.C (Misc. Petition No. 399 of 1977, dated 5th August 1980) Profit motive or public accessibility are not necessary attributes of trade or business under the licensing provisions. The appellate court relied on this principle to uphold the conviction of the Club despite absence of profit motive or public accessibility.
State of Maharashtra v. M.P Kamat (Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 1972, dated 21st November 1973) Clarified the attributes of trade or business relevant to licensing under the Act. Followed by the appellate court to confirm the conviction.
Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor Of Delhi (1978) 4 SCC 36 : AIR 1978 SC 1591 Interpretation of "Eating House" and exemption from licensing where no profit motive or public access exists. Relied upon by petitioners’ counsel to argue that the Club’s Dining Room is not an eating house requiring licence.
Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union v. The Management of the Gymkhana (AIR 1968 SC 554) A club serving only its members is not an industry or trade even if catering to material needs of a community section. Used to support the argument that the Club’s Dining Room is a self-serving institution incidental to its main sporting activity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory provisions defining "Eating House" under section 3(ff) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, emphasizing the requirement that food be supplied for profit or gain to the public. It noted that the Club’s Dining Room is exclusively for members and occasional guests, managed internally without contractor involvement, and not operated for profit. The court recognized the Dining Room as a domestic facility incidental to the Club’s principal activity of promoting yachting. Applying precedents, the court found that absence of profit motive and public accessibility excludes the Dining Room from licensing requirements under section 394(1)(e)(i) of the Act. However, the court declined to interfere with the conviction and fine imposed by the lower courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, limiting its relief to declaring that the Club is not liable to obtain the licence for the Dining Room.

Holding and Implications

The petitioners' claim that the Club’s Dining Room does not attract the licensing requirement under section 394(1)(e)(i) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, is upheld. The court held that the Dining Room is a domestic facility incidental to the Club’s main sporting activity and not an "Eating House" under the Act.

However, the court refused to interfere with the conviction and fine imposed by the lower courts. Thus, while the Club is not liable to obtain a licence for the Dining Room going forward, the past conviction stands. No new precedent was set beyond the clarification of the licensing applicability to such club facilities.

    Sohrab Vakil (Lt. Col.) And Another v. B.G Pimple And Another

    A.A Desai, J.:— In these proceedings, the petitioners, inter alia, claim that the Club does not carry any activity of Eating House as envisaged under section 394(e)(i) read with Schedule M, Part IV of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (‘the Act’) and hence, in the absence of licence under the relevant provisions, are not henceforth liable to be prosecuted.

    2. The petitioner No. 2 a Sports Club, amongst others, principally carries an activity of promoting Yachting. To facilitate its members, the Club maintains a Dining Room. The petitioners since did not possess the requisite licence were prosecuted for the offence under section 394(1)(e)(i) read with section 471 of the Act. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate on conviction, awarded a fine of Rs. 250/-. The Club carried an appeal. The appellate Judge has mainly placed reliance on a decision dated 5th August, 1980 delivered in Misc. Petition No. 399 of 1977, The Boots Company (India) Ltd. v. B.M.C, which has broadly followed the principle laid down in a decision (delivered by Tulzapurkar, J.) dated 21st November, 1973 in Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 1972, State of Maharashtra v. M.P Kamat. It is observed therein that profit motive or accessibility to the public are not necessary attributes of trade or business. The appellate Court confirmed the conviction and sentence.

    3. Mr. Chandrachud, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-Club, particularly invited our attention to:

    “Section 394(1)(e)—Except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence granted by the Commissioner, no person shall carry on or allow or suffer to be carried on, in or upon any premises—

    (i) any of the trades specified in Part IV of Schedule M…”

    The Schedule Entry—

    “Trades or processes or operations connected with trades which shall not be carried on or allowed to be carried on in or upon any premises without a licence.”

    Section 3(ff) — “Eating House” “means any premises to which the public are admitted and where any kind of food is prepared or supplied for consumption on the premises for the profit or gain of any person owning or having an interest in or managing such premises.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    4. Learned counsel mainly stressed upon the phraseography on which emphasis is supplied. He pointed out that as an undisputed position, as per the Constitution of the Club, the services of the Dining Room are restricted to its members and they are occasionally availed by the guests of the members. The management of the Dining Room is carried by the Club. The services of a contractor have not been engaged. The Club does not run the Dining Room by way of trade.

    5. The Club is not required to obtain a requisite licence. In support, reliance is placed on a decision in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor Of Delhi., (1978) 4 SCC 36 : AIR 1978 SC 1591.

    6. The predominant activity of the Club is to promote and to provide facilities to the members for a sporting activity known as Yachting. To carry out this activity successfully, the Club has incidentally provided the Dining Room. It is exclusively meant for the members and is also managed by the members. As such, they serve themselves. As required by defining clause (ff) of section 3 of the Act, it does not cater the needs of any outsider or members of the public. Apparently, Dining Room is a domestic device of the Club, which is incidental to principal activity of sport. The Supreme Court in The Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union v. The Management of the Gymkhana, AIR 1968 SC 554 held that—

    “the club was only a member's club and a member's self-serving institution and not an industry. No doubt the material needs or wants of a section of the community were catered for but that was not enough as it was not done as part of trade or business or as an undertaking analogous to trade or business.”

    7. The Dining Room is maintained as facility to the members-participants in Yachting. It could not be in that sense an eating house carried by way of trade, which is considered to be unimpeachable character envisaged under the relevant provisions referred to hereinbefore. Since the Dining Room is a domestic arrangement only for members of the Club, purport of maintaining any hygienic standard, etc. cannot be solicited. Activity of Dining Room does not represent any characteristic of trade, including profit motivation. Obtaining licence by or for such Dining Room cannot rationally be insisted. We, therefore, hold that the activity known as ‘Dining Room’ of the petitioner Club does not attract, in any manner, clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 394 of the Act. As such, the petitioner-Club is not liable to obtain the licence required for eating house under the relevant provisions.

    8. The petitioners further claim for setting aside of the order of conviction passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, which is confirmed by the learned appellate Court. However, we do not propose to interfere with the conviction in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The relief in this regard is hereby rejected.

    9. The rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (b). However, there will be no order as to costs.

    Order accordingly.
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    Comments

    Sohrab Vakil (Lt. Col.) And Another v. B.G Pimple And Another
    (Sep 18, 1992)