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  • sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956.48.
  • sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act.13.
  • sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act
  • section 433(f) of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956.48.
  • sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act.13.
  • sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act
  • section 433(f) of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a petition under sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking winding up of Solitaire Hotels Pvt. Ltd., a private company incorporated in 1985 whose main object was to own and operate a hotel at Reis Mages, Porvorim, Goa. The petitioner (an estate broker and financier from Bombay) invested about Rs. 8 lakhs and became a director with an intended one‑third stake. The petitioner alleged mismanagement, secret sale/allotment of shares to a new investor (the "Rao group"), fabrication of records, denial of access to company documents, and other conduct contrary to a memorandum of understanding agreed among director groups.

Procedurally, the petition was filed circa 15 February 1991; interim directions were given restraining a proposed extraordinary general meeting to remove the petitioner as director. A commissioner inspected the hotel and reported that commercial operations had not yet commenced though the project was near completion of the first phase. The learned single judge dismissed the winding up petition on 14 August 1991. The petitioner appealed; a Division Bench delivered judgment dismissing the appeal while vacating certain factual findings of the single judge and permitting the petitioner to pursue alternative statutory remedies.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the company should be wound up under sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, on the ground that it is "just and equitable" to do so (clause (f) of section 433).
  2. Whether principles applicable to dissolution of a partnership can be applied to justify winding up a private company that is alleged to be merely a "glorified partnership".
  3. Whether allegations of mismanagement, lack of probity, denial of inspection of records, and induction of the Rao group (by transfer/allotment of shares) establish a just and equitable case for winding up.
  4. Whether the petitioner has alternative, efficacious remedies (notably under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act) that make winding up inappropriate.
  5. Whether interim reliefs (including restraint on removal of the petitioner as director and retention of minutes books) should be continued and for what period.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The company is in substance a glorified partnership among limited participants; the dissolution principles of partnership should therefore inform the just and equitable test for winding up.
  • He was induced to invest by misrepresentations (including by respondent No. 2) about the project's prospects and timeline; thereafter respondents mismanaged the project, caused escalation of costs, and excluded him from management and accounts.
  • Respondents made a secret deal to sell or allot shares to the Rao group without his consent, fabricated minutes to show his attendance/consent, and thereby diluted or prejudiced his interests contrary to a memorandum of understanding that required unanimity for specified actions (including transfer and allotment of shares, increase of capital, and removal of directors).
  • He was denied inspection of company records and documents; the respondents engaged in collusive acts amounting to fraud and mismanagement, making winding up just and equitable.
  • Interim reliefs were sought to prevent his removal as director and to preserve minutes and records pending determination.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The petition is mala fide and an attempt to scuttle the hotel project at a critical stage because the petitioner did not receive the returns he expected; the allegations of mismanagement are false or exaggerated.
  • The company has statutory remedies available (sections 397/398) and winding up under section 433(f) is a last resort; mere mismanagement or disputes among shareholders do not justify winding up.
  • The induction of the Rao group was not secret or improper: the memorandum of understanding itself contemplated adding an equal partner to raise funds; documents and minutes show the petitioner was involved or aware; substantial payments were made by the Rao group and were traceable.
  • The alleged increase in authorised capital and appointments (e.g., secretary) were regularized and supported by filings with the Registrar of Companies; many of the petitioner's factual assertions were disproved by documentary exhibits.
  • Granting winding up would cause grave prejudice because the hotel project was near commercial operation and substantial public/financial institution funds were at stake.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Great Indian Motor Works Ltd. v. Chandi Das Nundy [1953] 23 Comp Cas 287 (Cal) Where a private company is essentially a partnership converted into a company, winding up rules applicable to partnerships may be applied. Cited by petitioner to support partnership‑dissolution analogy. The court considered it but, in light of later Supreme Court authority, did not accept a broad application of the partnership principle to this company.
Ramesh Premchand Shah v. Engineers' Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. [1977] 47 Comp Cas 294 (Bom) The considerations applicable to dissolution of a partnership can, if just and equitable, be imported into company winding up on facts showing serious disputes and lack of confidence in management. Relied on by petitioner; court noted it supports the general proposition but examined facts and later controlling authority before applying the principle.
Virendrasingh Bhandari v. Nandlal Bhandari and Sons P. Ltd. [1980] 50 Comp Cas 54 (MP) Just and equitable ground may exist, but mere mismanagement is not enough unless financial position warrants winding up; lack of confidence can be just and equitable. Used to observe limits of winding up for mismanagement; court required more than mere director mismanagement absent insolvency or hopeless commercial prospects.
Bhaskar Stoneware Pipes Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajinder Nath Bhaskar [1988] 63 Comp Cas 184 (Delhi) Where prima facie material discloses consistent acts of oppression and mismanagement (not isolated acts), winding up may be justified. Noted as authority showing that sustained pattern of oppression can justify winding up; court required proof and found petitioner’s material did not establish such a pattern here.
Toy Bok Choon v. Tahansan Sdn. Bhd. [1987] BCLC 472; [1987] 1 WLR 413 (PC) When a company is in the nature of a partnership and a petitioner faces removal as director, winding up orders can be made. English authority cited by petitioner to support partnership approach; court considered it but constrained its application by the Supreme Court test in Hind Overseas.
A Company, In re [1987] BCLC 133 Case of minority oppression; addresses appointment of receiver and remedies in minority oppression situations. Cited for the proposition that principles must be applied to facts; court acknowledged but emphasized statutory remedies and tests under Indian law.
Hind Overseas Pvt. Ltd. v. Raghunath Prasad Jhunjhunwalla [1976] 46 Comp Cas 91 (SC) Supreme Court test: principles of partnership dissolution cannot be liberally invoked for companies; only where company structure on piercing the veil is really a partnership or where deadlock, lack of probity and no hope of continuance exist, may winding up be justified. Held to be authoritative. The single judge relied on this decision to reject the petitioner's submission that partnership dissolution principles should apply generally to the company in question.
Jose J. Kadavil & K.T. Mathew v. Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. [1986] 59 Comp Cas 969 (Ker) Court can refuse to wind up where alternative remedies are available; sections 397/398 and other safeguards mean clause (f) should be a last resort. Relied upon by respondents and by the court to emphasize that the petitioner had alternative remedies and that winding up should not be ordered where other efficacious remedies exist.
S.S. Rajakumar v. Perfect Castings Pvt. Ltd. [1968] 38 Comp Cas 187 (Mad) Wide but circumspect application of just and equitable rule; mere factions, bickerings or exclusion from management are not by themselves sufficient for winding up. Invoked by the court to show the caution required before ordering winding up on just and equitable grounds where disputes and allegations are not of the gravest character.
Lokenath Gupta v. Credits Pvt. Ltd. [1968] 38 Comp Cas 599 (Cal) Mere mismanagement, misappropriation or general allegations of oppression are insufficient where alternative remedies are available. Used to reinforce the requirement that winding up should not replace available statutory remedies for misconduct or oppression.
Gadadhar Dixit v. Utkal Flour Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. [1989] 66 Comp Cas 188 (Orissa) If allegations of loss or misappropriation are not substantiated, a petition to wind up cannot be allowed to dismantle an established company. Applied to the facts to conclude that petitioner failed to substantiate material allegations sufficiently to warrant winding up.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two judicial stages: the learned single judge's detailed fact‑finding and legal analysis, followed by the Division Bench's appellate consideration.

Single Judge — Reasoning (G.D. Kamat, J.)

  1. Framing the legal test: The petition was brought under sections 433 and 434 (clause (f) — "just and equitable"). The judge noted that "just and equitable" is not definable and requires judicial discretion applied to the facts.
  2. Assessment of the partnership argument: The judge reviewed authorities invoked by petitioner showing that partnership‑dissolution principles have sometimes been applied where a company is effectively a partnership. However, the judge relied on the Supreme Court decision in Hind Overseas (1976) to hold that the partnership principle cannot be liberally invoked merely because shareholding is equal or restricted to a few families; there must be evidence that the company in reality is a partnership or there is a deadlock/no hope of continuance.
  3. Examination of documentary and factual evidence: The judge analysed the material on record (minutes, exhibits E and F, club slip, payments by Rao group, admission of petitioner to certain meetings, filings with Registrar) and concluded the induction of the Rao group was not clandestine: the memorandum of understanding dated 6 June 1990 contemplated adding a new equal investor; payments by the Rao group were substantial and traceable; some documents were initialled or signed by the petitioner and filings (Form Nos., resolutions) supported respondents' version.
  4. Evaluation of mismanagement allegations: The judge found many allegations of highhandedness, fabrication and misappropriation unsubstantiated. He emphasised that mere mismanagement, internal disputes, or allegations of improper tendering and contractor selection do not necessarily justify winding up absent evidence of insolvency or irreversible harm to shareholders' interests.
  5. Consideration of statutory alternatives: The judge stressed that statutory remedies (sections 397/398 and the Company Law Board) are available to redress mismanagement or oppression, and that winding up is inappropriate where efficacious alternatives exist and the company is not insolvent.
  6. Public interest and stage of company: The judge gave weight to the stage of the project — near commercial operation and significant investment already incurred (about Rs. 2 crores). He concluded winding up now would likely cause disproportionate harm to the company, financial institutions and shareholders, and would "nip it in the bud".
  7. Interim relief: Although the petition was rejected, the judge extended the interim restraint against removal of the petitioner and against handing over minutes books for a limited period (extended to 15 days on consent of counsels in court).

Division Bench — Reasoning (K. Sukumaran, J.)

  1. Affirmation of legal principles: The Bench reiterated that winding up under the Companies Act is an extreme remedy and should be used only where other remedies are unavailable or inadequate. It emphasised the statutory framework (including the Company Law Board and Registrar) designed to handle internal corporate disputes and oppression.
  2. Assumed truth of allegations for argument's sake: The Bench stated it would assume, arguendo, the petitioner's allegations to be true, and then asked whether such circumstances nonetheless justified the "extreme and irretrievable" remedy of winding up. It concluded they did not.
  3. Consideration of project stage and stakeholder harm: The Bench placed significant emphasis on the imminent commercial stage of the hotel project, the involvement of public financial institutions, and the large sums already invested — concluding that winding up would prejudice many stakeholders.
  4. Appellate treatment of factual findings: Although the Bench declined to undertake an exhaustive re‑weighing of all factual findings, it vacated the learned judge's factual findings on various allegations so that the petitioner would not be foreclosed from pursuing grievances elsewhere; this permits fresh adjudication by competent forums uninhibited by the single judge's findings.
  5. Disposition: Subject to vacating factual findings and permitting the petitioner to pursue alternative remedies, the Bench dismissed the appeal and affirmed the single judge's rejection of the winding up petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition for winding up under sections 433 and 434 was rejected by the learned single judge; the Division Bench dismissed the appeal and thus affirmed the refusal to wind up the company, while vacating the factual findings of the single judge so that the petitioner may pursue alternative remedies.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The court refused to exercise the equitable discretion to wind up the company at the present stage. The proceeding confirms that clause (f) (just and equitable) is a remedy of last resort and will not displace statutory remedies where those are available and the company is not insolvent.
  • The petitioner retains the ability to pursue statutory remedies (notably sections 397/398 before the Company Law Board) and other forums; the Division Bench vacated the single judge's factual findings so those forums are not precluded by the earlier findings.
  • The decision preserves the company's ongoing project (the hotel) from an immediate wind up that would otherwise cause loss to financial institutions and other stakeholders; the court emphasised harm to third parties and public interest in refusing winding up at a near‑commercial stage.
  • No new expansive precedent displacing the Supreme Court's test in Hind Overseas was created: the opinion reinforces that partnership dissolution principles are not broadly transferable to companies except in limited circumstances (as explained in Hind Overseas), and that mere mismanagement or disputes do not automatically equate to "just and equitable" winding up.

    Daulat Makanmal Luthria v. Solitaire Hotels Pvt. Ltd. And Others

    G.D Kamat, J. (14-8-1991):— This is a petition under sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, for an order for winding up the Solitaire Hotels Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Reis Mages, near Alto Porverim, Bardez Goa. The petition also prays for appointment of the official liquidator of the High Court as the liquidator of the assets of the company. Interim reliefs sought are for appointment of a provisional liquidator of all the assets including the office premises, hotel building known as Reis Mages with powers; at the same time an order is sought restraining the respondents-directors from acting in any manner as such, from disposing of or alienating or encumbering or parting with the possession of or creating any third party right, title and interest in respect of all the assets of the company and, lastly, for restraint from holding any extraordinary general meeting on February 18, 1991, or on any further date to consider and pass a resolution for removal of the petitioner from directorship of the said company.

    2. The Solitaire Hotels Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated under the Companies Act some time in the year 1985 by the then promoters of the company, Mr. Kishore Morumal Bachani and Mrs. Deepa Shivkar Bachani, the main objects being to own, construct, run, take over, manage, carry on the business of hotel, restaurant, cafe, tavern, bars, refreshment-rooms, boarding and lodging, house keepers, clubs, in India or in any other part of the world and to provide lodging and boarding restaurants, eating houses, bars, swimming pools, etc. The said company, however, was taken over by respondents Nos. 2 to 5. It appears that the issued and paid up share capital of the company Was Rs. 1,02,000 divided into 1,020 equity shares of Rs. 100 each. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 held 510 equity shares and the balance of 510 equity shares by respondents Nos. 4 and 5. The authorised share capital of the company is Rs. 50,00,000 divided into 50,0 equity shares of Rs. 100 each and 5,000 (12 per cent.) non-cumu-lative redeemable preference shares of Rs. 100 each. It is common ground that the company started the hotel project initially with a provision for 38 rooms in the category of a three-star hotel but subsequently enhanced to have 58 rooms with additional facilities such as swimming pool, etc. The construction of the hotel has been completed considerably though it is true that the commercial operation of the hotel had not started when the present petition was instituted some time on February 15, 1991.

    3. The petitioner himself claims to be an estate broker and financier, inter alia, in real estate and ordinarily resides at Bombay. Respondent No. 2 is a chartered accountant and it appears that he is carrying on his practice as such in a partnership in the firm name and style of Messrs. Kuvelkar, Naik and Gandhi at Bombay. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 2 was looking after his income-tax and financial affairs for more than four years prior to 1988 with the result that respondent No. 2 became aware of his financial position. The petitioner avers that in June, 1988, respondent No. 2 informed him about the hotel project of the company at Goa which was under execution and further informed him as to how respondents Nos. 2 to 5 are holding the entire subscribed and paid-up share capital and represented to him that the company is in need of one partner who could provide finance for the hotel project. A representation was made, says the petitioner, that the hotel project was lucrative and was likely to start on commercial linos within 18 months and in any event before June 30, 1990. The petitioner believed in the rosy picture painted and on the request of respondent No. 2 invested a sum of about Rs. 8,00,000 in the company. He accordingly agreed to purchase one-third of the total equity shares from respondents Nos. 2 to 5 with the result that the petitioner's stake in the company became equal to that of respondents Nos. 2 and 3, for short “the Naik group” on the one hand, and respondents Nos. 4 and 5, Khadawala group, on the other. According to the petitioner, he was inducted as a director of the company soon thereafter.

    4. The petitioner now says that he was lured into the company with the intention right from the first day to extract maximum money from him and according to him this is clear from several facts set out in the petition. According to the petitioner, he attended the office of the Economic Development Corporation (EDC), Goa, Daman and Diu, some time in February/March, 1989, to sign several documents including a deed of personal guarantee as EDC has agreed to give a loan of Rs. 85 lakhs to the company but, however, he does not have the copies of these documents. Without looking into the financial viability, according to the petitioner, respondent No. 2 negotiated purchase of an adjoining plot to expand the hotel and taking advantage of his ignorance and full faith that he reposed in respondent No. 2, respondents Nos. 2 to 5 took Over the management and control of the company and the said project and started managing the company at their whims and caprice with the result that there was considerable delay, wasteful expenditure and escalation in cost. According to the petitioner, looking to the present status of the project, the hotel will not be complete before June, 1992, and the cost of the project will go up to more than Rs. 2.30 crores though originally the project was to involve only Rs. 1.20 crores. The petitioner then has levelled allegations of mismanagement that respondent No. 2 went on changing the interior designers of the hotel project and they were replaced one after the other with the result that the petitioner does not even know today who is the present interior designer. The construction was allotted to one private firm known as Messrs. Descon, who are otherwise the clients of respondent No. 2 but, however, according to the petitioner, he is not aware of the terms and conditions on which Messrs. Descon are engaged for the construction work. Though, according to the petitioner, he was appointed as a director of the respondeat-company, he was not authorised to operate any bank accounts of the-company but after some persistent efforts, respondents Nos. 2 to 5 agreed to include him for operating the accounts. According to the petitioner, by a resolution passed at the meeting of May 5, 1990, the board of directors decided to distribute various works of the project amongst the directors so that the project could be completed at the earliest but, according to him, respondents Nos. 2 and 5 did not allow him to complete the work which was allotted to him. This resulted in the said respondents carrying on the business of the company in contravention of the assurances and representations made by respondent No. 2 to the petitioner. In the meeting held on June 6, 1990, at Bombay, a memorandum of understanding was arrived at in relation to the management of the company by which it was resolved that the memorandum and articles of association of the company would be amended in accordance with the memorandum of understanding so that the understanding reached is not breached by any one. According to the petitioner, the directors who were parties to this memorandum are bound by the same and are obliged to act according to the memorandum of understanding in the matter of management of the company and execution of the project. But, however, this was not to be and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 continued to manage the affairs of the company in their own way and without consulting the petitioner.

    5. Only recently, according to the petitioner, it was revealed to him that in the second week of June, 1990, respondents Nos. 2 and 5 made a secret deal and agreed to sell one-fourth of the total shares of the company without informing and discussing the matter with him. By their secret deal, it was decided to sell the shares of the company to respondents Nos. 6 and 7, whom I will refer to as the Rao group, and this decision was taken at a meeting alleged to have been held on June 19, 1990, at the Bombay Cricket Association Club, Bombay. The petitioner says that he was not given notice to either remain present at the meeting nor was he informed about the same. But to create a false evidence it has been shown in the minutes book that the petitioner was present at the said meeting. The decision to sell one-fourth of the shares of thief company to the Rao group is in flagrant violation of the memorandum of understanding and with a view to get over the same, according to the petitioner, the records are fabricated to show as if he was a party to that decision, which is not, therefore, binding on him. The petitioner now says that, in fact, a fraud has been played on him as the statement of account shows the total investment by the Rao group to be Rs. 22.31 lakhs and this conspiracy has been hatched by respondents Nos. 2 to 5 to jeopardise and cause harm to his interests. The purported transfer of shares to the Rao group is invalid being in contravention of the articles of association of the company and the memorandum of understanding reached on June 6, 1990.

    6. Another aspect mentioned is that the petitioner came across a letter written by the financial institution EDC that the EDC will disburse the subsidy only when the hotel starts functioning on or before September 30, 1990. The petitioner has averred that respondents Nos. 2 to 5 have represented to the EDC as if the hotel is commercially functioning, which, according to him, is a white lie. Despite the shady transaction, the petitioner says that the Rao group has been appointed directors of the company. The petitioner was, therefore, forced to enter into correspondence with the directors of the company in pointing out their functioning of bypassing the petitioner and illegally associating the Rao group. According to the petitioner, he objected to the presence of Mrs. Rao at the board meeting convened on October 1, 1990, specially to consider the letter addressed by the petitioner to the company, and when Mrs. Rao insisted on being present, the petitioner had no alternative but to leave the meeting and record his protest in the minutes book. The petitioner says he had himself offered to purchase the shares which were sought to be transferred from respondents Nos. 2 to 5 to the Rao group and at one time he even suggested that his brother-in-law, Mr. Ahuja, be taken on the board of directors of the company on par with the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 5, but, however, the same was not accepted. The petitioner has also made a grievance regarding the appointment of the secretary of the company., The petitioner now avers that he was surprised and shocked to receive a letter in December, 1990, addressed by respondent No. “5 on behalf of the company alleging that at the meeting of the board of directors held on December 22, 1990, at Bombay, it was resolved by the board of directors to increase the paid-up share capital of the company to Rs. 50 lakhs by issuing 5,000 preference shares of Rs. 100 each and 13,332 equity shares of Rs. 100 each. According to the petitioner, he had no notice of the meeting of December 22, 1990, and this increase which is in excess of the authorised share capital of the company is irregular and without the authority of the general meeting of the company. The petitioner protested saying that such resolution will not bind the company, the same being illegal, he also made a protest to the transfer of shares, viz. (19 per cent.), to the Rao group. This, according to him, amounts to a fraud inasmuch as respondents Nos. 2 to 5 never received any premium for the shares sold, to the Rao group though the petitioner was made to pay premium when he became the shareholder. The increase in the share capital and its allotment to the Rao group was a collusive act inter se between respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and the Rao group and in any event was in breach of the memorandum of understanding which clearly stipulated that increase in the share capital of the company can only be by an unanimous resolution; that at any rate the petitioner had never consented to such increase. The entry of the Rao group into the company has not been kindly taken to by the petitioner and despite the petitioner's challenge and protest in that behalf, the same were ignored. All these actions, according to the petitioner, are made with a view to somehow harm the interests of the petitioner by taking unfair advantage of him.

    7. The petitioner now says that in view of the breach of understanding and memorandum and articles of association the petitioner was compelled to address a letter to the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation, which has also agreed to finance the hotel project of the company, bringing to their notice the conduct of respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and further calling upon the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation not to disburse any further finances to the company. What he did in respect of the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation was also repeated in so far as the EDC of Goa, Daman and Diu is concerned that no additional loan or subsidy of Rs. 25 lakhs be given to the respondent company.

    8. Once the matters were thus taken up by the petitioner before the financial institutions, the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation and the EDC, according to the petitioner, respondents Nos. 2 to 7 addressed a letter dated January 10, 1991, requisitioning an extraordinary general meeting for consideration of a special resolution for removal of the petitioner as director of the company. By the notice dated January 20, 1991, an extraordinary general meeting of the members of the company was convened on February 18, 1991, to consider that resolution. Though the petitioner protested against the holding of the extraordinary general meeting for passing the resolution for his removal, according to him, the respondents were bent upon holding the meeting, which is in clear contravention of the memorandum of understanding which provides that no director shall be removed without the unanimous consent of all including the petitioner himself. The petitioner, therefore, says that he has lost confidence in the respondents and the company being otherwise a glorified partnership the same be wound up.

    9. All these events, according to the petitioner, do indicate that the affairs of the company are run for the personal benefit of respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and against the interests of not only the company, the financial institutions but also that of the petitioner who has admittedly a one-third stake in the company. The petitioner is sought to be removed from the directorship of the company so that he is excluded from the management with the ulterior motive and with a view to make secret profits for themselves. The petitioner further says that respondent No. 2 is managing the company as if it is his personal property and has not even cared to render accounts to the petitioner. The petitioner has been denied inspection of the documents of the company with a view to prevent the petitioner from stopping the mismanagement of the company by respondents Nos. 2 to 5. He now says that, initially, the project was envisaged at Rs. 1.20 crores and now it is revised to Rs. 2.34 crores. The company has already received a loan of Rs. 85 lakhs from the EDC which has not been properly utilized and in view of the mismanagement of the company, it is not possible to carry out and complete the project. Even with the revised estimate of Rs. 2.34 crores, the project is not likely to be completed soon. Due to escalation a further sum of Rs. one crore is liable to be invested. Already Rs. 1.90 crores has been incurred by way of expenditure and Rs. 40 lakhs are the outstanding's payable to various parties. That going by the economic viability it is impossible to run the hotel on profit and, therefore, in order to stop the company from incurring further losses and its capital being eroded, the company should be wound up and for other ancillary reliefs which are already mentioned.

    10. When the petition was heard on urgent circulation on February 16, 1991, the company was directed to file an affidavit on February 22, 1991, but in the meantime an order was made restraining the passing of the proposed resolution to remove the petitioner from the board of directors. On April 2, 1991, at the behest of the petitioner, the court appointed a Commissioner, Shri Braganza, Court Superintendent, to inspect the hotel premises and to submit his report. Accordingly a report has been submitted and from the report it is clear that the hotel has not started commercial operation though it is on the verge of getting completed, at least in so far as the first phase of it is concerned.

    11. The petition is vehemently opposed by the respondents and, according to them, this petition has been instituted with a mala fide intention to scuttle the hotel project at the stage when it is about to become commercial; that the allegations levelled by the petitioner are false and made deliberately in an attempt to secure an order to wind up the company only because the petitioner did not get expected returns on his investment as per his calculations he is seeking the present remedy by levelling wanton charges of mismanagement though otherwise he was himself a party to the events and happenings in the affairs of the company and its management. The petitioner is not ignorant for he is associated with some other companies and is otherwise a real estate agent and a financier in a city like Bombay.

    12. On the petitioner's own showing, according to the respondents, there is nothing just and equitable for the court to direct winding up of the company and even if the allegations of mismanagement are assumed to be true, this is not a case where a winding up order can be made by this court and at the most the petitioner may take up the alternative remedy by resorting to sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act.

    13. The first of the contentions of Shri D'Costa, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that though the company is incorporated under the Companies Act regard being had to the number of shareholders and the relationship and equal sharing, it is nothing but a glorified partnership. He says when one partner loses faith or when the company lacks probity, the principle governing dissolution of a partnership must equally apply to the winding up and in this connection he has placed reliance on some authorities to show as to how the courts have applied the principle of dissolution of a partnership in the winding up of companies.

    14. Shri Usgaonkar has, however, attempted to show that the principle of dissolution of a partnership cannot be applied, for the company has been a company right from the beginning and it is again not a family affair in the sense that members of one family are the only shareholders. By its very nature he says that this is a company and it can be only governed by the predicates incorporated in sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act and then he points out that clause (f) of section 433 is the only clause which the petitioner has invoked and in the fitness of things, therefore, it is necessary for this court to decide whether it is just and equitable. Before finding out whether it is just and equitable, let me consider the authorities on the subject as to how the dissolution of a partnership is applicable or not.

    15. These are the authorities which are relied upon by Shri D'Costa, learned counsel for the petitioner. In the decision of Great Indian Motor Works Ltd. v. Chandi Das Nundy, [1953] 23 Comp Cas 287 (Cal), it is held that in the winding up of a private company, where it is nothing more than a partnership converted into a company, the court will apply to a very great extent the rules applicable to the winding up of a partnership. The principle being that where the partners cannot agree or cannot carry on business or where one partner acts unfairly or dishonestly to another, the court will dissolve the partnership. Admittedly, in this case the shareholders of the company were in fact members of one family and the first cousin of the wife of one of the shareholders. The company had taken over the business of a partnership which was earlier carried on by two brothers and later decided to constitute a private limited company. The shares were in proportion to their holding in the partnership. A dispute arose between the shareholders and in the matter of struggle for power, the major shareholder brother sought to transfer a large number of shares to his three sons with the sole idea of obtaining greater voting power. On the facts the court held that the order of the learned single judge for the winding up of the company could not be faulted because the principle of dissolution of the firm would be applicable as far as may be for the winding up of the company.

    16. In the decision of Ramesh Premchand Shah v. Engineers' Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., [1977] 47 Comp Cas 294 (Bom), the same principle was applied. The court found that there were serious disputes and differences between two groups which were not conducive to carry on the business of the company. The two grounds taken up for dissolution were, firstly, that the company was unable to pay its debts and, secondly, that the petitioners therein had entirely lost confidence in the management. The case, it must be seen, was, however, decided on the facts and in that it was observed that the considerations which applied for the dissolution of partnership firms, if it is found just and equitable, can be imported into for the winding up of a company.

    17. In the decision of Virendrasingh Bhandari v. Nandlal Bhandari and Sons P. Ltd., [1980] 50 Comp Cas 54 (MP), again the same principle was reiterated. On the facts it was held that the petition contained allegations, on proof of which, a winding up order would be justified and the material showed that there was a fair possibility of these allegations being proved. But what is, however, relevant to notice is that it is held that mere mismanagement by directors is not a ground for a winding up order unless the financial position of the company is so bad rendering it desirable in the interests of the shareholders of the company to wind it up. No doubt lack of confidence in the conduct and management of the company's affairs is held to be a just and equitable ground for winding up.

    18. In so far as the decision in Bhaskar Stoneware Pipes Private Ltd. v. Rajinder Nath Bhaskar, [1988] 63 Comp Cas 184 (Delhi) is concerned, here again the facts were that the business was started as a partnership concern between four groups of family members and later on it was converted into a company. Material prima facie disclosed that there was oppression and mismanagement and further that the complaint was not of an isolated act but a consistent series of acts, lack of probity and fair dealings.

    19. Two authorities of the English courts are relied upon. The first case is in Toy Bok Choon v. Tahansan Sdn. Bhd., [1987] BCLC 472; [1987] 1 WLR 413 (PC) to suggest that when a company is in the nature of a partnership and the petitioner is sought to be removed from office as director, winding up orders can be made. The second case is in A Company, In re, [1987] BCLC 133. This was a case of minority oppression. A question arose for appointment of a receiver. It is well-settled law that principles are to be applied to the given facts in a case to make or not to make the relief sought.

    20. The matter, however, was put to rest to a certain extent by the Supreme Court in the decision of Hind Overseas Private Ltd. v. Raghunath Prasad Jhunjhunwalla, [1976] 46 Comp Cas 91 (SC). The matter which arose directly for consideration related to the scope of section 433(f) of the Companies Act, 1956, and in particular whether the principles applicable in the case of dissolution of a partnership could be invoked in the case of winding up of a company.

    21. Shri Usgaonkar for the respondents has heavily relied upon this authority to point out that by the ratio laid down it is not possible to hold in the present petition that the principles applicable in the case of a dissolution of a partnership can be invoked in the case of the present company. The Supreme Court noted the facts and set aside the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court that the company in substance was a partnership venture despite that the venture was between the members of one family who had started as a partnership concern and ultimately took the shape of a private company and despite the fact that the shareholding showed division amongst two family groups. The Supreme Court thereafter laid down the test that even when more than one family or several friends and relations together form a company and even when there was no agreement for active participation of all the members the principle of dissolution of partnership cannot be liberally invoked. It further laid down that when the shareholding is more or less equal and in cases where there is a complete deadlock in the company on account of lack of probity and there is no hope of smooth and efficient continuance of the company as a commercial concern, there may arise a case for winding up on just and equitable grounds and, lastly, that the principle of dissolution of a partnership may squarely apply if the apparent structure of the company is not the real structure and on piercing the veil it is found that in reality it is a partnership.

    22. On a conspectus of the authorities cited and the rationale laid down by the Supreme Court Shri Usgaonkar is right in saying that the present company was never started as a partnership venture nor partook of such a character at any stage thereafter. The company was indeed started by one Kishore Morumal Bachani and Deepa Shivkumar Bachani in the year 1985 and the company was later on taken over by respondents Nos. 2 and 4 and this is clear from the memorandum and articles of association of the company. Though the shareholding was equal in so far as the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 (Naik group and Khadawala group) were concerned that by itself does not give it a character of a partnership. Merely because the petitioner has averred that this is a glorified partnership, in my view, there is nothing to indicate that the structure of the company is a partnership even though it is restricted to some families in the beginning and thereafter to four families. Therefore, Shri D'Costa's contention that the principle of dissolution of partnership must apply to winding up proceedings cannot be accepted.

    23. The question, however, now remains as to whether it is just and equitable to wind up the company as sought by the petitioner. One of the main grievances of the petitioner appears to be the induction of the Rao group respondents Nos. 6 and 7 as shareholders of the company and that too without his consent by the purported sale of certain percentage of shares by respondents Nos. 2 to 5. The petitioner's case is that he was not aware of such induction and never consented to the same. In the first place he relies upon a document (exhibit “E”) which reads thus:

    “Decided to take a new partner for one-fourth share at 20 lakhs or at minimum at 17 lakhs.”

    24. This document is signed by respondents Nos. 2 and 5. This document itself suggests that it is on a piece of paper. Exhibit F is the minutes of the meeting of June 19, 1990, held at Garware B.C.A Club which suggests that the existing directors including the petitioner welcomed the Rao group as one-fourth equal partner on terms and conditions which suggest that the Rao group had paid Rs. 2 lakhs and further agreed to pay a total of Rs. 22.25 lakhs in instalments against the dates mentioned therein. The petitioner's case is that he never attended such meeting and the minutes of the meeting are fabricated to show that he was present, as the minutes are not found written in the minutes book. In answer to this, the case set out by the respondents is that exhibit “E” cannot be read in isolation and it has to be read with exhibit “F” to show as to how the payments of Rs. 22.25 lakhs in instalments against the dates mentioned therein are to be brought in by the Rao group; that exhibit “E” is a piece of paper given to the petitioner at his behest as he wanted a firm commitment from respondents Nos. 2 and 5 to induct a new person.

    25. In support of their case that the petitioner attended the meeting and was a party to the induction of the Rao group (sic) have produced a slip of the Garware B.C.A Club of June 19, 1990. It suggests that Manhar P. Khadawala is a member of the Garware B.C.A Club and the others are shown to be his guests at the club premises. It is indeed urged by the petitioner that this document of the Garware B.C.A Club is fabricated or obtained to lend credence to the case set up by the respondents. In my view it does not appear to be so when I consider some other facts.

    26. The petitioner has placed heavy reliance on a memorandum of understanding (annexure II to exhibit “C”) which are the minutes of the meeting of the directors of the company held on June 6, 1990. The minutes reveal that to avoid misunderstanding about the work a memorandum of understanding was approved at this meeting after long discussion and it was unanimously accepted and passed in the form of a resolution. It further reveals that this resolution was taken so that necessary amendment be carried out to the memorandum and articles of association of the company. The memorandum of understanding suggests that no business shall be transacted at any general meeting unless the requisite quorum shall be present at the commencement and continuation of the business. Several items are thereafter listed which shall not be transacted at any general meeting or at any meeting of the board of directors except with the unanimity of the petitioner on one side, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 on the second side and respondents Nos. 4 and 5 on the third side. The items are:

    “(a) Increase in the share capital of the company.

    (b) Reduction in the share capital of the company.

    (c) Increase in the issued capital of the company…

    (h) Appointment and/or removal of auditor.

    (i) Appointment and/or removal of directors…

    (k) Allotment of shares…

    (m) Transfer of shares.”

    27. The petitioner does not dispute that he was present at this meeting where this memorandum of understanding was resolved. What is, however, pertinent to be noticed is that the minutes of this very meeting suggest at item No. 4 that the budget as on June 6, 1990, was presented and after discussion to meet the immediate deficit of receipts and payments it was decided that Rs. 50,000 be contributed by each group before July 15, 1990, so that the total contribution raised will be Rs. 1.50 lakhs. It further says as under:

    “However, it was unanimously felt that we should all make efforts to add one more equal partner to overcome financial problems.”

    28. It, therefore, stands to reason that at this very meeting of June 6, 1990, it was agreed that an equal partner is to be added to overcome the financial problems.

    29. Now, the case of the respondents is that the decision to take a new investor was taken jointly and justifies their stand to say that when the Rao group was inducted in the company it was pursuant to this unanimous decision and, therefore, cannot run counter to the memorandum of undertstanding. I, therefore, fail to see as to how the petitioner can claim that the Rao group has been inducted without his consent and out of a secret deal.

    30. This is, however, not all. It appears that the Rao group are known to the petitioner much before their induction and that way they are not unknown parties. Shri Rao, respondent No. 6, has filed an affidavit in these proceedings wherein he has stated that they had known the petitioner prior to June, 1990, because the petitioner had worked-for them as broker for sale of their flat at Prabhadevi, Bombay, and that they had even paid brokerage to the petitioner for the said transaction. Placed in the predicament that he was, the petitioner in his affidavit dated February 25, 1991, could not deny the brokerage but tried to get out by saying that the petitioner company was engaged for the purpose of the sale of the flat of the Rao group and that he was not personally involved. But what is relevant to be noticed is that the transaction is not denied.

    31. The next aspect of the matter is that once the Rao group was inducted all the parties came to Goa by air and stayed at hotel Mandovi at Panaji, Goa, at the cost of the company in July, 1990. They visited the site of the hotel project at Porvorim for two days and the various notes/reports indicate this from various agencies involved in the construction of the hotel. The petitioner was a party to these events. It, therefore, clearly suggests that the petitioner's story that the Rao group had been inducted behind his back and are forced on him does not appear to be correct. There is yet one more factor. The Rao group was inducted pursuant to the resolution at the meeting of the board of directors held at the Garware B. CA Club on June 19, 1990, and initially they made the payment of Rs. 2 lakhs. It was stipulated that they will in all make a substantial contribution By various cheques and cash payments they made payments of over Rs. 15 lakhs commencing from June 20, 1990, till October 29, 1990. The petitioner is the director of respondent No. 1 company and it is not possible to accept that he was ignorant of such a large amount of finances brought in by the Rao group and even if he pleads ignorance the law has to presume that he is in the know of things.

    32. Considering all these aspects, it appears that the petitioner's interest in the company has dwindled and he wants some pretext or the other to level allegations and he now makes a grievance of induction of the Rao group to paint the other directors black which in reality is not supportable. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that induction of the Rao group into the company was known to the petitioner before their induction and there is nothing shady about the transaction as sought to be made. Viewed in this context the case of the respondents that exhibit “E” to the petition which is signed by respondents Nos. 2 and 5 on a piece of paper purporting to be only a proposal to take a new partner for one-fourth share at Rs. 20 lakhs or at the minimum of Rs. 17 lakhs dated June 17, 1990, was given to the petitioner at the petitioner's instance to look out for a new partner cannot be easily brushed aside. The word “partner” is in fact a misnomer; it must be investor.

    33. I have already held that the principle of dissolution of a partnership firm cannot be applied for the winding up of respondent No. 1 company. Obviously, the petition is filed under sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act and it cannot be disputed that clause (f) is pressed into service by the petitioner which says that the company can be wound up if the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable. What is just and equitable is not and cannot be defined and perhaps advisedly so because it is not possible to contemplate fact situations and, therefore, a discretion is left to a company court. Though several allegations are made against respondent No. 2 in particular and generally against respondents Nos. 2 to 5 regarding highhandedness and mismanagement it must be seen in the first place that the petitioner is not without a remedy. The petitioner is entitled to make complaints about mismanagement or against the purported acts of commission and omission of other directors before the. Company Law Board and such remedies are provided in sections 397 and 398. This is again not a case where the company is commercially insolvent but on the contrary the company is sought to be wound up at a stage when the company is about to go commercial. The hotel project of the company though not completed was indeed delayed because 20 additional rooms were sought to be added and financial matters were involved in the matter of expansion. Winding up at this stage will amount to nipping it in the bud which is not conducive to anyone.

    34. The next complaint of the petitioner is that he was shocked and surprised to receive the letter dated December 24, 1990, from the company stating that in the meeting of the board of directors held on December 22, 1990, it was resolved to increase the paid-up share capital of the company to Rs. 50 lakhs by issuing further capital of Rs. 5 lakhs by way of 5,000 preference shares of Rs. 100 each and Rs. 13,33,200 by issuing 13,332 equity shares of Rs. 100 each. The petitioner says that he was not informed nor present at the meeting and he was in any case not aware. According to him, the increase in the issued share capital being in excess of the authorised share capital of the company is not permissible. This statement of the petitioner appears to be baseless. At any rate, it is a wanton allegation. There has already been an increase in the authorised capital and this had been discussed at the board meeting of February 15, 1990, much before the petitioner purportedly took up cudgels against the company and its directors and the so called unauthorised induction of the Rao group. It appears that the resolution was passed to increase the authorised share capital at an extraordinary general meeting dated March 16, 1990, and the same is proved to the hilt because the same had been reported to the Registrar of Companies. The respondents have produced Form No. 5 dated March 16, 1990, and Form No. 23. The filing fees were paid on April 3, 1990. All these are documents at exhibits R-6, R-7 and R-9. The petitioner's statement in the petition, therefore, that the authorised share capital was Rs. 25 lakhs at the time of the filing of the petition is incorrect. I have already said that this statement of the petitioner is false and I will presently point out that the petitioner was a party to this resolution. The respondents have produced a document purported to be a resolution by which the authorised share capital was sought to be placed at Rs. 51 lakhs instead of Rs. 50 lakhs. It has been averred by the respondents that a suggestion had come from the petitioner himself to place it at Rs. 51 lakhs and not at Rs. 50 lakhs so that the petitioner, Naik group and the Khandawala group will each share the same at Rs. 17 lakhs as one-third of Rs. 50 lakhs would lead to a fraction. At first that resolution was made but, however, it was cancelled and the authorised share capital was made to rest at Rs. 50 lakhs because a little later the Rao group had been inducted so that shareholding of each group could be placed at Rs. 12.5 lakhs. A copy of this cancelled resolution appears at page 299 exhibit R-10 and what is more it has been initialled by the petitioner himself. It is, therefore, not understood as to how the petitioner could still maintain on the date of the filing of this petition that there was no increase of authorised share capital of the company. What is, however, still noteworthy is that the increase in capital had come in February and March, 1990, much before the parties had thought of inducting another investor, Rao group which came about only some time in June, 1990. Confronted with this situation the petitioner then went on denying that he ever attended any meeting of the board of directors some time later. The resolution to increase the authorised share capital to Rs. 51 lakhs as the endorsement suggests was cancelled on June 29, 1990, because in the meantime the Rao group had agreed to walk in and they were welcomed into the company at the Garware B.C.A Club meeting held on June 19, 1990, with the result that Rs. 50 lakhs as authorised share capital was agreed to, which could be conveniently divided into four.

    35. The petitioner had made a grievance that one, Shri Tanawala, was appointed as secretary of the company without authority or at least without his knowledge and consent. In answer to this averment it is the case of the respondents that Tanawala had been working as a part-time secretary from July, 1990, as the authorised share capital of the company had been increased and by the operation of law the company was required to appoint a secretary and that is how Tanawala was appointed as secretary. Ordinarily, nothing turns on this appointment but the petitioner has done this on a purpose with the view to allege that respondents have fabricated evidence to suit them. The petitioner levelled allegations that the respondents have fabricated documents, made alterations in the minutes book and/or minutes are fabricated thereby suggesting that such fabrication was brought about after the institution of the petition and that Tanawala was a party to the same. In fact Shri Tanawala was appointed as part-time secretary of the company at a remuneration of Rs. 500 per month in July, 1990, and he was made a full-time secretary at the meeting held on October 14, 1990. It appears that the petitioner did not attend the earlier meeting of June 14, 1990. The appointment of the secretary was duly notified to the Registrar of Companies and that is clear from document at exhibit R-28 indicating the appointment in the required form. The date of appointment is mentioned to be October 15, 1990.

    36. It is indeed alleged that some minutes are written in the handwriting of Tanawala even before his appointment, but, however, this charge is not substantiated. Even otherwise nothing turns on this.

    37. The petitioner has averred that he did not attend the board meeting of October 1, 1990, as according to him he was kept in the dark and had not received any notice. The attendance register of the meetings of the directors suggest that Daulat Luthria attended the meeting of the board on October 1, 1990, at 6.00 p.m but, however, it was the case of the respondent that he refused to sign the attendance register. The register suggests against the name of the petitioner that he attended the meeting but refused to sign. This endorsement is said to be a fabrication. On the next page of this attendance register is the attendance of the board meeting held on October 26, 1990, and against the name of the petitioner it is found:

    “As I objected to the presence of Mrs. Rao in the meeting I left in protest.”

    38. The petitioner has signed at the bottom of this note. It is clear that it is written by the petitioner. In so far as the board meeting held on October 1, 1990, is concerned, the endorsement against the petitioner's name shows that he had attended the meeting but refused to sign. Mr. and Mrs. Rao did not attend the meeting of October 1, 1990. It is, therefore, possible that the petitioner had attended the meeting though he did not sign the attendance register. I fail to understand as to why at all any fabrication was necessary to suggest that the petitioner attended the meeting but refused to sign at the board meeting held on October 1, 1990, for if the petitioner did not attend the meeting that was the end of it and there was no particular advantage the respondents could derive by making such endorsement. There are, however, reasons to believe that the petitioner attended the meeting of October 1, 1990, because the petitioner took up cudgels by writing a letter to the company dated October 4, 1990 (exhibit L) saying that the company and the board of directors must desist from agreeing to transfer any share from any member to the Rao group or their nominees. There are reasons to believe that the petitioner wants the court to believe that he was not present at the meeting of October 1, 1990, because it is at this meeting that respondents Nos. 6 and 7 (Rao group) were made additional directors and allotment of additional shares were made to them. The petitioner wants to show that he was not a party to such allotment. There are enough documents to suggest, as produced by the respondents, that with the increase of the authorised share capital, the share capital was sought to be increased by issue of fresh rights. At some point of time prior to October 1, 1990, the petitioner was keen in bringing his brother-in-law one H. Ahuja and the board had passed a resolution that Shri Ahuja be inducted provided he agrees to sign all documents that are necessary as solicited by the financial institutions. Apart from this, it was also decided to induct the petitioner's brother, Mohan Luthria, as additional director on the board but then the petitioner had backed out of the same. Since the petitioner was insisting that they would like to keep his one-third shareholding the petitioner was asked to subscribe accordingly and in token thereof the petitioner had given a cheque for part payment but, however, that cheque bounced because of an error found by the bankers, namely, the discrepancy in the figures and words. The petitioner was given an option to make his subscription but he failed and it is only thereafter that new rights were issued in favour of the Rao group. The document produced on record, therefore, totally belies the case of the petitioner. The conclusion to be derived from all this is that at some stage the petitioner in fact wanted to subscribe and induct his own relations but thereafter probably thought that further investment may not be lucrative and, therefore, went back and allowed things to happen in the way they happened of which in my opinion he cannot be allowed to take advantage. The petitioner has made the same false averments and the reasons are obvious. Having found that in the first affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, documents had not been produced in support of the averments the petitioner in his rejoinder embarked upon affirming his averments and denying the averments of the other side. Once several documents were produced on record in the sub-rejoinder filed on behalf of the company and its directors the petitioner could not come out of this but perhaps thought that it was wiser not to, come with any further affidavit. It is in this context that the petitioner has made the allegation of fabrication of documents. Perhaps the petitioner thought that this is a better course to adopt than to get caught further in the matter.

    39. I have already mentioned as to how the petitioner at one time desired to keep his one-third shareholding in the company. If he was to stick to this he had to make a contribution of Rs. 7,25,300. Time was given to him. In one breath he complained about the short time and in the other suggests that something was wrong with the management. Needless to say, if he had brought his contribution he would have had 33 per cent, of the holding but once the authorised share capital was increased and with that the issued share capital, it is but natural that the petitioner's shareholding came down and that was obviously because the Rao group had already come in though initially on transfer of shares from the Naik group and the Khandawala group thereafter by the purchase of the new rights. I am, therefore, not prepared to accept that there has been any manipulation so as to reduce the holding of the petitioner to a minority as sought to be made out.

    40. The petitioner has levelled allegations that he was denied access to the company records and has made grievance that though at one time he was called upon to take inspection of records and documents when his representative approached the company, he was denied the same on the ground that records and documents are at Goa. But the manner in which the petitioner has made claims in the petition as also produced several records themself show that the petitioner's allegations of no access to documents and records is not true.

    41. Several allegations of the petitioner of mismanagement and highhandedness on the part of the directors and respondent No. 2 in particular in the matter of the hotel project, viz., grant and acceptance of tenders, employing contractors, technocrats, etc., do not appear to be correct. These agencies did accompany the petitioner and other directors including the Rao group to personally inspect and view the ongoing project at Goa, in July, 1990. The various reports of these agencies suggest that the petitioner was personally present. Indeed the petitioner cannot deny that he had come at the company's cost by air and stayed at Hotel Mandovi along with other directors including the Rao group.

    42. Shri Usgaonkar indeed pointed out and not without justification that winding up petitions are liable to be dismissed when a petitioner has an alternative remedy more particularly when the companies are sought to be wound up on the just and equitable clause, viz., section 433(f). For this proposition he has placed reliance on the authority of Jose J. Kadavil and K.T Mathew v. Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd., [1986] 59 Comp Cas 969 (Ker). The rationale laid down in this case is significant on three aspects. Firstly, that the court can refuse to make an order winding up a company if it is of the opinion that some other remedy is available to the petitioner and if the petitioner is acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing that remedy. Secondly, when a safeguard against oppression in management has been provided in sections 397 and 398 and, lastly, that when clause (f) of section 433 is invoked it should be the last resort and when other remedies are not efficacious enough to protect the general interest of the company or that of a contributory. This observation came despite gross mismanagement in the affairs of the company having been alleged.

    43. In the decision of S.S Rajakumar v. Perfect Castings Private Ltd., [1968] 38 Comp Cas 187 (Mad) it has been laid down that the just and equitable rule is wide enough but it has its own circumspection. Existence of factions amongst shareholders, bickerings between one group of members and another, vague allegations against the quality of management by persons in charge of the company and mere exclusion from management, cannot themselves be grounds for winding up of the company. What is required is deliberate and wanton oppression by the company in exercising powers by the minority shareholders with a view to make personal illegal gains and indulging in subversive activities so as to jeopardise the substratum of the company.

    44. In the decision of Lokenath Gupta v. Credits Private Ltd., [1968] 38 Comp Cas 599 (Cal), the observations are that mere mismanagement or misappropriation or misconduct on the part of the directors or the managing director, by itself is no ground for winding up. Equally general allegations of oppression of minority shareholders is also held not to be a ground and if the petitioner has alternative remedies for the redress of his grievances the company need not be wound up.

    45. In the decision of Gadadhar Dixit v. Utkal Flour Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., [1989] 66 Comp Cas 188 (Orissa), it is laid down that when the petition alleges losses by the company and misappropriation of funds and when the petitioner fails to substantiate those allegations, the petition cannot be allowed to dismantle an established company.

    46. In the light of the discussion above, the allegations of the petitioner about mismanagement, lack of probity and/or highhandedness must fail. Similar is the case in relation to the so called manipulation or actions rendered to cause prejudice to him.

    47. I also considered the matter in all its perspective to find out whether this petition could be admitted and not advertised in order to hold an inquiry. I have, however, not been able to satisfy myself on this score also. In my view immense harm will be caused to the company if relief as prayed for by the petitioner is granted. As already mentioned elsewhere the hotel is about to begin commercially. About Rs. 2 crores has already been dumped on the project. It is not denied that EDC as the main financial institution has nominated its nominee as one of the directors of the company. Not only the project as it stood then but even the expanded project has been approved by EDC and other financial institutions. Even on the assumption that there is some inquiry necessary in the matter of mismanagement or the so called oppression, the petitioner has an efficacious remedy of going before the Company Law Board under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956.

    48. The next question to be asked is whether the board of directors be permitted to remove the petitioner as a director of the company. The petitioner has already created deadlock in obtaining further finance already sanctioned by the EDC. He has refused to sign papers and documents which are required to be signed and executed by the financial institutions. If the documents are not signed further finances will not be forthcoming from EDC and the chances of completing the hotel project is bound to be delayed which in my view is detrimental to the company including the shareholders and the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner is worried about his guarantees. If he is not a director it is not necessary for him to sign such guarantee in favour of EDC. It has become necessary in the interest of the company to remove the petitioner as director. Though this event is unfortunate I am unable to assist the petitioner. The petitioner himself wrote to the financial institutions not to disburse loans making wild allegations against the other directors, without seeking to take some other remedial action.

    49. The petitioner indeed has an apprehension that the cost of the hotel project has escalated with the result the hotel is not likely to run on profitable lines. This statement in my view is neither here nor there. Whether the project will become commercially viable is a matter in the realm of probability. It is possible that once the commercial operation starts, the hotel may bring in profits. Mere allegations of mismanagement by some other director is no ground for winding up. The petitioner has himself refused to sign documents which are required to be executed by the financial institutions with the result that a part of the finances agreed to be given to the company has been stalled. This delay has also come in the way of the hotel becoming operational. Viewed in that perspective it is difficult to accept that the company should be wound up at this stage on the allegations of the petitioner which are already dealt with. There are, however, reasons to believe that the petitioner is not that ignorant and even, according to him he is a broker dealing in real estate at Bombay and also a financier. Perhaps, he thought when he invested in the company that his expectation of fast returns has not come about and once this expectation was belied, is using this petition as a pressure tactic because he wants to get out of the company and that too at a premium on his investment. A person who is well versed in business at Bombay and who took the risk of this investment in the company for the sake of his disappointment cannot be permitted to get an order from this court to wind up the company by throttling it at this stage, which by no standard can be called just and equitable.

    50. Petition rejected.

    51. At this stage Shri D'Costa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, makes a prayer for extension of the order restraining the shareholders from passing a resolution for removal of the petitioner as a director of the company and also that the minutes books which are before the court be not handed over to the respondents for a period of 20 days. Shri Usgaonkar, learned counsel for the respondents, has no objection to the prayer made for extension for a period of 10 days. Order restraining removal of the petitioner from directorship and handing over of the minutes books is extended for a period of 15 days. Order accordingly.

    JUDGMENT OF DIVISION BENCH

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    K. Sukumaran, J.:— The petitioner in Company Petition No. 2-S of 1991 has come up in appeal against the judgment of the learned single judge dated 14-8-1991* by which his petition under sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, for an order of winding up of the company, Messrs. Solitaire Hotels Pvt. Ltd., has been dismissed.

    52. The company was incorporated in 1985. The main object was the running of a hotel and allied activities. The capital structure disclosed an authorised share capital of 50,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each and 5,0 preference shares of Rs. 100 each. Initially conceived as a three-star hotel with 38 rooms, it later underwent a change in conception with extended accommodation of 50 rooms and additional facilities like a swimming pool. At the time of filing of the petition in February, 1991, the construction was complete and the commercial activity was at a take off stage.

    53. The petitioner, an estate broker and financier, was attracted to the company some time in 1988 by the representations of respondent No. 2 who, according to him, has functioned as his chartered accountant from about 1984. He invested about rupees eight lakhs in the company. His calculation was that he would thereby obtain a one-third share along with respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (referred to as “the Naik group”) and respondents Nos. 4 and 5 (referred to as “the Khandawala group”).

    54. Escalation in the price of materials and services, understandably, led to a revision in the project cost. Additional capital had to be found. The latter developments were not in accordance with the expectations of the petitioner. He was pessimistic about an early completion of the project or a steady and attractive derivation of profit. The developments thereafter irked him, and he has a variety of complaints against the operational pattern adopted by respondents Nos. 2 to 5.

    55. The petition for winding up is based on the just and equitable clause, and no other. This has a significance in relation to the approach to the problem and assessment of the materials.

    56. The learned judge has adverted to the serious allegations made by the petitioner but entered adverse findings against him. In view of the course we propose to adopt, it is unnecessary to undertake an exhaustive discussion on the various allegations and attacks made on the findings as rendered by the learned judge.

    57. Lack of probity on the part of the respondents in relation to the functioning of the company, siphoning off of the funds of the company to private coffers, omission to account for money actually received, manoeuvring in relation to transfer of certain shares, manipulations in regard to the entries in the minutes and other books maintained by the company, are some of the aspects which were highlighted in the course of the arguments addressed to us.

    58. We would assume, for the sake of argument, that all these allegations are made out. That could be the highest that the appellant could aspire for. Even then, do circumstances exist for the extreme step of winding up of a company having regard to the existing circumstances? Inasmuch as the learned judge has answered the question in the negative, is there any reason or justification for interfering with that finding in appeal?

    59. The legal principles that should guide a court are no longer in a grey area. Those who have to deal with corporate entities of the modern world have necessarily to reckon with some hard facts or distressing realities. Instances are not rare where the fiduciary trust is betrayed by those entrusted with the management of the company. Quite often, the facade of the company is maintained for amassing private fortunes by those who had the opportunity to attend to important activities carried on by the company. That has been so even from the time of the East India Company. It has been on the increase in later times. Innovations made by vigilant Legislatures have checked but not altogether eradicated the malpractices in the corporate field. In a sense, history records the evolution of an expertise in corporate manipulations, fly-by-night operations and the like. Prolixity of legislation attempted to plug the loopholes in company administration. What was indeed a lean book of company law has now assumed almost about to burst obese proportions, with large number of statutory provisions, greater number of statutory forums, and bulk rules framed by diverse authorities, including the Government and the courts.

    60. The scheme of the Companies Act particularly after its amendment in 1956, would make one thing clear: A winding up has to be resorted to only when other means of healing an ailing company are of absolutely no avail. Remedies are provided by the statute in very many matters concerning the management and running of a company. A special forum itself has been created, and with an expertise and daily experience in relation to the problems in the working of the companies — the Company Law Board. It now adjudicates many such disputes which come before it as provided under the law. The Registrar of Companies has got an overseeing authority in relation to enumerated matters. These safeguards are visualised for the protection of the individual shareholder, who in the scheme of things, may not be in a position to have a close view of the working of the company and many of its deals. The important right of the majority of the shareholders to replace a group mismanaging its affairs or lacking in probity is always there. Experience has, however, shown that the majority could be manipulated by those with ideas in mind and money to back. Sections 397 and 398 confer valuable rights even on the minority to seek the aid of a vigilant court in redressing their grievances. If pursued properly and effectively, many of the misdeeds of an erring or dishonest management could be checkmated and/or remedied by resort to such proceedings. This scheme of the Companies Act lies at the bottom of evaluation of the principles which insist on keeping at bay a winding up process, except in very compelling circumstances. Some of the decisions which have indicated the principles, and stretching from 1968 to 1989 are as under:

    (1) S.S Rajakumar v. Perfect Castings Pvt. Ltd., [1968] 38 Comp Cas 187 (Mad).

    (2) Lokenath Gupta v. Credits Pvt. Ltd., [1968] 38 Comp Cas 599 (Cal).

    (3) Jose J. Kadavil and K.T Mathew v. Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd., [1986] 59 Comp Cas 969 (Ker).

    (4) Gadadhar Dixit v. Utkal Flour Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., [1989] 66 Comp Cas 188 (Orissa).

    61. In the present case, one strong circumstance which dissuades us from resorting to the extreme and irretrievable step of proceeding with winding up is the stage which the company and its activities have reached. As noted earlier, it is almost at the threshold of the commencement of commercial operation. The project is in an attractive segment of tourism development. It has been undertaken in a State noted for its scenic beauty and reputed for its tourist attraction, with palmy patches and breezy beaches. Public institutions have also got themselves involved in the working of the company by sizable financial support for working out the project. It will be against the interest of all, and even that of the petitioner, to halt the activities at a crucial stage and to dismantle the entire corporate achievements in an unimaginative manner. In that view of the matter, we would, therefore, affirm the order of the learned judge. Counsel for the appellant rightly stressed that in the light of the findings as entered by the learned judge, he would be denuded of a remedy in the protection of his rights even when he approaches other authorities or forums for ventilation of his grievances. In particular, he commented on the conduct of the respondents in filing a return with six documents initially and a surrejoinder with 41 documents. The petitioner has a conviction that the time gained in between has been abused for tampering with the records and even to fabricate some. In between the surrejoinder and the actual hearing, there had been no effective opportunity for the petitioner to attempt to disabuse the impression that could be formed in the court's mind, on the basis of the facts mentioned and the documents produced at the belated stage. Counsel appearing for the company and the respondents asserted that they have a satisfactory explanation in relation to all the allegations made by the petitioner. There is much force in the contention of counsel for the appellant about the prejudice that may be caused to his client by the adverse findings. The grievance about the inadequacy of time to establish all that the petitioner intended to, also appears to be genuine. The petitioner has to be liberated from the oppression of these prejudicial factors. It is all the more necessary, inasmuch as we have declined to go into the details of the allegations and assess the correctness of the findings of the learned judge. We would, therefore, vacate the factual findings on the various allegations as entered by the learned judge. It will be open to the petitioner to approach other authorities in accordance with law and seek ventilation of his grievances. Needless to add, it will be open to the respondents to present before such authorities their version and justification. The authorities, if and when approached by the petitioner, will adjudicate upon the grievances of the appellant uninhibited by any of the findings and observations of the learned judge.

    62. Subject to the above observations, we dismiss the appeal.

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