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  • provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred
  • Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act
  • section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial Court
  • provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • SECTION 25 G INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  • section 29(2)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act.5.
  • section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • SECTION 25 C INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • payment.9. Rule
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred
  • Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act
  • section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial Court
  • provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • SECTION 25 G INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  • section 29(2)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act.5.
  • section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • SECTION 25 C INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • payment.9. Rule
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.N. Srikrishna, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a trade union representing workmen employed in the Public Works Department (PWD) of Maharashtra. The petitioner-Union filed Complaint (ULP) No. 468 of 1987 before the Industrial Court, Nasik, under Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 ("the Act"), on behalf of 14 workmen. The complaint alleged that those 14 workmen were served with retrenchment orders dated 2-7-1987 terminating their services with effect from 9-8-1987.

The Union had earlier raised an industrial dispute concerning conditions of service for workmen on the Daily Wage Establishment, Work Charged Establishment and Temporary Establishment, including a demand that workmen who had worked on such establishments for one year or more should be made permanent. That dispute was admitted in conciliation on 18-9-1984 under section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. While conciliation was pending, the 14 workmen were retrenched on 2-7-1987. A Failure Report was filed by the Conciliation Officer dated 7-9-1987 and the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by a reference dated 2-3-1988.

The Industrial Court rejected certain contentions of the petitioner regarding want of publication of seniority list and non-compliance with section 25-G, and held that the 14 workmen were not "workmen concerned" in the conciliation proceedings and that termination did not breach section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner challenged that finding in this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the retrenchment/termination of the 14 workmen during the pendency of conciliation proceedings (admitted 18-9-1984 and referred 2-3-1988) amounted to an alteration of the conditions of service connected with the pending dispute and therefore contravened section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  2. Whether a breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act can amount to an "unfair labour practice" within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act, permitting the Industrial Court to grant relief under that Act.
  3. Whether the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to entertain and grant relief under the Maharashtra Act for conduct that might also be actionable under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Union)

  • The retrenchment of the 14 workmen amounted to an alteration of their conditions of service in a matter connected with the dispute that had been admitted in conciliation, and thus contravened section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • The retrenchment also constituted unfair labour practice under Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act.
  • The retrenchment was also challenged on grounds of want of publication of seniority list and failure to follow the "last come first go" rule (relying on section 25-C and section 25-G), although the Industrial Court found these contentions not established factually.

Respondents (State / Government Pleader)

  • The retrenchment was justified by pre-existing government policy and norms laid down in 1978 and reiterated by a Circular dated 12-11-1986; there was no mala fide or arbitrary action.
  • Even if there was a breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that breach is actionable under the special machinery of the Industrial Tribunals constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, and the Maharashtra Act's machinery cannot be utilised for that purpose.
  • The status of the 14 workmen was temporary before, during and up to the date of retrenchment; there was therefore no alteration of status during the pendency of conciliation and no contravention of section 33(1)(a).
  • Assuming contravention of section 33(1)(a), that contravention by itself does not necessarily amount to an unfair labour practice within the Schedules of the Maharashtra Act, so the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to grant relief under that Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S.G Chemicals and Dyes Tradings Ltd. (referred to in the opinion) Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act is sufficiently wide to include a breach of any statute which by its nature forms part of the employment contract; such breach can constitute failure to implement an award, settlement or agreement and thus fall within Item 9 (i.e., an unfair labour practice). The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to reject the respondent's submission that a breach of the Industrial Disputes Act could not be dealt with under the Maharashtra Act. The decision supported treating a breach of section 33(1)(a) as an unfair labour practice under Item 9.
Bhavnagar Municipality v. Alibhai Karimbhai, 1977 L.I.C 834 The removal of temporary/daily rated workmen during the pendency of an industrial dispute that sought conversion to permanent service constitutes tampering with the status quo ante and amounts to an alteration of conditions of service connected with the pending dispute; such alteration contravenes section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The court treated this authority as controlling on the question whether retrenchment during pendency of a dispute constitutes a contravention of section 33(1)(a). It held that the present facts fell within the principle there laid down and therefore the Industrial Court was wrong to find no contravention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first setting out the undisputed chronology: the industrial dispute arising from demands dated 20-1-1984; admission to conciliation on 18-9-1984 under section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act; the retrenchments occurring on 2-7-1987 while conciliation was pending; the Conciliation Officer's Failure Report dated 7-9-1987; and the subsequent reference to the Industrial Tribunal on 2-3-1988. The court treated the period from admission in conciliation to the reference as the period during which section 33(1)(a) protections operated (citing section 29(2)(c) as to terminus a quo and terminus ad quem).

The court evaluated the respondents' principal legal contentions: (a) that a policy decision and Circular justified the retrenchments, and (b) that any breach of the Industrial Disputes Act must be remedied only by the Industrial Tribunal machinery and not by the Industrial Court under the Maharashtra Act. On point (b) the court found the law settled by the Supreme Court in S.G Chemicals: Item 9 of Schedule IV is wide enough to encompass breaches of statutory obligations forming part of the employment relationship, and such breaches can amount to unfair labour practice. Therefore, the respondent's jurisdictional objection was rejected as lacking merit.

On the central factual-legal issue whether retrenchment during conciliation amounted to contravention of section 33(1)(a), the court relied on Bhavnagar Municipality v. Alibhai Karimbhai, where the Supreme Court held that removal of workers during a pendency of a dispute seeking conversion to permanent service constituted an alteration of conditions of service and contravened section 33(1)(a). Applying that authority, the court concluded that the Industrial Court had erred in holding that the 14 workmen were not "workmen concerned" in the conciliation proceedings and that there was no breach of section 33(1)(a).

Having concluded that section 33(1)(a) was breached, the court considered the consequence under the Maharashtra Act. In light of S.G Chemicals, the court held that such a breach falls within Item 9 of Schedule IV as an unfair labour practice. Consequently, the Industrial Court's order was quashed and set aside and the petitioner was entitled to the relief claimed before the Industrial Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's dispositive rulings are summarized as follows:

  • The impugned order of the Industrial Court is quashed and set aside.
  • The retrenchment of the 14 workmen by the respondents amounts to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
  • The affected workmen are entitled to reinstatement and back wages for the period of their unemployment.

Implementation and further consequences specified by the court:

  • The order of reinstatement and payment of back wages shall be carried into effect within eight weeks from the date of the judgment.
  • If the respondents fail to implement within eight weeks, the back wages shall carry simple interest at 12% per annum from the date on which they ought to have been paid until payment, in addition to other consequences.
  • The rule in the writ petition was made absolute with no order as to costs; the formal order is recorded as "Rule made absolute."

Implications: The decision directly affects only the parties by ordering reinstatement and back wages for the retrenched workmen and quashing the Industrial Court's contrary finding. The court relied on existing Supreme Court authorities (S.G Chemicals and Bhavnagar Municipality) to resolve the legal questions; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying those existing authorities.

Rule made absolute.

    Dalanvalan Imarat Bandhkam And Patbandhare Kamgar Union v. The State Of Maharashtra And Others

    B.N Srikrishna, J.:— This writ petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, impugns an order of the Industrial Court, Nasik, dated 17th March, 1989, made in Complaint (ULP) No. 468 of 1987 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

    2. The petitioner is a Trade Union of workmen employed in the Public Works Department. The petitioner-Union filed a complaint before the Industrial Court, Nasik, under Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act on behalf of 14 workmen working in the Public Works Department of the State of Maharashtra. It alleged that the concerned 14 workmen had been served with retrenchment orders on 2-7-1987 terminating their services with effect from 9-8-1987. The petitioner-Union had raised an industrial dispute, inter alia, with regard to the conditions of service of the workmen of the Public Works Department carried on the Daily Wage Establishment, Work Charged Establishment and Temporary Establishment. By the said dispute, one demand made was that any workman who had worked on any one or more of the said Establishments, for a period of one year or more, should be made permanent and taken on the permanent Establishment and given all the consequential benefits. This dispute was admitted in conciliation by the Conciliation Officer on 18th September, 1984, under section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Pending the proceedings in conciliation, the first respondent terminated the services of the 14 concerned workmen on 2-7-1987 on the ground that they were temporary. Subsequently the Conciliation Officer made a Failure Report dated 7-9-1987 and the Industrial Dispute came to be referred for adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal by a reference dated 2-3-1988. On these facts, about which there is no dispute, the petitioner contended before the Industrial Tribunal that the action of termination of services of its member-workmen amounted to an alteration of the conditions of service applicable to them in regard to a matter connected with the dispute which was admitted in conciliation. Since the said alteration was prejudicial to the interest of workmen, it amounted to the contravention of the provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as such change had not been brought out with the express permission of Conciliation Officer before whom the proceedings were pending. The petitioner also contended that the retrenchment was bad for want of publication of the Seniority Notice and for failure to follow the rule of ‘last come first go’ enunciated in section 25-c of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was, therefore, pleaded before the Industrial Court that the retrenchment of the concerned 14 workmen amounted to unfair labour practice under Items 5,9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. The Industrial Court rightly rejected the contention based on want of publication of seniority list and non-compliance with section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Court found that these contentions had not been established factually. On the question as to whether there was contravention of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial Court took the view that the workmen on whose behalf of the complaint had been filed were not workmen concerned in the conciliation proceedings and further that the termination of their services did not amount to breach of the provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This order of the Industrial Court is impugned in the present petition.

    3. Mr. Kochar, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, rightly did not impugn the findings of the Industrial Court on the issue of want of publication of seniority list and contravention of section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. He concentrated in attacking the finding of the Industrial Court that there was no breach of the provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore there was no unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act.

    4. The notice dated 25th September, 1984, issued by the Conciliation Officer and Additional Commissioner of Labour, Bombay, addressed to the petitioner-Union and the first respondent makes it clear that preliminary discussion in connection with the dispute between the Public Works Department, Rural Development, Irrigation, Power and Supply Department and its workmen, was held on 18th September, 1984, and that the dispute was admitted in conciliation under section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act on the same day. The dispute had arisen out of the demands contained in the letter dated 20th January, 1984, addressed by the Action Committee of the workmen to the first respondent. The first demand in the annexure to the said letter pertained to the demand for making permanent all workmen whose names were maintained in the Daily Wage Establishment. Work Charged Establishment and Temporary Establishment, after completion of 240 days and for giving them consequent benefits. The Failure Report made by the Conciliation Officer on 7-9-1987 also shows that the demands were admitted in conciliation proceedings on 18th September, 1984, and had ended in a failure. It is not in dispute that this Industrial dispute was ultimately referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication by reference order dated 2-3-1988. In view of these facts, it is clear that between 18th September, 1984 to 1-3-1988, the Industrial dispute was pending conciliation proceedings, the terminus a quo of the conciliation proceedings being the date of admission of conciliation and the terminus ad quem being the date of making of the reference, as indicated in section 29(2)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

    5. Mr. Soni, learned Assistant Government Pleader, for the respondents, strenuously contended that the order of the Industrial Court was perfectly correct in law and justified on the facts. He pointed out that, way back on 15th March, 1978, much before the dispute was ever raised, the Government had laid down certain norms as to the number of workmen on different establishments. By a Circular dated 12-11-1986, this policy decision as to the norms was reiterated and the concerned Departments were called upon to strictly conform thereto. Thus, contends Mr. Soni, there is no mala fides, no unjustified or arbitrary action on the part of the respondents. Apart from justifying the action on merits, Mr. Soni also contended that the complaint under the provisions of the Act was not maintainable even if it was assumed that there was a breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as the breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act was actionable either under the special machinery of Industrial Tribunals created under the provisions of that very Act. For a breach of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the machinery under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act cannot be utilised or brought into play, according to the learned Assistant Government Pleader. Then he contended that assuming that it was permissible for the petitioner to move the Industrial Court under the Act, there was no breach of section 33(1)(a) at all on facts inasmuch as the status of the workmen was that of temporary workmen prior to the commencement of the proceedings, during the proceedings and upto the date of retrenchment. This status had not been changed at all during pendency of conciliation proceedings and hence there was no alteration within the meaning of section 33(1)(a). Finally, Mr. Soni submitted that assuming that there was contravention of section 33(1)(a), that per se, did not amount to unfair labour practice within the meaning of any of the Schedules of the Act and therefore the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to grant any relief.

    6. I am afraid, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents are no longer res integra. In (S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S.G Chemicals and Dyes Tradings Ltd.)1, 1986 (69) Indian Factories Journal, 310, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the very same, arguments being presented to me. In the case before Their Lordships, a closure had been resorted to contrary to the provisions of section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act and the contention was raised that even if the closure was contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, it did not amount to an unfair labour practice under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act and therefore the Industrial Court under the said Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or grant any relief. The Supreme Court rejected this argument by taking the view that Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act was wide enough to accommodate within itself the breach of any statute which per proprio vigore, must be read as part and parcel of the employment contract itself. Any breach of such a statute, in the view of the Supreme Court, would amount to failure to implement award, settlement or agreement within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. The contention of Mr. Soni, on this aspect of the matter, therefore, has no merit and has to be rejected.

    7. The justification of the retrenchment of the concerned workmen is wholly besides the point and irrelevant. The question before the Industrial Court was not whether the workmen were justifiably retrenched, but whether their retrenchment amounted to breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. This is the question considered by the Industrial Court on which a finding adverse to the petitioner has been recorded. This is the only adverse finding which the petitioner has impugned in the present petition. Despite the efforts of Mr. Soni to persuade me to hold that there was no change in the conditions of service of the workmen, as they continued to be temporary throughout and consequently there was no breach of section 33(1)(a), I am afraid, this question also is not res integra in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in (The Bhavnagar Municipality v. Alibhai Karimbhai)2, 1977 L.I.C 834. In the case before the Supreme Court, daily rated workmen of the Municipality had raised an industrial dispute. The subject matter of the dispute was connected with the conversion of the temporary workmen into ermanent. During the pendency of this dispute, the Municipality removed the concerned workmen from service and the Supreme Court took the view that such tampering with status quo ante of those workers was a clear alteration of the conditions of their service and the alteration was in regard to a matter connected with the pending industrial dispute and thus there was contravention of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this issue, I decline to accede to the able arguments advanced by Mr. Soni touching this aspect of the matter.

    8. In my view, the Industrial Court erred in law and misdirected itself in coming to the conclusion that there was no breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The circumstances clearly showed that there was breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once the conclusion is reached that there was breach of section 33(1)(a) it is only a short hop therefrom to the conclusion that there is an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.G Chemical's case (supra). The impugned order of the Industrial Court is, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside which I hereby do. It is held that the retrenchment of the concerned workmen by the respondents amounts to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. They shall be entitled to the consequential relief of reinstatement and back wages for the period of their unemployment. The order of reinstatement and back wages shall be carried into effect within eight weeks from today failing which, in addition to other consequences, the back wages shall carry simple interest at 12 percent per annum from the date on which they ought to have been paid, until payment.

    9. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs.

    Rule made absolute.
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    Dalanvalan Imarat Bandhkam And Patbandhare Kamgar Union v. The State Of Maharashtra And Others
    (Sep 18, 1991)