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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Petitioner, who is the original complainant in C.R. No. 597 of 1985 (registered under section 406 IPC), challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, by way of a writ petition invoking Article 227 of the Constitution and section 482 CrPC. The dispute concerns custody of three vehicles (two motorcycles and one jeep MRF 8319). The learned Metropolitan Magistrate (18th Court, Girgaum, Bombay) by order dated 17 March 1986 directed that the vehicles be handed over to the Petitioner on his executing a bond for Rs. 1,50,000/- on usual terms. The Additional Sessions Judge, by order dated 16 February 1987, set aside the Magistrate's order in respect of the jeep and directed custody of the jeep MRF 8319 to be handed to Ajit Dandekar on his personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of like amount. The Petitioner has not pressed his claims as to the two motorcycles before this Court and challenges only the Sessions Judge's order insofar as it pertains to the jeep MRF 8319.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate's order dated 17 March 1986 regarding custody of the jeep MRF 8319 was interlocutory in nature under section 457 CrPC and therefore not amenable to revision under section 397(2) CrPC.
  2. Whether the Sessions Court properly exercised revisional powers in setting aside the Magistrate's custody order on the basis that the vehicle stood in the name of the registered owner (Ajit Dandekar).
  3. Whether, as a matter of law, custody of a seized vehicle must necessarily be given to the person in whose name the registration stands, or whether the Magistrate may direct custody to a person who establishes a superior title.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner) Arguments — Mr. Chari

  • The charge-sheet had been filed (1986) but the jeep had not been produced before the Magistrate in the trial; therefore, the Magistrate's order should be treated as one under section 457 CrPC.
  • An order under section 457 CrPC can be interim or final depending on circumstances; where trial has commenced but the property has not been produced, the order must be interlocutory.
  • Interlocutory orders under section 457 are not revisable under section 397(2) CrPC; hence the Criminal Appeals/Applications before the Sessions Court were not maintainable.
  • Cited authorities (including Shri Bharat Mahey and Ghafoor Bhai) to support that Magistrate may pass custody orders during investigation or before property is produced at trial.
  • On merits, the Magistrate had rightly found that the Petitioner had a superior title; registration is not conclusive of ownership (relying on Kishan Pandurang Kagde) and transfer of ownership occurs on date of sale, not on date of registration change.

Respondents' Arguments — Mr. Samant (for first and third Respondents)

  • Contended that the Magistrate's order was not interlocutory; relied on Supreme Court decisions (Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye) to argue existence of an intermediate category of orders that are neither final nor merely interlocutory but decide issues of moment.
  • Argued that normally custody of a seized vehicle should be given to the person in whose name the registration stands and cited Nandiram and U. Kariyappa in support of that proposition.
  • Pointed out procedural oddity: Dilawar Khan (respondent) had not claimed custody before Magistrate or Additional Sessions Judge; the claim had been put forward by Ajit Dandekar who was absent from further proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shri Bharat Mahey v. The State of U.P., 1975 Cri LJ 890 (Allahabad High Court) Distinction between interim and final orders under provisions relating to custody/disposal of seized goods (considering sections 457 and 458 CrPC) and when High Court's revisional jurisdiction is not barred. Cited by the Petitioner to show that final vs interim character of orders under sections like 457/458 must be determined by their substance; Court referenced it in discussing when revisional jurisdiction may be available.
Ghafoor Bhai Nabbu Bhai Tawar v. Motiram Keshaorao Bongirwar, 1977 Mah LJ 548 Interpretation of section 457 CrPC: words "and such property is not produced before the Criminal Court during the inquiry or trial" mean property not produced before the Magistrate; section 457 can apply during investigation or after charge-sheet but before production at trial. Relied upon by this Court to hold that the Magistrate may pass custody orders even after charge-sheet but before production at trial, and such orders in that context are interlocutory.
Kishan Pandurang Kagde v. Baldev Singh Gian Singh, 1977 Mah LJ 656 Registration is not conclusive of ownership; transfer of ownership takes place from date of sale and not from the date of recording in the registration certificate; transfer/ownership governed by Sale of Goods Act principles. Applied to uphold the Magistrate's ability to direct custody to a person who establishes superior title notwithstanding registration standing in another name; Court agreed registration is not always conclusive.
Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : AIR 1977 SC 2185 Recognises an intermediate category of orders which are not final yet not merely interlocutory; historical background of section 397(2) CrPC discussed. Cited by Respondent to argue Magistrate's order fell in the intermediate category; Court considered the proposition but rejected application to the facts, holding the Magistrate's order was interlocutory.
Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47 Also discusses that not every non-final order is interlocutory; existence of orders that decide issues of moment and thus may not be barred from revision. Cited by Respondent for the same purpose as Amar Nath; Court acknowledged the authority but held the present Magistrate order did not fall into that intermediate category.
Ram Prakash Sharma v. State of Haryana, (1978) 2 SCC 491 : AIR 1978 SC 1282 General guidance that Courts must be circumspect before releasing property in custody and should exercise jurisdiction judiciously. Respondent relied on it; Court held that nothing in Ram Prakash Sharma supported the contention that the Magistrate's order was not interlocutory and found the authority did not decide that issue in the respondent's favour.
Nandiram v. State of Gujarat, 1967 Cri LJ 483 Reflects the normal rule that custody/return of seized vehicle is in favour of the person in whose name the registration stands, subject to a superior title being proved by another person. Relied upon by Respondent to support the general rule; Court held these cases do not establish an inviolable principle and affirmed that where Magistrate finds superior title, he may order custody to that person.
U. Kariyappa v. P. Sreekantaiah, 1980 Cri LJ 422 Similar authority cited for the proposition that custody normally follows registered ownership unless a superior title is shown. Relied upon by Respondent; Court held it does not lay down an absolute rule and is consistent with the position that the Magistrate may give custody to a person who proves superior title.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages: (A) threshold jurisdictional analysis concerning the nature of the Magistrate's order and (B) merits analysis on the correctness of the Sessions Judge's interference.

(A) Nature of the Magistrate's Order and Revisional Bar

  • The Court accepted the Petitioner's contention (following Ghafoor Bhai) that section 457 CrPC covers situations where the Magistrate is called upon to pass orders relating to custody even after the charge-sheet has been filed but before the property is produced in Court during trial.
  • Applying that principle, the Court held that the Magistrate's order of 17 March 1986—passed after filing of the charge-sheet but before production of the jeep at trial—was an interlocutory order.
  • Because the order was interlocutory and not appealable under any express provision of the CrPC, it was also barred from revision under section 397(2) CrPC; thus the Additional Sessions Judge should not have entertained revisional interference with the Magistrate's custody order.
  • The Court considered the Respondent's submission based on Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye about an intermediate category of orders but concluded the Magistrate's order did not decide any issue of moment nor finally determine rights; therefore it did not fall in that intermediate category.

(B) Merits — Whether Sessions Judge was Justified in Disturbing Magistrate's Finding

  • Even assuming arguendo that the order could have been subjected to revision, the Court examined the merits and found the Additional Sessions Judge's reasoning inadequate. The Sessions Judge had relied primarily on the fact that the registration and taxation certificates showed Ajit Dandekar as the registered owner and that, ordinarily, a vehicle should be returned to the registered owner.
  • The Court considered the authorities and principles (notably Kishan Pandurang Kagde) establishing that registration is not conclusive of ownership and transfer of ownership occurs at the date of sale; the Magistrate had recorded findings that the Petitioner had made out a superior title and that there was collusion/fishy facts on the part of Dilawar Khan and Ajit Dandekar.
  • The Court concluded that the learned Additional Sessions Judge took a simplistic approach by treating registration as decisive and thereby exceeded his revisional powers in setting aside the Magistrate's order.
  • Given the settled principle that revisional powers are to be sparingly exercised and only where jurisdictional error, perversity, or grave miscarriage is shown, the Sessions Judge's interference was held to be improper.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is partly allowed. The order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 16 February 1987 (in Criminal Appeal Nos. 103 of 1986 and 110 of 1986) is set aside insofar as it pertains to the Jeep MRF 8319. The Sessions Judge's order is maintained with regard to the two motor-cycles because the Petitioner did not challenge that part.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Magistrate's order directing temporary custody of the jeep MRF 8319 to the Petitioner (on executing the bond previously directed) is effectively restored by setting aside the Sessions Judge's contrary order as to the jeep.
  • Practical consequence: The learned Magistrate is permitted to impose such additional conditions upon the Petitioner regarding use of the jeep pending final disposal of the criminal trial as he deems fit; these may include direction to deposit a reasonable amount for the user of the jeep during the pendency of the trial. The Magistrate must hear all parties before making any such order.
  • Costs: The rule was made partly absolute with no order as to costs.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to create any new broad legal principle beyond applying existing authorities to the facts; it emphasizes that registration is not necessarily conclusive and reiterates the limited scope for revisional interference with interlocutory custody orders under section 397(2) CrPC.

Final Disposition in the Opinion: Petition partly allowed. (No order as to costs.)

    Virendrakumar J. Handa v. Dilawarkhan Alij Khan And Others

    1. By this writ petition invoking the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and its inherent powers saved under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Petitioner has challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, by which he reversed the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 18th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, directing that two motor cycles and one jeep, which are the subject matters of the present petition, be handed over to the Petitioner on his executing a Bond in the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- on usual terms.

    2. The Petitioner is the original complainant in C.R No. 597 of 1985 which was registered with Dadasaheb Bhadkamkar Marg Police Station under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. Though the Petitioner prayed for setting aside the whole order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, pertaining to the custody of one Honda motor cycle, one Yamaha motor cycle and one jeep, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Chari stated at the bar that he would not be pressing the claims in respect of the two motor vehicles. I shall, therefore, consider the correctness of the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge only in so far as it pertains to the jeep MRF 8319.

    3. It is the case of the complainant that he purchased the jeep MRF 8319 from Respondent No. 1, Dilawar Khan, in 1973 when Dilawar Khan was in need of Rs. 25,000/-. He handed over the Registration Certificate and other duly signed documents to the Petitioner after receiving the money. Sometime later, Dilawar Khan wanted to get the jeep repaired at Bhopal and desired to have the Registration Certificate to be carried with the vehicle. On this assurance, Dilawar Khan took back the jeep along with the Registration Certificate. Later, after getting the vehicle repaired he colluded with his servant Ajit Dandekar and got the jeep transferred in favour of Ajit Dandekar. Ajit Dandekar in turn claimed that Dilawar Khan had purchased this jeep in 1982 from the Collector of Central Excise in auction and on 11-10-1982 he transferred it in his own (Dilawar Khan's) name and thereafter the said jeep came to be transferred to Ajit Dandekar. According to Ajit Dandekar, the original Taxation and Registration Certificates were misplaced by Dilawar Khan who applied for and obtained duplicate certificates which were duly issued and thereafter the said vehicle was transferred to the name of Ajit Dandekar by Dilawar Khan on 7-12-1984.

    4. The charge-sheet was filed before the learned Magistrate sometime in the year 1986. Before the vehicle in question was actually produced or put in the custody of the Court during the trial of the case, the Petitioner made an application to the learned Magistrate praying that he may be granted temporary custody of the jeep in question subject to the usual conditions such as not to dispose of or remove any part, etc. and to produce the said property in Court whenever called upon to do so. The Petitioner filed before the learned Magistrate the T.C.R, T.T.O and other forms which were alleged to have been signed by Dilawar Khan in respect of his application. Dilawar Khan did not file any say denying the facts alleged in the application made by the Petitioner before the Court. Though Ajit Dandekar filed his say before the Magistrate and claimed that he was entitled to custody of the said jeep as he was the owner thereof, he did not produce any receipt or other documents to show that he had paid any consideration to Dilawar Khan, his employer, nor any material was placed before the learned Magistrate in support of his plea.

    5. On the material placed before him and after hearing the parties concerned, the learned Magistrate made an order dated 17th March, 1986 in which he took the view that the circumstances placed before him, particularly the failure of Dilawar Khan to deny the averments made by the Petitioner in support of his application and the failure of Ajit Dandekar to produce any material to show that any consideration had been paid by him to Dilawar Khan for transfer of the jeep, spelt out fishy collusion of Dilawar Khan and Ajit Dandekar to defeat the otherwise lawful claim of ownership of V.K Handa. The learned Magistrate, therefore, took the view that the Petitioner was entitled to the temporary custody of all the three vehicles and directed that all the three vehicles be handed over to the Petitioner on his executing a Bond in the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- on usual terms.

    6. The order of the learned Magistrate dated 17th March, 1986, was challenged before the Sessions Court, Greater Bombay, by Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1986 by Dilawar Khan and Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1986 by Kekoo Soli Sethana (Respondent No. 3 herein). Since Kekoo Soli Sethana's appeal pertained only to one of the motor cycles, I need not consider the case made out by him. Turning to the case made out by Dilawar Khan in his Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1986, he contended before the Sessions Judge that he had at no time sold the jeep to the Petitioner and that the signatures appearing on the T.T.O forms and the receipts were not his signatures but were forged ones. He contended that the jeep concerned was all along in his possession from the date he purchased it from the Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, and that on 7-12-1984 he had sold the jeep to his Manager Ajit Dandekar. He, therefore, prayed for setting aside the order dated 17th March, 1986, passed by the learned Magistrate. Curiously, though Ajit Dandekar had filed his say before the learned Magistrate and had claimed custody of the jeep, he does not appear to have filed any proceedings to challenge the order dated 17th March, 1986 made by the learned Magistrate granting custody of the jeep to the Petitioner.

    7. By his order dated 16th February, 1987, the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, took the view that though the proceedings before him were styled as criminal appeals, they were in fact criminal revisions and he purported to entertain them as applications invoking the revisional powers of the Sessions Court. On merits, so far as the custody of the jeep in question was concerned, the learned Additional Sessions Judge took the view that although Ajit Dandekar had not produced any receipt for payment of the price of the jeep to Dilawar Khan, the fact that the Registration Book and the Taxation Certificate Book duly issued by the R.T.O, Bombay, showed his name as the present owner and the fact that there was no explanation from the Petitioner as to why he had failed to get the registration transferred in his name, despite receipt of duly signed T.T.O forms duly signed by Dilawar Khan on the 6th March, 1983, were significant. He also took the view that normally the vehicle should be returned to the registered owner, as it is he who is called upon by the R.T.O or any other authority if anything goes wrong with the vehicle and further the registered owner is answerable under the Motor Vehicles Act in respect of the vehicle standing in his name. Since on record Ajit Dandekar was the registered owner of the jeep and as Dilawar Khan had challenged his signature on the T.T.O forms and the receipt produced by the Petitioner, the learned Additional Sessions Judge took the view that Ajit Dandekar was the proper and fit person to whom the custody of the jeep should have been given by the Magistrate. In this view of the matter, he set aside the order of the Magistrate giving custody of the jeep to the Petitioner and ordered that the custody of the jeep MRF 8319 be handed over to Ajit Dandekar on his Personal Bond of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of like amount. It is this order dated 16th February 1987 made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, which is seriously impugned in the present proceedings before this Court. Since Mr. Chari, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has not pressed his challenge to the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dealing with custody of the two motor cycles, I shall only deal with the challenge to the said order only in so far as it pertains to the custody of the jeep MRF 8319.

    8. Mr. Chari, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, fairly conceded that though the charge-sheet had been filed by the police sometime in the year 1986, there did not appear to be any material to show that the jeep in question had been produced before the Magistrate in the trial either physically or symbolically. He, therefore, contended that though it was not clear from the order of the learned Magistrate as to under which section the learned Magistrate had exercised jurisdiction, the order of the learned Magistrate could be said to be one really falling under section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Proceeding further, Mr. Chari submits that an order under section 457 could be either an interim order or it could be a final order depending on the circumstances of the case. In his submission, considering the fact that the trial had commenced by the charge-sheet which had already been filed against the accused and the fact that the jeep in question had not been produced in the trial, there was no occasion for making a final order under section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the order could be considered only as an order for temporary custody of the property, namely, the jeep in question. His next contention is that considering the interlocutory nature of the order passed by the learned Magistrate under section 457 of the code, such an order could not have been subject to revision under section 397 of the code as it was specifically barred under sub-section (2) of section 397. According to Mr. Chari, the two Criminal Appeals Nos. 103 of 1986 and 110 of 1986 were not maintainable in any view of the matter since an order under section 457 of the code is not made appealable under the Code of Criminal Procedure and if they were to be treated as applications, for exercising revisional powers, they were barred by section 397(2) of the Code.

    9. Mr. Chari relied upon a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Shri Bharat Mahey v. The State of U.P, 1975 Cri LJ 890. That case arose under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act. Certain tins of Dalda had been seized under the provisions of the said Act and an application was made to the Judicial Magistrate for release of the Dalda and tins in question. The learned Judicial Magistrate rejected the said application and the said order was challenged by way of revision before the High Court. The High Court took the view that the order that was passed by the learned Magistrate finally disposed of the tins of Dalda and that it was not an interim arrangement for the delivery, custody or production of the case property, as and when required by the Court. The corpus of the tins ceased to exist by the sale of the goods and it could not be said that the sale proceeds would adequately represent the corpus of the property in question. After considering the provisions of sections 457(1), (2) and 458(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the High Court held that both final orders and temporary orders with regard to the disposal of the property are contemplated under these two sections. Since, however, the Court came to the conclusion that the order impugned before it could not be deemed to be an order in the nature of an interim order, and was really a final order regarding the disposal of the goods in question, the powers of the High Court in revision were not barred.

    10. This Court, in Ghafoor Bhai Nabbu Bhai Tawar v. Motiram Keshaorao Bongirwar, 1977 Mah LJ 548, while construing the provisions of section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, held that by the words ‘and such property is not produced before the Criminal Court during the inquiry or trial’ used in the section, all that the Legislature intended to convey is that the property has not been produced before the Magistrate. Such non-production could be on account of (1) the absence of any inquiry or trial, or (2) though the enquiry or trial is pending, the investigation agency had not yet produced it in the Court. The Court then held that the provisions of section 457 of the Code were sufficiently wide so as to cover the case where the Magistrate is called upon to pass an order about disposal or custody of a property even during the investigation stage of the matter.

    11. Mr. Chari contends that these authorities clearly point out that it is permissible to the Magistrate to pass an order with regard the custody of the property even while the investigation is under progress or after the investigation is over and the trial has commenced but before the property is actually produced during the course of the trial. He submits that in the latter case, any order passed by the Magistrate can never be a final order as the trial has yet to commence and the order would necessarily be an interim arrangement pending the trial.

    12. In my view, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the Petitioner has merit and has to be accepted. As pointed out by Gadgil, J., in Ghafoor Bhai's case (supra), an order may be passed under section 457 of the code purely at the stage of investigation or even after the charge-sheet had been filed, but before the property was actually produced before the Court during the trial. In the latter case, any order passed by the Magistrate must necessarily be an interlocutory order subject to the final orders to be passed after the trial has concluded.

    13. Turning to the merits of the case, Mr. Chari argued that even if it be assumed that the powers of the Sessions Court in revision could be invoked to impugn the order of the learned Magistrate dated 17th March, 1986, it is trite position in law that the powers of revision ought to be sparingly used and exercised only when there is clear lack of jurisdiction or where the order is patently absurd, perverse or results in grave miscarriage of justice. None of these elements is present in the order of the learned Magistrate, according to Mr. Chari. The learned Magistrate has, on the basis of the material placed before him, drawn certain conclusions as to who would be the fit and proper person to be in custody of the jeep in question pending the criminal trial. These conclusions have been arrived at by appreciation of the material placed on record and these conclusions of facts could not be disturbed by a revisional Court.

    14. Lastly, Mr. Chari contended that there is no universal principle that a vehicle must necessarily be handed over to the custody of the person in whose name the registration stands. In this context, he cited the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Kishan Pandurang Kagde v. Baldev Singh Gian Singh, 1977 Mah LJ 656, as an authority for the said proposition. In Kishan's case (supra), the Division Bench analysed the arguments based on section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act and pointed out that there was nothing in the said provision which dealt with transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle, which like any movable property is governed by the Sale of Goods Act. The Division Bench pointed out that section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act merely lays down that after change of ownership, a corresponding change in the registration certificate should be recorded and that the transfer of ownership takes place from the date of sale and not from the date on which the name of transferee is recorded in the registration certificate. According to Mr. Chari, the sale of the jeep in question took place in 1973 when Dilawar Khan received the consideration, signed the necessary Transfer Forms and handed over possession of the jeep to him. The fact that the registration of the vehicle had not been changed in the Records of the R.T.O was wholly immaterial. I think that there is substance in this contention also which is supported by the authority of the Division Bench.

    15. Mr. Samant, learned counsel appearing for the first and third Respondents, vehemently joined issue with the contentions of Mr. Chari. Before dealing with the arguments of Mr. Samant, it may be straightway noticed that Mr. Samant's client, Dilawar Khan, had not claimed custody of the jeep either before the Magistrate or before the Additional Sessions Judge. Such a claim was put forward in both the Courts by Ajit Dandekar (Respondent No. 5 in this petition) but, curiously, he has chosen to remain absent. The arguments of Mr. Samant, though of assistance to the Court, can hardly be treated as the arguments of Respondent No. 5 regarding the order of the learned Sessions Judge.

    16. Mr. Samant argued that the order in question was not an interlocutory order at all. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : AIR 1977 SC 2185 and in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra., (1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47 : 1978 Cri. L.J 165, and pointed that after noticing the historical background against which section 397(2) was brought on to the statute book, the Supreme Court in these two cases accepted the proposition that every order which is not final, need not be an interlocutory order. He also pointed out that in these judgments the Supreme Court has laid down that there could be an intermediate category of orders which were not final and yet could not be considered as merely interlocutory as they decide issues of moment and determined or seriously affected the rights of a party. Relying on these judgments, Mr. Samant contended vehemently that the order passed by the learned Magistrate was not an interlocutory order at all.

    17. While the proposition of law canvassed by Mr. Samant, on the basis of the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court, is unexceptionable, I am not in a position to accept his contention that the order passed by the learned Magistrate was an order of the nature falling within the intermediate category as contemplated by the said Supreme Court judgments. In my view, the learned Magistrate's order does not determine any issue of moment, nor does it determine the rights of either party, nor can it be said to prejudice the rights of either party. Mr. Samant's contention that by the said order, the right of possession of the accused is disturbed or affected, does not cut ice. All interim orders, in their impact, must necessarily affect some party or the other, as they are obviously in favour of one and operate against another. By this criterion, every interim order must necessarily fall into the intermediate category as contemplated by the Supreme Court. In my view, the present order does not fall in the intermediate category and it is an interlocutory order pure and simple. Mr. Samant then cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Prakash Sharma v. State of Haryana, (1978) 2 SCC 491 : AIR 1978 SC 1282, in his attempt to persuade me that the order of the learned Magistrate is an interlocutory order. I am afraid, there is nothing of this nature decided by the Supreme Court in Ram Prakash Sharma's case (supra). All that the Supreme Court has held in this case that the Court has to be circumspect before releasing the property which comes in its custody and has to exercise its jurisdiction judiciously and wisely. In my judgment, the order of the learned Magistrate dated 17th March, 1986, is clearly an interlocutory order. It was not appealable under any express provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, being an interlocutory order, it was also not revisable under section 397 of the code, on account of the bar under sub-section (2) of that section.

    18. Though the above finding should really conclude the petition, I shall deal with the contentions on merits, since they have been canvassed, on the assumption that the order of the learned Magistrate could have been subjected to the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court under section 397.

    19. On merits, the learned Magistrate, after sifting the material before him, came to the conclusion that the Petitioner was entitled to the temporary custody of the jeep in question. He rejected the argument that the vehicle must be returned to the person in whose name it is registered. The learned Sessions Judge, at least so far as the custody of the jeep is concerned, has only given one reason, namely, that the jeep stood in the name of Ajit Dandekar and therefore he was the person who was best entitled to custody. I am afraid, this is too simplistic view of the matter and cannot be accepted. As pointed out by the Division Bench of our High Court in Kishan Pandurang Kagde v. Baldev Singh Gian Singh, 1977 Mah LJ 656, the mere fact that the registration of the vehicle stands in the name of a party is not conclusive. If the Magistrate, upon appreciation of the material before him, records a finding that the ownership and possession had passed to a particular person, then it is open to the Magistrate to direct the vehicle to be handed over to the custody of such person, notwithstanding that the registration stands in the name of another. I respectfully agree with the views expressed by the Division Bench of our High Court in Kishan's case that the transfer of ownership takes place from the date of sale and not from the date on which the transfer is recorded. Mr. Samant relied on the judgments in Nandiram v. State of Gujarat, 1967 Cri LJ 483 and in U. Kariyappa v. P. Sreekantaiah, 1980 Cri LJ 422, in support of his contention that where a vehicle is seized in connection with the criminal offence, the only order that the Magistrate can make for custody of the vehicle must be in favour of the person in whose name the registration of the vehicle stands. In my view, neither of these two cases lays down any such invoilable proposition of law. Both these judgments point out that such is the normal rule unless another person makes out a superior title. In the case of the Petitioner, the learned Magistrate has recorded the finding that the Petitioner had made out a superior title and directed handing over of the jeep to the Petitioner. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was not right in interfering with the said order in the purported exercise of his revisional powers. The limitations on the exercise of revisional powers are too well settled to call for repetition here. Suffice it to say that the learned Additional Sessions Judge exceeded his revisional powers in interfering with the order of the learned Magistrate. The order deserves to be set aside by this Court in exercise of its constitutional and inherent powers.

    20. In the result, the petition is partly allowed. The order of the Additional Sessions Judge, dated 16th February, 1987, made in Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1986 and Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1986, is set aside so far as it pertains to the Jeep MRF 8319. It is maintained with regard to the two motor-cycles as the Petitioner has not challenged that part of the order. However, it will be open to the learned Magistrate to impose such conditions upon the Petitioner with regard to the user of the jeep MRF 8319 pending the disposal of the criminal trial pending before the Magistrate. These conditions, apart from the conditions that the learned Magistrate had already imposed, could also be of the nature of directing the Petitioner to deposit such reasonable amount, as the learned Magistrate finds reasonable, for the user of the jeep during the pendency of and subject to final orders in the trial. The learned Magistrate shall of course hear all the parties concerned before making any such order.

    21. Rule made accordingly partly absolute with no order as to costs.

    Petition partly allowed.
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    Virendrakumar J. Handa v. Dilawarkhan Alij Khan And Others
    (Jun 17, 1991)