Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — A.V. Savant, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The suits arise from a Bill of Exchange (Exh. "A") dated 8 August 1989, payable 30 days after date without days of grace. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the drawers; the bill was accepted by defendants Nos. 3 and 4. Defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 are firms; defendant No. 2 is a partner in the first firm and defendant No. 4 is a partner in the second firm. Both defendant-firms conduct business from the same premises (11-12, Ashok Chambers, 1st floor, Broach Street, Bombay).

After dishonour of the bill, the plaintiff served a notice dated 8 November 1989. On 15 November 1989 both sets of defendants acknowledged that notice and requested inspection; no defence was stated in those letters. The plaintiff offered inspection by letters dated 2 January 1990 — inspection was taken by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (on 11 January 1990) but defendants Nos. 3 and 4 did not take inspection (the plaintiff had informed them inspection could be had on 9 January 1990).

The defendants filed affidavits raising several pleas: absence of consideration, absence of notice of dishonour, theft of blank but signed bills of exchange (allegedly with connivance of an employee), a bar under section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, and the plaintiff's alleged failure to make account books available for inspection.

By consent the two suits were heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants have raised a substantial or triable defence sufficient to obtain unconditional leave to defend the summary suits brought on the negotiable instrument.
  2. Whether the specific pleas advanced by the defendants — notably alleged theft of blank but signed bills, absence of consideration, absence of notice of dishonour, and a statutory bar under section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act — constitute bona fide defences or are sham/illusory.
  3. If the defendants do not have a good defence, whether conditional leave to defend (subject to deposit) is appropriate and what conditions should be imposed.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • There is no substantial or plausible defence pleaded by the defendants.
  • The theft plea (that blank but signed bills were stolen with employee connivance) is a sham, bogus and wholly un‑believable; defendants provided no particulars (no employee named, no steps taken, no details of theft).
  • Section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act operates as a prohibition against taking or accepting amounts and does not bar giving the amount; thus the defendants' argument relying on that provision (and invoking section 23 of the Indian Contract Act) is misconceived.
  • Reliance is placed on a judgment of Suresh J. (C.R.A. No. 573 of 1990, decided 13 August 1990) where the same defendants raised identical pleas and those pleas were rejected.
  • Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act creates a presumption that the negotiable instrument was made for consideration; the makers have not pleaded facts to rebut that presumption.
  • Because the defendants have no substantial defence, they should not be granted unconditional leave — at most they should be required to deposit the amount claimed.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contend they have substantial defences and triable issues: absence of consideration, absence of notice of dishonour, plea of theft of blank signed bills, and the bar under section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's decision in Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation ((1976) 4 SCC 687 : AIR 1977 SC 577) to outline the tests for grant of leave in summary suits.
  • It was argued that, in view of section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act, section 23 of the Indian Contract Act would also operate against the plaintiff.
  • The defendants pointed out that the plaintiff informed them that he was not relying on any account books; consequently the defendants alleged inability to inspect accounts was justified.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Judgment of Suresh J., C.R.A. No. 573 of 1990 (decided 13 August 1990) Rejection of identical pleas raised by the same set of defendants in an earlier matter (i.e., the theft plea was negatived). The Court relied on Suresh J.'s earlier rejection of identical defences to support the view that the theft plea in the present suits is sham and should be rejected.
Division Bench of Bharucha & Srikrishna, JJ., Appeal No. 1238 of 1988 Application of section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: a special rule of evidence presuming that the negotiable instrument was made for consideration; burden on maker to show lack of consideration. The Court applied the Division Bench's observations to hold that the defendants had not rebutted the presumption of consideration; therefore the defendants' plea regarding nondisclosure of account books did not assist them.
Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation ((1976) 4 SCC 687 : AIR 1977 SC 577) General principles and tests for considering grant of leave to defend in summary suits (e.g., distinguishing bona fide/triable defences from sham or illusory defences). The Court accepted the Mechelec framework but held that, under that framework, the defendants' defence fell into the category of sham/illusory defences that do not merit unconditional leave; accordingly conditional leave was imposed.
Jashbnai Motibhai Parel v. Hasmukhbhai Ravjibhai Patel (1990) 2 Guj. L.R. 1296 Authorities cited by defendants (single judge Gujarat High Court decision) — invoked in support of defendants' position. The Court found the facts of that Gujarat case to be materially different and held that its ratio could not be applied to the present matters; consequently it did not influence the Court's decision here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the pleaded defences and the surrounding correspondence and applied settled principles for summary suits:

  1. Examination of the documentary and correspondence record: the letters of 15 November 1989 (acknowledging the 8 November notice and requesting inspection) contained no mention of any defence — "not even a whisper" of the defence now pleaded. The lack of particulars in the affidavits (no employee named, no steps taken, no details of alleged theft) undermined the credibility of the theft plea.
  2. Reliance on section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: the Court noted the statutory presumption that the negotiable instrument was made for consideration. Because the defendants (as makers) did not allege particulars to rebut that presumption, the presumption stood in favour of the plaintiff.
  3. Characterisation of the pleaded defences against the tests in Mechelec: the Supreme Court's guidance was applied — where a defendant shows a good defence or a bona fide triable issue, leave to defend may be granted (sometimes unconditionally). Conversely, when a defence is illusory, sham or "moonshine", leave should ordinarily be refused. The Court found the present defendants' theft defence to be of the sham/illusory class.
  4. Treatment of the statutory bar alleged under section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act: the Court accepted the plaintiff's point that the statutory prohibition proscribes taking or accepting amounts and does not prevent paying (giving) the amount; accordingly the suggested consequence under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act did not survive scrutiny.
  5. Consideration of precedents: the Court relied on Suresh J.'s earlier rejection of identical pleas advanced by these defendants and on the Division Bench's analysis concerning the presumption under section 118 to reject the defendants' contentions about absence of consideration and nondisclosure of account books.
  6. Rejection of contrary reliance: the Court found the Gujarat High Court decision (Jashbnai) factually distinguishable and not persuasive on the facts of these suits.

Based on these findings — that the principal defence (theft of blank signed bills) lacked particulars and was sham — the Court concluded that the defendants were not entitled to unconditional leave to defend. Instead, the Court exercised its discretion to grant leave conditionally (by requiring a security deposit).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The suits are disposed of by this common judgment. Leave to defend is granted conditionally.

The Court ordered the following specific consequences (direct effects on the parties):

  • The defendants in each suit must deposit Rs. 50,000 (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) in Court within six weeks from the date of the judgment as a condition of leave to defend.
  • On deposit of the said amount in each suit, the suits will be transferred to the list of Commercial Causes and the following timetable will apply:
    • Written Statement to be filed within eight weeks thereafter.
    • Affidavit of documents to be filed within eight weeks thereafter.
    • Inspection to be allowed forthwith thereafter.
    • Suits to be placed on the Board for hearing in the last week of February, 1992.
  • On deposit, the Prothonotary & Senior Master is directed to invest the sums with a Nationalised Bank initially for one year and to renew the investment thereafter until further orders of the Court.
  • If the defendants do not make the required deposit, the plaintiffs have liberty to have the suits set down forthwith for hearing.

The opinion does not purport to create or announce a novel legal precedent; it applies established principles (including the presumption under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Mechelec tests) to the facts and reaches a discretionary outcome (conditional leave with deposit) in the exercise of the Court's summary-suit jurisdiction.

Order: As recorded in the judgment, conditional leave to defend is granted subject to deposit as specified; otherwise plaintiffs may proceed to have the matters set down for hearing.

    Jayantilal M. Jain v. J.M. Sons

    A.V Savant, J.:— Heard Counsel for the parties. By consent, both the suits are disposed of by this common judgment. The suits are based on the Bill of Exchange, Exh. “A”, dated 8th August 1989, which was payable 30 days after the date without days of grace. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the drawers and the bill has been accepted by the defendants Nos. 3 and A. It may be mentioned that defendant No. 1 is a firm, of which defendant No. 2 is a partner and similarly defendant No. Sis a firm, of which defendant No. 4 is a partner. Incidentally, both defendant No. 2 firm and defendant No. 3 firm are carrying on business from the same premises viz. 11-12, Ashok Chambers, 1st floor, Broach Street, Bombay.

    2. Pursuant to the dishonour of the Bill of Exchange, a Notice dated 8th November 1989 was given by the plaintiff to both the defendant-firms. On 15th November 1989, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 wrote to the plaintiff asking for inspection. Similarly, defendants Nos. 3 and 4 asked for inspection by a letter of even date. While doing so, the defendants have acknowledged the receipt of the Notice dated 8th November 1989. There is, however, no whisper by any of the defendants of any defence whatsoever in the said letters of 15th November 1989.

    3. By a letter dated 2nd January 1990, the plaintiff informed the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 that inspection could be had on 9th January 1990. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were informed on the same date that inspection could betaken on 11th January 1990. There is no controversy that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 did take inspection. However, defendants Nos. 3 and 4 did not bother, to take inspection.

    4. In the affidavits filed on behalf of the defendants, certain pleas have been raised such as absence of consideration, absence of notice of dishonour, plea of theft of the blank but signed bills of exchanges with the connivance of employee, bar of section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 and the failure on the part of the plaintiff to make the account books available for inspection.

    5. Mr. Jain, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff in both the suits has contended that there is no substantial defence or even a plausible defence raised by the defendants. The plea of theft of the blank but signed bills of exchange is a totally sham and bogus plea. The bar of section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act is not against giving the amount, but at the highest it could be against taking or accepting the amount. Reliance has been placed on the Judgment of Suresh J., In C.R.A No. 573 of 1990, decided on 13th August 1990 where a similar plea of the same set of defendants has been negatived by this Court. Mr. Jain has also placed reliance on the Division Bench decision of S.P Bhaorcha & B.N Srikrishna, JJ., on the question of the presumption of consideration and the burden of proof. He, therefore, concluded that the defendants were not entitled to an un-conditional leave, but must be called upon to deposit the entire amount.

    6. On the other hand, Mr. Tulzapurkar and Mr. Avasia, the learned Counsel appearing for the defendants, have contended that the defendants have raised a substantial defence and there are triable issues such as absence of consideration, absence of notice of dishonour, the plea of theft, etc. Mr. Tulzapurkar has placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation)1, (1976) 4 SCC 687 : A.I.R 1977 Supreme Court, 577 to point out the tests which are to be applied for deciding the question of grant of leave in summary suits. Mr. Avasia has, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Tulzapurkar, emphasised the point that in view of the bar of section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act, section 23 of the Indian Contract Act would also come in the way of the plaintiff. He has also emphasised the fact that in the letter dated 17-01-1990 written by the attorneys of defendants Nos. 1 and 2, it was clarified that the inspection of the accounts was not possible because the plaintiff had informed the defendants that he was not relying upon any account books.

    7. In reply, Mr. Jain for the plaintiff has placed reliance on the provisions of section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He has further invited my attention to the fact that under the document itself the Notice of dishonour was waived. He has contended that the plea of theft of certain blank but signed Bills of Exchanges is wholly un-believable and that beyond the ipsi dixit of the defendants, there is nothing on record to inspire confidence in the said defence. There are no details of the alleged theft, no employee has been named and there is nothing to indicate what action has been taken by the defendants in that behalf. The plea of some blank but signed bills of Exchanges being stolen is, therefore, totally false, sham and a bogus plea, nothing short of moonshine. In this behalf, Mr. Jain has also placed reliance on the Judgment delivered by Suresh. J., in Civil Revision Application No. 573 of 1990 where against another plaintiff the same set of defendants had taken identical pleas which have been rejected. In reply to the plea of bar of section 269(SS) of the Income-Tax Act, this Court has rightly observed that the prohibition under the Act was against taking or accepting and not against giving the amount. In view of this, in my opinion, the plea of bar of section 23 of the Contract Act would not survive for my consideration.

    8. On the question of the plaintiff not having offered the Account Books for inspection, apart from what Suresh, J., has stated, Mr. Jain has invited my attention to the observations of the Division Bench of Bharucha and Srikrishna, JJ., in Appeal No. 1238 of 1988 where similar plea was raised by the defendants in that case. It was contended before the Division Bench that though the plaintiffs in that case were money-lenders and were thus bound to maintain books of accounts, they had not disclosed their books of accounts, which disclosure may have borne out the defendants case. The Division Bench rightly negatived the contention referring to the fact that the suit was a summary suit and the reliance placed on the Privy Council Judgment was mis-placed. It was further pointed out by the Division Bench that in view of section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a special rule of evidence was laid down which required the Court to presume that the negotiable instrument was made for consideration. Since the maker of the instrument has pleaded nothing to show lack of consideration, the argument was rejected. In my opinion, the observations of the Division Bench would equally apply to the facts of the present case and hence, the plea of the defendants has to be rejected.

    9. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Mechalac Engineer's case (supra) no doubt lays down the general principles for considering the question of grant of leave to defend. There can be no controversy that where the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good defence, he is entitled to seek leave to defend which may be unconditional. Similarly, if the defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair, reasonable and a bona fide defence, although not a positively good defence, he may be entitled to unconditional leave to defend. However, the Supreme Court itself has said that in category of cases where the defendant has no defence, or where the defence set-up is illusory, sham or practically moonshine, then ordinarily the plaintiff would be entitled to leave to sign the judgment and the defendant may not be entitled to leave to defend. In my opinion, the last category of cases cited by the Supreme Court would nearly answer the present cases. The defendants' case about the theft of the blank but singed Bills of Exchanges is totally sham and bogus and is nothing short of moonshine. Justice Suresh, before whom the same defence was pleaded by the very set of defendants, rejected the same. There is nothing in the replies to the Notice dated 8-11-1989 to indicate, even remotely, that the defendants had any such defence to the suit. There is not even a whisper in the correspondence of even the possibility of such a defence.

    10. Mr. Avasia also relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the case of (Jashbnai Motibhai Parel v. Hasmukhbhai Ravjibhai Patel)2, (1990) 2 Guj. L.R 1296. In my opinion, the facts of that case were entirely different and, therefore, the ratio of the Gujarat case can have no bearing on the facts of the present cases. Moreover, in a case where identical defence was raised by the same set of defendant's Suresh, J., has taken the view that grant of conditional leave was proper. I see no reason to take a different view in the facts and circumstances of these two cases.

    11. In view of the above, leave to defend is granted on condition that in each of the two suits, the defendants deposit Rs. 50,000/- within 6 weeks from today. In the event of the defendants depositing the amount as aforesaid, both the suits to be transferred to the list of Commercial Causes. Written Statement within 8 weeks thereafter. Affidavit of documents within 8 weeks thereafter. Inspection forthwith thereafter. Suits to be placed on Board for hearing in the last week of February, 1992.

    12. In the event of the defendants depositing the said amount of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) in the Court in each of the two suits as aforesaid, the Prothonotary & Senior Master to invest the said amount with a Naticnalised Bank, initially for a period of one year and to renew the same thereafter for suitable period until further orders of the Court.

    13. In the event of the defendants not depositing the said amount as aforesaid, liberty to the plaintiffs to have the suits set down forthwith for hearing.

    Order accordingly.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Jayantilal M. Jain v. J.M. Sons
    (Feb 25, 1991)