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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant No.1, Vaijayantabai (for herself and on behalf of her daughter Taibai, appellant No.2), filed Special Civil Suit No.130 of 1975 in the Court of the Second Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar on January 8, 1975. The suit sought maintenance, arrears of maintenance, marriage expenses and costs. The defendant, Keru Gangarde, had earlier married Ambai and later married Vaijayanta about 23 years prior to the suit. Vaijayanta bore two daughters during cohabitation with Keru and lived with him for about 15 years before she and her daughters were driven out, allegedly because she did not produce a son. Keru admitted marriage with Vaijayanta and paternity of the two daughters but denied certain allegations including driving them out.

At trial several issues were framed, including whether plaintiff No.1 and plaintiff No.2 were legally entitled to maintenance, whether the defendant deserted them, quantum of maintenance, and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court recognized and granted maintenance to plaintiff No.2 (the minor) and arrears for three years, but rejected plaintiff No.1's claim for maintenance on the ground that her marriage was illegal/void under the Hindu Marriage Act due to the subsisting marriage with Ambai. Vaijayanta appealed to this Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Keru died and his heirs were brought on record.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether appellant No.1 (Vaijayantabai) can claim maintenance under section 18(2)(d) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, despite her marriage being not legal under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (because a prior subsisting marriage existed).
  2. (As framed at trial) Whether plaintiff No.2 is legally entitled to claim maintenance; whether the defendant deserted and refused to maintain the plaintiffs; what quantum of maintenance (if any) and whether the defendant is liable for marriage expenses of Babai; and whether the suit is barred by limitation or whether the Court has jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion contains specific party submissions and counsel arguments; these are summarized below.

Appellant's Arguments (by counsel Shri R.G. Karmarkar)

  • Appellant No.1 is entitled to maintenance under section 18(2)(d) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, even though her marriage was void under the Hindu Marriage Act due to the existence of a prior valid marriage.
  • Relied on authorities (Rajeshbai v. Shantabai; T.P.K. Nateshan v. Achiyayee; C. Obula Konda Reddy v. C.P.V. Lakshamma and others) to support the proposition that a Hindu woman whose marriage is void on account of a subsisting earlier marriage may still claim maintenance if she cohabited with the deceased as his wife and remained unable to maintain herself.
  • Argued that social and secular purposes of maintenance statutes and the concepts developed under Hindu personal law justify recognizing maintenance rights notwithstanding formal invalidity under the Hindu Marriage Act.

Respondent's Arguments (by counsel Shri Vinay Dixit)

  • Counsel for respondent placed reliance on section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code in support of the decree (i.e., apparently to support the maintenance order or its character), an argument the Court did not find appropriate to adopt for interpretation of section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
  • At trial the defendant admitted marriage and paternity but denied the allegation of having driven out the plaintiffs; the defendant resisted the plaintiff's claims on those and other pleaded grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajeshbai v. Shantabai, 1981 Mah LJ 820 Explained the social/secular objectives of maintenance; treated the term 'wife' and maintenance obligations in the context of securing basic needs and social security; relied on the Court's inherent powers and on earlier authorities to support maintenance rights even where marriage is void. The Court followed Rajeshbai to hold that maintenance measures aim to prevent destitution and immorality, that the law of maintenance under Hindu personal law evolved to protect dependants, and that those principles support recognizing appellant No.1's claim despite formal invalidity of the marriage.
T.P.K. Nateshan v. Achiyayee, AIR 1975 Mad 202 (Madras High Court) Held that a Hindu woman whose marriage was void because the husband had another wife living could be entitled to maintenance under section 18(2)(d) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The Court considered this decision as supportive of the proposition that void marriages (due to existence of a first wife) do not necessarily bar maintenance claims; noted factual differences but treated the decision as persuasive authority for allowing maintenance.
Govindrao v. Anandibai, 1977 Mah LJ 144 : 79 BLR 73 Dealt with the exercise of discretion under section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act in decrees (including nullity) and the grant of alimony; illustrated that alimony/maintenance can be allowed even when marriage is set aside/nullity is decreed. The Court relied on Govindrao to show consistency between provisions of section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, supporting maintenance relief after a nullity/void marriage.
Sushilabai v. Ramcharan, 1976 Mah LJ 82 Addressed grant of interim maintenance, relying on section 151 CPC and recognizing liability of maintenance arising from existence of the relationship and possession of property. The Court drew on Sushilabai for the proposition that courts have power (including under inherent provisions and section 151 CPC) to grant maintenance to meet justice and prevent destitution while a suit is pending.
C. Obula Konda Reddy v. C.P.V. Lakshamma, AIR 1976 AP 43 Held that the Act does not define 'Hindu wife' strictly in a way that would render section 18 otiose; observed legislature could not have intended that a woman beguiled into a void marriage be left without maintenance. The Court relied on Obula Reddy to emphasize legislative intent and the desirability of interpreting maintenance provisions to avoid leaving women without support simply because a marriage was void under the Hindu Marriage Act.
Shantaram v. Smt. Dagubai, 1987 Mah LJ 179 : AIR 1987 Bom 182 Division Bench acceptance of Rajeshbai: held rights under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be worked out in civil proceedings; section 151 CPC assists courts to do justice but does not itself create rights. The Court cited Shantaram as a later acceptance of Rajeshbai, using it to underline that courts can apply inherent powers/section 151 CPC to achieve substantial and effective justice in maintenance matters and to support appellant No.1's entitlement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner grounded in the evidentiary record and the cited authorities:

  1. Evidence and factual findings: The trial record showed (and the Court accepted) that Keru treated Vaijayanta as his wife, they cohabited for about 15 years, she bore two daughters, villagers and relatives recognized the relationship, and Keru made representations at the time of marriage that he had divorced his first wife. Keru admitted the marriage and paternity of the children.
  2. Legal question: Whether a woman in such circumstances can claim maintenance under section 18(2)(d) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act even though the marriage is legally void under the Hindu Marriage Act due to a subsisting first marriage.
  3. Policy and statutory interpretation: The Court emphasized the social and secular objectives of maintenance provisions — to avoid destitution and immorality and to provide basic sustenance. It noted that Hindu personal law and the codified Acts should be interpreted so as not to defeat those social objectives.
  4. Reliance on precedent: The Court relied particularly on Rajeshbai (and the chain of authorities referenced therein, including Govindrao and Sushilabai) and other High Court decisions (Nateshan, Obula Reddy, Shantaram) to support the proposition that maintenance may be granted notwithstanding the formal invalidity of a marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act where facts show cohabitation and treatment as wife and where denying relief would defeat the protective purpose of maintenance law.
  5. Rejection of CrPC section 125 as a means of interpretation: The Court declined the respondent's invitation to interpret section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act by reference to section 125 CrPC, stating that such aid was not appropriate for interpretation of section 18 and emphasizing distinctions between interim maintenance/permanent alimony under the Hindu Marriage Act and the rights under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
  6. Application to facts: Applying these principles and authorities to the admitted facts (treatment as wife for 15 years, children, representations by Keru, recognition by the community, and destitution of the appellant), the Court concluded that appellant No.1 is entitled to maintenance and arrears.
  7. Specific findings on other claims: The Court agreed with the trial Judge that the claim of Rs.16,000 as marriage expenses for Babai was not maintainable because Babai was a married daughter (relying on section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act).
  8. Quantum and relief: The Court accepted that appellant No.1 claimed Rs.100 per month and awarded maintenance at Rs.100 per month from the date of application (January 8, 1975) and arrears for three years amounting to Rs.3,600. The Court also maintained the charge of maintenance on the deceased defendant's property and directed mutation under sections 26 and 27 of the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED IN RESPECT OF APPELLANT NO.1.

The Court quashed and set aside the trial Court's judgment and decree dated October 15, 1976, insofar as it denied maintenance to appellant No.1. It directed the respondents to pay maintenance to appellant No.1 at the rate of Rs.100 per month from January 8, 1975 (the date of application) and to pay arrears of maintenance of Rs.3,600 (for three years prior to the suit). A charge of maintenance in favour of appellant No.1 is to be created on the defendant's (deceased's) property by the concerned Revenue Officer by making the necessary mutation in the Record of Rights in accordance with sections 26 and 27 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.

Consequences and implications:

  • The direct effect is that appellant No.1 receives an order for maintenance (Rs.100 per month) and arrears (Rs.3,600) and a charge on the deceased's estate has been directed to be created to secure payment.
  • The trial Court's grant of maintenance to plaintiff No.2 (the minor daughter) and arrears for three years was recognized in the proceedings, and the minor will continue to receive maintenance until majority in accordance with section 20(3).
  • The claim for marriage expenses of Babai (Rs.16,000) was rejected because Babai was a married daughter and not entitled under section 20(3) to such maintenance.
  • The opinion applies existing precedents and principles of interpretation to reach its result; it does not purport to announce a novel overriding rule beyond applying and reconciling earlier authorities that maintenance may be allowed in circumstances where a woman has been treated and lived as a wife despite formal invalidity of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act.

Order in the opinion: "Order accordingly."

    Vaijayantabai v. Keru Anant Gangarde

    1. The disastrous consequences of the age old anxiety for the birth of a male child that are suffered by the appellant No. 1 in this appeal are writ large on the face of the present proceedings.

    2. The question that is posed by this appeal is whether the appellant No. 1 can base her claim for maintenance under section 18(2)(d) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, in spite of the fact that her marriage is not legal in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This claim has been denied by the trial Court, leaving her to approach this Court by this appeal.

    3. On January 8, 1975, the appellant No. 1-Vaijayantabai for herself and on behalf of the appellant No. 2, her daughter Taibai, filed in forma pauperis Special Civil Suit No. 130 of 1975 in the Court of the Second Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division. Ahmednagar, for maintenance, arrears thereof, the marriage expenses and the cost of the suit.

    4. Practically all the facts which form the basis of the claim are admitted or proved, and it is so held by the learned trial Judge, they are briefly stated as follows:

    5. The original defendant-Keru Gangarde, an agriculturist of village Mandali, having large properties consisting of agricultural lands and houses, initially married to Ambai who gave birth to eight daughters. Out of whom, seven daughters are alive. He wanted a son and, therefore, married the appellant No. 1-Vaijayanta, 23 years before the suit, according to Hindu rituals at village Sakat, Tq. Ashti.

    6. Thereafter for a period of 15 years, Keru and Vaijayanta led a happy married life. Vaijayanta gave birth to two daughters — Babai, aged about 20 years and Tai, aged about 11 years, on the date of the suit.

    7. Finding that not only Ambai gave birth to eight daughters but also Vaijayanta gave birth consecutively to two daughters, it is alleged, Keru started illtreating Vaijayanta, obviously for her not giving birth to a son. Vaijayanta was neglected and then Vaijayanta and her two daughters were driven out of the matrimonial home.

    8. Vaijayanta went to reside with her parents at village Sakat. The parents made efforts through the villagers for maintenance from Keru who refused his liability to maintain Vaijayanta and her minor daughter Tai.

    9. A notice dated April 28, 1971, was sent through the Advocate calling upon Keru to make arrangements for maintenance of Vaijayanta and her daughters. The notice also claimed for arrangements for the marriage expenses of Babai. Keru did not pay any heed nor made any arrangement for the marriage expenses. Vaijayanta's father Bapurao, by spending an amount of Rs. 16,000/-, got Babai married.

    10. Vaijayanta has alleged that Keru owns about 46 Acres of land which include Bagayat land fetching him an yearly income of Rs. 20,000/-. She alleged that Keru is in possession of silver and gold ornaments and does money-lending business. The suit was, therefore, filed for a claim of maintenance at Rs. 100/- per month for Vaijayanta and for Rs. 50/- per month for Tai from the date of the suit; for an amount of Rs. 23,250/- towards marriage expenses of Babai and arrears of maintenance for a period of 3 years prior to the suit.

    11. The suit was resisted by the written statement (Exhibit 29) wherein Keru Gangarde has admitted marriage with Vaijayanta 23 years prior to the suit. Keru also admitted paternity of the two daughters — Babai and Tai. Obviously, Keru has denied his driving away Vaijayanta along with her daughters and other averments in the plaint in regard thereto.

    12. Broadly on these pleadings, the learned Judge by Exhibit 21 framed the following issues:—

    “(1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that plaintiff No. 1 is legally entitled to claim maintenance from the defendant?

    (2) Whether the plaintiffs prove that plaintiff No. 2 is legally entitled to claim maintenance?

    (3) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendant deserted and refused to maintain them?

    (4) Whether the defendant is liable to pay maintenance. If yes, then what quantum?

    (5) Whether the defendant is liable to pay expenses for the marriage of Babai. If yes, then what quantum?

    (6) Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

    (7) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit?

    (8) What order and decree?”

    13. The only issue to be considered is the legal liability of the defendant-Keru for maintaining the present plaintiffs.

    14. The learned Judge, by the impugned judgment, has recognised and granted maintenance of Rs. 50/- to plaintiff No. 2, as well as the amount of arrears of maintenance for a period of 3 years prior thereto by creating the necessary charge of maintenance on the property of Keru bearing Survey No. 37 of village Mandali, Tq. Karjat, Dist. Ahmednagar by directing the Revenue Officer to make the necessary mutation entry in the Record of Rights of the suit property.

    15. The learned Judge held, as far as the appellant No. 1-Vaijayanta is concerned, that the claim to maintenance under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, can be recognised only in respect of a legally wedded wife and is not extended to any other woman under any circumstances. The learned Judge came to this conclusion in view of the fact that the marriage of Keru with Ambai was subsisting rendering the marriage of Keru with appellant No. 1 as illegal and void in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act.

    16. The learned Judge came to this conclusion on the basis of the admitted position not only on the basis of the averments in the written statement, but also on the basis of the evidence of Keru that Keru married the appellant No. 1 before 22 years, and regarded Ambai as his first wife and the appellant No. 1-Vaijayanta as his second wife.

    17. On behalf of the appellant No. 1-Vaijayanta, she examined herself (Exhibit 37) to contend that at the time of her marriage with Keru, the persons concerned were represented that Keru had already divorced Ambai. Vaijayanta's father Bapurao is also examined at Exhibit 40 who also repeated that Keru told him that he had divorced Ambai. On behalf of the plaintiffs, one Raoji Mhaske - Exhibit 41 — is also examined as a witness for the marriage of Keru and Vaijayanta, as a distant relative of Vaijayanta. Additionally, Vaijayanta's brother Kisan Bapurao is also examined.

    18. Keru examined himself at Exhibit 43, and as stated above, he has admitted marriage with Vaijayanta. Keru has stated that he had about 80 Acres of land at the time of his marriage with Vaijayanta and he sold about 30 Acres thereafter out of the said land. He has stated that he gets about Rs. 1500/- as income from the land in question. However, he has admitted that he has not sold any land during the period of plaintiff No. 1's stay as a married wife with him.

    19. Thus, the evidence on record shows that Keru treated Vaijayanta as his wife, almost legally married. Keru and Vaijayanta resided together in the matrimonial home well nigh for a period of 15 years thereafter. The friends, relatives and villagers recognised Keru and Vaijayanta as husband and wife. The consistent evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs shows that Keru made a representation at the time of settlement of the marriage that he had divorced Ambai and the marriage with Vaijayanta was settled in pursuance of this representation by Keru.

    20. The necessary basic facts for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether Vaijayanta is entitled to a claim for maintenance as per her suit are, therefore, crystal clear that Keru treated Vaijayanta as his wife and cohabited with her for a period of 15 years after the marriage giving birth to two daughters.

    21. During the pendency of the appeal, Keru Gangarde expired and his heirs and legal representatives have been duly brought on record. The appeal came to be transferred to this Bench and transfer notices have been duly served on the appellants. Even after the service of the transfer notices, none appeared for them and, therefore, firstly in view of the fact that this is an old matter and also in view of the fact that this appeal raises an important question for decision, by my order dated February 7, 1991, 1 requested Shri R.G Karmarkar, a senior Advocate of this court, to appear as amicus curiae, under the legal aid system, obviously in view of the fact that the appellants are poor and mostly must be unable to engage an Advocate after the decision of their suit in the year 1976. Shri R.G Karmarkar readily accepted my request and in pursuance thereof has really made strenuous efforts to place all the necessary law enunciated in the reported decisions on the subject. I must record that Shri R.G Karmarkar has taken utmost pains to assist this Court in the decision of this appeal and I would be failing in my duty in not adequately and properly acknowledging his efforts in conducting this appeal. Shri Vinay Dixit, Advocate, has appeared for respondent No. 10 and in view of the fact that respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3 (A and B) and 4 to 11 are served through transfer notices and also in view of the fact that the respondent No. 10, who is represented by Shri Dixit, is the brother of respondents Nos. 2 and 6 who are not served, the estate having been represented for the purpose of this appeal, the appeal was taken up for hearing.

    22. Shri Karmarkar, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the appellant No. 1-Vaijayanta can claim maintenance in spite of the fact that her marriage with Keru is not legal in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions; one of this Court Rajeshbai v. Shantabai, 1981 Mah LJ 820, and the other of Madras High Court T.P.K Nateshan v. Achiyayee, AIR 1975 Mad 202. Relying on these decisions, the learned counsel submitted that a Hindu woman, whose marriage is void under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, because of the existence of a valid marriage of the first wife, is entitled to claim maintenance out of the estate of the deceased with whom she lived as a wife if she is not in a position to maintain herself remains chaste and does not marry other person. The learned counsel submitted that in the Nateshan's case, the Madras High Court has come to the conclusion that the wife is entitled to claim maintenance under section 18(2)(d) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, on the ground that the husband has other wife living. On going through the decision of the Madras High Court, it has to be stated that in the said case, the claim was on behalf of the first wife on the ground that the second marriage of the husband therein was illegal and in that connection, the Court has come to the conclusion on the basis of acceptance of the second marriage by the defendant-husband therein that the wife is entitled to maintenance. In the said case, the Court came to the conclusion that the first wife is entitled to claim maintenance. The facts in the present case are slightly different.

    23. In Rajeshbai's case (supra), this Court has stated that the term ‘wife’ denotes a legal and juridical relation resulting from a valid and legal marriage. It is observed that the measures for maintenance by themselves are secular and social in character. These measures aim at avoiding immorality and destitution. Maintenance for judicial purposes has its own pragmatics having relation to the need and necessity to make provisions for securing reasonable bioeconomic as well as biocultural requirements for persons such as shelter, food, garment and health. The need to provide reliefs of maintenance emanate from social ethics and personal economics and this need is sought for both on the moral and secular grounds. Maintenance is a personal obligation and where there is estate, the rights in maintenance could be worked against the estate and there can be a charge upon it.

    24. The principles of Hindu Personal Law have developed in an evolutionary way out of the concern for all those subject to it so as to make fair provision against destitution. The law of maintenance stems out of the secular desire to achieve the social objectives for making bare minimum provision to sustain the members of relative smaller social groups. The institution of property amongst the Hindus is a fine admixture of rights and duties, obligations and liabilities, the object being the right or entitlement to it. It is observed that there is no reason to hold that by codification of the laws, this basic concept for providing a sort of social security in favour of the defendants has been completely taken away or abrogated by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.

    25. Accordingly, this Court in Rajeshbai's case, has sought support from two earlier decisions of this Court Govindrao v. Anandibai, 1977 Mah LJ 144 : 79 BLR 73 and Sushilabai v. Ramcharan, 1976 Mah LJ 82. In Sushilabai's case, this Court was dealing with the question of grant of interim maintenance and in that connection has relied upon the provisions of section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code with reference to a suit for partition and in that dealing with the powers of the Court to grant interim maintenance during the pendency of the suit in the event of the plaintiff having no independent source of livelihood. The Court has observed that the liability of maintenance arises from the existence of the relationship and on possession of the property. In Govindrao's case, the Court was dealing with the discretion under section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, of the Court exercising jurisdiction at the time of passing any decree and in that connection, in a decree for nullity of marriage has ordered the grant of alimony to the wife and it is in this connection this Court has observed that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and those of section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.

    26. Relying on these two decisions, in Rajeshbai's case, this Court has observed that even after rendering a decree of nullity, the wife related by such marriage was treated to be entitled to have alimony and maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Court has stepped one step ahead to observe that the Court possesses the inherent power to make such orders in matters of maintenance as may be necessary so as to meet the ends of justice, and such power has to be exercised undoubtedly and unfailingly to reach out a just and fair dispensation of justice to the parties before the Court. The facts of Rajeshbai's case are similar to the case at hand, in that even in Rajeshbai's case, the marriage was void because of the exitence of earlier wife.

    27. Shri Karmarkar, has yet again placed reliance on one more decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court C. Obula Konda Reddy v. C.P.V Lakshamma, AIR 1976 AP 43 laying down a proposition that the Hindu wife whose marriage is solemnised though void under the Hindu Marriage Act and, therefore, such a wife will be entitled to claim maintenance from the husband. In this Obula Reddy's case, the claim for maintenance of the wife was rejected on the ground that her marriage was void on the ground of the existence of the first wife. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that the Act does not define a Hindu wife and in that connection, the Court has observed that the interpretation that the marriage has to be valid in accordance with the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, would render the provisions of section 18 almost otiose. The Court has further observed that an unscrupulous married man may beguile an unwary woman into matrimony and thereafter turn out and say “our marriage is void and I need not maintain you”. The Court has observed that it could not have been the intention of the Legislature that such a woman is not entitled for any maintenance.

    28. For the purposes of the record, I must state that this decision in Rajeshbai's case though in a different context has been referred to and accepted in a subsequent decision of the Division Bench of this Court Shantaram v. Smt. Dagubai, 1987 Mah LJ 179 : AIR 1987 Bom 182. In Shantaram's case, this Court was dealing with the right of maintenance of a woman under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act whose marriage is void or declared void under the Act. In this connection, the Division Bench has observed that it is in agreement with the decision in Rajeshbai's case that the right recognised by section 18 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be worked out in any civil proceedings. The Division Bench has observed that section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code does not invest the Court with powers, but only enables a Court to pass orders to do justice between the parties. The Court observed that the inherent powers are in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred upon it by other provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court has observed that no right is created under the inherent powers. It must be stated that in Rajeshbai's case, this Court has not observed that section 151 of the code creates any right, but has sought the help of the provisions of section 151 of the Code to do substantial and effective justice to the facts of the case before it. The position that emerges as a result of the above discussion is that the applicant No. 1 is entitled to a claim for maintenance. Shri Vinay Dixit, the learned counsel, contended in support of the decree, by placing reliance on section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. I am afraid, it is not possible to consider the provisions of section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the aid of interpretation of the provisions of section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The distinction between the right of interim maintenance and permanent alimony under the Hindu Marriage Act on one hand and the right recognised in favour of a wife under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, on the other hand, has to be kept in mind and from the facets of the problem discussed by me in detail hereinabove, it will have to be held that the claim for maintenance has to be recognised on the basis of the concept of the Hindu family under the Hindu Personal Law. The observations of this Court in Rajeshbai's case are apt and fitting with reference to the facts at hand in the present appeal. For all these reasons, I hold and come to the conclusion that the appellant No. 1 is entitled to the claim of maintenance and arrears.

    29. With regard to the claim of Rs. 16,000/- by way of marriage expenses, the learned Judge in answer and discussion of issue No. 5 has rightly held that Babai was a married daughter and that unmarried daughter, if adult, cannot claim maintenance under section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. I see no reason to hold otherwise with regard to this item.

    30. The appellant No. 1 has claimed the amount of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month and also for arrears for a period of 3 years prior to the suit. The learned Judge of the trial Court has already granted arrears of maintenance to the minor daughter Tai for a period of 3 years prior to the suit. The appellant No. 1, therefore, is also entitled to a claim for arrears of maintenance for a period of 3 years prior to the suit amounting to Rs. 3,600/- (Three thousand six hundred only).

    31. As far as the appellant No. 2 who was minor on the date of the suit and also on the date of filing of this appeal, will obviously get the amount of maintenace till the date of attainment of her majority in view of the provisions of section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.

    32. Before parting with the judgment, I must record and also acknowledge with gratitude the invaluable assistance rendered to me by Shri R.G Karmarkar, Advocate appointed by me. He has placed all these submissions based on the decisions cited and discussed in detail by me hereinabove. I recommend that the concerned authorities under the legal aid system should consider the efforts taken by the learned Advocate in the matter. I also recommend that he should be, if possible paid an amount of Rs. 750/-, taking into consideration the efforts taken by him and the manner in which he appeared and argued the appeal for a destitute Hindu woman.

    33. The result of the discussion is that the appeal, as far as the appellant No. 1-Vaijayanta is concerned, is allowed with costs throughout and the judgment and decree dated October 15, 1976, in Special Civil Suit No. 130 of 1975 of the Second Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar, is hereby quashed and set aside and it is directed that the appellant No. 1-Vaijayanta Gangarde is entitled to a claim of maintenance and the defendants-respondents are accordingly directed to pay maintenance to her at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month from the date of application i.e on and from January 8, 1975, with a further direction that they are directed to pay Rs. 3,600/- to the appellant No. 1-Vaijayanta Gangarde by way of arrears of maintenance. The charge of maintenance granted to the appellant No. 1 be kept on the property of the defendant-Keru Gangarde-deceased, now at the hands of the present respondents and the concerned Revenue Officer is directed to create such a charge by making the necessary mutation in the Record of Rights of the suitable property of village Mandali, Tq. Karjat, Dist. Ahmednagar in accordance with the provisions of sections 26 and 27 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.

    Order accordingly.
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    Vaijayantabai v. Keru Anant Gangarde
    (Feb 19, 1991)