1. The present petition arises out of proceedings initiated by the respondent original applicant landlady under section 32P of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The land in dispute originally bore Survey No. 97/1A/5. It was later formed into Gat No. 366. The land is situate at village Lohare, Taluka Wai, District Satara. It admeasures 35 gunthas out of which 28 gunthas are under cultivation and five gunthas are Pot Kharaba. The said land was originally owned by one Rama. He died leaving behind him two sons and two daughters. The eldest was Tukaram who was blind. Second was a daughter Vithabai. Third was a son Nathu who during his lifetime was insane. The fourth was a daughter Parvatibai who is the original applicant. Tukaram died on 27th April 1976. Vithabai died on 18th December 1977 and Nathu on 11th September 1980. Tukaram during his lifetime on 11th March 1976 executed a registered will in favour of the applicant bequeathing various properties. The suit land, which is the subject matter of dispute under the present petition, did not form one of the properties which were bequeathed under the said will.

2. On 21st December 1956 i.e prior to the Tillers Day Tukaram filed an application No. 1037 of 1957 against the opponent under section 31 for possession. A notice in respect of the said proceedings was duly served upon the opponent and statement of the opponent was recorded in the said proceedings. On 7th November 1957 the said application under section 31 was dismissed.

3. After the death of Tukaram which occurred on 27th April 1976, mutation entry No. 295 dated 25th August 1976 was certified in favour of the plaintiff in respect of several lands which were mutated in her favour. However, the suit land did not figure in the said mutation entry. On 5th May, 1977, the applicant filed an application under section 88C for exemption certificate. The said application was filed against several tenants including the opponent. However, the suit land did not figure in the said application. In the said proceeding the statement of the opponent was recorded on 29th July 1977 wherein he stated that he had no concern with the land which was the subject matter of the application under section 88C. By a judgment and order dated 30th June 1978 an Exemption Certificate under section 88C was issued in favour of the applicant. The said Certificate did not relate to the suit land but in respect of the other lands which were subject matter of the application. The said certificate was sought to be challenged by the tenants as also by the opponent. But the same was confirmed right upto this Court.

4. On 1st August 1977 the opponent filed an application under section 32G for purchase of the suit lands. As is clear from the admission of the applicant a notice in respect of the said application was duly served upon her on 12th December 1977. A fresh notice in respect of the said application was also served on 17th April 1978. On 26th April 1978 the applicant appeared in the said proceedings. It is at this stage that the applicant on 4th May 1978 filed instant application under section 32P for possession. It was the case of the applicant that the opponent had failed to exercise the right of purchase under section 32F within a period of 2 years from the date of death of Tukaram. The opponent had, therefore, forfeited his right to purchase. Consequently the applicant was entitled to possession under section 32P. In the said proceedings the applicant applied for stay of the further proceedings under section 32G and the said proceedings were accordingly stayed.

5. The aforesaid proceedings under section 32P were heard and finally disposed of by the Tahsildar, Wai, who by his judgment and order dated 9th April 1981 held that the opponent had forfeited his right of purchase as he had failed to intimate his intention of purchase within two years of the death of Tukaram. After recording the said finding, the learned Tahsildar proceeded to pass an order for delivery of possession of the suit lands to the applicant.

6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order dated 9th April 1981 of the Court of Tahsildar, Wai, in Tenancy Case No. 32-P, Lohare No. 131/172/78 the opponent preferred an appeal, in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mahableshwar Division, Wai, Tenancy Appeal No. 16 of 1981 wherein by a judgment and order dated 30th November 1981 the order of the trial Court was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed. Being aggrieved the opponent preferred before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. Revision Application No. MRT.NS.III.2/82 (TEN.B.50/82) wherein by a judgment and order dated 30th August, 1983 the Revision Application was dismissed, with no orders as to costs. Taking exception to the aforesaid concurrent findings of the three authorities, the original opponent has preferred the present writ petition.

7. Having heard Shri R.M Agrawal the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition and Shri S.V Page appearing on behalf of the original applicant. I am clearly of the view that all the three authorities have clearly erred in granting the application of the applicant under section 32P and ordering possession of the suit land in favour of the applicant. The facts stated above will show that Tukaram the predecessor-in-title of the applicant had on 21st December 1956 filed an application bearing No. 1037 of 1957 under section 31 for possession. The notice, which was issued to the opponent in respect of the said application, is on record. Similarly the extract of the Register of applications under the Tenancy Act in respect of the said proceedings is also on record. The same shows that an application was filed by Tukaram against the opponent in respect of the suit land and it further shows that the said application was dismissed on 7th November 1957. A combined reading of the said notices and the extract of the Register shows that Tukaram had on 27th December applied for possession under section 31 and the same was dismissed on 7th November 1957. What follows from the said dismissal is that the opponent has become the deemed purchaser of the suit land as on 7th November 1957. In such a case the provisions of section 32f(1)(a) have no application and the tenant's right to purchase is governed by section 32(1)(b) and not by section 32f(1)(a). Hence the opponent will be entitled to be declared a deemed purchaser automatically on the rejection of the applicant's application under section 31. See Patel Chinibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khariderao Jambekar reported in AIR 1965 SC 1457: Nago Dattu Mahajan v. Smt. Yeshodabai Huna Mahajan* reported in 78 BLR 427.

8. Shri Page, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant, however, contended that the judgment dismissing the applicant's application under section 31 is not on record. It is, therefore, not possible to find out the grounds on which the application was rejected. He also submitted that the present contention was not raised either in the trial Court or in the Appellate Court but was raised for the first time before the Tribunal. In my judgment, the fact of the applicant having made an application under section 31 and the same having been dismissed is a matter of record. The same is abundantly clear from the copy of the notice of the said proceedings that was served upon the opponent and extract of the register in respect of the application under the Act. What follows therefrom is a consequence in law. If as a result of the dismissal of the application under section 31 the opponent is entitled to become a deemed purchaser without anything more, such right cannot be frustrated on the technical pleas sought to be advanced by Shri Page. If we ignore the fact that the opponent was entitled to be declared as a deemed purchaser with effect from 1st November 1957 even then he would be entitled to purchase the suit land under section 32F(1)(a) of the Act. Tukaram who was a landlord under disability died on 22nd April 1976. The opponent on 1st August, 1977 applied for purchase of the suit land. This was well within the period of two years provided under section 32f(1)(a). Once the opponent is shown to have exercised his right of purchase within the stipulated period the opponent would be entitled to purchase under section 32F.

9. Shri Page, however, submitted that though the opponent may have filed an application for purchase within the period of two years he has failed to give a notice of his intention to purchase to the applicant in the prescribed form within the said period. Since the opponent has failed to comply with the provision of section 32f(1)(a) the opponent's right, if any, has been lost. He drew my attention to Form-10 prescribed under Rule 20 in respect of the intimation of the desire to exercise right of purchase conferred by section 32F or section 32-O. The said notice is required to be addressed to the landlord. Since there is a total absence of such a notice the opponent has forfeited his right to purchase.

9-A. In my judgment, there is no merit in the above contention. The notice of the application filed by the opponent under section 32G was duly served upon the applicant on 12th December, 1977 and this is admitted by the applicant. The said notice was thus served on the applicant within a period of two years prescribed under section 32F. Similarly the fresh notice which was served upon the applicant in respect of the said proceedings was served on 17th April 1978 which also is within the period of two years from the date of death of Tukaram. A copy of the said notice is on record. In view of the said notices I am inclined to hold that there is sufficient compliance of the requirement on the part of the opponent to give intimation of his desire of exercising the right of purchase. The Tenancy Act is a social legislation intending to confer certain benefits to the tenants. Such benefits cannot be permitted to be frustrated on the ground that the tenant has failed to give an intimation of his desire of purchase in the prescribed form. If it is shown that there has been a due intimation of his desire to the landlord the same would be sufficient compliance of the requirement under section 32f(1)(a) of the tenancy act. Thus viewing the case in any angle the opponent will have to be declared to be a purchaser in respect of the suit land.

10. Shri Page further contended that the applicant in the present case is a certified landlord. After an exemption certificate was issued in favour of the applicant on 30th June 1978 the applicant was entitled to apply under section 33P for possession of the entire suit land. According to Shri Page, the said right cannot be frustrated by the opponent by filing an application under section 32G.

11. In my judgment, there is no merit in the above contention. The proceedings under section 88C though directed against the opponent along with other tenants did not pertain to the suit land. The statement of the opponent was recorded wherein he stated that he had no concern with the lands which were the subject matter of the application. The certificate that was issued under section 88C did not pertain to the suit land. Consequently no right accrued in favour of the applicant to apply for possession under section 33P.

12. In view of the above discussion, I find that all the three authorities have misdirected themselves in arriving at the finding that the applicant is entitled to possession of the suit land. Even if it were to be held that the opponent has lost his right of purchase it was not open to the concerned authorities to straightway direct the possession of the suit land without holding an enquiry under section 32P.

13. In view of the aforesaid facts I hold that the instant application under section 32P is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. I declare that the opponent is entitled to purchase the suit land under section 32G. The proceedings under section 32G which were stayed will now be proceeded with on their own merits and in accordance with law.

14. In the result, the impugned judgment and orders of all the three authorities are set aside. It is declared that the petitioner (original opponent) is entitled to purchase the suit lands bearing Gat No. 366 (Survey No. 98.A) situate at village Lohare, Taluka Wai, District Satara. The Tahsildar, Wai, will proceed with the proceedings under section 32G for fixation of the purchase price.

15. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.

16. The petitioner will be entitled to costs throughout.

Order accordingly.