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Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • V.A Mohta, J.: Section 44-B of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (the Ceiling Act)
  • section 38 of the Advocates Act and Article 138 of the Constitution. Article 138 of the Constitution
  • section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1976.2.
  • section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act and section 30 of the Advocates Act, H.S Srinivasa
  • section 30(ii) from the provision in section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926,
  • section 9-A of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1975,
  • Article 31-B of the Constitution.21. To conclude, section 44-B of the Ceiling Act
  • section 30 of the Advocates Act and section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act.6.
  • section 30 of the Advocates Act and section 14 of the Bar Councils Act
  • section 44-B of the Ceiling Act. Section 30 of the Advocates Act
  • SECTION 20 HARYANA CEILING ON LAND HOLDINGS ACT 1972
  • Article 254(2) of the Constitution since the Ceiling Act
  • SECTION 48 A KARNATAKA LAND REFORMS ACT
  • SECTION 14 BAR COUNCILS ACT
  • Councils Act by sub-clause (a) of section 14(1),
  • SECTION 30 ADVOCATES ACT
  • SECTION 36 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (4) of section 9,
  • section 20-A of that State's Ceiling Act
  • section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act,
  • section 30(h) of the Advocates Act.
  • section 44-B of the Ceiling Act.
  • SECTION 38 ADVOCATES ACT
  • BAR COUNCILS ACT
  • Act including section 44-B
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • section 14(1)(b)
  • section 44-B
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • V.A Mohta, J.: Section 44-B of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (the Ceiling Act)
  • section 38 of the Advocates Act and Article 138 of the Constitution. Article 138 of the Constitution
  • section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1976.2.
  • section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act and section 30 of the Advocates Act, H.S Srinivasa
  • section 30(ii) from the provision in section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926,
  • section 9-A of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1975,
  • Article 31-B of the Constitution.21. To conclude, section 44-B of the Ceiling Act
  • section 30 of the Advocates Act and section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act.6.
  • section 30 of the Advocates Act and section 14 of the Bar Councils Act
  • section 44-B of the Ceiling Act. Section 30 of the Advocates Act
  • SECTION 20 HARYANA CEILING ON LAND HOLDINGS ACT 1972
  • Article 254(2) of the Constitution since the Ceiling Act
  • SECTION 48 A KARNATAKA LAND REFORMS ACT
  • SECTION 14 BAR COUNCILS ACT
  • Councils Act by sub-clause (a) of section 14(1),
  • SECTION 30 ADVOCATES ACT
  • SECTION 36 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (4) of section 9,
  • section 20-A of that State's Ceiling Act
  • section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act,
  • section 30(h) of the Advocates Act.
  • section 44-B of the Ceiling Act.
  • SECTION 38 ADVOCATES ACT
  • BAR COUNCILS ACT
  • Act including section 44-B
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • section 14(1)(b)
  • section 44-B
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (V.A. Mohta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Letters Patent Appeal raised a narrow challenge to section 44-B of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 ("the Ceiling Act"). The appellant contended that section 44-B, which prohibits appearance of a legal practitioner on behalf of any party to proceedings under the Ceiling Act before specified authorities, was (i) void for want of legislative competence of the State legislature and (ii) unenforceable because it was repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1976. The court heard and analysed earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and various High Courts bearing on the competence and repugnancy questions, the distinction between section 30 and section 14(1)(b), and a subordinate equality (Article 14) attack; the appeal was ultimately dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 44-B of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 is void for want of legislative competence of the State legislature.
  2. Whether section 44-B is repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act, 1976, and therefore unenforceable.
  3. Whether the prohibition in section 44-B is discriminatory or oppressive in breach of Article 14 of the Constitution (a contention considered by the court).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 44-B was enacted without legislative competence by the State because entries in the Seventh Schedule (particularly Entries 77 and 78 of List I dealing with persons entitled to practise) preclude the State from regulating appearance of legal practitioners.
  • Section 44-B is repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act (an absolute right to practise throughout the territories to which that Act extends) and to section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act, 1976, and thus unenforceable.
  • The prohibition results in unequal contest between citizen and State (since the State may be legally represented), creating discrimination contrary to Article 14.

Respondent / State's Arguments (as addressed in the opinion)

  • The Ceiling Act (and section 44-B) falls in pith and substance within land legislation (Entry 18 and Entry 65 of List II), and thus the State legislature had competence to enact restrictions concerning proceedings under that Act.
  • Section 30 of the Advocates Act has not been brought into force; section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act itself permits the right to practise before courts other than High Court and before tribunals to be regulated "by or under any other law for the time being in force," so a State law can validly regulate appearance.
  • Earlier binding decisions of the Supreme Court and of a Division Bench of the High Court upheld the Ceiling Act and similar provisions; such precedents bind the court under Article 141 and judicial discipline, preventing the court from striking down section 44-B on the appellant's grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548 : AIR 1977 SC 915 Upheld validity of the Ceiling Act. Cited as a Supreme Court decision affirming the validity of the Ceiling Act and as a binding precedent the High Court could not go behind.
Woman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362 : AIR 1981 SC 271 Upheld validity of the Ceiling Act. Relied upon as another Supreme Court decision affirming the Ceiling Act's validity; forms part of binding law (Article 141).
Vithalrao v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 Bom 99 Division Bench of Bombay High Court upheld the Act including section 44-B. Cited as the High Court's earlier decision which was affirmed by the Supreme Court; reinforces binding character of the pro-Act view.
T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1973) 1 SCC 336 : AIR 1973 SC 974 Binding effect of conclusions about validity is not taken away merely because certain aspects were not considered earlier. Used to support proposition that previously declared law on validity cannot be reopened merely because some grounds were not considered earlier.
Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P., (1980) 3 SCC 719 : AIR 1980 SC 1762 Not every new discovery or novelty can compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. Relied on to refuse reopening of settled precedent based on novel or late-raised arguments.
Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, (1970) 2 SCC 267 : AIR 1970 SC 1002 High Court cannot ignore a Supreme Court decision on the ground that certain legal provisions were not brought to its notice. Cited to underline necessity of following Supreme Court decisions even if some aspects were not earlier considered.
Lingappa Pachanna v. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 1 SCC 479 : AIR 1985 SC 389 Upheld validity of a similar prohibition (section 9-A Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to ST Act) and held it not repugnant to section 30 (not in force) or to section 14(1)(b). Held directly applicable (in pari materia) to section 44-B; court treated Lingappa as authoritative on the distinction between section 30 and section 14(1)(b).
H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka, (1987) 2 SCC 692 : AIR 1987 SC 1518 Held a provision (section 48-A Karnataka Land Reforms Act) void for want of legislative competence and repugnant to section 30 and section 14(1)(b). Recognised as a later Supreme Court decision reaching the opposite conclusion to Lingappa; the court analysed the conflict and explained why Lingappa (larger Bench) should be followed.
Mahadeo Kisan Bankar v. State of Maharashtra, L.P.A. No. 284 of 1984 (Division Bench, decided 1-10-1987) Division Bench of this Court held Lingappa (larger Bench) was binding and repelled attack on section 9-A. Applied as binding on the High Court; the ratio was held to apply equally to section 44-B.
Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365 : AIR 1974 SC 1596 In case of contradictory judgments, the decision of a larger Bench is binding though it may not be later in time. Relied upon to support the view that Lingappa (larger Bench) is binding over the contrary later decision.
Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State Of Maharashtra, (1985) 1 SCC 275 : AIR 1985 SC 231 Supreme Court sits in different Divisions; number of Judges may not be material for internal Supreme Court conflicts. Cited but held inapplicable here because that case concerned the Supreme Court's own precedents, not bindingness on subordinate courts.
Ramish Francis v. Violet Francis, AIR 1989 Cal. 128 (Full Bench, Calcutta High Court) Full Bench held a High Court may follow one of co-equal conflicting Supreme Court benches if it considers it better in law. Cited; court noted the present case did not present co-equal bench conflict and would have followed Lingappa anyway.
Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221 Punjab & Haryana High Court declared section 20-A (Haryana Ceiling Act) void as repugnant to section 30 (assuming section 30 in operation). Used as background to explain divergent reasoning in H.S. Srinivasa; court rejected the assumption that section 30 was in force for that decision.
O.N. Mohindroo v. Bar Council of Delhi, AIR 1968 SC 888 Interpreted the scope of Entries 77 and 78 and Entry 26 in relation to practitioners and legislative competence. Discussed in relation to the scope of Entries in the Seventh Schedule and to explain how the field of regulation is apportioned between Parliament and States.
Paradip Port Trust, Paradip v. Workmen, (1977) 2 SCC 339 : AIR 1977 SC 36 Distinction between language of section 30 of Advocates Act and section 14(1)(b) of Bar Councils Act; generalia specialibus non derogant. Relied upon to emphasise the material difference between section 30 (absolute right, not in force) and section 14(1)(b) (subject to other laws) and to justify a special law prevailing over a general one.
Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 54 : AIR 1988 SC 1768 Supreme Court directed Central Government to consider within six months whether section 30 should be brought into force. Cited to demonstrate that section 30 had not been brought into force despite directions, reinforcing the court's view that section 30 was not operative.
Nandlal v. State of Haryana, 1980 Supp SCC 574 : AIR 1980 SC 2097 Addressed other points raised to the Supreme Court in relation to Haryana Ceiling Act. Court observed the decision did not touch the specific competence/repugnancy point relied upon by appellant and therefore did not assist the appellant.
Vishnupant Girdhar Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No. 1595 of 1987 (Single Judge) Single Judge decision referenced in procedural history. Mentioned to note that the Single Judge may not have been drawn to the Division Bench decision (Mahadeo Kisan Bankar) when deciding that matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis followed a structured approach based on precedent, statutory interpretation of competing provisions, and constitutional doctrines:

  1. Binding precedents: The court began by observing that the Ceiling Act's validity had previously been upheld by the Supreme Court (Dattatraya Govind Mahajan; Woman Rao) and by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (Vithalrao), and that such decisions are "law declared" under Article 141. Consequently, the court stated it was impermissible to go behind those conclusions unless a binding higher authority overruled them.
  2. Conflict in authorities: The court acknowledged a later Supreme Court decision (H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar) which struck down a similar State provision as void for want of legislative competence and repugnant to Advocates Act/Bar Councils Act. The court analysed this apparent conflict with an earlier three-Judge decision in Lingappa Pachanna which upheld a similar Maharashtra provision.
  3. Bench strength and bindingness: The court relied on the principle that when there are contradictory judgments, the decision of a larger Bench is binding (Mattulal v. Radhe Lal). A Division Bench of the High Court (Mahadeo Kisan Bankar) had held Lingappa (a larger Bench decision) to be binding; hence Lingappa's reasoning was treated as binding on the High Court in preference to the later contrary decision.
  4. Distinction between section 30 Advocates Act and section 14(1)(b) Bar Councils Act: The court undertook textual analysis. Section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act entitles advocates to practise "save as otherwise provided by sub-section (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force," whereas section 30 of the Advocates Act confers an absolute right "as of right" to practise throughout the territories to which it extends. That distinction was central: because section 30 is not in force, and because section 14(1)(b) expressly allows regulation "by or under any other law," a State enactment regulating appearance could be validly sustained.
  5. Pith and substance / legislative competence: Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, the court held the Ceiling Act in its true character relates to land and land reforms (Entries 18 and 65 of List II). Since section 44-B must be viewed in the context of the Ceiling Act as a whole, it falls within the State's legislative field and is not beyond the competence of the State legislature. The court rejected the contention that Entries 77 and 78 (List I) ousted the State's competence in this special field of land legislation.
  6. Generalia specialibus non derogant and precedent: The court cited Paradip Port Trust to explain that a special statute dealing with a specific subject can govern representation and appearance within that domain notwithstanding a later general provision; similarly, Lingappa was applied on the basis that the State's special legislation (Ceiling Act) could validly regulate appearance before its authorities.
  7. Operative status of section 30: The court emphasized that section 30 of the Advocates Act had not been brought into force (with reference to Aeltemesh Rein), and this reinforced the conclusion that section 14(1)(b) still permitted other laws to regulate practice before certain authorities.
  8. Article 14 challenge: The court acknowledged that the inequality in allowing the State legal representation while prohibiting a citizen from engaging a legal practitioner had some force as a fairness argument. However, the court observed that the Ceiling Act enjoys a privileged position in the Ninth Schedule under Article 31-B, which effectively renders an Article 14 attack ineffectual in the present context.
  9. Conclusion of analysis: Synthesising the above — binding precedents upholding the Ceiling Act; the non-operative status of section 30; the textual and purposive distinction between section 30 and section 14(1)(b); pith and substance locating the Ceiling Act within State competence over land — the court concluded that section 44-B was neither void for want of legislative competence nor repugnant to the cited provisions of central legislation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's final decision was that APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that section 44-B of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 is upheld as valid and enforceable.
  • The court applied and followed existing binding precedents (including Lingappa Pachanna and earlier Supreme Court affirmations of the Ceiling Act) rather than creating new precedent; the judgment does not purport to set a novel principle beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion. No additional facts or external inferences have been introduced.

    Anant v. State Of Maharashtra

    V.A Mohta, J.:— section 44-B of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (the Ceiling Act) prohibits appearance of a legal practitioner on behalf of any party to proceedings under the said Act before various authorities specified therein. The only point raised in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether that section is (i) void for want of legislative competence and (ii) unenforceable being repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1976.

    2. In our view, the point has to be answered in the negative. Here are our reasons:

    3. In the first place, the validity of the Ceiling Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548 : AIR 1977 SC 915 and (ii) Woman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362 : AIR 1981 SC 271. Initially, a Division Bench of this Court had upheld the validity of the said Act including section 44-B in the case of Vithalrao v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 Bom 99 and this judgment was affirmed in the former Supreme Court case. Those decisions are not merely binding precedents but are “law declared” under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is impermissible for us to go behind those conclusions. It is true that the validity has not been examined on the touch-stone of the points raised before us, but it is nobody's case that those points were not available then. As held in the case of T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1973) 1 SCC 336 : AIR 1973 SC 974 binding effect of the conclusion about the validity of the provisions is not taken away merely because certain aspects based on Article 19(1)(f) were not considered therein. It is further held that the points though available were not raised then and hence cannot be raised in subsequent petitions even before the Supreme Court. In the case of Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P, (1980) 3 SCC 719 : AIR 1980 SC 1762 it is held that every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. Moreover, High Court cannot ignore a Supreme Court decision on the ground that certain legal provisions were not brought to its notice. (See Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, (1970) 2 SCC 267 : AIR 1970 SC 1002). Inspirations behind all these decisions are well known legal principles — stare decisis, judicial discipline and certainty of law.

    4. The Supreme Court in the case of Lingappa Pachanna v. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 1 SCC 479 : AIR 1985 SC 389 had occasion to examine the validity of a similar prohibition contained in section 9-A of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1975, on the very same grounds raised before us. That attack on the validity was repelled holding that the said provision was not repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act dealing with Advocates' absolute right of practice before all the Courts and Tribunals, because it has not been brought into force so far. It was not repugnant to section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act because the right to practise before Courts (other than High Court). Tribunals etc. contained therein is itself subject to any other law for the time being in force. The said provision was held to be valid. The ratio of that decision will apply on all fours to section 44-B of the Ceiling Act since the two provisions in the State Laws are in pari materia. It seemed that controversy which arose directly was set at rest. But it was not to be so.

    5. Controversy was sparked off once again in the case of H.S Srinivasa Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka, (1987) 2 SCC 692 : AIR 1987 SC 1518 in which section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1962, containing similar prohibition against appearance of Legal Practitioners was held to be (i) void for want of legislative competence of the State legislature in view of entries 77 and 78 of List I in 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India and (ii) repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act and section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act.

    6. The validity of section 9-A of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1975, was thereafter challenged in this Court contending that in between the above contradictory decisions of the Supreme Court, the latter decision had the binding force. A Division Bench of this Court (to which one of us was a party) in that case Mahadeo Kisan Bankar v. State of Maharashtra. L.P.A No. 284 of 1984, decided on 1-10-1087 repelled the attack holding that since the earlier Lingappa's case (supra) was rendered by a larger Bench, it was that decision which was binding on the High Court. In taking that view, reliance was placed upon the case of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365 : AIR 1974 SC 1596 wherein it is held that in case of contradictory judgments on the same point, decision of a larger Bench is binding though it may not be later in point of time. Thus, the point raised stands concluded against the appellant so far as this Court is concerned, since the ratio of Mahadeo's case (supra) will clearly apply also to section 44-B of the Ceiling Act. It appears that the attention of the learned Single Judge was not drawn to the aforesaid Division Bench decision either when the case of Vishnupant Girdhar Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No. 1595 of 1987 was decided on 16th March, 1988 or when the impugned judgment under appeal was delivered.

    7. Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State Of Maharashtra, (1985) 1 SCC 275 : AIR 1985 SC 231 to the effect that Supreme Court sits in different Divisions for the sake of convenience and therefore, number of the Hon'ble Judges constituting the Bench is not a material factor. That decision is of no relevance in this matter because in that case point was about binding nature of earlier precedents of the Supreme Court on the Supreme Court itself and not the subordinate Courts. Recent decision of a Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Ramish Francis v. Violet Francis, AIR 1989 Cal. 128 was also brought to our notice. Ratio of that decision is that High Court is free to follow any one of the contradictory decisions of co-equal benches of Supreme Court, which, in its opinion, is better in point of law. We are not faced with such an embarrassing situation in this appeal because the conflicting decisions are not of benches of equal strength. Even if there was any choice open to us, we would have preferred to adopt the view taken in Lingappa's case.

    8. While Lingappa's case exhaustively deals with the distinction between section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act and section 30 of the Advocates Act, H.S Srinivasa Raghavachar's case (supra) merely adopts the reasoning given in the case of Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 Punjab and Haryana 221 by which section 20-A of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (containing similar prohibition against legal practitioners) was declared as void on the ground that the said provision was repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act — a law made by Parliament pursuant to entries 77 and 78 of List I of Seventh Schedule. It was further held that section 20-A would not be saved even by Article 254(2) of the Constitution since the Ceiling Act is not a law made pursuant to Entry 26 in List III. Now, Punjab and Haryana High Court has proceeded upon the assumption that section 30 of the Advocates Act is in operation. After the said judgment was prepared, it was brought to the notice of the High Court that section 30 was not brought into force. The High Court then proceeded to add that until section 30 comes into force, the Bar Councils Act continues in force and in view of section 14 of the Bar Councils Act, all that has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of O.N Mohindroo v. Bar Council of Delhi, AIR 1968 SC 888 upon which the decision is based and by the said Court with reference to section 30 of the Advocates Act would apply with the same vigour to section 14 of the Bar Councils Act. In other words, the High Court has held that section 30 of the Advocates Act and section 14 of the Bar Councils Act are the provisions in pari materia. With deepest respect, that does not seem to be the correct assumption. We reproduce the provisions for ready reference:

    9. section 14 of the Bar Councils Act, reads as under:

    “14. Right of advocates to practise. — (1) An Advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise—

    (a) subject to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 9, in the High Court of which he is an Advocate, and

    (b) save as otherwise provided by sub-section (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force in any other Court and before any other Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence; and

    (c) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under the law for the time being in force entitled to practise.”

    10. section 30 of the Advocates Act, reads as under:

    “30. Subject to the provisions of this Act, every Advocate whose name is entered in the State roll shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the territories to which this Act extends—

    (i) in all courts including the Supreme Court;

    (ii) before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence, and

    (iii) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise.”

    11. It would be seen that while right of an advocate to practise in the High Court is regulated under the Bar Councils Act by sub-clause (a) of section 14(1), the said right to practise in any other Court, Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence is regulated by sub-clause (b) which begins with the terminology “save as otherwise provided by sub-section (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force.” In other words, that right — and we are concerned with that right in this appeal — is subject to the provisions contained in any other law. section 30 of the Advocates Act is an absolute right to practise before all Courts, Tribunals etc. and the two provisions are materially different. This basic distinction has been noticed not only in Lingappa's case but also in the case of Paradip Port Trust, Paradip v. Workmen, (1977) 2 SCC 339 : AIR 1977 SC 36 which does not appear to have been brought to the notice of either Punjab and Haryana High Court or the Supreme Court in the case of H.S Srinivasa Raghavachar. It also appears that even Lingappa's case was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court in the later decision. The following observations in the three Judges Bench decision in Paradip Port Trust's case rendered in the context of section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act are to the point:

    “Besides, it is also urged by the appellant that under section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, every Advocate shall be entitled “as of right” to practise in all courts and before any tribunal [section 30(i) and (ii)]. This right conferred upon the advocate by a later law will be properly safeguarded by reading the word “and” as “or” in section 36(4), says counsel. We do not fail to see some difference in language in section 30(ii) from the provision in section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, relating to the right of advocates to appear before courts and tribunals. For example, under section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act, an advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise save as otherwise provided by or under any other law in any courts other than High Court and tribunal. There is, however, no reference to “any other law” in section 30(h) of the Advocates Act. This need not detain us. We are informed that section 30 has not yet come into force. Even otherwise, we are not to be trammelled by section 30 of the Advocates Act for more than one reason. First, the Industrial Disputes Act is a special piece of legislation with the avowed aim of labour welfare and representation before adjudicatory authorities therein has been specifically provided for with a clear object in view. This special Act will prevail over the Advocates Act which is a general piece of legislation with regard to the subject matter of appearance of lawyers before all Courts, Tribunals and other authorities. The Industrial Disputes Act is concerned with representation by legal practitioners under certain conditions only before the authorities mentioned under the Act. Generalia specialibus non derogant. As Maxwell puts it:

    ‘Having already given its attention to the particular subject and provided for it, the legislature is reasonably presumed not to intend to alter that special provision by a subsequent general enactment unless that intention be manifested in explicit language…. or there be something in the nature of the general one making it unlikely that an exception was intended as regards the special Act. In the absence of these conditions, the general statute is read as silently excluding from its operation the cases which have been provided for by the special one’. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 169.

    Second, the matter is not to be viewed from the point of view of legal practitioners but from that of the employer and workmen who are the principal contestants in an industrial dispute. It is only when a party engages a legal practitioner as such that the latter is enabled to enter appearance before Courts or tribunals. Here, under the Act, the restriction is upon a party as such and the occasion to consider the right of the legal practitioner may not arise.”

    12. We may at this stage notice that section 30 of the Advocates Act has not been brought into force as yet despite direction of the Supreme Court dated 4th August, 1988 issued to the Central Government in the case of Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 54 : AIR 1988 SC 1768 to consider within six months whether it should be brought into force or not.

    13. This takes us to the consideration of the case of O.N Mohindroo's (supra). The said decision deals with the scope of entries 77 and 78 in List I and Entry 26 in List III in the context of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under section 38 of the Advocates Act and Article 138 of the Constitution. Article 138 of the Constitution deals with the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Article 138(1) provides for further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters in the Union List as Parliament may by law confer. Article 138(2) provides for such enlargement by law made by Parliament with respect to any matter upon which Government of India and the Government of any State may specially agree. Submission made and accepted by the Delhi High Court was that the said Act was a composite legislation partly falling in Entries 77 and 78 of List I and partly in Entry 26 of List III and therefore, fell under Article 138(2) and not Article 138(1). Disagreeing with the said view, the Supreme Court held that the Act wholly fell within Entries 77 and 78 of List I, the power to regulate in regard to persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and High Court was carved out from the general power to legislate with regard to the legal, medical and other professions in Entry 26 in List III and is made the exclusive field for legislation by Parliament only. The following observations are to the point:

    “Barring those entitled to practise in the Supreme Court, and the High Courts, the power to legislate with respect to the rest of the practitioners would still seem to be retained under Entry 26 of List III.”

    14. Conclusion was that section 38 of the Advocates Act was covered by Article 138(1) and not by 138(2) and hence was not invalid because of its enactment without the special agreement with the State Government.

    15. The following entries in 7th Schedule are relevant:

    List I Entry 77: Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court including contempt of such Court and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court. Entry 78: Constitution and organisation including vacations of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Courts persons entitled to practise before the High Courts. List II Entry 18: Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization. Entry 65: Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list. List III Entry 26: Legal, medical and other professions. Entry 46: Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters in this List.

    16. Now, legislative entries are fields of legislation and not the powers of the legislation, which are contained in various Articles of the Constitution, such as Article 246. When there is apparent conflict between different entries, an attempt has to be made for reconciliation. In case of overlapping, the doctrine of “pith and substance” has to be applied to find out the real nature of the legislation. Specific item excludes the general. Enactment is not a mere collection of sections and therefore, subject matter of each section is not decisive of the matter. Therefore, enactment as one organic whole keeping in view its aims and objects has to be examined while judging its true character and the head of legislation under which it falls. Incidental encroachment on the heads in the other List is sometimes inevitable. But, such encroachment does not affect the legislative competence.

    17. Applying the above well known tests which are crystallised by judicial pronouncement from time to time, it seems to us that section 44-B of the Ceiling Act cannot be viewed in isolation and will have to be viewed in the context of the letter and spirit of the Ceiling Act as a whole for the purposes of determining the correct legislative head under which it falls. The purpose and scheme of the Ceiling Act is too well known to be elaborately stated and discussed. The said Act in pith and substance relates to land which comes under entry 18 in List II read with entry 65 in List II, and the Advocates Act or the Bar Councils Act in pith and substance relates to entries 77 and 78 in List I.

    18. Having regard to all these factors, we find it extremely difficult to locate any want of legislative competence of the State legislature in enacting section 44-B of the Ceiling Act. section 30 of the Advocates Act is not in operation and section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act does not occupy the field of entitlement to practise in Courts other than High Court, Tribunals etc. referred to in section 14(1)(b) which can be regulated by other laws including a State law. Therefore, section 44-B is not repugnant to section 14(1)(b) which itself permits legislation in this regard.

    19. Our attention was also invited to the case of Nandlal v. State of Haryana, 1980 Supp SCC 574 : AIR 1980 SC 2097 and it is contended that the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court about invalidity of section 20-A of that State's Ceiling Act is upheld therein. We have gone through the said decision and the submission does not impress us. The said decision does not even remotely touch this point and has only dwelt upon altogether new points raised before the Supreme Court.

    20. All that survives is the consideration of the last submission that the battle between a citizen and the State in the Ceiling Act is unequal, specially when the State is allowed to be represented by a trained legal brain and the similar facility is denied to a citizen and hence the prohibition is highly discriminatory and oppressive. In this submission there is some force. But this ground of attack is essentially based upon Article 14 from which the Ceiling Act is immune because of the privileged position it occupies by being placed in Ninth Schedule under Article 31-B of the Constitution.

    21. To conclude, section 44-B of the Ceiling Act is neither void nor unenforceable. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, but with no order as to costs.

    Appeal dismissed.
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    Anant v. State Of Maharashtra
    (Sep 15, 1989)