Bharucha, J.:— The appellant was assessed to income tax for the Assessment Year 1971-1972 by Assessment Order dated March 27, 1974. On September 30, 1974 the appellant was given notice under s. 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, of the proposed re-opening of his assessment for the said Assessment Year. On November 29, 1975 the appellant wrote to his I.T.O protesting against the proposed re-opening. He asked I.T.O to furnish him with the grounds for the same. On that day he also filed a return as required by the notice under s. 148, but under protest.

2. Nothing transpired until January 17, 1980 when the I.T.O wrote to the appellant on the subject of the re-opening of his assessment under s. 147(a) for the said Assessment Year. He stated that after the assessment for that year had been made, the Income-tax Department came to know that loans shown by the appellant were not genuine; that one J.K Thakkar had merely lent his name to show that a loan had been received from him though he had not given it. The Department had, therefore, reason to believe that the amount of the loans represented the appellant's own unexplained money and that his income had escaped assessment because he had failed to furnish full, true and correct particulars of his income at the time of the original assessment. Accordingly, the assessment had been re-opened under s. 147(a) by issue of a notice under s. 148. Along with the letter, the I.T.O enclosed notices under ss. 143(2) and 142(1) and a summons for personal attendance under s. 141. On February 15, 1980 the appellant wrote to the I.T.O a long letter in which he again asked to be furnished with the grounds recorded by the I.T.O before the notice under s. 148 was issued. On February 23, 1980 the I.T.O informed the appellant of the grounds. They were recorded thus:

“The assessee had for this year shown a loan of Rs. 50,000/- taken from one Jethalal K. Thakkar which has been accepted in the original assessment made. As per intimation letter dated April 20, 1974, on record from the 2nd I.T.O, B.S.D (West) this person has given havalas. There is also an intimation from the 3rd I.T.O, X-Ward, Bombay that one J.K Nathwani had arranged bogus havala loans in the name of Jethalal Karsondas & Mohanlal & Sons, during the year 1971 & 1972 for the assessee.

I have, therefore, reason to believe that on account of the assessee's omission to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for assessment for this year, income chargeable to tax of Rs. 50,000/- has accepted assessment. Issue notice u/s. 148.

I.T.O”

3. Along with the letter dated February 23, 1980 the I.T.O enclosed copies of letters dated February 7, 1975 and April 20, 1974 which were referred to in the grounds. On March 4, 1980 the appellant filed a writ petition impugning the notice under s. 148, the notices under ss. 143(2) and 142(1) and the summons under s. 141. The writ petition was heard and disposed of by the learned single Judge on December 22, 1983. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition in so far it concerned the notice under s. 148 on the ground of delay. He quashed the notices under ss. 143(2) and 142(1) and the summons under s. 141. This appeal, filed by the original petitioner, assails the judgment and order of the learned Judge in so far as they rejected his contentions in regard to the notice under s. 148.

4. The notice under s. 148 was issued on September 30, 1975. Soon thereafter, on November 29, 1975, the appellant wrote to the I.T.O calling for the grounds for the proposed re-opening. There was no reply to this communication. Nothing was heard of the proposed re-opening until the I.T.O wrote to the appellant on January 17, 1980, even then he did not set out the grounds which he had recorded before he issued the notice under s. 148. It was, however, for the first time that the I.T.O then stated that the re-opening was proposed under s. 147(a). It was only when, once again, the assessee required the I.T.O to furnish him with the grounds that they were given to him on February 23, 1980. The writ petition was thereafter filed on March 4, 1980. In these circumstances, it does not appear to us equitable that the appellant's writ petition should be dismissed in regard to the notice under s. 148 only upon the ground of delay.

5. To appreciate what follows clauses (a) and (b) of Section 147 must be set out.

(a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the Income-tax Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or

(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year,

he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).”

6. It is apparent from the grounds, which are quoted above, that the re-opening could not have been under cl. (a) of s. 147, and this is not seriously disputed. It is equally apparent from the grounds that the re-opening was proposed because of the information received by the I.T.O by the letters dated February 7, 1975 and April 20, 1974 from fellow I.T.Os The first of the letters was written by the I.T.O of the aforementioned J.K Thakkar (also called J.K Nathwani). The letter stated that J.K Thakkar had filed an affidavit in which he had listed the names of parties for whom he had arranged ‘havalas’ on commission basis. The appellant was shown in the list as having received in the Assessment Year 1971-1972 a ‘havala of Rs. 50,000/-’. The second letter was also from the I.T.O of J.K Thakkar. It referred to an entry in the account of J.K Thakkar maintained in the appellant's books which showed that the former had advanced Rs. 50,000/- in cash to the latter on March 31, 1971. Information gathered, the letter said, showed that J.K Thakkar acted only as name-lender passing bogus havalas for the alleged loans.

7. The question now is whether, in these circumstances, we should strike down the notice under s. 148 because s. 147(a), which the I.T.O invoked, is not applicable. There is in our mind no doubt that the letters dated February 7, 1975 and April 20, 1974 furnished to the I.T.O definite information. This was no case of “wholly vague, indefinite, far-fetched and remote” information. The information could not but have led to the reasonable belief that income chargeable to tax in the appellant's hands had escaped assessment.

8. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rahimtoola, learned counsel for the appellant, to the judgment of Allahabad High Court in Raghubar Dayal Ram Kishan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P The judgment was delivered on a reference. The question that was answered read thus:—

“Where an Income-tax Officer assesses the income under section 34(1)(a) and the Appellate Tribunal, on appeal, comes to the conclusion that it should have been assessed under section 34(1)(b), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to convert or alter the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer under section 34(1)(a) to an assessment under section 34(1)(b) and maintain it as such.”

9. Desai, C.J and Manchanda, J. having differed, the question was referred to Pathak, J. Pathak, J. agreed with Desai, C.J in answering the question in negative. He referred to the powers conferred upon the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and held that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to convert an assessment made under one clause of s. 147 to an assessment under the other clause.

10. The Allahabad case, as we have noticed, was concerned with the powers of the Tribunal and was delivered on a reference. The matter before us is an appeal filed from a judgment and order on a writ petition under art. 226 of the Constitution. If a court exercising powers under art. 226 is of the view that the interests of justice will be defeated if some order or notice is quashed for technical reasons, it may decline to issue the necessary writ. It is our view that the information conveyed as aforesaid to the I.T.O of the appellant required a re-opening of the appellant's assessment and further inquiry. The interests of justice will not be served if such inquiry does not take place by reason of the striking down of the notice under s. 148. We, therefore, decline to issue that writ.

11. Mr. Jetly, learned counsel for the Revenue now draws our attention to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ganga Saran & Sons (HUF) v. Income-tax Officer, Company Circle-IV, New Delhi A notice under s. 148 was issued to an assessee after his assessment was sought to be re-opened by invoking the provisions of cl. (a) of s. 147. The assessee challenged the notice by filing a writ petition. The court came to the conclusion that the provisions of cl. (a) of s. 147 were not attracted. It then considered the question as to whether a notice issued under cl. (a) of s. 147 could be validated by reference to cl. (b) thereof. The facts before the court were such that the provisions of cl. (b) of s. 147 were applicable. The principle objection raised by the assessee was, however, that the I.T.O had initiated the action not under cl. (b) but under cl. (a) of s. 147 and that, therefore, the Revenue could not be permitted to seek the aid of cl. (b) of s. 147 for sustaining proceedings initiated under cl. (a) thereof. The court held that it was open to the Revenue to do so notwithstanding the fact that cl. (b) of s. 147 had not been specifically pleaded and had for the first time been referred to in the course of argument. The court referred to its own earlier judgment in Avtar Singh Sandhu v. WTO and to judgments of the Calcutta High Court (the latest in Smt. Nirmala Birla v. WTO) and concurred with the view therein expressed that it was possible for the I.T.O to entertain on the same set of facts alternate beliefs under cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 147 and there was nothing to prevent the I.T.O from seeking to support the Validity of a notice by reference to the appropriate provision in the statute. The court said that the Revenue had, no doubt, purported to re-open the assessment under cl. (a) of s. 147 but, if the facts could sustain the re-opening of the assessment under cl. (b) thereof, it did not see why the validity of the notice under s. 148 could not be supported. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the context of writ petitions to strike down notices issued under s. 148 in exercise of powers under cl. (a) of s. 147. Where the facts may sustain the proposed re-opening under cl. (b) of s. 147 but not under cl. (a) thereof, the court may not strike down the notice under s. 148.

12. In the result, we dismiss the appeal but with no order as to costs.

13. Appeal dismissed.