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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (Qazi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a Central Government employee serving as a Time Scale Clerk with the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Nagpur. The petitioner alleges that on 15-3-1967 the Post Master General, Maharashtra Circle, Bombay issued directions for fixation of seniority of clerks recruited before 27-1-1959 who passed the confirmation test at their fifth or sixth attempt; pursuant to those instructions the petitioner was relegated to the bottom of his recruitment year on the basis of the date of confirmation. On 10-8-1970 the Director General issued a circular directing preparation of a common gradation list of certain personnel (T.R.A. personnel and personnel working in the Engineering division) based on continuous service, and a common gradation list was prepared by the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Nagpur. The petitioner says these directives and the resulting gradation list caused his supersession.

The petitioner made a representation dated 1-2-1971 to the Post Master General complaining of supersession; the representation was rejected. The petitioner therefore filed a petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. While the petition was pending, respondents reconsidered seniority refixation in light of the Supreme Court decision Union of India v. G.S. Ganapathi Kini ((1972) 1 SCC 379 : AIR 1972 SC 670), and the Government issued a memo dated 28-4-1978 (Annexure P) setting out principles for revision of seniority. The petitioner amended his petition to challenge the memo dated 28-4-1978 as well as the earlier circulars and directions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, the High Court retains jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain and decide service matters concerning recruitment and conditions of service of civil servants.
  2. Whether Article 323-A of the Constitution and the Administrative Tribunals Act (specifically sections 14, 28 and 29) validly exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court in matters of recruitment and service conditions, including challenges to government circulars/notifications and claims founded on fundamental rights.
  3. Whether the Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate challenges to circulars/notifications and related questions of constitutional validity that arise in service matters.
  4. Whether Article 323-A (and consequentially the Administrative Tribunals Act) is constitutionally valid or violative of the basic structure of the Constitution so as to leave intact High Court writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Pillai and Mr. Bobde)

  • The present petition should be heard by the High Court notwithstanding establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal; the Administrative Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to adjudge the validity of government circulars or notifications.
  • Article 226 confers constitutional powers on High Courts which cannot be affected or taken away by an ordinary statute enacted by Parliament; the Administrative Tribunals Act cannot and does not validly exclude Article 226 jurisdiction.
  • Article 323-A is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution because it seeks to exclude High Court jurisdiction in respect of recruitment and conditions of civil servants.
  • Counsel relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court (M.B. Shukla v. Union of India) to support the proposition that the Administrative Tribunal has not been conferred writ jurisdiction and hence the High Court's writ jurisdiction remains unaffected.
  • Senior counsel (Mr. Bobde) cited constitutional precedents (Keshvananda Bharati, Minerva Milk Ltd., Umaji Keshao Meshram) to emphasize limits on Parliament's power to curtail constitutional remedies and to support the proposition that Article 226 cannot be ousted by ordinary legislation.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Natu)

  • After establishment of the Administrative Tribunal the High Court no longer has jurisdiction to entertain matters of civil servants concerning recruitment and conditions of service; such jurisdiction is exercisable by the Administrative Tribunals under Article 323-A.
  • Article 323-A(1) empowers Parliament to provide for adjudication by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of public servants; clause (2)(d) permits exclusion of the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136.
  • The Administrative Tribunals Act, enacted pursuant to Article 323-A, validly excludes the jurisdiction of all Courts (other than the Supreme Court) in respect of these matters; the Act thus has overriding effect notwithstanding other constitutional provisions.
  • Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act confers on the Central Administrative Tribunal the jurisdiction, powers and authority that were immediately before exercisable by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to recruitment and related service matters; thus Articles 225 and 226 are effectively covered by section 14.
  • Section 28 excludes the jurisdiction of Courts (except the Supreme Court) once the Tribunal's jurisdiction becomes exercisable; section 29 transfers pending proceedings to the Tribunal. Consequently, the present petition should be transferred to the Tribunal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. G.S. Ganapathi Kini ((1972) 1 SCC 379 : AIR 1972 SC 670) Principles for revision/refixation of seniority in service matters (used by the Government to reconsider and refix seniority). The Court noted that the respondents considered refixation of seniority in light of this Supreme Court decision and that the Government evolved principles by memo dated 28-4-1978 pursuant to that decision.
M.B. Shukla v. Union of India (Allahabad High Court, 1986 Labour & Industrial Cases, July Issue, 1034) Held that Administrative Tribunal had not been conferred power to issue writs under Article 226 and that High Court's writ jurisdiction could not be excluded by section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act; distinguished between service disputes and enforcement of Part III rights. The present Court explicitly stated it could not agree with this view and noted that the Allahabad High Court itself did not follow it in a subsequent decision (Udaibhan Singh Chauhan). The Court rejected M.B. Shukla's reasoning.
Keshvananda Bharati Sripadgalvaru v. State of Kerala ((1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461) Cited (by petitioner) in support of broad constitutional principles regarding limits on Parliamentary power to curtail constitutional remedies (basic structure doctrine). The decision was cited by petitioner's counsel in argument; the Court recorded the citation but proceeded to apply Article 323-A and the Administrative Tribunals Act as validly enacted and operative.
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India ((1980) 3 SCC 625 : AIR 1980 SC 1789) Cited (by petitioner) concerning constitutional limits on legislative action affecting constitutional provisions. Petitioner's counsel relied on this authority; the Court acknowledged the citation but concluded that Article 323-A itself authorises the exclusion of High Court jurisdiction in the field specified and that the Tribunals Act is validly enacted thereunder.
Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhikabai (1986 Supp SCC 401 : AIR 1986 SC 1272) Cited (by petitioner) as part of authorities touching constitutional powers and remedies under Part III. Cited by petitioner; the Court recorded the citation but relied on Article 323-A and the language of the Administrative Tribunals Act to conclude exclusion of High Court jurisdiction in service matters covered by the Act.
Udaibhan Singh Chauhan v. Union of India (Allahabad High Court, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.19135 of 1985) Subsequent Allahabad High Court decision which did not follow the reasoning in M.B. Shukla. The Court relied on the fact that the M.B. Shukla view was not consistently followed; this supported the Court's disagreement with M.B. Shukla and its acceptance of the Tribunal scheme under Article 323-A.
Writ Petition No. 800 of 1981 with Writ Petition No. 623 of 1985 (Single Judge decision dated 26-6-1986) Held that Article 323-A is part of the Constitution as much as Article 226 and that clause (2)(d) of Article 323-A permits a law excluding High Court jurisdiction in specified service matters; interpreted sections 14, 28 and 29 of the Tribunals Act as valid and effectual. The Court expressly stated its full agreement with the Single Judge's observations and followed the reasoning to conclude that the Administrative Tribunals Act excludes High Court jurisdiction under Article 226 in the matters covered by Article 323-A.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the competing positions by reference to the Constitution and the Administrative Tribunals Act, taking the following path:

  1. The Court examined the Allahabad High Court decision in M.B. Shukla, which held that the Administrative Tribunal had not been conferred writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and therefore could not oust High Court powers. The present Court stated it could not agree with that reasoning and observed that the Allahabad High Court itself did not follow that view in a later decision (Udaibhan Singh Chauhan).
  2. The Court then turned to Article 323-A of the Constitution. It emphasized that Article 323-A(1) authorizes Parliament to provide for adjudication by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service, and that clause (2)(d) permits exclusion of the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136. Article 323-A is expressed to have overriding effect ("shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force").
  3. On that basis, the Court accepted the respondents' contention that Parliament was competent to enact legislation (the Administrative Tribunals Act) under Article 323-A and to exclude High Court jurisdiction in relation to the matters specified by Article 323-A.
  4. The Court examined section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, which (save as otherwise provided) invests the Central Administrative Tribunal with the jurisdiction, powers and authority that were exercisable immediately before the appointed day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to recruitment and service matters described in the section. The Court read section 14 as covering matters that would otherwise fall within the High Courts' jurisdiction under Articles 225 and 226.
  5. The Court considered section 28 (exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court) and section 29 (transfer of pending proceedings to the Tribunal) and concluded these provisions operate to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in the specified class of service matters and to transfer pending proceedings to the Tribunal.
  6. The Court agreed with the reasoning of a Single Judge decision (Writ Petition No. 800 of 1981 with Writ Petition No. 623 of 1985) that Article 323-A and the Tribunals Act can validly exclude High Court writ jurisdiction in the matters referred to in Article 323-A(1). It accepted the conclusion that the Tribunal is competent to decide incidental questions including those involving alleged contraventions of constitutional provisions (for example, Articles 14 and 16) when those questions arise in the adjudication of service matters.
  7. Applying those legal conclusions to the present petition, the Court held that it could not proceed to hear and dispose of the petition under Article 226 because the Administrative Tribunals Act has the effect of excluding the High Court's jurisdiction in respect of recruitment and conditions of service matters, and the petition therefore had to be transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The Court held that, insofar as disputes and complaints relate to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts as specified in Article 323-A(1), the Administrative Tribunals Act ( enacted under Article 323-A ) validly excludes the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226; accordingly, this petition is being transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay, forthwith.

Direct consequences and practical implications:

  • The present petition under Article 226 could not be heard or disposed of by this High Court and was ordered transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay.
  • The Court accepted that Article 323-A(2)(d) permits legislative exclusion of High Court jurisdiction in respect of the matters identified in Article 323-A(1), and that the Administrative Tribunals Act (notably sections 14, 28 and 29) operates to transfer and entrust adjudication of such service matters to the Tribunal.
  • The Court recorded its agreement with an earlier Single Judge decision that the Tribunal must decide incidental and related questions (including questions touching constitutional provisions such as Articles 14 and 16) insofar as they arise within service matter adjudications before the Tribunal.

The opinion does not expressly state that it is laying down a novel principle beyond applying Article 323-A and the Administrative Tribunals Act; its immediate, concrete effect is the transfer of the petition to the Central Administrative Tribunal.


Order as recorded in the opinion: "Order accordingly." — Petition transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay.

    Rekapally Laxminarayanrao Naidu v. Union Of India And Others

    Qazi, J.:— The petitioner is a Central Government employee working as a Time Scale Clerk with the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Nagpur. It is contended that on 15-3-1967 the Post Master General, Maharashtra Circle, Bombay, issued a direction for the fixation of seniority of those clerks who were recruited before 27-1-1959 but have passed confirmation test at fifth or sixth attempt. In view of these instructions, the petitioner was relegated to the bottom for that particular year of recruitment on the basis of the date of confirmation. It is contended that on 10-8-1970 the Director General issued a circular for preparation of common gradation list of the then T.R.A personnel and the personnel already working in the Engineering division on the basis of continuous service in either of the units. In pursuance of the said circular, the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Nagpur, prepared and issued a common gradation list of seniority working in the cadre, scale and same grade of time scale. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid directions and circular resulted in his supersession. The petitioner made a representation dated 1-2-1971 to the Post Master General, Maharashtra Circle, Bombay, making a grievance about his supersession on account of the directions and circulars referred to supra. However, the representation was rejected and hence he approached this Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It appeared that during the pendency of the petition certain developments took place and the respondents considered the question of refixation of seniority of all the categories of employees including the Time Scale Clerks working under the control of the Post Master General and the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Nagpur, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, reported in (1972) 1 SCC 379 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 670 (Union of India v. G.S Ganapathi Kini, Inspector of Central Excise Hassan). The principles for revision of seniority in the light of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court were evolved by the Government finally by its memo dated 28-4-1978 (Annexure P). However, it appears that the petitioner was not even then satisfied and, therefore, he amended the petition and also challenged the memo dated 28-4-1978.

    2. Mr. Pillai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the present petition will have to be heard by this Court itself, notwithstanding the establishment of Central Administrative Tribunal. According to Mr. Pillai, certain circulars are under challenge and the same cannot be decided by the Administrative Tribunal. According to him, the Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudge the validity of the circulars or notifications issued by the Government. He has heavily relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1986 Labour and Industrial Cases, July Issue, 1034 (M.B Shukla v. Union of India). Since the question involved is of some importance, we also heard Mr. Bobde, Senior Advocate. He invited our attention to the decisions reported in (1973) 4 SCC 225 : A.I.R 1973 S.C 1461 (Keshvananda Bharati Sripadgalvaru v. State of Kerala), (1980) 3 SCC 625 : A.I.R 1980 S.C 1789 (Minerva Milk Ltd. v. Union of India), and 1986 Supp SCC 401 : A.I.R 1986 S.C 1272 (Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhikabai). According to him, the constitutional powers of the High Court such as the one contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be affected in any manner by an ordinary law ??? by the Parliament. Therefore, according to him, the Act itself is unconstitutional. He has also submitted that Article 323-A is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, inasmuch as it excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of the matters relating to recruitment and conditions of civil servants.

    3. The question that fell for consideration before the Allahabad High Court (reported in 1986 Labour and Industrial Cases, July Issue, 1034) cited supra, was about the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and decide petition under Article 226 after the establishment of Central Administrative Tribunal. The Allahabad High Court observed:—

    “The High Courts under the Constitution exercise two powers one arising out or law framed by the appropriate legislature Central or State and the other constitutional. Former can be regulated, withdrawn, withheld or expanded but latter prerogative in nature essential for society governed by rule of law, for upholding fairness, for keeping the balance between State and individual even, for keeping stream of national life clean, establishing harmonious and cohesive society, saving individual from tyranny, promoting social change cannot be rendered dormant by legislation express or implied.”

    4. According to this decision, the Central Administrative Tribunal has not been conferred with jurisdiction to issue writs under Article 226 and, therefore, this power of the High Court to issue writs cannot be excluded by section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. It has been further held that what has been debarred is the power and jurisdiction of Courts to entertain disputes in respect of service matters and not the enforcement of constitutional rights guaranteed to an employee by Part III. With great respect, we may say that it is not possible for us to agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid decision. This view has not been followed even by the Allahabad High Court itself in a subsequent decision in Udaibhan Singh Chauhan v. Union of India (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19135 of 1985 decided by K.C Agarwal and R.P Shukla, JJ. on 4th December 1985.)

    5. Mr. Natu on behalf of the respondents submitted that after the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any matter of a civil servant in respect of recruitment and conditions of service. He has invited our attention to Article 323-A of the Constitution of India, the relevant portion of which reads thus—

    “323-A(1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conations of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government.

    (2) xxxxxxxx

    (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1);

    (e) provide for the transfer to each such administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment;

    (3) The provisions of this Article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force………”

    6. In view of this Article, Mr. Natu submitted that the Constitution itself authorises the Parliament to make an enactment providing for the adjudication by the Administrative Tribunal of all disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of civil servants. He has further submitted that the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, has been enacted by the Parliament in pursuance of its legislative power conferred on it by the Constitution itself. The Constitution itself authorises the Parliament that while making such an enactment it can exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court of India. Therefore, according to Mr. Natu, it cannot be said that the Parliament has exceeded its legislative powers or competence in enacting Act No. 13 of 1983 and providing therein that the jurisdiction of all Courts except that of the Supreme Court is excluded. He has further submitted that Article 323-A has been given overriding power on all other provisions of the Constitution and that it shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provisions of the Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force. This would also mean that this Article shall have over-riding effect even as against Article 226 of the Constitution.

    7. He has also invited our attention to Article 225 of the Constitution of India. According to him, it is this Article which confers jurisdiction on the High Court and Article 226 confers powers on the High Court to issue certain writs. Therefore, according to him, if the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain certain matters there can be no question of exercising power of issuing writs in respect of such matters. It is in this context that he invited our attention to the wordings used in section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act reads as under:—

    “14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal — (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, ill the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to—

    (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services,

    being in either case, a post filled by a civilian;

    (b) an service matters concerning

    (i) a matter of any All India Service; or

    (ii) a person (not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c)) appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union; or

    (iii) a civilian (not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c)) appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence.

    and pertaining to the service of suh member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    8. According to Mr. Natu, the words used in section 14 completely cover the jurisdiction, powers and authority which is conferred on the High Courts under Articles 225 and 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, according to him, it is unthinkable that any power is left with the High Court in the matter of adjudication of the matters in relation to recruitment and conditions of service.

    9. Mr. Natu has also invited our attention to section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, which is reproduced below—

    “28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution—

    On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority become exercisable under ??? Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of any service or persons appointed to any service or post, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or such service matters.”

    10. It is submitted that the jurisdiction of Courts except that of the Supreme Court of India is excluded and, therefore, the present petition will have to be transferred to the Tribunal as required by section 29. In our view, there is much substance in the submission of Mr. Natu. We have pointed out above, the Act No. 13 of 1985 is enacted by the Parliament pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. We have also shown above that this Article over-rides all other provisions of the Constitution or for that matter of any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, it is obvious that it also overrides Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The entire arguments of Mr. Pillai as well as Mr. Bobde are essentially based on the hypothesis that the constitutional powers of the High Court such as the one contained under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be affected in any manner by an ordinary law made by the Parliament. We have already shown above that Article 323-A(2)(d) itself authorises the Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except that of the Supreme Court of India with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of the civil servants. Therefore, it would not be correct to argue that the constitutional power of the High Court as contained in Article 226 of the Constitution has been affected by an ordinary law made by the Parliament. In view of Article 323-A, it cannot be argued that the Administrative Tribunals Act is in excess of the legislative powers conferred upon the Parliament.

    11. The question that falls for our consideration in the present petition is no more res integra. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 800 of 1981 with Writ Petition No. 623 of 1985 decided on 26th June 1986 held as under:

    “Article 323-A is as much a part of the Constitution as Article 226. It cannot, therefore, be argued that Article 323-A cannot legitimately exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 even if that jurisdiction relates to the enforcement of fundamental rights. If clause (2)(d) of Article 323-A permits a law to be made to exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, then the Tribunals Act, which can be regarded as validly enacted under Article 323-A, can provide for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in respect of disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1) of the said Article. The Act must be regarded as a valid piece of legislation.”

    12. The learned Single Judge has further observed in para 17 that—

    “Section 14 of the Tribunals Act, invests the Tribunal with the power to decide all questions in relation to recruitment and all other service matters in relation to All India Service and services in connection with the affairs of the Union. When, therefore, the Tribunal proceeds to decide such questions it has to decide all incidental questions. Whenever a Court or a Tribunal has been invested with the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any complaint or grievance it has necessarily the jurisdiction to decide all questions incidental to the main adjudication. When, therefore, the Tribunal proceeds to decide any question in relation to a service matter and if it is called upon to decide that any action taken by the authorities is in contravention of the Constitution or any statute or any rules made under the Constitution or the statute, it will have to necessarily go into that question. It will have to decide whether there has been such a contravention. Without deciding this question it will naturally be unable to give the relief which it is entitled to give to the concerned civil servant. Even when questions relating to the contravention of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution arise in an application by a civil servant the Tribunal has to decide those questions because it will be unable to give the relief or it will be unable to decide the application properly unless it adjudicates on the question of the contravention of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This must necessarily follow, as mentioned above, from the fact that a Court or a Tribunal adjudicating upon any issue as the jurisdiction should decide all, incidental questions arising in that adjudication.”

    13. We are in full agreement with the observations of the learned Single Judge. In our view, the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, notwithstanding whether the challenge is based on the breach of statute, rules or orders or notifications or relating to contravention of fundamental rights such as those contained under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In fact, there is nothing in the Administrative Tribunals Act to suggest that the Parliament intended that only a part of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in so far as that jurisdiction relates to the service matters of the Union be excluded.

    14. Mr. Palshikar submitted that the writ petitions in which the rule has been issued have been saved by the Administrative Tribunals Act and they cannot, therefore, be transferred. He has further submitted that since the appeals have been saved, the writ petitions must also be taken to have been saved by necessary implication. In our view, there is no substance in these submissions. There is nothing either in sections 14, 28 or 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, which would justify this interpretation placed by Mr. Palshikar. On the contrary, section 29 specifically states that every suit or other proceeding pending before a Court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, shall stand transferred. (Emphasis supplied.) There can be no doubt that the word ‘proceeding’ shall include also the writ petitions. The words used in section 29 specifically refer to the proceeding pending and does not make any distinction as sought to be made by Mr. Palshikar, that it would not cover the petitions which are already admitted. The second limb of his submission that since the appeals have been saved the writ petitions must also be taken to have been saved, is wholly without substance. Section 29 specifically saves the appeals pending before the High Court. If the Legislature also wanted to save the writ petitions which are admitted, then surely it would have been so mentioned. In our view, section 28 read with section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act completely excludes the jurisdiction of all the Courts except that of the Supreme Court of India. We, therefore, hold that we cannot proceed to hear and dispose of this petition and the same is being transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay, forthwith.

    Order accordingly.
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    Rekapally Laxminarayanrao Naidu v. Union Of India And Others
    (Sep 12, 1986)