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  • provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, hereinafter referred
  • provisions contained in S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act
  • P.U.L.P Act.7. Section 3(16) of the P.U.L.P Act
  • S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • S. 30(2) of the P.U.L.P Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • S. 30 of the P.U.L.P Act
  • Indian Companies Act
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citation codes
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  • provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, hereinafter referred
  • provisions contained in S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act
  • P.U.L.P Act.7. Section 3(16) of the P.U.L.P Act
  • S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • S. 30(2) of the P.U.L.P Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • S. 30 of the P.U.L.P Act
  • Indian Companies Act
Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary — Complaint (U.L.P.) No. 244 of 1984

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a limited company operating a cotton textile mill in Pune and is governed by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The first respondent is the trade union recognized as the representative union for the petitioner's mill. The second respondent is a Member of the Industrial Court at Pune.

The respondent filed Complaint (U.L.P.) No. 244 of 1984 under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (the P.U.L.P. Act). The complaint alleged that the petitioner repeatedly laid off employees without following the procedure prescribed under Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act and without applying to the State Government prior to laying off employees; details were included in annexures to the complaint.

The complaint alleged that the petitioner's actions were illegal, involved force and violence because the employees were allegedly prevented by force from joining duties, and therefore amounted to an unfair labour practice under item (10) of Schedule IV of the P.U.L.P. Act. The respondent also sought interim relief restraining the petitioner from laying off employees without obtaining the State Government's permission during pendency of the complaint.

The petitioner opposed the complaint and the interim relief application, contending that even if the complaint's allegations were accepted, the act of laying off did not constitute an act of force or violence under item (10) of Schedule IV and therefore was not an unfair labour practice under the P.U.L.P. Act; accordingly, the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or grant interim relief under Section 30 of the P.U.L.P. Act.

The Industrial Court, by its order dated 18 August 1984 under Section 30(2) of the P.U.L.P. Act, directed that "Until further orders, the respondent should not give lay-off to its workmen without following the procedure prescribed in S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947." The petitioner challenged this order by approaching this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the act of an employer declaring a lay-off in contravention of the express and mandatory provisions of Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act can be regarded as an "act of force or violence" under item (10) of Schedule IV of the P.U.L.P. Act, and therefore an unfair labour practice.
  2. Whether the Industrial Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 30 of the P.U.L.P. Act, could entertain the complaint and grant interim relief based on the allegations that the employer's acts amounted to force or violence.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The petitioner repeatedly laid off employees without following the statutory procedure under Section 25‑M and without obtaining State Government permission, as shown in annexures to the complaint.
  • Those actions were illegal and involved elements of force and violence because employees were prevented by force from joining their duties; therefore the petitioner committed an unfair labour practice under item (10) of Schedule IV of the P.U.L.P. Act.
  • Interim relief was sought to restrain the petitioner from laying off employees without following S.25‑M during the pendency of the complaint.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Even if all averments in the complaint are accepted, the act of laying off cannot amount to an act of force or violence as contemplated by item (10) of Schedule IV; it is not an unfair labour practice.
  • Accordingly, the Industrial Court did not have jurisdiction under Section 30 of the P.U.L.P. Act to entertain the complaint or to grant the interim relief sought by the respondent.
  • Sri Shrikrishna (for the petitioner) argued that the words "force" and "violence" used together indicate that "force" must be understood in the same category as physical acts (noscitur a sociis), i.e., requiring a physical act compelling another person.

Additional Submissions Noted by the Court

  • Miss Bach/Buch (for the respondent) argued that "force" in item (10) should be liberally construed to include economic compulsion, a show of strength, or other compulsions by the employer; she did not contend that mere illegality necessarily amounted to an unfair labour practice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
General Workers' Union v. Municipal Council, Sangli [(1984) 48 F.L.R. 411] The distinction between an illegal act and an unfair labour practice; a complainant under the P.U.L.P. Act must prove an unfair labour practice and not merely an illegal act. The appropriate remedy for an illegal act that is not an unfair labour practice is different. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that mere contravention of statutory provisions (an illegal act) does not automatically amount to an unfair labour practice under the P.U.L.P. Act; on the facts, an illegal act may not translate into a P.U.L.P. complaint.
People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India [1982—II L.L.N. 410 and 642] (the "Asiad" case) The Supreme Court's discussion of "forced labour" under Article 23, including that force may be physical, legal compulsion, or compulsion arising from economic circumstances (hunger, poverty); a factor that deprives a person of choice and compels a particular course may be regarded as force. The Industrial Court had relied on this judgment to treat economic compulsion as "force." This Court examined that reliance, noted the constitutional context (forced labour under Art. 23), and interpreted the Asiad passage as involving compulsion by one person upon another; it concluded that the Asiad reasoning did not justify treating the petitioner's act of laying off as an act of force in the meaning of item (10) of Schedule IV.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by isolating the factual averments and the legal question arising from them. The complaint alleged two distinct bases for claiming an act of force: (1) the petitioner's action in declaring lay-offs was illegal and in contravention of Section 25‑M of the Industrial Disputes Act, and (2) the petitioner or its officers had by force prevented employees from joining their duties. The Court found no material to support the second averment (that force was actually used to prevent employees from joining duties) and noted that the Industrial Court had not found that such physical force had been employed.

Consequently, the Court identified the single legal question as whether an employer's act that is illegal or in contravention of express statutory provisions would necessarily amount to an unfair labour practice (specifically an "act of force or violence" under item (10) of Schedule IV of the P.U.L.P. Act).

The Court set out the statutory definitions: Section 3(16) of the P.U.L.P. Act refers to unfair labour practices as defined in Section 26, which in turn incorporates the practices listed in Schedules II to IV; item (10) of Schedule IV prescribes "To indulge in act of force or violence" as an unfair labour practice. The Court emphasized that mere illegality is not, without more, an unfair labour practice and relied on the General Workers' Union v. Municipal Council authority for that distinction.

The Court then examined the Industrial Court's reliance on the Supreme Court's Asiad judgment to treat economic compulsion as "force." The Asiad discussion concerned Article 23 (forced labour) and observed that force can be physical, legal, or arise from economic compulsion (hunger, poverty). The passage relied upon stated that any factor depriving a person of choice and compelling a course of action may be regarded as force.

This Court analyzed the Asiad passage and observed that the concept of force there implicitly involved an action by one person that compels another to act—the imposition of compulsion by an actor on another. The Court concluded that the proper construction of "act of force or violence" in the P.U.L.P. Act is an action designed to compel another to do or refrain from doing something. The Court also referred to the Oxford English Dictionary definition of "force" as an aid.

Applying this understanding, the Court reasoned that when an employer declares a lay‑off, the act is not directed at compelling the employees to do or not do a particular thing; it is not an action designed to coerce employees into a specific course. Any consequence such as reduced wages is a consequence of the employer's action, not an act that compels employees to perform or refrain from performing a specified act. The Court accepted the contention (invoking noscitur a sociis) that the pairing of the words "force" and "violence" suggests a physical or coercive element, and held that absent a physical or coercive act intended to compel, the lay‑off did not amount to an act of force within item (10).

The Court considered but rejected the respondent's counsel's submission that "force" should be liberally construed to include various forms of compulsion or a show of strength; even adopting a liberal construction, the Court found that the facts did not establish that the lay‑off was an act intended to coerce the employees into a particular action. Therefore, the impugned order of the Industrial Court treating the lay‑off as an act of force was not sustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition succeeds. The Court set aside the Industrial Court's order dated 18 August 1984 (below exhibit U2 in Complaint (U.L.P.) No. 244 of 1984).

Core Ruling: The declaration of lay‑off by an employer, by itself and in the absence of evidence that the employer or its agents used coercive or physical action to compel employees, does not constitute an "act of force or violence" under item (10) of Schedule IV of the P.U.L.P. Act and therefore does not automatically amount to an unfair labour practice.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Industrial Court's interim direction that the petitioner should not lay off workmen without following Section 25‑M was set aside; there will be no order as to costs in this petition.
  • Broader implication (as expressed in the opinion): The decision clarifies that illegality under another statute (here, the Industrial Disputes Act) does not by itself convert the employer's action into an unfair labour practice under the P.U.L.P. Act; an element of coercion or compulsion directed at employees is required to fall within item (10) of Schedule IV. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond this interpretation of "force" in the statutory context considered.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond what appears in the text.

    Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona Mills, Ltd. v. Girni Kamgar Sanghatana And Another

    1. The petitioner is a limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act and is running a cotton textile mill at Pune. The first respondent, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, is a trade union, which is the representative union as far as the petitioner is concerned. The petitioner's mill it governed by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and hence the necessity of mentioning that the respondent is the representative union. The second respondent is the Member of the Industrial Court at Pune, before whom a complaint, being Complaint (U.L.P) No. 244 of 1984, has been filed by the respondent under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, hereinafter referred to as the P.U.L.P Act.

    2. The complaint mentioned above alleges that the petitioner is often laying off its employees without following the procedure prescribed under S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is alleged that the petitioner has, in law, to follow the said procedure which it is not doing. The complaint further alleges that the petitioner has not applied to the State Government at any time before laying off its employees. The details of the said action of the petitioner have been given in the annexures to the complaint. The complaint thereafter proceeds to state as follows:

    “The respondent has thus illegally and high handedly and forcibly laid off thus: employees and refused them work and alto refused them wages for the days they were laid off as shown in the annexures A and B to the complaint. The complainant states that the said actions of the respondent thus amount to the acts of force and violence since the said acts are illegal, invalid, in contravention of the express and mandatory provisions of law and also involve elements of force inasmuch as the employees so laid off have been prevented by force by the respondent and its officers from joining their duties on the dates shown in the annexures. The respondent has thus committed the unfair labour practice under item (10) of Sch. IV of the Act …”

    The respondent also filed an application for interim relief and prayed that during the pendency of the complaint the petitioner may be directed not to lay off any employees without obtaining the permission of the State Government.

    3. The petitioners resisted the said complaint as well as the application for interim relief by contending that even if all the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted at their face value, the act of the petitioner in the instant case cannot amount to an act of force or of violence as mentioned in item (10) of Sch. IV of the P.U.L.P Act. In other words, it was contended that the act complained of was not an unfair labour practice at all and, therefore, the Industrial Court exercising jurisdiction under S. 30 of the P.U.L.P Act could neither entertain the complaint nor grant interim relief on the application made in that behalf by the respondent.

    4. The Industrial Court at Pune by its judgment and order, dated 18 August 1984, gave a direction under S. 30(2) of the P.U.L.P Act that:

    “Until further orders, the respondent should not give lay-off to its workmen without following the procedure prescribed in S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.”

    It is against this order that the petitioners has approached this Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India.

    5. In the normal course it would have been permissible for me to decline to go into the merits of this case because what has been done by the Industrial Court is to require the petitioner to follow the law. But having gene through the facts and circumstances of this case and the law governing the jurisdiction of the Courts under the P.U.L.P Act, I thought it necessary to go into the rival contentions of the parties and decide the question arising because it is a pure question of law going to the jurisdiction of the Courts under the provisions of the P.U.L.P Act.

    6. From the averments in the complaint extracted above it is noticed that the case of the respondent was that:

    “the said actions of the respondent (petitioner before me) thus amount to acts of force and violence since the said acts are illegal, invalid …”

    It was also mentioned that the said acts of the petitioner involved elements of force inasmuch as the employees so laid off have been prevented by force by the petitioner and its officers from joining their duties. The unfair labour practice alleged by the respondent was thus based upon two averments. First was that the acts of the petitioner are illegal and in contravention of the express and mandatory provisions of law amounting to acts of force and violence and secondly that the petitioner and its officers are preventing by force the employees of the petitioner from joining their duties. In so far the second averment is concerned there is no material at all to hold that apart from declaring the lay-off, allegedly in contravention of the provisions contained in S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioner or its officers are actually by force preventing the employees of the petitioner-company from joining their duties. It has not been held by the Industrial Court that such force has been employed either by the petitioner or by its officers in preventing the employees from joining heir duties. Therefore, the only question that is to be decided is whether an act of the employer, which is illegal or in contravention of the express and mandatory provisions of law, would necessarily amount to an unfair labour practice as denned under the P.U.L.P Act.

    7. Section 3(16) of the P.U.L.P Act defines “unfair labour practice” to mean the unfair labour practices as defined in S. 26 of the said Act. Section 26 says that “unfair labour practices” means any of the practices listed in Schs. II to IV. We are here concerned with item (10), Sch. IV, which says: “To indulge in act of force or violence” is to indulge in an unfair labour practice. Therefore, the question is whether by declaring a lay-off in contravention of the provisions contained in S. 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act an employer can be said to indulge in an act of force or violence. Merely, because an employer contravenes a provision of some Act or even indulges in an illegal act it cannot be said that he is indulging in an unfair labour practice. In General Workers' Union v. Municipal Council, Sangli [(1984) 48 F.L.R 411], this Court has pointed out that there is a difference between an illegal act and an unfair labour practice. A complainant under the P.U.L.P Act has to prove that there is an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer and not merely that the act is illegal. It has also been pointed out that the remedy for challenging an act which is illegal but does not amount to an unfair labour practice is different and not by way of a complaint under the P.U.L.P Act. On the facts of Sangli Municipal Council case (vide supra), what was found by this Court was that the employer was, if at all, guilty of an illegal act which did not amount to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of the P.U.L.P Act.

    8. This Industrial Court in the impugned judgment has held that the act of laying off itself amounts to indulging in an act of force as mentioned in item (10) of Sch. IV. While so holding the Industrial Court has referred to and relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India [1982—II L.L.N 410 and 642] The Industrial Court regarded that judgment as an authority in Para. 15, at page 661:

    “… for the proposition that any factor which deprived a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action, may properly be regarded a force, and if a situation is created in which a person would be acting not as a free agent, with a choice between alternatives, but under the compulsion of economic circumstances, there would be force…”

    Since the Industrial Court has referred to and relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court, it would be necessary to briefly refer to the context in which the word “force” came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court in that judgment.

    9. In the case in question, which is well known as the “Asiad case,” the Supreme Court was examing the ambit of Art. 23 of he Constitution of India which says that

    “traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited.”

    While considering the phrase “forced labour” occurring in Art. 23 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, in Para. 15 of its judgment, noted that “forced labour” may arise in several ways. Proceeding further the Supreme Court said at page 661 of 1982-II L.L.N:

    “…It may be physical force which may compel a person to provide labour or service to another or it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution…”

    Thereafter occurs the sentence on which the Industrial Court placed reliance, namely.

    “…Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may properly be regarded as ‘force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such ‘force’, it would be forced labour…”

    The sentence on which the Industrial Court placed reliance itself shows that when the force is used by one person it compels another person to follow a course of action. In other words, implicit in the word “force” is the concept of an action that is being imposed upon another. If, for example, one person indulges in an act which does not compel or coerce another person to do a particular act, then it cannot be said that the first act amounts to force.

    10. The Supreme Court judgment itself shows that force may be of various types and may be used in different circumstances. Looking to the context in which the words “act of force or violence” are used in the P.U.L.P Act, to my mind it is clear that the force in the Act means an action which is designed to compel another to do an act or refrain from doing an act. Though the dictionary meaning may not be wholly determinative of the connotation of the word used in this Act it would be useful to refer to the same as an aid to understanding the meaning of the words used in the Act. The word “force” used as a verb has been defined in Oxford English Dictionary to mean to overcome the resistance of or to compel one to act prematurely or to adopt a policy he dislikes. It also means to compel or constrain or oblige a person to do a thing or to drive a person to or into a course of action. In the instant case, it can be seen that when the employer lays off the workmen it is not for the purpose of compelling them to do a particular thing or not to do a particular thing. The action involved in laying off the workmen is not intended to compel or coerce the workmen to do or not to do a particular thing. It is true, as has been stated by Miss Bach, appearing for the respondent, and also as has been mentioned by the Industrial Court, that as a result of the action taken by the employer the workmen concerned are required to accept lesser wages than the wages to which they would have been entitled if they were fully employed. But this situation is a consequence flowing from the action of the employer himself. It is not an action which the employees are forced or obliged to take. It is in this sense that the action of the employer in laying off the workmen cannot be said to be an act of force.

    11. It has been urged with some justification by Sri Shrikrishna, appearing for the petitioner, that when the Legislature used the word “force” along with the word “violence” it necessarily meant that both the words belong to the same category of actions. The maxim noscltur a soclis has been invoked in interpreting the words in this provision. The word “force” means an act indulged in by a person and it must necessarily be some physical act. When the force is applied to another person it results in violence. Force itself may not necessarily be violent though it may threaten to be violent. So unless there is a physical act on the part of the employer compelling or coercing the employees to do a particular act or not to do a particular act, it cannot amount to an act of force within the meaning of item (10) of Sch. IV. This is undoubtedly one aspect of the act of force. But it is not inconceivable that an employer may indulge in an act with a view to coercing the workmen to surrender one way or another. In such a case, the act can be said to be an act of force. However, merely because an employer is indulging in an action which may be found to be illegal under the provisions of an Act like the Industrial Disputes Act, it does not necessarily follow that he is indulging in an unfair labour practice such as indulging in an act of force or violence.

    12. Miss Buch did not canvass the proposition that merely because an act is illegal it must amount to an unfair labour practice. She, however, contended that the word “force” ased in item (10) of Sch. IV of the P.U.L.P Act should be liberally construed and should be held to include compulsions of various kinds or a show of strength or power on the part of the employer. Even if this contention of Miss Buch is accepted I do not see how the action of the employer in laying off the workmen would amount to an act of force properly understood. As I have already mentioned, the use of force must be to compel or oblige another person to act in a particular manner. That is not the case here. Merely because the result of an act or the necessary consequence of an act is the payment of lesser wages to the workmen, it cannot be said that the said consequence was the intended purpose of the act of force indulged in by the employer. Interpreted in either way, in my opinion, the act complained of in the instant case cannot be said to be an act of force.

    13. In the result, this petition must succeed. The order, dated 18 August 1984, passed by the Industrial Court at Pune, below exhibit U2 in Complaint (U.L.P) No. 244 of 1984 is set aside.

    14. There will, however, be no order as to costs in this petition.

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    Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona Mills, Ltd. v. Girni Kamgar Sanghatana And Another
    (Mar 6, 1985)