Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • clause of sub-sec. (1) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • provisions of S. 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • sub-sec. (2) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • necessary.5. S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act. 1963
  • sub-sec. (2) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act
  • S. 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • clause of sub-sec. (1) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • provisions of S. 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • sub-sec. (2) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • necessary.5. S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act. 1963
  • sub-sec. (2) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act
  • S. 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision application challenges the order dated 18-2-1984 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Jalgaon in Regular Darkhast No. 229 of 1981. The Regular Darkhast was filed by the petitioner (decree-holder) against the respondent (judgment-debtor) seeking possession of half portion of House No. 37, C.T.S. 1615 of Jalgaon. A sale deed in favour of the petitioner had been executed pursuant to a decree previously passed in his favour.

In the plaint the petitioner sought specific performance of the agreement of sale and execution of the sale deed through the Court if the respondent failed to execute it; no specific prayer for possession was made in the plaint. No application for amendment to seek possession was filed by the petitioner in the execution (Darkhast) proceedings, and the executing Court, invoking sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, rejected the petitioner's prayer for possession. The petitioner filed this revision and also an application to amend the plaint in Regular Civil Suit No. 289 of 1974 to include a claim for possession. The respondent remained absent though served.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an executing Court can grant delivery of possession of immovable property to a decree-holder where the plaint did not specifically claim possession but the decree for specific performance exists and the defendant is in possession.
  2. Whether, under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a plaintiff who did not originally claim possession may be permitted to amend the plaint to include such a claim at any stage of the proceedings (including execution proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Possession is a relief incidental to specific performance of a contract of sale; specific performance includes executing necessary documents and putting the vendee in possession of the property.
  • The executing Court, when decreeing specific performance, is vested with the powers necessary to give full effect to the decree, including granting possession even if the decree is general or silent on delivery of possession.
  • Decisions of various High Courts and the Supreme Court support the proposition that ancillary relief (including possession) may be obtained after judgment in an action for specific performance and that the Court retains control over the subject matter after passing a decree for specific performance.
  • Under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22, the plaint may be amended at any stage of the proceedings to include a claim for possession; the term "proceeding" is broad and includes execution proceedings.

The opinion does not contain any detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments; the respondent was absent though served.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deonandan Prasad Singh v. Janaki Singh, AIR 1920 Pat 89 Support that possession is incidental to specific performance. Referred to by petitioner as authority supporting that delivery of possession is part of relief ancillary to specific performance; the Court treated it as one of several supporting decisions.
Atal Behary v. Barada Prasad, AIR 1931 Pat 179 Support for view that possession flows from specific performance. Relied on by petitioner; Court regarded it as supporting the general proposition that possession may be granted as incidental relief.
Janardan Kishorelal v. Giridharilal, AIR 1957 Pat 701 Support for the petitioner's contention regarding possession as ancillary relief. Referred to as part of a line of Patna High Court decisions endorsing the incidental-nature principle.
Parmeshwar Mandal v. Mahendra Nath, AIR 1961 Pat 466 Support that possession can accompany specific performance decrees. Counted among authorities relied on by petitioner; Court treated it as consistent authority.
Kartik Chandra v. Dibakar Bhattacharjee, AIR 1952 Cal 362 Holding that a Court granting specific performance vests the executing Court with powers to give full effect to the decree. Identified by the Court as supporting the proposition that the executing Court may grant possession to give full effect to a decree.
Subodh Kumar v. Hiramoni Dasi, AIR 1955 Cal 267 Followed Kartik Chandra's approach on executing Court's powers. Noted as following the reasoning in Kartik Chandra and supporting the petitioner's contention.
Arjun Singh v. Sahu Maharaj Narain, AIR 1950 All 415 Authority on delivery of possession following decree for specific performance. Referred to as an earlier All-India decision followed in Balmukund; used to support connection with S.55(1)(f) TP Act.
Balmukund v. Veer Chand, AIR 1954 All 643 Stated that a decree for specific performance implying sale deed execution implies delivery of possession in accordance with S.55(1)(f) Transfer of Property Act. Noted by the Court as an authority taking the view that delivery of possession is implied by such decrees; used to support the legal analysis.
Venkatesh v. Parappa, (1966) 1 Mys. LJ 799 Sustained order of delivery of possession though decree was in general terms. Referred to as an instance where a High Court upheld delivery of possession even when decree was general; used to bolster petitioner's position.
S.S. Rajabathar v. N.A. Sayeed, AIR 1974 Mad 289 Madras High Court taking similar view about possession ancillary to specific performance. Referred to as another High Court decision supporting the petitioner's contention.
Narayana Pillai v. Ponnuswami Chettiar, AIR 1978 Ker 236 Held that the executing Court can grant delivery of possession even where decree for specific performance does not expressly grant it. Placed as a directly supportive Kerala decision; Court expressly noted and relied on this case in reasoning.
Hungerford Investment Trusts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra, AIR 1972 SC 1826 Supreme Court acceptance that a Court passing decree for specific performance retains control over subject matter and that ancillary relief may be obtained after judgment. Quoted and relied upon to support proposition that decree for specific performance is effectively a preliminary decree and court retains power to grant ancillary relief (including possession).
Gyasa v. Risalo, AIR 1977 All 156 Interpretation of phrase "in an appropriate case" in opening clause of sub-section (1) of S.22 Specific Relief Act. Relied on by the Court (via Narayana Pillai) to support that it is not always incumbent on plaintiff to specifically claim possession in the original plaint.
Duke of Buccleugh, (1892) P. 201 (Fry LJ) Observation that words "at any stage of the proceeding" apply as long as anything remains to be done in the case. Quoted to support the breadth of the proviso to S.22(2) permitting amendment "at any stage"; used to show amendments remain permissible while matters remain to be done.
Ex-service-men Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Sumey Singh, AIR 1976 Delhi 56 Interpreted "proceeding" as comprehensive and "at any stage" as wide in meaning. Adopted by the Court to support the view that amendment under proviso to S.22(2) can be allowed at execution stage.
Rameshwar Nath v. U.P. Union Bank, AIR 1956 All 586 Authority for the meaning that "proceeding" is a comprehensive term. Cited in support of the proposition that "proceeding" includes execution proceedings and that amendment can be allowed in execution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by textual and precedential analysis of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and relevant case law. The core elements of the analysis were:

  1. Interpretation of Section 22(1) and (2): The Court reproduced S.22 and observed that sub-section (2) bars granting relief under clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) unless it has been specifically claimed. However, the bar is qualified by the opening words "in an appropriate case" in S.22(1).
  2. Distinction between ancillary and independent claims: The Court explained that if possession (or other relief) is ancillary to and necessarily flows from the decree for specific performance, then it is not necessary to specifically claim it in the plaint; the bar in S.22(2) would not be attracted in such cases.
  3. Application to the facts: The Court found as an admitted fact that the respondent was in possession of the property subject to the decree for specific performance and was bound to deliver possession after executing the sale deed. Given this factual position, the relief of possession necessarily flowed from the decree and thus did not have to be specifically sought in the original plaint.
  4. Proviso to S.22(2) and amendment: Independently, the proviso permits the plaintiff to amend the plaint "at any stage of the proceeding" to include a claim for such relief, on such terms as may be just. The Court interpreted "proceeding" broadly (including execution proceedings) and "at any stage" to mean so long as anything remains to be done in the case. The Court relied on English authority (Duke of Buccleugh) and Indian decisions (e.g., Ex-service-men Enterprises, Rameshwar Nath) for this proposition.
  5. Reliance on precedent: The Court surveyed various High Court decisions and the Supreme Court's decision in Hungerford Investment Trusts v. Haridas Mundhra to support both propositions — that ancillary relief can be obtained after judgment and that the Court retains control over the subject matter so as to enable such relief or amendments after decree.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: On these bases the Court concluded that the executing Court was bound to grant the relief of possession in the circumstances (possession by defendant and decree for specific performance), and alternatively that the petitioner was entitled to amend the plaint under the proviso to S.22(2) even in execution.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Revision allowed. The order of the executing Court rejecting the petitioner's prayer for possession is set aside. The petitioner's application to amend the plaint to include a claim for possession is allowed and the matter is remitted to the executing Court for further proceedings according to law. No order as to costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The executing Court's order rejecting the possession prayer has been vacated; the petitioner may amend the plaint to claim possession and the executing Court will proceed further in accordance with law.
  • On legal doctrine: The opinion affirms that where possession is ancillary to and necessarily flows from a decree for specific performance (e.g., when the defendant is in possession), it need not be specifically claimed in the plaint; alternatively, the proviso to S.22(2) permits amendment "at any stage" (including execution) to add such a claim. The Court relied on existing authorities rather than announcing a novel principle.
  • No new broad precedent proclaimed: The judgment applies and reconciles existing statutory text and precedents to the facts of the case; it does not purport to set a new departure from the cited authorities.
Revision allowed.

    Lotu Bandu Sonavane v. Pundalik Nimba Koli .

    1. This revision application arises out of the order dated 18-2-1984 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Jalgaon in Regular Darkhast No. 229 of 1981 filed by the petitioner decree-holder against the respondent-judgment-debtor for possession of half portion of House No. 37, C.T.S 1615 of Jalgaon in respect of which a sale deed was executed in favour of the petitioner in pursuance to a decree passed in his favour.

    2. In the plaint filed by the petitioner no specific prayer for possession was made. The only prayer was for specific performance of the agreement of sale and execution of the sale deed through Court in case the respondent failed to do so. No application for amendment of the plaint was filed by the petitioner even in the Darkhast proceedings and hence in view of sub-sec. (2) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the executing Court rejected the prayer of the petitioner for possession of the property. It is this order which is sought to be revised.

    In this petition the petitioner decree-holder has filed an application for amendment of the plaint in Regular Civil Suit No. 289 of 1974 for including the relief of possession. The respondent remained absent though served.

    3. Shri A.G Pawar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that the right to grant possession of the property is a relief, which is incidental to specific performance of the contract of sale which not only includes the execution of necessary documents but also putting the vendee in possession of the property. This contention finds support in the decisions of the Patna High Court in Deonandan Prasad Singh v. Janaki Singh, AIR 1920 Pat 89 and Atal Behary v. Barada Prasad, AIR 1931 Pat 179, Janardan Kishorelal v. Giridharilal, AIR 1957 Pat 701 and Parmeshwar Mandal v. Mahendra Nath, AIR 1961 Pat 466. The Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Kartik Chandra v. Dibakar Bhattacharjee, AIR 1952 Cal 362 and Subodh Kumar v. Hiramoni Dasi, AIR 1955 Cal 267. In the first case it was held that the Court while allowing the prayer for specific performance vests the executing Court with all the powers which are required to give full effect to the decree for specific performance. Kartik Chandra's case was followed in Subodh Kumar's case. In Balmukund v. Veer Chand, AIR 1954 All 643 which followed the earlier decision in Arjun Singh v. Sahu Maharaj Narain, AIR 1950 All 415 same view was taken stating that ‘the decree for specific performance which provides that the property shall be sold to the plaintiff by the defendants and the sale deed shall be executed within certain time failing which the Court will have the sale deed executed by a person nominated by it implies that the delivery of possession shall be given in accordance with the provisions of S. 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act’. In Venkatesh v. Parappa (1966) 1 Mys. LJ 799 the Mysore High Court sustained an order of delivery of possession though the decree for specific performance was passed in general terms. The above stated view was taken by the Madras High Court also in S.S Rajabathar v. N.A Sayeed, AIR 1974 Mad 289. All these decisions were referred to and relied on by a single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Narayana Pillai v. Ponnuswami Chettiar, AIR 1978 Ker 236 on which strong reliance is placed by the petitioner. The learned Judge held:

    “The executing Court can grant delivery of possession of property even where no such relief is granted by a decree for specific performance of the contract of sale.”

    4. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court on behalf of the petitioner in Hungerford Investment Trusts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra, AIR 1972 SC 1826 in support of the contention that the Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the subject matter even after the decree has been passed and that a decree for specific performance is virtually a preliminary decree. In that case their Lordships referred to various decisions in which such a view was taken and also quoted the statement of law on that point from the Book “Fry on Specific Performance”. Their Lordships also quoted Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 36, Pp. 351-2, where the law on the point is stated as under:—

    “Ancillary relief may be obtained after judgment in an action for specific performance where such further relief becomes necessary.”

    5. S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act. 1963 reads as follows:

    “22(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 any person suing for the Specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may in an appropriate case ask for

    (a) possession or partition and separate possession of the property in addition to such performance, or

    (b) any other relief to which he may be entitled including the refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or made by him in case his claim for specific performance is refused

    (2) No relief under Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) shall be granted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed;

    Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the Court shall at any stage of the proceeding allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief.

    (3) The power of Court to grant relief under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) shall be without prejudice to its powers to award compensation under S. 21”

    No doubt sub-sec. (2) specifically lays down that no relief under Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) of the said sub-section shall be granted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed. But it is not always necessary to claim such a relief. The requirement to claim the relief under Cl. (a) or (b) of S. 22(2) is qualified by the clause “in an appropriate case”. ‘An appropriate case’ means a case in which the relief does not necessarily flow from the decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale. If such a relief is ancillary to and necessarily flows from a decree for specific performance then it is not necessary to specifically seek such a relief and the bar of S. 22(2) would not be attracted. If the defendant is in possession of the property agreed to be sold and the decree directs a specific performance of the agreement of sale, the defendant is bound to execute the sale deed as per the decree and to put the plaintiff in possession of the property as contemplated by S. 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act. In such a case it is not necessary to specifically claim the relief of possession in the suit.

    6. This view finds support in the above referred decision of the Kerala High Court in Narayan Pillai's case (AIR 1978 Ker 236). In that case relying on the decision in Gyasa v. Risalo, AIR 1977 All 156 the learned single Judge interpreted the expression ‘in an appropriate case’ appearing in opening clause of sub-sec. (1) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and held that the said expression indicates that it is not always incumbent on the plaintiff to claim possession or partition and separate possession in a suit for specific performance of the contract for transfer of immovable property.

    7. Admittedly the respondent in this case is in possession of the property, which is subject-matter of the decree for specific performance and is bound to deliver possession of the property after execution of the sale-deed. Hence even though no specific prayer is made in the plaint and even though the decree is silent about delivery of possession, the executing Court was bound to grant the relief.

    8. As mentioned above the petitioner has also sought amendment of the plaint for including the claim for possession of the property in question. Proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S. 22 of the Specific Relief Act permits the plaintiff who has not claimed any such relief contemplated by Cl. (a) or (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 22 to amend the plaint for including a claim for such relief. The amendment can be sought at any stage of the proceeding and if the plaintiff moves for such an amendment the Court is bound to allow him to do so, of course on such terms as may be just.

    9. The term “proceeding” is a very wide and comprehensive term and it includes execution proceeding also. The expression “at any stage of the proceeding” gives widest permission to the Court to allow amendment at any stage of the proceeding including execution of the decree. The amendment can be allowed even in an appeal arising out of the order passed by the executing Court rejecting the prayer for permission. The proviso recognises the well settled position that the Court passing a decree for specific performance retains control over the subject matter as long as anything remains to be done in the case.

    In the Duke of Buccleugh, (1892) P. 201 Fry LJ observed as follows:

    “I base my decision upon the words ‘at any stage of the proceeding’. It has been argued that the rules do not apply after final judgment. They apply, in my opinion, as long as anything remains to be done in the case.”

    These observations were quoted by a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Ex-service-men Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Sumey Singh, AIR 1976 Delhi 56. In that case relying on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Rameshwar Nath v. U.P Union Bank, AIR 1956 All 586 it was held that the word “proceeding” is a very comprehensive term meaning generally a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right and the expression “at any stage” in its literal and actual meaning means without limitation either in frequency or duration or length of time. I am in agreement with this view.

    10. In this view of the matter the application filed by the petitioner for amendment of the plaint will have to be granted, even though such an amendment was not necessary.

    11. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order rejecting the prayer of the petitioner is set aside. The application filed by the petitioner for amendment of the plaint is allowed and the matter is remitted to the executing Court for proceeding further according to law. No order as to costs.

    Revision allowed.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Lotu Bandu Sonavane v. Pundalik Nimba Koli .
    (Feb 19, 1985)