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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ginwala, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed as a Sales Tax Officer, Class I, at Nagpur and was placed under suspension by a Government resolution dated 31 March 1983 pending investigation into a charge of demanding and accepting illegal gratification. The suspension continued until 11 June 1984, when the petitioner filed this writ petition; the suspension was still continuing at the time of the opinion. The petitioner relied on a Government circular dated 18 September 1974 (produced as an annexure) which, he contended, limited suspension to six months and permitted a further extension of three months only with the Chief Secretary's order; on that basis he sought revocation of the suspension and reinstatement. The State Government resisted the petition in its return and by oral submissions, asserting that the circular was not mandatory and did not apply to serious offences such as those under the Prevention of Corruption Act, that the circular was an administrative instruction not enforceable against the State, and that the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (the "Rules of 1979") governed suspension.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the nature and legal effect of the 18 September 1974 circular—whether it is an enforceable rule governing conditions of service or merely an executive/administrative instruction?
  2. Whether the circular applies to cases involving charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act (i.e., whether such cases are excluded from the circular's operation).
  3. Whether the circular, if existing prior to the Rules of 1979, survived or was saved by the savings provision in rule 29(1) of the Rules of 1979.
  4. Whether the petitioner's suspension amounts to an indefinite suspension contrary to principles against indefinite suspension (as discussed by the Madras High Court), and if so, whether that would render the suspension invalid.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by counsel)

  • The 18 September 1974 circular limits suspension to six months and permits extension for a further three months only by the Chief Secretary; therefore the suspension should have been revoked and the petitioner reinstated.
  • The circular constitutes a condition of service made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and is therefore enforceable in court; reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision in Chandrokant Sakharam Karkhanis v. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 193).
  • The petitioner contended that indefinite suspension is not permissible under principles of natural justice, relying on State of Madras v. K.A. Joseph (A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 155).
  • It was also argued that the circular survived the Rules of 1979 by virtue of the savings provision in rule 29(1)(iv)(a).

State Government / Respondent's Arguments

  • The circular is not mandatory and does not apply to cases of a serious nature involving offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act; such cases are outside the circular's operation.
  • The circular is an executive/administrative instruction (not a statutory rule) and therefore cannot be enforced by the petitioner against the State. The fact that it is marked "confidential" indicates that it was not intended to be a public rule governing conditions of service.
  • The Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 govern suspension; specifically Rule 4(1) authorises suspension and sub-clause (c) provides that where suspension is because of a criminal investigation, inquiry or trial, the suspension is coterminous with the termination of that investigation/inquiry/trial — i.e., not an indefinite suspension.
  • The State has discretion whether to continue prosecution or action after six months depending on facts and circumstances of each case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chandrokant Sakharam Karkhanis v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 193 (Full Bench) The test for treating a Government circular/order/resolution as a rule made under the proviso to Article 309: (1) the instrument's contents mainly or substantially deal with recruitment rules and/or service conditions, and (2) it contains rules or principles of general applicability. The Court applied this test to the 1974 circular. Although the circular was of general application, the Court found it did not meet the test because it was marked "confidential" and the Court concluded it was not intended to be a public rule governing conditions of service; hence it cannot be treated as a rule under Article 309 and is not enforceable in court.
State of Madras v. K.A. Joseph, A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 155 (Division Bench) Principle that a government employee should not be subjected to indefinite suspension; suspension must not be of indefinite duration (principles of natural justice). The Court acknowledged that the principle is "exemplary" but found it inapplicable on the facts: under Rule 4(1)(c) of the Rules of 1979 the suspension is coterminous with the investigation/inquiry/trial, which the Court described as not being "indefinite" in the sense contemplated by the Madras judgment. Therefore the petitioner was not found to be under indefinite suspension in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, relying solely on the materials and arguments before it:

  1. Scope of the circular with respect to corruption charges: The Court rejected the State Government's contention that the circular did not apply to cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act. A bare perusal of the circular showed that officers suspended pending investigation of corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act are not exempted from its operation.
  2. Nature/effect of the circular (core issue): The Court posed and addressed the central question of whether the 1974 circular is merely an administrative instruction or a rule governing conditions of service made under the proviso to Article 309. The Court invoked the Full Bench test from Chandrokant (i.e., whether the instrument mainly deals with recruitment/service conditions and whether it is of general application).
  3. Application of Chandrokant test: The Court accepted that the circular is of general application (it contains directions applicable to government employees suspended pending investigation). However, the Court placed decisive weight on the fact that the circular was marked "confidential." The Court reasoned that a rule governing conditions of service would not sensibly be kept confidential — such rules are meant to be publicly applicable to all government employees. Therefore, despite general application, the confidentiality marking indicated governmental intent that it be treated as executive guidance rather than a public, enforceable rule under Article 309.
  4. Consequent legal effect: Because the circular cannot be treated as a rule under Article 309, the Court concluded it is not enforceable in a court of law and the petitioner cannot base a right to revocation of suspension on it.
  5. Survival after the Rules of 1979: The Court observed it was unnecessary to decide the point because of its primary finding. Nevertheless, the Court addressed the matter: rule 29(1) of the Rules of 1979 lists rules repealed and contains a proviso saving the previous operation of notifications or orders made under the rules so repealed. The Court reasoned that only notifications/orders made under the repealed rules are saved; the circular did not appear to have been issued under any of the repealed rules and therefore was not saved by the proviso in rule 29(1).
  6. Indefinite suspension argument and Madras authority: The Court acknowledged the Madras decision's principle that no government employee should suffer indefinite suspension. However, the Court noted that the Madras decision's specific circumstances were not reproduced and could not be meaningfully compared. On the facts here, Rule 4(1)(c) of the Rules of 1979 provides that where suspension is because of criminal investigation, inquiry or trial, the suspension is coterminous with the termination of that investigation/inquiry/trial. The Court considered this to mean the suspension is not "indefinite" in the sense condemned by the Madras decision. The Court nevertheless urged the State Government to take speedy action if it was contemplated.
  7. Conclusion: On these bases the Court dismissed the writ petition and discharged the rule.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge based on the 18 September 1974 circular failed — the circular was held not to be an enforceable rule under the proviso to Article 309 (it was treated as an administrative instruction, marked "confidential"), and therefore it could not be enforced to require revocation of the suspension. The petitioner's suspension therefore was not revoked by this Court.
  • On the Rules of 1979: The Court indicated that, even if it had been necessary to decide, the circular did not appear to be saved by the savings provision in rule 29(1) of the Rules of 1979 because it did not appear to have been issued under any of the repealed rules.
  • On broader legal consequences: The opinion does not establish a new principle contrary to the principles already stated in the cited authorities; it applied established tests (as set out in Chandrokant) and related existing principles on indefinite suspension to the facts. The Court expressed an expectation that the State will act with reasonable promptness in dealing with the petitioner's case, but did not grant relief.

    Rambhan Raghobaji Rewatkar v. State Of Maharashtra And Another

    Ginwala, J.:— The petitioner, who was then working as Sales Tax Officer, class I at Nagpur, has been placed under suspension under Government resolution, dated 31 March, 1983, pending investigation in respect of the charge of demanding and accepting illegal gratification. The said order of suspension continued till 11 June, 1984, when this petition was filed, and is still continuing. Relying on the circular issued by the Mate Government on 18 September, 1974, the petitioner contends that the suspension cannot continue beyond a period of six months and that if it had to be continued beyond that period, it could be done so only for a further period of three months under the orders of the Chief Secretary to the Government, tie contends that in view of the clear directions given in the circular, the order placing him under suspension should have been revoked and he should have been permitted to resume his duties. It is with this grievance that he has come to this Court for appropriate relief.

    2. The said circular has been produced at annexures A in this petition.

    3. In its return, the State Government contends that:

    “the circular is not mandatory and the cases of serious nature involving the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act are not covered by that circular about the progress of the prosecution.”

    It is contended that in view of the serious nature of the offence of which the petitioner is charged, it is not a fit case where the order of suspension could be revoked and he could be reinstated in service. It is submitted that it is entirely the discretion of the State Government whether to or not to prosecute the person after six months and that it depends upon facts and circumstances of each case.

    4. The contention of the State Government that the circular does not cover cases involving offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act appears to be misconceived. Bare perusal of the circular would at once show that cases of officers who are suspended pending investigation of charges of corruption under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are not exempted from its operation.

    5. However, at the bearing, Sri A.A Desai, the learned Assistant Government Pleader For Respondent 1, submitted that at any rate the said circular not being statutory instrument of rule could not be sought to be enforced by the petitioner against the State Government. Sri Desai submitted that the circular contains mere executive or administrative instructions for the guidance of the officers concerned and the petitioner cannot base any right whatsoever on it in support of this contention, Sri Desai submitted that the very fact that this circular is marked as “confidential” would indicate that the State Government never intended this to be a rule governing conditions of service of its employees and if that is so, it cannot confer any right on the petitioner or persons like him for getting the suspension order revoked after the period of six months or the extended period of nine months. Sri Desai further submitted that in any case that circular does not hold the field in view of specific provisions now being made by the State Government in that behalf by the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, made in exercise of powers conferred by Art 309 of the Constitution. Sri Desai pointed out that rule 4(1), which authorises the authority concerned to place an employee under suspension, itself lays down the outer limit for the period of suspension and Cl. (c) of this sub-rule, according to him, would show that in case where an employee is suspended because of the case against him in respect of any criminal offence being under investigation, inquiry or trial, the outer limit would be the termination of the inquiry or trial, as the case may be, and it cannot be said that in such a case the suspension is for an indefinite period. He pointed out that the said rules under which the petitioner has been suspended do net lay down any definite period for which the suspension can last and on the expiry of which it was to be revoked.

    6. On the other hand, Sri Manohar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in spite of the abovesaid rules made by the State Government, the circular would survive its effect by virtue of rule 29(1)(iv)(a) under which the previous operation of any notifications of orders made, or anything done, or any action taken under the rules repealed are saved. Sri Manohar strenuously contended that the circular prescribes the condition of service relating to suspension of Government employees and though it does not specifically state so, it has been issued in exercise of the power derived by the State Government from proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution. He submits that this being the condition of service governing the employee, it was enforceable in the Court of law and if the State Government contravened the provisions of this circular, it can be said that it is guilty of breach of statutory duty cast upon it. For the proposition that the circular is a rule made under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution, Sri Manohar seeks to rely on the decision of Full Bench of this Court in Chandrokant Sakharam Karkhanis v. State of Maharashtra [A.I.R 1977 Bom. 193]. Sri Manohar further submitted that it is not open to the Government to place its employee under suspension for an indefinite period as doing so would be in contravention of principles of natural justice and in support of this proposition, he seeks to rely on the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in State of Madras v. K.A Joseph [A.I.R 1970 Mad. 155].

    7. The question, therefore, which falls for consideration is as to what is the nature or effect of this circular. It is true that it is nowhere stated in it that it has been issued by the State Government in exercise of the power derived under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution. But, as held by the Full Bench of this Court in Chandrokant case [A.I.R 1977 Bom 193] (vide supra), that cannot be a circumstance to hold that it has not been made in exercise of the said power. The Full Bench has held that although a circular, order or resolution of the Government does not expressly state that the same is made or issued in exercise of the powers conferred under the proviso to Art. 309, it could be construed to be one issue or made in exercise of the said power If some conditions are satisfied, namely, the contents of such circular, order or resolution mainly or substantially deal with the topic of Recruitment Rules and/or service conditions of Government employees and secondly it contains rules or principles of general applicability. According to the Full Bench, if the said instrument does not meet these two requirements, it can be taken merely as containing executive instructions and will not partake of the nature of rules made under the said article governing the conditions of service of Government employees.

    8. It cannot be gainsaid that the circular is of general application. It is not issued merely to cover a particular case or small class of cases. It contains directions as to how the cases of those Government employees who are suspended pending investigation are to be dealt with and when their suspension would be revoked. However, this by itself would not make it a rule embodying conditions of service as contemplated by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution. The question, therefore, remains whether in issuing this circular, the Government intended to make a rule governing conditions of service. This, in our opinion, is not so and one factor which goes strongly against the petitioner is the fact that the circular has been marked as “confidential”. It is impossible to conceive that a rule governing conditions of service of Government employees made under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution would be treated as confidential. The very purpose of making such rule is to apply it to all the Government employees and if that is so, it cannot be kept secret from them. In our view, therefore, this circular cannot be treated as a rule governing conditions of service, namely, suspension of Government employees and is, therefore, not enforceable in Court of law.

    9. In view of what we have said above, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the circular has survived the Rules of 1979. However, if our finding is required on it, we would say that it does not. Sub-rule (1) of rule 29 lists the rules which stand repealed on the commencement of the Rules of 1979. Proviso (a) to sub-rule (1) merely says that such repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any notifications or orders made, or anything done, or any action taken under the rules so repealed. Obviously, therefore, only those notifications or orders which are made under the rules which are repealed are saved. The circular under consideration does not appeal to have been issued or made under any of the rules which have been repealed. It is not, therefore, possible to say that this circular is saved under this rule.

    10. Coming to the decision of the Madras High Court in State of Madras v. K.A Joseph [A.I.R 1970 Mad. 155] (vide supra), no doubt the principles propounded therein is exemplary. It is true that no Government-employee should suffer indefinite suspension. Now whatever has been said by the Madras High Court seems to be in the context of some order passed therein which has not been reproduced in the judgment. Even the rules have not been reproduced. It is not possible to say in what circumstances such an order came to be passed and whether the suspension was pending any investigation over which the State Government would not have any control. As we have pointed out in the present case under rule 4(1)(c) the suspension would be coterminous with the investigation, inquiry or trial which would not be indefinite in that sense of the term. It is not, therefore, possible to say that the petitioner has been placed under suspension indefinitely thus violating the principles of natural justice as held by the Madras High Court. However, we hope that the State Government would look into the matter and see that speedy action is taken against the petitioner if it is contemplated. For these reasons, the writ petition is dismissed and the rule discharged.

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    Rambhan Raghobaji Rewatkar v. State Of Maharashtra And Another
    (Aug 9, 1984)