Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit was filed by a husband against his wife, both practicing the Jewish Religion, seeking a decree for divorce. Alternatively, the plaintiff prayed for judicial separation. Additionally, the plaintiff sought custody of their minor daughter Michelle and costs of the suit. The suit was called for final disposal with the plaintiff represented and the defendant absent. The plaintiff testified that the marriage was solemnized according to Jewish rites in Bombay in 1972, and the couple had a daughter born in 1973. The defendant left Bombay without reasonable cause and resided with her parents in Israel, resulting in a cessation of cohabitation. The plaintiff followed her to Israel, where the defendant expressed her intention not to continue the marriage. The plaintiff obtained a divorce decree from a Jewish Religious Court and now seeks a decree from this Court. The defendant did not appear, and the Court considered jurisdictional and procedural questions related to the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree of divorce between parties professing the Jewish Religion.
  2. Whether the Court should pass a decree absolute or a decree nisi in the first instance, following the practice under the Indian Divorce Act.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Benjamin v. Benjamin, 28 Bom LR 328 (AIR 1926 Bom 169) Jurisdiction of the Bombay Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to entertain matrimonial disputes involving Jews; application of Jewish law with adaptations for justice. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that Jewish law applies with necessary adaptations.
Ardaseer Cursetjee v. Perozeboye Recognition of the necessity for courts and law to provide remedies in matrimonial disputes irrespective of religious persuasion. Quoted to emphasize the need for jurisdiction and remedy in matrimonial matters among Jews, supporting the Court’s jurisdictional conclusion.
Engel v. Engel, 45 Bom LR 921 (AIR 1944 Bom 15) Whether to pass a decree absolute or decree nisi in matrimonial suits where no statute prescribes the procedure; application of lex fori and principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. Guided the Court’s decision to pass a decree absolute immediately, noting no statutory provision for decree nisi and analogies with other religious matrimonial decrees.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined whether it had jurisdiction to entertain a divorce suit between parties professing the Jewish Religion. Relying on the precedent in Benjamin v. Benjamin, it held that under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the Court does have jurisdiction and must apply Jewish law with necessary adaptations to ensure justice. The Court further considered the procedural question of whether to grant a decree absolute or a decree nisi. The Engel v. Engel case was reviewed, where it was reasoned that in the absence of a specific statutory procedure, the Court may grant a decree absolute immediately, especially since similar treatment is accorded in other religious matrimonial cases. Given the facts that the defendant deserted the plaintiff for over two years and that the plaintiff had obtained a divorce decree from the Jewish Religious Court, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a divorce decree. The Court declined to pass any order on custody or costs as those prayers were not pressed.

Holding and Implications

The Court granted a decree for divorce dissolving the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.

The defendant's desertion and the prior divorce decree from the Jewish Religious Court justified the Court's jurisdiction and the grant of divorce. No orders were made regarding custody or costs as those were not pursued. The decision directly affects the parties by legally dissolving their marriage but does not set any new precedent beyond affirming jurisdiction and procedural practice in similar matrimonial cases involving the Jewish Religion.

    Pinhas Ezekil Silas (Dr.) v. Sally Pinhas Silas

    1. This is a suit filed by a husband against his wife, both practising Jewish Religion, praying for a Decree for divorce of their marriage. In the alternative, the plaintiff-husband has prayed for judicial separation against the defendant. Thirdly, the plaintiff-husband has prayed for the custody of the minor daughter Michelle and lastly, for costs of the suit.

    2. The suit was called out for bearing and final disposal today, when the plaintiff was represented by his Advocate. The defendant has remained absent. The Affidavit of Service has been marked as Exhibit ‘A’. A copy of the letter of the Superintendent of Post Offices, Bombay City South Division, addressed to the Sheriff of Bombay has been marked as Exhibit ‘B’.

    3. The plaintiff has examined himself. In his evidence he has deposed that he and the defendant both practiced Jewish Religion and that he was domiciled in India. He has stated that he was married to the defendant on 24th May, 1972 at the Jewish Synagogue, Byculla, Bombay, according to Jewish Rites and Ceremonies. The plaintiff has produced the certificate of marriage issued by the Synagogue, which has been tendered and marked Exhibit ‘C’.

    4. After the marriage, the parties resided at Simla House, Napean Sea Road, Bombay. There is one issue of the said marriage, a daughter named Michelle born in Bombay on 20th August, 1973.

    5. The plaintiff stated that after the marriage, the defendant without any reasonable cause and without his consent left Bombay and went to reside with her parents in Israel and since then the parties had not cohabited or resided together.

    6. The plaintiff stated that sometime later he followed the defendant to Israel. The plaintiff met the defendant when the defendant told him that she did not wish to continue living with him as his wife and that she intended to reside with her parents in Israel. The plaintiff thereafter obtained a decree for divorce against the defendant in the Jewish Religious Court. The plaintiff has produced the decree of divorce together with the translation thereof, which has been marked as Exhibit ‘D’. The plaintiff stated that there was no collusion between him and the defendant in respect of the subject matter of the suit. The plaintiff stated that the defendant had deserted him for a period of over two years and, therefore, prayed for a decree for divorce.

    7. The question which I have to consider in this suit is whether this Court has jurisdiction to pass a Decree of Divorce where the parties professed Jewish Religion. This question was considered by this Court in the case of Benjamin v. Benjamin reported in 28 Bom LR 328 : (AIR 1926 Bom 169), wherein Crump, J. observed:—

    “Here the parties are Jews and the question is whether Clause 12 of the Letters Patent gives this Court jurisdiction to entertain a suit arising out of matrimonial disputes between Jews. .. … ….. … It follows that nothing was there decided which is in any way relevant to the question now before me, I reach this conclusion the more readily as it avoids the position which the Privy Council deprecated so strongly in Ardaseer Cursetjee v. Perozeboye,* when their Lordships said: “But we should much regret if there were no Courts and no law whereby a remedy could be administered to the evils which must be incidental to the married life amongst them.” Those words are as applicable to Jews as to litigants of any other persuasion, and, as I have endeavoured to show, Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent was deliberately intended to remove the difficulty. I hold, therefore, that I have jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and that in deciding it the Jewish law must be applied “with such adaptations to the circumstances of the case as justice may require … … .. .. ..” “It would thus appear that under the Jewish law the plaintiff is entitled to a divorce, and it maybe noted that there-suit would be the same under English Law as it now stands.”

    8. The next question which must be decided in this case is whether I should make the decree absolute or in the first instance pass a decree nisi, since that is the practice under Indian Divorce Act. This question also came up for consideration in the case of Engel v. Engel reported in 45 Bom LR 921 : (AIR 1944 Bom 15) wherein Blagden, J. observed:—

    “The law which I am to apply must, therefore, be the lex fori. But what is the lex fori? I ought to follow, by analogy, either the statute applicable here to English Christians and make a decree nisi, or the general law applicable to ordinary suits and grant the plaintiff absolutely the relief to which I am sure he is entitled. It was assumed, without argument, in Benjamin v. Benjamin that the former was correct, though for some reason Crump J. prescribed less than the usual period before the decree could be made absolute. No doubt there was some special reason for this, but it does not appear from the report. Nor, in any case, does it appear that the point, taken here by Mr. Forbes, that the latter view is correct, was ever argued before Crump J. I do not therefore think that I am bound by this decision as to the form of relief.” “When there is no statute applicable here the Letters Patent require me to decide according to “justice equity and good conscience” which has long been held, in general, to mean “English law so far as it is applicable to the conditions of life in India… … … … … …”

    “I think that Mr. Forbes, for the plaintiff, is right when he points out that I have no power by statute if, for example, a debt is proved before me to pass a money judgment which is not to be enforceable unless for six months nobody shows cause against it, and (since no statute provides for it) no power to make a decree nisi in this case. I am not enforced in this opinion by the practice of this Court in the case of Parsis since its duties are there laid down by statute: but I am powerfully enforced by the fact that a decree absolute is made at once in the case of Mahomedans. Moreover, I do not think that any irreparable injustice can result if I have been misled as to the facts, since if the plaintiff has presented a false case to the Court — and I do not for a moment suggest that he has done so — the defendant, even if the time for appeal has passed, could always commence a suit to set aside my decree on that ground that it has been obtained by fraud.”

    Blagden J. thereafter proceeded to pass a decree absolute in favour of the plaintiff.

    9. Id the instant case, the defendant-wife has deserted the plaintiff for a period of more than two years. Since this Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, as laid down by the authorities cited above, I think that the plaintiff in this case is entitled to a decree from this Court for divorce against the defendant.

    10. In the circumstances, there will be a decree for divorce dissolving the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. Mr. Zaiwala does not press for the prayer for custody of the minor child. There will be no order with regard to prayer (c). There will be no order as to costs of this suit.

    Order accordingly.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Pinhas Ezekil Silas (Dr.) v. Sally Pinhas Silas
    (Apr 15, 1983)