Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 5 of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947. and under S. 8 read with S. 23(IA) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947,
  • Art. 311(2) as well as rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
  • Appeal) Rules or rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
  • Cl. (b) of Sub-sec.(2) of S. 45 read with Ss. 8(2) and 20(1) of the Air Corporations Act, 1953,
  • rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965,
  • rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
  • provisions of S. 18-AA of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act, 1951,
  • Appeal) Rules, 1968. Relevant rule 1719 of the Railway Establishment Code
  • provisions of the Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
  • provisions of the Customs Act, the Import (Control) Order of 1955
  • Ss. 135(a) and 135(b) read with S. 135(1) of the Customs Act, 1962,
  • Art. 311(2), proviso (a) nor rule 14 (i) of the Rules of 1968
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT 1947
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT
  • S. 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
  • PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT 1958
  • S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935,
  • Ss. 111(d) and 119 of the Customs Act, 1962.
  • S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act
  • S. 240 of the Government of India Act,
  • S. 45 of the Air Corporations Act,
  • S. 112 of the Customs Act, 1962.
  • rule 14 of the Rules of 1968
  • provisions of rule 14(ii)
  • Sea Customs Act or rules
  • Rule 14(1) of the rules
  • provision in rule 14 (i)
  • Corporations Act, 1963,
  • provisions of rule 14,
  • provision in rule 14
  • sub-rule (1) of rule 7
  • clauses of rule 14
  • rule 14(ii),
  • Sub-rule (2)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 5 of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947. and under S. 8 read with S. 23(IA) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947,
  • Art. 311(2) as well as rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
  • Appeal) Rules or rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
  • Cl. (b) of Sub-sec.(2) of S. 45 read with Ss. 8(2) and 20(1) of the Air Corporations Act, 1953,
  • rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965,
  • rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
  • provisions of S. 18-AA of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act, 1951,
  • Appeal) Rules, 1968. Relevant rule 1719 of the Railway Establishment Code
  • provisions of the Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
  • provisions of the Customs Act, the Import (Control) Order of 1955
  • Ss. 135(a) and 135(b) read with S. 135(1) of the Customs Act, 1962,
  • Art. 311(2), proviso (a) nor rule 14 (i) of the Rules of 1968
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT 1947
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT
  • S. 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
  • PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT 1958
  • S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935,
  • Ss. 111(d) and 119 of the Customs Act, 1962.
  • S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act
  • S. 240 of the Government of India Act,
  • S. 45 of the Air Corporations Act,
  • S. 112 of the Customs Act, 1962.
  • rule 14 of the Rules of 1968
  • provisions of rule 14(ii)
  • Sea Customs Act or rules
  • Rule 14(1) of the rules
  • provision in rule 14 (i)
  • Corporations Act, 1963,
  • provisions of rule 14,
  • provision in rule 14
  • sub-rule (1) of rule 7
  • clauses of rule 14
  • rule 14(ii),
  • Sub-rule (2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chandurkar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (Capt. R. Khan) was a Deputy Director of Operations employed by Air India. Customs authorities (the Additional Collector of Customs) on 9 September 1970 found 247 diamonds (valued at Rs. 1,50,000), certain drafts and cheques for dollars 415.90 in a coat found in the Customs enclosure at Santa Cruz Airport and seized dollars 91 from the respondent's hotel room. The Additional Collector adjudicated confiscation of the items under Ss. 111(d) and 119 of the Customs Act and imposed a personal penalty of Rs. 20,000 under S. 112 of the Customs Act.

Relying on that adjudication, the General Manager of Air India (appellant) removed the respondent from service on the basis of regulation 44(ii) of the Air India Employees' Service Regulations, stating the offence constituted serious misconduct. The respondent was subsequently prosecuted in criminal proceedings (Case No. 15.CW of 1972) on offences under the Customs Act, Import/Export (Control) Act and FERA; the criminal Court (Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate) acquitted him on 23 March 1973, and that acquittal was later upheld on appeal by a single Judge of this Court (the appeal occurred after the single Judge in the present writ matter had given his decision).

The respondent also appealed the Customs adjudication and the Central Board of Excise and Customs upheld the Additional Collector's order; revision before the Government of India was rejected; a writ petition to this Court challenging the Customs authorities' orders was referred to a Division Bench which upheld the Customs authorities' orders (the Division Bench in effect supported the Customs adjudication).

After acquittal in the criminal Court, the respondent sought reinstatement (application 17 April 1973), which was rejected by the Managing Director (24 May 1973). He sent further notice/representations and appealed to the Chairman of Air India (20 July 1973). The Chairman rejected the appeal (order dated 18 October 1973). The respondent filed the writ petition on 19 November 1973 challenging his removal on grounds including denial of the procedure under regulation 44(i) / Schedule II and violation of natural justice and Articles 14 and 311 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether regulation 44(ii) of the Air India Employees' Service Regulations excludes the requirement to follow the disciplinary procedure in Schedule II (including Para. 15) and consequently excludes an obligation to give the employee a separate notice to show cause against punishment where (a) a Court/Tribunal has convicted the employee of an offence involving moral turpitude or (b) a penal action has been brought by Customs/FERA authorities for activities amounting to misconduct under Cl. (xxiv) of Regulation 42.
  2. Whether the disciplinary authority (or the Court in judicial review) may re-open or go into the correctness of the adjudication/order made by the Additional Collector of Customs when the employer proposes to act on that adjudication under regulation 44(ii).
  3. Whether the learned single Judge correctly held that Para. 15 of Schedule II (independent satisfaction of the competent authority and consideration of extenuating/aggravating circumstances) remains applicable even when regulation 44(ii) is invoked, and whether the order of removal should be quashed on that ground.
  4. Whether the respondent was prejudiced by any alleged non-observance of natural justice and whether any such breach required quashing of the removal order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Air India) Arguments

  • Regulation 44(ii) relieves the competent authority from following Schedule II (including Para. 15) in the two specified categories: (i) conviction by Court/Tribunal for an offence involving moral turpitude; and (ii) penal action by Customs/FERA authorities for activities amounting to misconduct under Cl. (xxiv) of Regulation 42. Accordingly, no separate departmental enquiry or show-cause notice was required before imposing penalties listed in Regulation 43.
  • Where the statutory/statutory-adjacent authority (Customs) has adjudicated and imposed penalty, it would be futile duplication to hold a fresh enquiry; the employer may act on the statutory adjudication.
  • Even if some element of natural justice could be argued, there was no averment or evidence that the removal was harsh or disproportionate; prejudice resulting from any non-compliance was not shown.
  • The writ petition was delayed; the respondent did not immediately challenge removal and only moved after criminal acquittal.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Regulation 44(ii) only avoids duplication of enquiry (i.e., does not preclude reliance on the statutory adjudication instead of a fresh enquiry), but it does not exclude the latter part of Para. 15 of Schedule II which requires the competent authority to consider extent/gravity of misconduct, past record and extenuating/aggravating circumstances before imposing punishment. That latter part is substantive and flows from principles of natural justice.
  • The order of removal was made without giving any charge-sheet or hearing and violated regulation 44(i)/Schedule II and principles of natural justice, Art. 14 and Art. 311.
  • The learned single Judge found that the Additional Collector's adjudication was based on no evidence and therefore the employer could not validly act on that adjudication without independent satisfaction; the respondent relied on that finding to show the removal was unlawful.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis (Smt.) [1973] Courts can declare dismissal invalid if contrary to statutory rules or natural justice. Cited to confirm that courts may invalidate dismissals violating statute/natural justice; used as general authority supporting review power.
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975] Statutory authorities cannot deviate from conditions of service; deviations enforceable by courts. Used to support proposition that statutory rules must be followed and courts can enforce compliance.
Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee [1980] Principles on relief in employment matters and exceptions to specific performance; reference to Executive Committee v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi. Cited in support of court power to grant relief to public/statutory servants in appropriate cases.
Executive Committee, U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : AIR 1970 SC 1244] Limits on specific performance of personal service contracts; exceptions for public servants dismissed in contravention of Art. 311 etc. Referenced as background authority on when courts may grant relief to public servants.
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150] Natural justice supplements but does not supplant statutory law; which rule of natural justice applies depends on statutory framework and facts. Relied upon to explain that natural justice operates only where not excluded by statute and courts must decide necessity of natural justice in each context.
Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellappan [1976] Construction of rule analogous to Art. 311 proviso: although departmental enquiry may be dispensed with, disciplinary authority must "consider the circumstances" and typically give a summary hearing. Used as primary analogical authority to interpret what it means to "consider the circumstances" after conviction; Court distinguishes Chellappan's additional textual requirement from the present regulation 44(ii).
State of Uttar Pradesh v. O.P. Gupta [(1969) 3 SCC 775 : AIR 1970 SC 679] Principles of natural justice are not fixed; application depends on facts and whether non-observance deflects course of justice. Cited to support proposition that courts must assess whether non-observance of natural justice likely deflected course of justice.
Union of India v. J.N. Sinha [(1970) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1971 SC 40] If statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes natural justice, court cannot read it back in; consideration depends on express words, nature/purpose/effect of power. Cited to support the view that where rules/statute exclude natural justice the Court cannot import it; used heavily in construing regulation 44(ii).
Halsbury's Laws of England (citation) Statement that natural justice rules apply to bodies acting judicially, save where excluded expressly or by necessary implication. Quoted to show accepted principle that natural justice can be excluded by statute or exhaustive procedural code; used in interpretive context.
Kesava Mills Co. v. Union of India [(1973) 1 SCC 380 : AIR 1973 SC 389] Instances where test of prejudice is considered when natural justice allegedly violated. Referenced among authorities illustrating that courts have sometimes required proof of prejudice before setting aside administrative action.
Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala [AIR 1969 SC 198] Test of prejudice / consequences of breach of natural justice examined by courts. Used as example of cases where prejudice concept was applied.
Tata Oil Mills Co. v. Its Workmen [1963 — II L.L.J 78] Similar use on natural justice / prejudice. Cited as part of survey on when breach of natural justice leads to interference.
Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa [(1969) 3 SCC 392] Courts consider actual prejudice caused by denial of particular right; not all breaches result in interference. Quoted for the principle that actual prejudice is relevant in deciding interference.
Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664 : AIR 1981 SC 818] Quasi-judicial/administrative decisions in violation of audi alteram partem are null and void unless statute excludes the rule. Referred to show rule that violation of audi alteram may nullify decisions unless statute displaces the rule; used in contrast to regulation 44(ii) language.
Delhi Municipal Committee case [(1980) 4 SCC 379 : AIR 1981 SC 136] Non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice; Court need not require independent proof of prejudice; but Courts may refuse futile writs. Quoted for the proposition that denial of natural justice is prejudice per se; the Court here distinguished the present facts because the respondent had appellate remedies and did not press quantum of punishment in appeal.
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379 : AIR 1981 SC 136] Denial of natural justice is prejudice; may not require separate proof of prejudice. Cited in argument summarizing modern position that denial of natural justice harms by itself; Court noted conflicting lines of authority but distinguished on facts.
Director of Postal Services v. Daya Nand [1972 S.L.R 325] (Delhi Full Bench) Interpreting proviso (a) to Art. 311(2): where conviction exists, the requirement of natural justice procedure may be dispensed with. Used to support the position that where statute/proviso dispenses with procedure, no natural justice procedure is required to impose penalties after conviction.
Rajinder Singh v. Punjab State [1969 S.L.R 754] Proviso to Art. 311(2) and service rules: dismissal without enquiry could follow on conviction; authorities must apply mind to facts (but show-cause not always required). Referenced to show that non-application of mind (rather than lack of show-cause) can invalidate punishment.
Om Prakash v. Director of Postal Services, Punjab Circle [A.I.R 1973 Punj. & Har. 1] Construction of rule analogous to Rule 19(i) — whether natural justice rules are taken away by rule. Cited among High Court authorities discussing effect of statutory provisions dispensing with enquiry.
Hardyal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(1977) 1 S.L.R 327] Concerning rule analogous to Rule 19(i): no show-cause necessary but authorities must apply mind when selecting punishment. Cited to show authorities holding no mandatory show-cause when statutory provision dispenses with it, subject to correct application of mind.
T. Jayant v. Union of India [(1981) 1 S.L.R ?] Application of the ratio in Chellappan; similar interpretation adopted by Andhra Pradesh High Court judge. Referenced as a case applying Chellappan ratio to similar rules.
Union of India v. Rajendra Prasad Srivastava [(1977) 2 S.L.R 81] Cases construing Railway Servants rules (rule 14). Noted as following Chellappan's approach; included among supporting authorities.
Ramcharitra Sharma v. Union of India [(1977) 2 S.L.R 531] Similar to Rajendra Prasad Srivastava — rule 14 cases. Included as further authority following Chellappan.
Director of Operations, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal [(1973) 2 S.L.R 81] Regulation analogous to rule 14: disciplinary authority must apply mind; debate over right to hearing on penalty. Cited to indicate inconsistencies in High Court decisions; Court considered it not decisive here.
Union of India v. Tara Chand [(1975) 2 S.L.R 28] Rule similar to rule 14: order must show authority applied mind to circumstances of conviction before imposing penalty. Used to illustrate that orders should reflect application of mind though not to mandate show-cause in all cases.
Krishnakutty v. Senior Superintendent of Post Office [1975 L. & I.C 1732] Rule 19(i) of CCS Rules — question of applicability. Referred to as part of judicial material on applicability of statutory dispensations from procedural rules.
Shantilal v. H.A. Rangaswami [1977 Mah. L.J 587] (Full Bench) If appellate tribunal can cure defects of trial body, High Court need not treat trial decision as void for breach of natural justice. Relied upon to show appellate cure may preclude treating the original order as nullity.
Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders [(1971) 1 Ch. 34] (Megarry, J.) and Privy Council consideration Whether failure in first-instance hearing can be cured by adequate appeal; Privy Council cautioned against treating Megarry's phrasing too broadly. Quoted to support view that appellate cure is sometimes acceptable; Court relied on Privy Council to reject absolute rule that trial defects cannot be cured on appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a textual and purposive construction of the relevant regulatory scheme and the pleaded facts. The reasoning proceeds by reference to the Air India Employees' Service Regulations (promulgated under S. 45 of the Air Corporations Act) and the procedural Schedule II (which prescribes investigation, charge-sheet, enquiry, report and the competent authority's duties under Para. 15). The Court's analysis unfolded in these steps:

  1. Nature and scope of Regulation 44 and Schedule II:

    The Court accepted that Schedule II is a comprehensive code for disciplinary action and Para. 15 requires the competent authority, on receipt of the enquiry committee's report, to satisfy itself independently as to correctness of findings and, where it deviates, to record reasons and take into account gravity, previous record and extenuating/aggravating circumstances before issuing punishment.

  2. Plain meaning of regulation 44(ii):

    Regulation 44(ii) contains a non obstante clause ("notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations") and explicitly carves out two categories where the procedure need not be followed: (i) conviction by Court/Tribunal for offence involving moral turpitude; and (ii) where penal action has been brought by Customs or FERA authorities for activities amounting to misconduct under Cl. (xxiv) of Regulation 42. The Court read this provision as dispensing with the entire procedural code in Schedule II for those two categories.

  3. Interaction with principles of natural justice and precedents:

    The Court examined precedents (Kraipak, Chellappan, J.N. Sinha, Delhi Municipal Committee, and Full Bench decisions) and acknowledged two lines of authority: (a) Kraipak and related decisions which require courts to decide whether particular rules of natural justice are necessary; and (b) decisions (including Chellappan and rule‑14 jurisprudence) which treat a statutory provision that requires the disciplinary authority to "consider the circumstances" as importing an obligation to hear the delinquent as part of summary consideration.

    The Court concluded that where the statutory/regulatory text expressly dispenses with the procedural code (as regulation 44(ii) does by its unambiguous non obstante language), the Court could not read back into the regulation the procedural safeguards of Schedule II. It relied on Union of India v. J.N. Sinha to the effect that an express exclusion of natural justice in the statutory text must be respected.

  4. On the limited scope of Chellappan and related rules:

    The Court carefully distinguished Chellappan: Chellappan construed rule 14(i) which itself contained the express mandate that the disciplinary authority "may consider the circumstances of the case" — a textual provision which imports a duty to hear for the purpose of "considering" the circumstances. Regulation 44(ii) lacks such additional wording that would preserve the latter part of Para. 15; accordingly, Chellappan's requirement of a summary hearing did not automatically apply to regulation 44(ii) cases.

  5. Effect of Schedule II being dispensed with in specified cases:

    The Court held that, for the two categories in regulation 44(ii), the entire procedure in Schedule II (including the staged process culminating in Para. 15's earlier stages) was dispensed with. The last sentence of Para. 15 ("The competent authority shall thereafter issue an order of punishment...") presupposes the earlier stages; the Court considered it impermissible to isolate only the last sentence (concerning consideration of gravity, past record, extenuating circumstances) while importing the others when the regulation 44(ii) clearly made the whole of Sch. II inapplicable.

  6. On the disciplinary authority re-opening Customs adjudication:

    The Court held that regulation 44(ii) permits the employer to act on the adjudication of the Customs/FERA authorities and it would be impermissible for the disciplinary authority (or the High Court in writ review of the disciplinary decision) to collaterally re-open or re-evaluate the correctness of a statutory adjudication that remained binding and had been unsuccessfully appealed/revised in the statutory hierarchy. The respondent's attempt to show the Customs order was perverse was not sustainable because the learned single Judge did not have the full materials on which the Additional Collector's order was based, and the Customs adjudication had been upheld in appellate/revisional proceedings (and by this Court).

  7. On alleged breach of natural justice and prejudice:

    The Court noted the conflicting approaches in the precedents: some authorities treat non-observance of natural justice as prejudice per se (e.g., Delhi Municipal Committee / S.L. Kapoor), while earlier decisions require an inquiry into whether prejudice resulted. The Court observed it need not resolve that larger conflict because on the facts the respondent had the opportunity to raise his grievance (including lack of hearing or severity of punishment) in the statutory appeal and did so — but did not press the point that the punishment was disproportionate. The appeal to the Chairman was considered on its written merits; no claim was made there regarding quantum of punishment. The Court found the respondent had not consistently advanced a claim that he was prejudiced by non-availability of a chance to show mitigating circumstances before punishment was imposed.

  8. Application to the present facts:

    Given: (a) the Additional Collector's adjudication imposed penalty on the respondent for conduct amounting to smuggling (Cl. (xxiv) of Reg. 42), (b) the regulatory text of 44(ii) plainly allowed the employer to act on such adjudication without following Sch. II, and (c) the Customs adjudication and appellate review had upheld the penalty, the Court concluded the disciplinary authority was entitled to remove the respondent under regulation 44(ii) without following the Schedule II stages (including a separate show-cause on quantum) and that the learned single Judge erred in quashing the removal on the ground that the employer failed to independently satisfy itself of the correctness of the Customs findings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal by the appellants (Air India) was allowed. The Court held that regulation 44(ii) on its plain language excludes the operation of Schedule II (including Para. 15) in the two classes of cases specified by that sub-regulation, and therefore the disciplinary authority was not obliged to follow the Schedule II procedure (including giving a separate notice to show cause against punishment) when acting on a binding adjudication by the Customs/FERA authorities or a criminal conviction involving moral turpitude. The learned single Judge's order quashing the removal was set aside.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The direct effect for the parties: The appellant's appeal succeeds and the writ judgment reinstating the respondent (and ordering payment of dues) is overturned. The respondent does not obtain reinstatement pursuant to the writ. The Court also directed that amounts deposited in Court by the appellant are not to be withdrawn by the appellant until 15 February 1982; since the appeal succeeded, the respondent had no present right to withdraw amounts.
  • On precedent and administrative procedure: The Court affirmed that an express statutory/regulatory exclusion of the disciplinary procedure will be given effect to and courts cannot read into such provisions procedural requirements (derived from principles of natural justice) when the statutory language excludes them. At the same time the Court emphasized the limitation that the power to award punishment must be exercised for "good and sufficient reason" and must not be so grossly disproportionate as to amount to arbitrary exercise of power.
  • No new broad precedent abolishing natural justice principles was laid beyond the construction of regulation 44(ii); the Court carefully distinguished Chellappan and other authorities and confined its ruling to the statutory/regulatory text under consideration.
  • Other procedural notes in the judgment: The Court refused leave to the respondent to appeal to the Supreme Court and recorded no order as to costs. The Court also observed that where a statutory appellate authority can remedy a defect of the trial/disciplinary body, the High Court may decline to treat the trial decision as a nullity if the appellate process is competent to cure the defect.

This summary is confined strictly to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

    Air India Corporation And Another v. Richard Rashid Khan

    Chandurkar, J.:— This appeal arises out of an order passed by Mukhi, J., allowing the respondent's petition for quashing the order of removal made by the General Manager of Air India, appellant 1, removing the respondent from service with effect from the date of the order.

    2. The respondent was a Deputy Director of Operations in the employment of Air India. A proceeding was taken against him by the Additional Collector of Customs for violation of provisions of the Customs Act, the Import (Control) Order of 1955 and a notification, dated 21 February, 1963, issued under S. 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, on the footing that 247 diamonds valued at Rs. 1,50,000, some drafts and cheques for dollars 415.90 were found is a coat in his possession and that foreign currency of dollars 91 was seized from the room of the respondent in the Sun-N-Sand Hotel where he was staying. By the same order, dated 9 September, 1970, the Additional Collector of Customs ordered that all the diamonds, namely, 247 pieces and the drafts and cheques for dollars 415.90 seized from the check designed coat at Santa Cruz Airport and dollars 91 seized from the respondent's residence along with the coat should be confiscated absolutely under Ss. 111(d) and 119 of the Customs Act, 1962. In addition to this order of confiscation, the Additional Collector also imposed a personal penalty of Rs. 20,000 on the respondent under S. 112 of the Customs Act, 1962. Relying on this order of the Additional Collector of Customs, the General Manager of Air India, after quoting the operative portion of the order of the Additional Collector of Customs, made the order of removal, the operative part of which reads as follows:

    “The offence established against Capt. Khan constitutes serious misconduct. In view of the penal action taken against him by the Customs Authorities and in terms of sub-regulation (ii) of regulation 44 of Air India Employees' Service Regulations, I hereby order that Capt. R. Khan, Deputy Director of Operations, be removed from the service of the Corporation with immediate effect.”

    3. To complete the resume of facts which have a bearing on the disposal of this petition, it is necessary to mention that the respondent was subsequently prosecuted for an offence under Ss. 135(a) and 135(b) read with S. 135(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, as well as under S. 5 of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947. and under S. 8 read with S. 23(IA) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, in Case No. 15.CW of 1972, in the Court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Eighth Court, Esplanade, Bombay. It is not in dispute that the facts on which this prosecution was based were the same as the facts on which the order of the Additional Collector of Customs was based. The Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate by his order, dated 23 March, 1973, acquitted the respondent of the offences with which he was charged. It is also not in dispute that an appeal was filed against the order of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate and in that appeal before a single Judge of this Court, the acquittal of the respondent was upheld. That event, however, took place after the petition was already decided by the learned single Judge.

    4. In the meantime, after the Additional Collector had made his order of penalty on 9 September, 1970, the respondent had challenged that order by an appeal which came to be decided by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, who upheld the order of the Additional Collector. The order of the board was challenged in a revision application filed before the Government of India, which came to be rejected and, therefore, a writ petition was filed in this Court challenging the order of all the Customs Authorities. That writ petition was referred to the Division Bench. That petition was first heard by us and we have upheld the orders of the Customs Authorities.

    5. Now, after the respondent was acquitted by the criminal Court, he made an application on 17 April, 1973, to the General Manager claiming that since he had not been found guilty and he was acquitted of the various charges framed by the Customs Authorities, he stood completely exonerated from “complicity in the offence with which I have been charged” and, according to him, the action of removal from service became unreasonable, illegal and against the laws of natural justice and equity. He, therefore, claimed that he should be reinstated and compensated for the hardship and losses he had undergone. This representation was rejected by the Managing Director on 24 May, 1973.

    6. The respondent then served another letter through his advocates on 21 July, 1973, alleging that the order of removal from service, which is, dated 10 November, 1970, was improper and illegal and that

    “to contend contrary would be deliberate attempt at ignoring of a judgment of the Court, directly, binding on you and Air India.”

    The letter was really in the form of notice intimating to appellant I that if the orders of suspension and removal were not withdrawn, the respondent would be free to take further steps. It appears that simultaneously the respondent had also preferred an appeal to the Chairman of Air India on 20 July, 1973, that is, the date prior to the day on which the advocate's notice was sent. In the appeal, reliance was placed on the judgment of acquittal made by the criminal Court and it was alleged that the order, dated 20 July, 1970, was bad and void. The order was challenged as being in violation of the principles of natural justice as no opportunity to show cause was given to him. A personal hearing was also sought in the appeal. The appeal memo was forwarded by a forwarding letter of the advocates, in which also a request was made for personal hearing. This appeal, however, came to be rejected on 18 October, 1973, and the result seems to nave been communicated by the Deputy Managing Director, Air India, stating that the Chairman had considered the respondent's appeal and had passed his order rejecting the appeal. The order rejecting the appeal states that the Chairman has carefully gone through and considered the memorandum of appeal and the various grounds mentioned therein but that the Chairman found no substance in the said ground to justify the setting aside of the order of removal from service. The respondent then filed the writ petition on 19 November, 1973.

    7. In the petition it was alleged that there was no enquiry whatsoever into the alleged misconduct and that there was no charge-sheet framed or given to the petitioner to show cause and no opportunity whatsoever was given to the petitioner, and that he was deprived of an opportunity of getting himself exonerated of the charge and got himself reinstated. Non-compliance with regulation 44(i) of the Air India Employees' Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the regulations) was alleged. It was alleged that sub-regulation (ii) of regulation 44, on which reliance was placed by the appellants, was in violation of principles of natural justice and/or Art. 14 and/or Art. 311 of tne Consitution of India. The case of the respondent in the petition was that sub-regulation (ii) of regulation 44 had no application whatsoever. Certain other grounds have been made out in the petition, but for the disposal of the petition, only such grounds as were urged before us at the hearing will be referred to by us.

    8. The appellants relied on regulation 44(ii) and it is their case that it was neither necessary nor incumbent on them to give any notice to the petitioner or to issue a chargesheet or to hold an enquiry or to give him any opportunity to submit any say in view of the order of the Additional Collector, dated 20 November, 1970. That indeed appears to be the mainstay of the case of the appellants.

    9. The learned single Judge, who decided the petition, took the view that regulation 44(ii) could be availed of only when the penal action brought by the Customs Authorities or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Authorities successfully terminates in the imposition of a penalty and that regulation 44(ii) disclosed an arrangement that if statutory authorities like the Customs Authorities or the Foreign Exchange Authorities have commenced proceedings for penal action against an employee in relation to activites which may constitute misconduct, then the Corporation may be at liberty to base its decision as to any punishment to be imposed on the result of such an enquiry held by the statutory authorities instead of holding an enquiry of its own under regulation 44(i). He further held that there is no reason why the enquiry held by a statutory authority could not be used by the employer for the purpose of arriving at his own finding as to misconduct within the meaning of its regulations. On a construction of regulations 44(i) and 44(ii), the learned Judge observed that the rationale of sub-regulation (ii) of regulation 44 was to eliminate the enquiry otherwise compulsory under sub-regulation (j) of regulation 44 and the adjudication proceedings and the order of the Customs Authorities and the findings arrived at therein.

    “in a sense replace the enquiry proceedings and the report which the committee of enquiry appointed by the Corporation would have had to formulate as provided for in Para. 14 of Sch. II.”

    It may be mentioned that this view has not been challenged by either of the parties before us.

    10. The learned Judge, however, further held that although sub-regulation (iii) of regulation 44 does enable the Corporation, if it so chooses to do to avoid hooding its own enquiry, the requirements of Para. 15 of Sch II are not and cannot be excluded. It is this view which has been the subject of considerable debate at the bar and on the correctness of which much turns in this appeal.

    11. With regard to the value to be attached to the order of the Additional Collector of Customs in the penalty proceedings before us, the learned Judge, however, took the view that

    “even if the Customs Authorities have held a full-fledged enquiry and on evidence before him the Additional Collector of Customs has found the person charged guilty of an act amounting to smuggling and then imposed a personal penalty on him, the Corporation, as the employer, still has the power and the duty through its competent authority designated by the regulations, to decide whether the enquiry held by the Customs Authorities and the adjudication order passed thereon furnish good and sufficient reason for imposing any punishment on the employee.”

    The learned Judge equated the adjudication order made by the Additional Collector with the report of the Corporation's committee of enquiry and then observed:

    “The competent authority who is invested with the power to impose punishment under regulation 43 has still to satisfy himself that the enquiry conducted by the Customs Authorities and the finding thereon is correct.”

    Consistent with this view, the learned Judge in a later part of the judgment came to the conclusion that the order of the Additional Collector of Customs was based on no evidence at all but was based on suspicions, conjectures and surmises and, in his view, there was nothing to connect the respondent with the possession of the snuff coloured check-designed coat containing the contraband, which coat was found in the Customs enclosure.

    12. The learned Judge analyzed regulation ???4 and he took the view that if an action is to be taken for misconduct under Cl. (xx) of regulation 42, then the competent authority roust satisfy itself that the conviction by the criminal Court is in fact for an offence involving moral turpitude and that if the competent authority after following the requirements of Para. 15 of Sch. II comes to the conclusion that the finding is correct and so the activities amounting to the misconduct alleged have been established, then it can proceed to impose appropriate punishment but before deciding on the quantum of punishment, the competent authority must consider the previous service record as well as extenuating as well as aggravating circumstances of the case, if any. In the view of the learned Judge, there was nothing in any of the regulations to exclude the requirement that when the competent authority proposes to act on the basis of a conviction or an adjudication order made by a Court or statutory authority other than the Corporation itself, the person concerned should not be allowed an opportunity to say or show nevertheless why no action should be taken by the Corporation in its capacity as the employer. Holding that the impugned order of removal does not show that the General Manager had cared to satisfy himself about the correctness of the findings by giving independent attention to the weightage of evidence, the learned Judge found that since Para. 15 of Sch. II had not been complied with the order of removal was bad and become a nullity.

    13. Having taken this view, the learned Judge quashed the order of removal of the respondent and directed the respondent to be reinstated and to be paid all his dues as expeditiously as possible. This order is challenged in this appeal.

    14. Before we go to the contentions advanced before us both on behalf of the appellants and the respondent, it is necessary to make a reference to the regulations which are relevant. The regulations have been made by Air India in exercise of powers conferred by Cl. (b) of Sub-sec.(2) of S. 45 read with Ss. 8(2) and 20(1) of the Air Corporations Act, 1953, with the approval of the Central Government as required by S. 45.

    15. The first relevant regulation to which a reference is necessary is regulation 42 which deals with “misconduct.” The two clauses of misconduct which have become relevant for the purposes of argument are Cls. (xx) and (xxiv) and regulation 42 with these clauses in so far as it is material reads as follows:

    “42. Misconduct.— Any breach of these regulations shall be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable as provided hereinafter. Without prejudice to the generality of the term ‘misconduct’, it shall be deemed to include the following:

    (xx) Conviction in any court of law for any criminal offence involing moral turpitude.

    (xxiv) Smuggling, aiding, or being concerned in any way in smuggling, or carrying goods in the aircraft in circumstances which give rise to a presumption that it is done with the object of private trading or pecuniary gain or carrying currencies and/or instrument of exchange in contravention of any rules or regulations or the governmental orders.”

    The opening part of regulation 42 deals generally with misconduct and says that any breach of the regulation shall constitute misconduct under regulation 42. The clauses which specify the different kinds of misconduct in regulation 42 are illustrative. We have referred to Cls. (xx) and (xxiv) and they have a bearing on the construction of regulation 44(ii). The punishments for misconduct are specified in regulation 43 and eight kinds of punishments are specified including censure, fine, withholding of increment, recovery of the whole or part of any loss caused to the Corporation by the employee's negligence, default for breach of any regulation or orders, suspension on loss of pay and allowances, reduction to a lower grade of pay or lower stage in the time-scale of pay, removal from service and dismissal. Under regulation 43 any one or more of these punishments can be imposed by competent authority on any employee of the Corporation “for good and sufficient reason.” Regulation 43-A deals with suspension pending enquiry, with which we are not concerned. Regulation 43-B deals with the authority who can exercise the power to award punishment. Then comes regulation 44, Cls. (i) and (ii) of which read as follows:

    “44. Procedure for awarding punishments.— (i) No punishment under regulation 43 except censure, shall be awarded to an employee unless he has been informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and has been afforded in adequate opportunity of defending himself in accordance with the procedure laid down in this behalf in Sch. II.

    (ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, it shall not be incumbent upon the authority competent to impose a punishment to follow the procedure herein prescribed before imposing any of the penalties enumerated in regulation 43 on an employee, when such employee has been convicted by any Court or Tribunal on a criminal charge involving moral turpitude or any penal action has been brought against him by the Customs Authorities under the Sea Customs Act or rules made thereunder or by the appropriate authorities under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, or rules made thereunder for activities amounting to ‘misconduct’ within the meaning of Cl. (xxiv) of regulation 42.”

    It is not necessary to reproduce in detail the provisions of Sch. II which are headed as “Procedure for disciplinary action” which is referred to in regulation 44(i). Schedule II makes it cleat that “where disciplinary action is to be taken against an employee under regulation 44, the following procedure shall be followed.” The procedure consists of several stages. Provision is made for the competent authority to investigate as to whether a prima facie case exists against an employee. When the competent authority receives any information or a report indicating that the employee has committed misconduct in a given case, the competent authority has been empowered to dispense with such investigation and proceed to issue or authorize the issuance of a charge-sheet to the employee concerned. Paragraph 4 deals with the service of chargesheet on the employee and the employee being given reasonable time not less than forty-eight hours to submit his written explanation. Paragraphs 5 to 12 deal with the manner in which the enquiry into the misconduct should be made. Under Para. 5(ii) it is provided that if the employee admits in writing the misconduct alleged against him, the enquiry committed may not be constituted and the authority competent to impose punishment under regnulation 43-B may proceed to pass an order of punishment under regulation 42. However, in case an enquiry is required to be made, then the employee is to be informed of the date and time of the enquiry. The employee is entitled to be present during the hearing of witnesses along with the person permitted to defend him. The enquiry committee is required before examination of witnesses, to ask the employee whether he has anything further to say in addition to his written explanation. Paragraph 10 specifies the kind of witnesses who are to be examined and the procedure to be adopted for recording their statement. Under Para. 13 the employee is given a further opportunity of making a final statement in his defence after all the relevant evidence has been recorded. This statement is required to be signed by the employee if he chooses to do so. In case he refuses to sign the statement this fact is to be recorded in the enquiry proceedings. Paragraph 14 describes the manner in which the committee of enquiry should formulate its report. Then comes Para. 15 which reads as follows:

    “15. The competent authority on receiving the report of the enquiry committee shall satisfy itself as to the correctness of the findings by giving its independent attention to the weightage of evidence both for and against the charges. Where the competent authority agrees with the findings of the enquiry committee, it is not necessary for it to give reasons for the acceptance of the report, but where it disagrees, it shall record the reasons for such disagreement. The competent authority shall thereafter issue an order of punishment. In awarding punishment, the competent authority shall take into consideration the extent and gravity of the misconduct, previous service record of the person charged and any extenuating or aggravating circumstances of the case.”

    Paragraph 16 of Sch. II entitles the employee to a copy of the enquiry committee's report and statement recorded before the enquiry committee, if they are asked for. These are then the relevant regulations.

    16. It is not necessary for us to deal extensively with two submissions which were advanced on behalf of the respondent that the Air India is a State and the employees of Air India enjoy a statutory status and that the power to dismiss an employee of Air India as and by way of punishment is a statutory power derived from the Air Corporations Act, 1963, because none of these propositions seems to have been disputed either before the learned single Judge or in this appeal. It is not contended before us even on behalf of the appellants that if the respondent was found entitled to have the order of removal set aside, this Court will not be entitled to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution in his favour, on the ground that a writ cannot issue to Air India or that the power of Air India to punish its employee is not a statutory power.

    17. It is now well established that in appropriate cases in the case of servants of the State or local authorities or statutory bodies, Courts have the power to declare the dismissal of employees to be invalid if the same is violative of the statutory rules or of natural justice. We may briefly refer to the three authorities which are cited before us, though no authorities are really necessary on behalf on the respondent.

    18. In Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis (Smt.)) [1973 — I L.L.N 226], the Supreme Court observed as follows in Para. 18, at page 23:

    “… In the case of servant of the State or of local authorities or statutory bodies, Courts have declared in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the provisions of the statute. Apart from the intervention of statute there would not be a declaration of nullity in the case of termination or dismissal of a servant of the State or of other local authorities or statutory bodies.”

    19. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 — I L.L.N 366], it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of service and any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction of declaration by Courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules and regulations.

    20. Same is the law laid down in Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee [1980 — I L.L.N 297]. Referring with approval to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee, Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation, Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : A.I.R 1970 S. C 1244], the Supreme Court observed as follows in Para. 9, at page 301:

    “… Speaking through Vaidialingam, J., this Court held that a declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will not normally be granted. It was noted that there are three exceptions to this rule—

    (i) appropriate cases of public servants who have been dismissed from service in contravention of Art. 311;

    (ii) dismissed workers under industrial and labour law; and

    (iii) when a statutory body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute.”

    21. It is, however, argued by Sri Nariman, appearing on behalf of the appellants, that regulation 44(ii) expressly excludes any requirement of natural justice under Para. 15 of Sch. II and it is further argued that observance of the rules of natural justice are necessarily intended to prevent injustice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. The learned counsel mainly relying on the decision in A.K Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 150], has contended that this was not a case where the course of justice can be said to have been deflected apart from the fact that to be heard on a matter of punishment in a departmental enquiry is neither a fair nor a reasonable requirement and cannot be read into any regulation unless it is absolutely necessary. According to Sri Nariman, there is not even an averment anywhere in the petition or even in the appeal that the punishment of removal awarded to the respondent is in any why harsh or is disproportionate to the misconduct and the learned counsel wanted to contend that before an order is set aside on the ground of any violation of the principles of natural justice, prejudice resulting from such non-compliance must be shown. The learned counsel has contended that even the respondent had always understood that the penalty of removal must follow from the order of adjudication of penalty and the learned counsel points out that it was not till after the criminal Court adjudicated the respondent not guilty that the respondent asked for reinstatatement.

    22. Sri Singhavi, appearing on behalf of the respondent has seriously disputed the proposition that regulation 44(ii) excludes the operation of principles of natural justice and, according to the learned counsel the power, of punishment under regulation 43 can be exercised only in conformity with the principles of natural justice. On the scope of regulation 44(ii) it was the contention of the respondent that all that it does is that it only avoids duplication of enquiry for finding out the guilt of the employee as an enquiry has already been made by a statutory authority, but that by reason of the said regulation, the competent authority is not absolved from taking all the steps which he is otherwise required to take including service of notice regarding punishment and taking into consideration all the relevant factors, past record, extenuating circumstances, etc., which is a matter of substance and not of procedure. A large number of authorities have been cited on behalf of the respondent to which we shall refer later, but we may mention that the sheet anchor of the argument advanced before us in the decision of the Supreme Court in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R Chellappan [1976 — I L.L.N 269], which we shall discuss later. As another limb of the same argument, Sri Singhavi has argued that the removal of the respondent is null and void because the mandatory provisions of Para. 15 of Sch. II were not followed before imposing the penalty and no notice whatsoever was given by the disciplinary authority before making the order of removal.

    23. Before we go to the argument founded on the violation of the principles of natural justice, it is first necessary to construe the scope of regulation 44(ii). That necessitates a reference to the provisions made in regulation 44(i) which is to be read with Sch. II. There can be hardly any dispute that in view of the provision in regulation 44 where punishment except censure is to be awarded a full-fledged enquiry into misconduct alleged against the employee has to be made and the procedure for that enquiry is prescribed in Sch. II. As we have already pointed out, Sch. II lays down the procedure for taking disciplinary action commencing from the investigation into a misconduct before deciding to institute an enquiry into the misconduct and terminating in making an order of punishment. These regulations, which are made in the exercise of statutory power under S. 45 of the Air Corporations Act, form a complete code as to the manner in which the disciplinary power is to be exercised by the competent authority. After the report of the enquiry committee is formulated, as required by Para. 14, what is provided under Para. 15 is that after the report of the enquiry committee is received by the competent authority, it has first to satisfy itself as to the correctness of the findings by giving its independent attention to the weight-age of evidence both for and against the charges. This means that the competent authority is required by the regulations to apply its mind to the correctness of the findings recorded by the enquiry committee and it mast independently consider whether the findings recorded by the enquiry committee are supported by the evidence and it has to take into account such evidence as is adduced in rebuttal of the charges. Now, thereafter the second stage is that if the competent authority agrees with the findings of the enquiry committee, the competent authority shall issue an order of punishment. If the competent authority does not agree with the report of the enquiry committee, then the competent authority has to give its own reasons. There may be a case where the report of the enquiry committee discloses that the employee is not guilty and the competent authority disagrees with that finding. In such a case, the competent authority must give its reasons for the disagreement. If the enquiry committee's report discloses that the employee is guilty, it can accept that report.

    24. Now, under Para. 15, it is obligatory on the competent authority before issuing an order of punishment to take into consideration the extent and gravity of the misconduct, previous service record of the person charged and any extenuating or aggravating circumstances of the case. What appears to be the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there is no element of natural justice implied in Para. 15 of Sch II and, as already pointed out, the alternative argument is that even if any element of natural justice is implied in this procedure regarding punishment, even that is expressly excluded by regulation 44(ii). Now, it is no doubt true that even in a case where the enquiry committee has reported in favour of the employee, the competent authority has the jurisdiction not to accept those findings of the enquiry committee and come to a contrary conclusion and Para. 15 by itself does not make any reference to any notice to show cause against punishment. It appears to us that it will be wholly contrary to the principles of natural justice to proceed to make an order of punishment against a person who has been found to be not guilty by the enquiry committee without giving an opportunity to him to satisfy the competent authority that the reasons given by it for departing from the view of the enquiry committee were not justified. This will also necessarily imply that a notice to show came against punishment will also be necessary on the terms of Para. 15 in view of the latter part of Para. 15 because it is difficult for us to see how (he competent authority can take into consideration any extenuating circumstances of the case unless the person for whose benefit the extenuating circumstances are to be taken into consideration is given an opportunity to put those circumstances before the competent authority.

    25. A similar provision has been construed by the Supreme Court in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269], cited. That was a case dealing with rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, which read as follows in Para. 9, at page 273:

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 9 to 13:

    (i) where any penalty is imposed on a railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit.”

    Now, we wish to make it clear at this stage that when we are referring to the decision in Chellappan case (vide supra), it is for the limited purpose of trying to understand the scope of the duty which is laid on the competent authority when it is required to consider certain things before making an order of punishment. As to whether such will necessarily be the case in the case of misconduct which falls within Cl. (xx) or Cl. (xxiv) of regulation 42 shall be discussed later, While dealing with the scope of rule 14, the Supreme Court has pointed out that in a case governed by rule 14(i), while the conviction of the delinquent employee will be taken as sufficient proof of misconduct,

    “the authority will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee”

    and that the

    “statutory provision referred to above merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of Justice and fair-play.”

    The construction placed by the Supreme Court turned on the use of the words “may consider the circumstances of the case.” It was this phraseology which implied the requirement of a notice to the employee to show cause against punishment. Paragraph 15 of Sch. II is similarly worded. It is not, therefore, possible for us to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that Para. 15 of Sch. II of the Air India Employees' Service Regulations does not imply any principle of natural justice.

    26. This, however, does not dispose of the matter so far as this appeal is concerned because what is relevant for our purpose is the true construction and the scope of regulation 44(ii). Now, when we go to regulation 44 (ii), it is not difficult to find out what is the effect of that regulation on a bare reading of that regulation. Regulation 44 (ii) carves out an exception and it uses the non obstante cluase “notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations.” This clause will also include the first part of regulation 44. As already pointed out, regulation 44 (i) expressly refers to the procedure for awarding punishments and the effect of regulation 44(ii) must be that the operation of regulation 44 (i) will have to be restricted to cases which are not covered by regulation 44(ii). Under regulation 44(ii) it is expressly provided that in the matter of imposition of punishment, it is not incumbent upon the competent authority to follow the prescribed procedure before imposing any of the penalties enumerated in regulation 43 on an employee in the two kinds of cases which are referred to therein. The two kinds of cases are,—

    (i) where an employee has been convicted by any Court or Tribunal on a criminal charge involving moral turpitude; and

    (ii) where any penal action has been brought against him by the Customs Authorities under the Sea Customs Act or rules made thereunder or by the appropriate authorities under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act or rules made thereunder for activities amounting to ‘misconduct’ within the meaning of Cl. (xxiv) of regulation 42.

    So far as the first category of cases is concerned, the prescribed procedure which admittedly is the procedure prescribed in Sch. II need not be followed by the competent authority where the employee has been convicted on a criminal charge involving moral turpitude by any Court or Tribunal. For the purposes of the second category of cases, we must go back to Cl. (xxiv) of the misconduct which we have described above. The effect of regulation 44(ii) is that if an employee is involved in any of the activities which are referred to in Cl. (xxiv) such as smuggling, aiding or being concerned in any way in smuggling, which alone is material for our purpose, and these activities specifically amount to misconduct, and in case any penal action has been brought against the employee by the appropriate authorities under the Acts or rules specified in regulation 44(ii), then it is not necessary for the competent authority to follow the procedure prescribed in Para. 15 of Sch. II.

    27. What is, however, argued before us on behalf of the respondent is that the effect of this clause is merely to obviate a second enquiry. The only procedure which need not be gone through according to the respondent, is the procedure leading to the report of the enquiry committee but that the latter part of Para. 15 of Sch. II which require that

    “In awarding punishment, the competent authority shall take into consideration the extent and gravity of the misconduct, previous service record of the person charged and any extenuating or aggravating circumstances of the case.”

    is really not a matter of procedure but is a matter of substance and the competent authority is not absolved from complying with this part of Para. 15 of Sch. II and, according to the learned counsel, any punishment awarded without complying with this last part of Para. 15 will be in violation of the principles of natural justice. As already pointed out, heavy reliance is placed on the decision in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra).

    28. Now, so far as the principles of natural justice are concerned, we cannot overlook the fact that in the matter of punishment and enquiry into misconduct the regulations and the schedule which is a part of the regulations form a self-contained code. When we are now dealing with a case covered by regulation 44(ii), the fact that in a case covered by regulation 44(i) where the competent authority declines to accept the report of the enquiry committee which absolves the employee, a notice will be required to be given to the employee and in view of the decision in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269], a notice to the employee will be required to be issued before any punishment is awarded to him, will not control the plain and grammatical meaning of the words of regulation 44(ii) which expressly makes inapplicable the procedure prescribed in Sch. II.

    29. Sri Nariman, apart from relying on some decisions of the Supreme Court to which we shall presently refer, has also relied on a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England. Vol. I, 4th Edn., Para. 64, page 76, where the following observations occur:

    “The rules of natural justice, implict in the concept of fair adjudication lie two cardinal principles, namely, that no man shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in causa sua), and that no man shall be condemned upheard (audi alteram partem). These two principles, the rules of natural justice, must be observed by Courts, Tribunals, arbitrators and all persons and bodies having the the duty to act judicially, save where their application is excluded expressly or by necessary implication.”

    [Emphasis supplied.]

    The learned counsel has referred to foot note (5) where illustration of an expres-exclusion is given as where an exhaustive procedural code has been prescribed by statute. Now, it is well known that the question as to what principles of natural justice can be imported in a particular case will really depend on several circumstances and where a complete code for making a domestic enquiry and for dealing with disciplinary matters is provided for and where-in certain cases there is a specific provision to exclude that procedure having regard to certain facts or contingencies, unless the scheme of those rules or that code still warrants, any particular requirement of natural justice cannot be taken as necessarily implied.

    30. We may usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kraipak case [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 150] (vide supra) where in Para. 20, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

    “The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years … What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.”

    Sri Nariman has relied on this passage for two purposes. Firstly, according to Sri Nariman, where the regulations themselves exclude a particular procedure, a different procedure cannot be required to be followed on the ground that there will be denial of the principles of natural justice and the second limb of the argument, which we shall consider later, was that in any case, there is ho miscarriage of justice in the instant case, assuming that a notice to show cause against penalty was required to be issued.

    31. To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. O.P Gupta [(1969) 3 SCC 775 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 679]. In Para. 10 of that judgment, after setting out the requirements of S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

    “It is true that an enquiry under S. 240 of the Government of India Act, must be conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But those principles are not embodied principles. What principle of natural justice should be applied in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. All that the Courts have to see is whether the non-observance of any of those principles in a given case is likely to have resulted in deflecting the course of justice.”

    32. Very relevant are the observations of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J.N Sinha [(1970) 2 SCC 458 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 40], where after reproducing the observations of the Supreme Court in Kraipak case [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 150] (vide supra), that the rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made and they do not supplant the law but supplement it, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

    “It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the Legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power.”

    These observations of the Supreme Court leave no one in doubt that if there is an exclusion of the principles of natural justice on the words of the statute or the rules or regulations, then such rules cannot be overlooked and contrary to the requirements of the mandate of those rules, the requirements of natural justice cannot be imported. When we eariler observed that Para. 15 of Sch. II of the regulations, as it stands, has a provision which controls the final process of the enquiry, we were reading that regulation in consonance with the principles of natural justice, because it could not have been in the contemplation of the authority making the regulation that where the normal requirements of natural justice such as giving a delinquent a notice of the charges, giving himan opportunity of being heard, making the enquiry in the presence of the delinquent were specifically provided by the regulations, when the occasion for determining the guilt and awarding the punishment arose, that would be done without hearing him when the regulations expressly required consideration of extenuating circumstances because this could be done only after the delinquent is given an opportunity to satisfy the disciplinary authority about the extenuating circumstances on which a lesser punishment can be canvassed.

    33. However, when we come to the mandate of regulation 44(ii), the words therein are so wide and unambiguous that in the two kinds of cases contemplated thereby, the requirement of the whole of Sch. II has been dispensed with. Importing the concept of natural justice in a case which is governed by regulation 44(ii) will be doing something which is expressly dispensed with by the express words of regulation 44 (ii). As we have already pointed out, regulation 44(ii) operates only in a limited class of cases, indeed only in two classes of cases. We are really concerned in this case with Cl. (xxvi) of regulation 42 for the misconduct alleged and where a person against whom penal action has already been taken for the kind of activities which are enumerated in Cl. (xxvi) of regulation 42, it is obvious that it would have been wholly futile to have a second enquiry made in respect of the same facts which have been adjudicated upon by the Courts. Tribunals and statutory authorities referred to in regulation 44(ii). Instead of making a fresh enquiry, the competent authority is entitled to accept the findings of the Court or the statutory authorities under the relevant statutes regarding the involvement of the concerned employee in the activities enumerated in Cl. (xxiv). Once that adjudication has been made and is available to the competent authority, then the power to award the punishment under regulation 43 can be exercised by the competent authority. Normally the power to award punishment is exercisable only in the manner prescribed or after following the procedure prescribed in Sch. II. But once the compliance with Sch. II is dispensed with, by regulation 44(ii) it is difficult to see how compliance with the principles on which Sch. II itself is based can be imported indirectly in regulation 44(ii). As already pointed out, Sch. II is nothing but an embodiment of principles of natural justice and that is really excluded by regulation 44(ii) in certain cases, probably deliberately.

    34. It is difficult to understand the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent as well as the view taken by the learned single Judge that the adjudication order has to be equated with an enquiry report and the proceedings with regard to punishment must, therefore, be controlled and regulated by the latter part of Para. 15 Sch. II. Dissecting of Para. 15 in this manner seems to us to be wholly impermissible not only having regard to the very clear mandate given to the competent authority by regulation 44(ii) but also having regard to the scope and the manner in which Para. 15 of Sch. II itself is worded. As we have already pointed out, Para. 15 deals with a stage consisting firstly of the competent authority either accepting or not accepting the report of the enquiry committee and secondly of the follow up action on such acceptance or non-acceptance. When the last but one sentences of Para. 15 of Sch. II reads, “the competent authority shall thereafter issue an order of punishment,” the word “thereafter” cannot be overlooked. Really speaking, there is a sequence in Para. 15 and the word “thereafter” clearly indicates that the power to issue an order of punishment, as specifically provided in Para. 15, follows the earlier stage of either agreeing or disagreeing with the report of the enquiry committee. In so far as Para. 15 controls the power to issue an order of punishment, it is conditioned upon acceptance or non-acceptance of the report of the enquiry committee. But the entire requirement of Para. 15 is dispensed with in certain cases by regulation 44(ii) and the last part of Para. 15 cannot be separated from the earlier part of that Paragraph. Paragraph 15, therefore, has to be read as a whole and isolating the last part of Para. 15, namely, that in awarding the punishment, the competent authority must take into consideration the extent and gravity of misconduct, previous service record of the person charged and any extenuating or aggravating circumstances of the case, would be impermissible. That part does not, in our view, seem to be attracted in a case where an employee is found guilty of misconduct consisting of conduct which has resulted in conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude or guilty of the activity which is covered by Cl. (xxiv) of regulation 42. If notice to show cause against the punishment became necessary only because of Para. 15 of the Second Schedule and not because of any principle of natural justice and regulation 44 (ii) could be read only as expressly excluding that requirement, then it is clear that the power to determine what punishment is to be awarded in the cases covered by regulation 44 (ii) has under the regulations been left exclusively to the discretion of the competent authority.

    35. As an aid to this argument, the learned counsel for the appellants has contended that it is no requirement of natural justice that a notice to show cause against punishment should be issued unless it is expressly provided that such a notice is necessary and reliance was placed on the manner in which the proviso to Art. 311 of the Constitution, has been worded as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Shahdara (Delhi) Sharanpur Light Railway Company, Ltd. v. Shahdara-Sharanpur Railway Workers' Union [A.I.R 1969 S.C 513]. That was a case dealing with certification of standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Under S. 4 of the Act power is given to the Regional Labour Commissioner to certify the standing orders and the appellate authority is the Chief Labour Commissioner. The workers' union sought certain modifications in the standing orders and one of these modifications which was permitted was to the following effect:

    “In case the management propose to remove the workman from service they shall serve on the workman separate show-cause notice to that effect.”

    The standing order in the original unamended form was as follows:

    “Every person against whom departmental enquiry is being made shall be supplied with a copy of the findings in connexion with his dismissal and removal from service. The workman shall also be supplied with a copy of the proceedings of the enquiry committee as soon as possible after the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings in his case and be allowed to defend his case through union's representative.”

    After the modification was allowed, that modification was challenged by the employer in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while dealing with the requirement as to whether a second show-cause notice is necessary pointed out that neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law required an employer to give such a notice. The Supreme Court referred to the only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary, that is, under Art. 311 of the Constitution, which had also been amended. This is clear from the following observations of the judgment:

    “As regards the modifications requiring a second show-cause notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice. In none of the decisions given by Courts or the Tribunals such a second show-cause notice in case of removal has ever been demanded or considered necessary. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Art. 311. Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that article. To import such a requirement from Art. 311 in industrial matters does not appear to be either necessary or proper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view, there is no justification on any principle for such equation. Besides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible. In our view it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should, therefore, be set aside.”

    The Supreme Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the certifying authorities which permitted the proposed modification of the standing orders providing for the second show-cause notice at the stage when a decision about suitable punishment was to be made.

    36. It is no doubt true that this decision arose under the industrial law. But what is important to point out is that when the Supreme Court observed that even under the ordinary law of the land such a second notice to show cause against punishment is not required to be given and that provision with regard to the second show-cause notice could not be justified on the ground of reasonableness or fairness, it must necessarily follow that the absence of a requirement to issue a second show-cause notice in respect of punishment has not been considered by the Supreme Court as either being unfair or being unreasonable. The principles of natual justice are intended only to ensure a fair and a just decision. If, according to the Supreme Court, absence of a provision with regard to a second notice to show-cause does not affect the fairness of the procedure or the reasonableness of the procedure, then, in our view, on the basis of this decision, it can safely be concluded that in a case where there is no positive rule requiring a second show-cause notice to be given in respect of punishment, the absence thereof and proceeding to decide the question of punishment without such a show-cause notice will not bs contrary to the principles of natural justice. Therefore, if regulation 44 (ii) does away with the procedure prescribed in Para. 15 of the Second Schedule resulting in absence of a notice to show cause against the punishment, there cannot be said to be any violation of the principles of natural justice.

    37. We are supported in the view which we have taken by a decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Director of Postal Services v. Daya Nand [1972 S.L.R 325]. That was a case under proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. Artlicle 311(2) reads as follows:

    “311. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of these charges and where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry:

    Provided that this clause shall not apply—

    (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or…”

    In that case, two employees of the Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department were charged under S. 468 read with Ss. 34 and 420 read with S. 511 of the Penal Code and both of them pleaded guilty to the charges and were convicted of toe same. However, instead of being sentenced, they were placed under probation for one year under S. 4 of tbe Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Both of them were, however, dismissed under proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution without being given an opportunity either to rebut any charges or to show cause against any proposed punishment. One of the grounds on which the orders of dismissal were challenged was that the orders were contrary to Art. 311(2) including the proviso (a) there to independently of S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act and alternatively, the orders were contrary to Art. 311(2) including the proviso (a) thereto read with S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. We are not concerned with that part of the judgment which deals with S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The Full Bench in that case held that though the punishing authority may not be prohibited by the proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) from following the whole or part of the procedure under Art. 311(2), that authority cannot be compelled by the High Court to exercise such a discretion when proviso (a) clearly relieves the authority of the obligation to follow the said procedure. The Delhi High Court made reference to proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) as well as rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and observed that these provisions dispense with the procedure after conviction in imposing other major penalties and the minor penalties listed in rule 11 thereof, and then observed as follows:

    “The law has thus been made consistent and no natural justice procedure is required to be followed in imposing a major or a minor penalty after the conviction of the employee concerned of a criminal offence.”

    38. Now, it is possible to argue that in so far as these observations are made in respect of the scope of rule 19, which is more or less identical with rule 14 which was construed in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), the view of the Full Bench may not be correct. But what we wish to point out is that so far as proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) is concerned, the view taken is that there is no requirement of natural justice in view of the proviso (a) to Art. 3???(2) which does not require a notice to show cause against punishment to be given where the employee has been convicted for a criminal offence.

    39. The Full Bench also dealt with the question as to whether after a conviction is recorded against the person concerned, the punishing authority could regard the conduct forming the criminal charge as not proved and posed two questions:

    (1) Can the punishing authority regard the conduct forming the criminal charge as not proved?

    (2) Can it take a different view of the offence and come to the conclusion that the accused was not guilty?

    and answered the questions as follows:

    “In our view, it is not only not required to do so, but is not even entitled to do so. The conviction is binding on the State as well as the accused. Proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) is based on the theory that the conduct is conclusively bad because of the conviction. If the punishing authority cannot take any other view of the conduct except the view which resulted in the conviction, it is not understandable why any sharp distinction between conduct and conviction should be made in taking action under proviso (a).”

    The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court then observed as follows:

    “Taking into account the standard of behaviour required of a Government servant, it is inconceivable that a person convicted of a criminal offence can be allowed to remain in Government service. Therefore, whenever a Government servant is convicted of a criminal offence (unless in an exceptional case the charge is a trivial or technical one like a traffic offence) the punishment of dismissal would be inflicted on the convict as a matter of course. It is only in theory that it is true that the punishing authority has to consider which particular punishment should be imposed on the convicted person. In practice, however, continuance of a convict in Government service would be always regarded as undesirable unless the conviction was for a technical offence,”

    40. These observations would, in our view, apply with full force to a case to which regulation 44 (ii) would be attracted. We are dealing with a Corporation whose business is air transport of passengers and goods internationally. In respect of articles brought from outside within the country, there will always be regulations which will have to be operative such as the provisions of the Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in the case of currency. If a captain and a pilot of a plane is found indulging in an activity which squarely falls within Cl. (xxiv) of regulation 42 and is proceeded against under the relevant law not necessarily in a criminal Court but even before the departmental authorities and he is found guilty and liable to pay penalty, it is difficult to see what further evidence is necessary before the disciplinary action can be taken in view of the express provision in regulation 44 (ii). We are dealing with a case where a person has been found guilty of being concerned in smuggling of diamonds worth Rs. 1,50,000 and the penalty has been finally upheld by this Court. Removal or disimssal could be the only punishment in such a case because it will hardly do any credit to any airline company to have such a person in its employment and take the risk involved in any further similar conduct on his part. We do not find that there is anything illegal or wrong if in such specified type of cases, the awarding of punishment is kept exclusively in the discretion of the punishing authority as under proviso (a) to Art. 311(2). Needless to say that the power under regulation 44(ii) will be subject to the punishment being inflicted for good and sufficient reason. A conviction by a criminal Court of an offence involving moral turpitude or by departmental authorities functioning under relevant statutes could be nothing else but good and sufficient reason unless the punishment is so grossly disproportionate to the misconduct that it can be treated as an arbitrary exercise of the power, so that the punishment awarded could not be said to be for good and sufficient reason.

    41. Sri Singhavi has relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in First Appeal No. 819 of 1973, in support of his contention that if a notice to show cause against punishment is not given, the order must be held to be bad. That decision is in Air India International Corporation v. J.A.R Carvalho [First Appeal No. 819 of 1973, decided on 30 November, 1981], by Dharmadhikari and S.J Deshpande, J. The matter came to this Court in first appeal arising out of a suit filed by the respondent, who was an engineer in the employment of Air India. That was a case in which a regular chargesheet was served upon the employee and a regular enquiry was held and he was removed from service. His appeal against the order of dismissal was also dismissed by the Chairman. The facts of that case show that that was not a case in which the power was exercised under regulation 44(ii), but the enquiry proceedings were challenged on the ground that the charge levelled against him was hopelessly vague and witnesses on whose statements the department put reliance for proving the charge against him were not even examined. It was also alleged in the suit that the alleged contraventions under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act did not amount to misconduct and not only had the authorities not applied their mind to the facts of the case, but the defendant had failed to comply with the principles of natural justice, rules and regulations. One of the charges was that the plaintiff was associated in illegal activities with Marshall, Khambatta in connexion with smuggling of goods and it was admitted before the trial Court that for dismissal on the basis of this charge, the authorities had relied upon statements of Marshall and Khambatta and another person, but none of them could be examined during the course of enquiry, but what was contended was that the second charge was itself enough to sustain the dismissal. The trial Court had found that the second charge based on the contravention of the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was not maintainable and the finding on the first charge having been vitiated as the principles of natural justice were not followed, the suit was liable to be decreed. The second charge consisted of an allegation that some gold coins and foreign exchange were found in his possession when his residence was raided and in respect of which proceedings were taken against him by the enforcement directorate and the gold coins and foreign exchange were confiscated. With regard to the second charge the authorities had relied upon what they thought was an admission of the plaintiff. As a matter of fact, his case with regard to the gold coins was that they were a part of his wife's jewellery, which was also the contention raised before the departmental authorities and the Director of Enforcement had observed in his order that:

    “Having regard to the fact that the contravention was committed under the impression that he was a Portuguese national and as such the notification will not be attracted, I am not inclined to impose a penalty.”

    On facts of that case, this Court took the view that though the Corporation had tried to support the order of dismissal only on the basis of the second charge, that is, the possession of gold coins, it could not be forgotten that the punishment of dismissal was imposed because the enquiry committee as well as the competent authority held him guilty of both the charges. The Division Bench further observed that the extreme penalty of dismissal could not have been imposed unless an opportunity of being heard was given to the plaintiff. It is no doubt true that the Division Bench held that the competent authority had to apply its mind to what would be adequate punishment, but it is difficult for us to see how this decision can be of any assistance to the respondent because we are dealing specifically with a case under regulation 44(ii), while the case before the Division Bench was one in which a regular enquiry was held, but no notice to show cause against punishment was given.

    42. A large number of authorities which turned on the construction of rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules or rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules were cited before us by Sri Singhavi in support of the contention that even where punishment is awarded on the basis that the person has been convicted or found guilty on charges based on conduct which amounted to misconduct under the regulations, a notice to show cause before punishment was necessary. We really do not think it necessary to refer to all those cases because with the similarity of the provisions, which were dealt with in those cases, with the provisions of rule 14, which was considered in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), a reference to those cases would be futile because more important would be the view which was taken by the Supreme Court. We shall first deal with the decision of the Supreme Court in Chellappan case (vide supra), and then briefly notice the other cases relied upon which, in our view, were really not relevant for our purpose.

    43. In Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), the rules concerned were the Raliway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. That judgment of the Supreme Court disposes of three appeals which came on decisions of different High Courts. All the three employees who were the respondents in the respective appeals were convicted by criminal Courts in criminal cases but were released on probation and all these three persons came to be removed from service without making any further enquiry. Writ petitions filed by them were allowed and the orders of removal were quashed and the Union of India, therefore, filed an appeal. Rule 14(1) of the rules relevant in those cases read as follows in Para. 9, at page 273:

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 9 to 13:

    (i) where any penalty is imposed on a railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge,

    the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstance of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit.”

    Considering rule 14, the Supreme Court observed that rule 14(i) merely seeks to incorporate the principles contained in proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court analyzed Art. 311(2) and pointed out that the constitutional guarantee therein contemplated three stages of departmental enquiry before an order of dismissal, removal or reduction can be passed. The first stage was the framing of the charges and the holding of the enquiry, the second stage was that the appointing authority had to come to a tentative conclusion regarding the penalty after the report of the enquiry is received and the third stage was that before imposing the penalty, a final notice to the delinquent to show cause against penalty had to be given. The Supreme Court then pointed out that proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) completely dispenses with all the three stages of departmental enquiry when an employee is convicted on a criminal charge. The reason for this, according to the Supreme Court, is that in a criminal trial, the employee has already had a full and complete opportunity to contest the allegations against him and to make out his defence and the accused is given full opportunity to produce his defence and it is only after hearing the arguments that the Court passes the final order of conviction. The Supreme Court pointed out that if after a conviction by the Court a fresh departmental enquiry is not dispensed with, it will lead to unnecessary waste of time and expense and fruitless duplication of the same proceedings all over again and that was why the founders of the Constitution thought that where once a delinquent employee has been convicted of a criminal offence, that should be treated as sufficient proof of his misconduct and the disciplinary authorities may be given the discretion to impose the penalties referred to in Art. 311(2), namely, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The Supreme Court pointed out that rule 14(i) only incorporated the principle enshrined in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The observations on which reliance has been placed by Sri Singhavi are as follows:

    “In the instant case neither Art. 311(2), proviso (a) nor rule 14 (i) of the Rules of 1968 contain any express provision that the moment a person is found guilty of a misconduct on a criminal charge he will have to be automatically dismissed from service. Article 311(2), proviso (a) is an enabling provision which merely dispenses with the various stages of the departmental inquiry and the show-cause notice. Rule 14 despite incorporating the principle of proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) enjoins on the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case before pasting any order. Thus, in our opinion, it is a fallacy to presume that the conviction of a delinquent employee simpllciter without anything more will result in his automatic dismissal or removal from service.”

    44. Relying on these observations, it was contended by Sri Singhavi that if we so read regulation 44(ii) at to mean that no notice to show cause against punishment is necessary, the logical result of it would be that dismissal of the employee must automatically follow either on conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude or if there is a penal proceeding taken against the employee.

    45. Now, it is necessary to point out that the above quoted observations of the Supreme Court, will show that though, according to the Supreme Court, the stage provided for in Art. 311(2), which required a notice to show cause to be given, had been dispensed with, by virtue of the proviso and though rule 14 is based on the same principle as the proviso (a), there was an additional provision in rule 14 itself which required the authority to consider the circumstances of the case before making an order of punishment. Therefore, in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), the view that there is nothing in rule 14 which makes dismissal automatic following on a conviction was a logical consequence of an additional provision in rule 14 itself which requires the authority to consider the circumstances of the case before making an order of punishment. This is more clear in the further observations made in Para. 21 where rule 14 was construed at conferring an additional power to consider the circumstances of the case before making an order of punishment. Construing the words “considering the circumstances of the case” in rule 14(i), the Supreme Court obesrved as follows:

    “The rule-making authority deliberately used the word ‘consider’ and not ‘determine’ because the word ‘determine’ has a much wider scope. The word ‘consider’ merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words, the term ‘consider’ postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an inquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held by the disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee. It is not at all necessary for the disciplinary authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry which is dispensed with under rule 14 of the Rules of 1968 which incorporates the principle contained in Art. 311(2), proviso (a). This provision confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the delinquent employee. It is obvious that in considering this matter the disciplinary authority will have to take into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features if any present in the case and so on and so forth.”

    It is clear from these observations that rule 14 has been so construed by the Supreme Court as not only embodying the principle of proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) but also further requiring the authority to make a summary enquiry which, according to the Supreme Court, could be made only after the employee is heard. It is clear that the duty to make the summary enquiry and to hear the delinquent was spelt out from the requirement of considering the circumstances of the case, which is expressly referred to in rule 14. The decision in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), cannot, therefore, be treated as laying down that in a case which is analogous to a case under proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, there is a necessity to hear the delinquent on the matter of punishment.

    46. That the decision in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), is not an authority for the proposition that even in a case which is analogous to a case covered by proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) it is necessary to hear the delinquent on the matter of punishment is also clear from Para. 22 of the judgment. When it was argued before the Supreme Court that it may not be necessary for the disciplinary authority to hear the accused and consider the matter where no provision like rule 14 exists because in such a case, the Government can in exercise of its executive powers dismiss, remove or reduce in rank any employee who has been convicted on a criminal charge by force of proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and the further argument advanced was that in cases where proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) applied, a departmental enquiry is completely dispensed with and the disciplinary authority can on the doctrine of pleasure terminate the services of the delinquent employee, the Supreme Court did not express any opinion on this aspect of the matter because, according to the Supreme Court,

    “the cases of all the three respondents before us are cases which clearly fall within rule 14 of the Rules of 1968 where they have been removed from service without complying with the last part of rule 14 of the Rules of 1968 as indicated above.”

    47. It is clear, therefore, that the decision in Chellappan case [1976 — 1 L.L.N 269] (vide supra), turned on the additional provision in rule 14 (i) which required the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case before making any order of punishment. The additional provision in rule 14 (i) has been described by the Supreme Court as a very salutary provision which has been enshrined in the rules and one of the purposes for conferring this power was said to be that in cases where the disciplinary authority is satisfied that the delinquent employee is a youthful offender who is not convicted of any serious offence and shows poignant penitence or real repentance, he may be dealt with as lightly as possible. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court in that case observed that the statutory provision in rule 14—

    “merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fair-play.”

    These observations cannot, however, be construed as meaning that where by rules or regulations made in the exercise of statutory power a certain procedure is prescribed for dealing with disciplinary matters and that procedure is dispensed with in cases such as those specified in regulation 44(ii), an opportunity to show cause against punishment should still be treated as being incumbent on the part of the disciplinary authority.

    48. Having considered the decision in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra) we may now briefly refer to the other decisions cited on behalf of the respondent.

    49. Rajinder Singh v. Punjab State [1969 S.L.R 754], was a case under proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) where the Government servant was convicted under S. 332 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced for assaulting a bus conductor with whom he is alleged to have exchanged hot words on the latter's refusal to carry students studying in his school and refusing to make available to the petitioner the complaint book. Rule 4 of the service rules in that case enumerated the different penalties to be imposed for good and sufficient reasons and under sub-rule (1) of rule 7 it was provided that no order of dismissal, removal or reduction could be passed against a person to whom those rules were applicable unless he had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Sub-rule (2) laid down the procedure for the enquiry and proviso (b) of that sub-rule read as follows:

    “(2) The provisions of the forgoing sub-rule shall not apply were a person is dismissed or removed or reduced on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge…”

    The argument in that case was that the extreme penalty of dismissal without enquiry could be only for an offence involving moral turpitude and that was negatived by the Division Bench on the ground that there was no warrant for imposing such a restriction on the powers of a dismissing authority on the plain language of the relevant provisions. The Division Bench no doubt pointed out that in taking action against a Government servant, who is convicted of a criminal offence, the authority concerned has to take into account not merely the fact of his conviction but also examine his conduct leading to his conviction and consider, inter alia, the nature and quantum of penalty to be imposed, but the decision does not go as far as to hold that the penalty cannot be imposed without giving a show-cause notice. The argument in that case proceeded on the footing that even though a show-cause notice and enquiry contemplated by Art. 311(2) was not necessary where one of the three major punishments specified was inflicted on a person in civil service for his conduct resulting in his conviction on a criminal charge, the authorities had to apply their mind to the facts of the case to determine whether his conduct leading to his conviction was such as to call for punishment. This argument was accepted and it was on this ground that the order was found to be on the face of it extremely vague as it did not even disclose the offence for which the petitioner was convicted nor the date of his conviction and that the Court had found him guilty. The order was, therefore, struck down on the ground of non-application of mind. There is, however, nothing in this decision on which it can be contended that a notice to show cause is necessary before punishment is awarded.

    50. Three other cases which are relied upon by Sri Singhavi arose under rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, and are Om Prakash v. Director of Postal Services, Punjab Circle [A.I.R 1973 Punj. & Har. 1], Hardyal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(1977) 1 S.L.R 327] and T. Jayant v. Union of India [(1981) 1 S.L.R 2???6]. Two other cases cited on behalf of the respondent turned on the construction of rule 14(i) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules of 1968. Both these cases take the same view as is taken by the Supreme Court in Chellappan [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), and need not be discussed. They are Union of India v. Rajendra Prasad Srivastava [(1977) 2 S.L.R 81] and Ramcharitra Sharma v. Union of India [(1977) 2 S.L.R 531]. It is not necessary to discuss the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Om Prakash v. Director of Postal Services, Punjab Circle (vide supra), because the view taken therein that the principles of natural justice contained in rules 14 to 18 of the 1965 rules have been specifically taken away by rule 19 and in the face of that statutory provision, the Court cannot supplant the principles of natural justice so as to nullify the effect of rule 19 would be contrary to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), because rule 19 (i) is in almost identical terms as rule 14 (i) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. The relevant part of rule 19(i) reads as follows in Para. 9, at page 273:

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 14 to 18—

    (i) where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or

    the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit.”

    It may be pointed out that the petition of the petitioner directed against his termination on the ground of conviction in a criminal trial was allowed as the dismissal order was based only on conviction. The same is the case with the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Hardyal Singh case (vide supra), in which it was held on a construction of rule 19 (i) that no show-cause notice or enquiry was necessary, though on the facts of that case it was held that the punishing authority had failed to apply its mind to the facts of that case with a view to select a proper form of punishment because the proper application of mind as regards selection of correct punishment having regard to the peculiar facts of each case was necessary. The decision of the learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Jayant case (vide supra), also need not be discussed because the ratio of Chellappan case (vide supra), has been applied in that case.

    51. A reference was made to a decision of a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Director of Operations, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad v. Industrial Tribunal [(1973) 2 S.L.R 81]. Regulation 13 of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees' (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations of 1967, which was relevant in that case, read as follows:

    “Notwithstanding anything in regulation 12—

    (i) where a penalty is imposed on an employee on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit.”

    While construing that regulation, the learned single Judge held that the regulation contemplated that the authority imposing the punishment should necessarily apply its mind to the circumstances which show the conduct in relation to the offence and conviction in exercise of its discretion in imposing punishment, though it appears to have been held in that case that there was no right of hearing with regard to punishment. Having regard to the wording of regulation 13, which is analogous to rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, that view cannot be said to be correct.

    52. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Union of India v. Tara Chand [(1975) 2 S.L.R 28], which did not really turn on the construction of a rule which was identical with rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. Relevant rule 1719 of the Railway Establishment Code was akin to rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, and contained a provision that where a penalty is imposed on a railway servant on a ground of conduct which had led to a conviction on a criminal charge, the deciding authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit. The decision in that case really turned on the question as to whether an order which merely referred to the conviction of the employee and stated:

    “Since they have both been convicted, they are removed from service”

    was a valid order and the learned Judge held that the contents of an order made under rule 1719(1) must lead to an inference that the authority had applied its mind to the conduct of the person leading to his conviction and had also taken the circumstances of the case into consideration while imposing the penalty. Reading the order as a whole, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the punishing authority did not take into consideration the conduct of the employee leading to his conviction on a criminal charge nor the circumstances of the case. This decision will not take the case of the respondent further than the decision in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra).

    53. One more decision which was cited was of a learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Krishnakutty v. Senior Superintendent of Post Office [1975 L. & I.C 1732]. The question involved in that case turned on rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which was held to be inapplicable.

    54. Some reference was made to a decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 2139 of 1974, which really dealt with the second and third clauses of rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. There was a difference of opinion between Deshpande, J., as he then was, and Mridul, J., as will be clear from the order, dated 23 March, 1976, and the matter was referred to Deshmukh, J., as he then was, who agreed with the view taken by Deshpande, J. The difference of opinion was on the question as to whether in that case under the provisions of rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, an opportunity was required to be given to the delinquent against the punishment of dismissal and to bring forth the circumstances for the consideration of the competent authority regarding the quantum and nature of penalty imposed. Deshmukh, J., held that Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), does not interpret rule 14(ii), which was analogous to proviso (b) to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and that the approach of the Supreme Court in interpreting rule 14(i) cannot be bodily implied in interpreting rule 14(ii). In our view, it is not necessary to go into the detailed discussion of this decision because the regulation with which we are concerned is not analogous to rule 14(ii), the scope of which fell for consideration before the learned Judges in that case.

    55. It was further argued by Sri Nariman that even assuming that the principles of natural justice had been violated, the present is not the case in which the Court should issue a writ as there is no miscarriage of justice. The authorities of the Supreme Court which he has cited before us show that it is not obligatory to issue a writ and quash the impugned order only on the ground that there is a breach of natural justice. It is contended that no grievance has been made by the respondent at any stage that the punishment of removal was disproportionate or severe.

    56. Sri Singhavi, on the other hand, contended that the order of removal made in violation of rules of natural justice cannot be said to be valid. It is argued that it is not open to the appellants to say that even if the principles of natural justice had been violated, no useful purpose would have been served even if notice was given to the respondent and that the result would have been the same. Heavy reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in S.L Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379 : A.I.R 1981 S. C. 136], to point out that where a person has been denied natural justice, no independent proof of prejudice is necessary and denial of natural justice in itself is a prejudice.

    57. As already pointed out, Sri Nariman has placed reliance on the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Kraipak case [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 150] (vide supra), and it is contended that in Delhi Municipal Committee case [(1980) 4 SCC 379 : A.I.R 1981 S.C 136], the Supreme Court has not made any reference to the decision of a larger Bench in Kraipak case (vide supra). As already pointed out, in Kraipak case (vide supra), the Supreme Court has taken the view that whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case. Similarly, there are previous decisions of the Supreme Court in which a clear view seems to have been taken that unless there is prjeudice, the impugned order need not necessarily be struck down. To cite a few decisions where the test of prejudice was applied by the Supreme Court, we may refer to the decision in Kesava Mills Company v. Union of India [(1973) 1 SCC 380 : A.I.R 1973 S.C 389], Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala [A.I.R 1969 S.C 198], and Tata Oil Mills Company v. Its workmen [1963 — II L.L.J 78]. As a matter of tact there are clear observations of the Supreme Court in Jankinath Sarangi v. State Of Orissa . [(1969) 3 SCC 392], that actual prejudice which has been caused to a person by the supposed denial of a particular right to him must be considered. These observations are as follows:

    “There is no doubt that if the principles of natural justice are violated and there is a gross case this Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal; but there are cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right.”

    58. As an illustration of the principle that an impugned order need not necessarily be struck down where principles of natural justice have been violated, reference was also made to tae decision of the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664 : A.I.R 1981 S.C 818]. It may, however, be pointed out that in that case, the Supreme Court has also taken the view that a quasi-judicial or administrative decision rendered in violation of the audi alteram partem rule, wherever it can be read as an implied requirement of the law, is null and void, though the decision in that case itself turned on whether under the relevant provision at the pre-takeover stage, the provisions of S. 18-AA of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act, 1951, expressly or by intendment excluded the audi alteram partem rule.

    59. In Delhi Municipal Committee case [(1980) 4 SCC 379 : A.I.R 1981 S C. 136], the Supreme Court observed as follows:

    “In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs.”

    Fortunately, we do not think we are called upon to decide in this case whether we should follow the later decisions of the Supreme Court which seem to take a different view from the decision in Karipak case [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 150] (vide supra), because on the facts of the present case, we find that the respondent had sufficient opportunity to agitate his supposed grievance of being denied natural justice in the statutory appeal provided under the regulations. It appears that when the respondent agitated the matter after the decision of the criminal Court which acquitted him in March 1973, stress was essentially laid on the fact that the order of dismissal was passed without giving him any hearing and it was expressly argued before us that if opportunity was given to him to show cause when he asked for revocation of his order or removal, he would have shown to the authorities the order of acquittal of the criminal Court and could have on that basis attempted to convince that he was not guilty. Therefore, what was essentially complained of at that stage was that he was not given an opportunity to establish that he was innocent. As we shall presently show, it would not be permissible for the competent authority, having regard to the specific provision in regulation 44 (ii), to go into the question whether the penal action taken against the respondent in the proceedings before the Additional Collector of Customs was justified or not. There was, therefore, no question of making any enquiry into his conduct which was adjudicated upon by the Additional Collector of Customs and on the ratio of the decision in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 269] (vide supra), that enquiry proceeding was obviated. What is now additionally argued before us is that the last part of Para. 15 of Sch. II of the Air India Employees' Service Regulations contemplates an opportunity to show cause against punishment. The argument, therefore, must in its final analysis come to this that assuming that the order of the Additional Collector of Customs could be taken as the basis of disciplinary action against the respondent, he was still entitled to the opportunity to show that the punishment was too severe or that he could have shown cause against the punishment of removal.

    60. In a writ petition we are entitled to consider, when such is the contention, as to whether such a contention was ever raised and in that contest, one circumstance which becomes very relevant is that for almost three years after the order of removal was passed till the judgment of acquittal was recorded by the criminal Court, the respondent never thought of agitating the matter with regard to his removal. Now, even after the order of acquittal was passed and the respondent wrote a letter to the General Manager for reinstatement, the grievance was not with regard to quantum of punishment. The grievance was that he was not liable to be punished at all because he had been acquitted and, therefore, the order of removal was illegal and against the principles of natural justice. Even in the letter addressed by the petitioner's advocates to the Managing Director of the appellant, dated 21 July, 1973, no grievance is made that the punishment of removal was harsh for the misconduct alleged. If we look at the appeal which was forwarded to the Chairman, no contention whatsoever has been made with regard to the quantum of punishment. Therefore, at no stage was any grievance made with regard to the quantum of punishment in respect of which it is now argued that opportunity should have been given to show cause against the nature of punishment.

    61. Some reference was made on the basis of some documents on record that in one case of Capt. Kashyap, Air India after having terminated his services reinstated him though he was convicted and had undergone imprisonment as a result of conviction. Now, when we go through those documents, it appears wholly incorrect to say that Capt. Kashyap was reinstated. As a matter of fact the documents show that he was re-appointed as an ordinary co-pilot on probation as a fresh employee, as will be clear from the letter, dated 14/18 July, 1970, and he was clearly informed by this letter that his ultimate re-promotion to the post of senior captain could not be claimed as a matter of right and he will be treated as a fresh employee as a co-pilot on probation and during probation, his service may be terminated at any time without assigning any reason.

    62. It may be pointed out that the decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Municipal Committee case [(1980) 4 SCC 379 : A.I.R 1981 S.C 136] (vide supra), does not consider the question as to whether in a matter like the instant one, where there is an appellate authority which is capable of going into the question as to whether a person has been deprived of any opportunity to show cause and where the appellate authority is itself entitled to take into consideration something which the delinquent was prevented from putting forth before the authority which made the termination or dismissal order, it must necessarily follow that the impugned order was liable to be quashed merely on the ground that before the trial authority the person had been deprived of an opportunity to show cause. It is an established proposition that an appellate authority has normally the same powers as the original authority and if, in our view, a breach of any principle of natural justice can be remedied by the appellate authority in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it will not be obligatory on the High Court to necessarily quash the order of the trial authority merely on the ground that there is a breach of natural justice. The question has been considered at some length in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Shantilal v. H.A Rangaswami [1977 Mah. L.J 587], in which the Full Bench has taken the view that if there is any defect in the proceeding of the trial Tribunal arising out of violation of or non-compliance with any principle of natural justice and the appellate Tribunal is, under the appropriate rules, empowered to cure the defect, it will be difficult for the person concerned to contend that the order of the trial Tribunal should totally be ignored as anullity on the ground that there is a breach of the principles of natural justice before the trial Tribunal. It has been held by the Full Bench that if a decision which, it is contended, is vitiated by violation of the principle of audi alteram partem could be subjected to scrutiny by the appellate Tribunal, it cannot be equated with a void decision as a decision without jurisdiction is.

    63. Recently the observations of Justice Mr. Megarry in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders [(1971) 1 Ch. 34], where he had observed that “a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body” have been considered by the Privy Council as Megarry, J., having stated the principle too broadly. Referring to the decision of Megarry, J., the Privy Council observed as follows:

    “In his judgment in that case the Judge seems to have elevated the conclusion thought proper in that case into a rule of general application. In an eloquent passage he said:

    ‘If the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal ? … As a general rule … I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body.’

    In their Lordships' opinion this is too broadly stated. It affirms a principle which may be found correct in a category of cases; these may very well include trade union cases, where movement solidarity and dislike of the rebel, or renegade, may make it difficult for appeals to be conducted in an atmosphere of detached impartiality and so make a fair trial at the first probably branch level an essential condition of justice. But to seek to apply it generally overlooks, in their Lordships' respectful opinion, both the existence of the first category, and the possibility that, intermediately, the conclusion to be reached, on the rules and on the contractual context, is that those who have joined in an organization, or contract, should be taken to have agreed to accept what in the end is a fair decision, notwithstanding some initial defect.”

    The Privy Council pointed out that there may be instances where the defect is so flagrant, the consequences so severe, that the most perfect of the appeals or rehearings will not be sufficient to produce a just result, or there may be cases when the appeal process is itself less than perfect; it may be vitiated by the same defect as the original proceedings, and it was pointed out that in such cases, it would no doubt be right to quash the original decision. Pointing out that these are all matters which the Court must consider, the Privy Council observed as follows:

    “Whether these intermediate cases are to be regarded as exceptions from a general rule, as stated by Megarry, J, or as a parallel category covered by a rule of equal status, is not in their Lordships' judgment necessary to state, or indeed a matter of great importance. What is important is the recognition that such cases exist, and that it is undesirable in many cases of domestic disputes, particularly in which an inquiry and appeal process has been established, to introduce too great a measure of formal judicialization. While flagrant cases of injustice, including corruption or bias, must always be firmly dealt with by the Courts, the tendency in their Lordships' opinion in matters of domestic disputes should be to leave these to be settled by the agreed methods without requiring the formalities of judicial processes to be introduced.”

    64. Now, it has been argued before us that even in the appeal, the respondent has not been given a hearing. Regulation 45, which deals with appeals, does not provide for any right of hearing and such a right of hearing in an administrative appeal is not a necessary condition of a proper disposal of the appeal. As a matter of fact, as we find, the entire claim in the appeal was wholly misconceived in the sense that following an acquittal by the criminal Court, the respondent claimed to be reinstated. The memo of appeal itself is self-contained. No grievance was made about the quantum of punishment or about being deprived of any opportunity to show cause against the punishment. The appeal memo is drafted by advocates and contains all the grounds on which the removal has been challenged. The appeal order says that the memorandum of appeal and the various grounds mentioned have been considered by the appellate authority. As in our view, the correctness of the order of the Additional Collector of Customs could not have been canvassed before the disciplinary authority and there was, therefore, no scope for interference with the order of removal, no grievance having been made that the punishment was vitiated as no opportunity to show cause against it was given, there was no error in the order of the appellate authority which was not bound to give a personal hearing.

    65. Before the appellate authority the respondent had asked for inspection of the papers relied upon relating to the order of 20 November, 1970. While dealing with this request, the appellate authority has mentioned that the order of removal refers to two orders, one, order of suspension, and the other, the order of the Additional Collector of Customs. Both these orders were said to be with the respondent, which fact has not been disputed and could not be disputed because the respondent had filed an appeal against the order of the Additional Collector of Customs, and the suspension order was admittedly served on him. The appellate authority was, therefore, justified in observing that there was no question of giving inspection of these documents.

    66. We are satisfied in this case that even assuming that the respondent was entitled to be heard on the question of punishment, which under the regulations was solely within the discretion of the disciplinary authority, he had never before made any such grievance even in appeal and that grievance now cannot be successfuly canvassed. In any case, on the facts it was clear that he had never thought that that order worked to his prejudice on the ground that the punishment was grossly disproportionate or severe.

    67. That takes us to the finding which is recorded by the learned Judge that the order of the Collector of Customs is perverse and without any basis. According to the appellant, the material on which the finding was recorded by the Additional Collector of Customs was not before the learned single Judge who was not entitled to go into the correctness of that finding. It is argued by Sri Singhavi that not only was the learned single Judge entitled to go into the correctness of the finding of the Additional Collector of Customs, but even the disciplinary authority was entitled to go into the correctness of the finding of the Additional Collector of Customs. It is argued before us that regulation 44(ii) does not take away the jurisdiction of the competent authority to go into the findings given by the Customs Authorities in adjudication proceedings for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against the employee against whom action had been taken by the Customs Authorities. It was contended that the order of the Additional Collector of Customs was based on no evidence, because it was based purely on the hearsay evidence, namely, the statements of Malap and Bhiva, the two drivers, coming behind the back of the respondent, which was not only retracted before the enquiry but also not independently proved.

    68. We must first deal with the question as to whether it is open to the disciplinary authority acting under the regulation to go into the correctness of the findings recorded by the Additional Collector of Customs. So far as the present case is concerned the misconduct consisted of the respondent being concerned in smuggling inasmuch as he was alleged to be in unauthorized possession of diamonds worth Rs. 150000 which were brought by him and were found in a coat which was alleged to be his. It is no doubt true that if an independent enquiry was made, that would have been required to be made according to the requirements of the Second Schedule. The procedure laid down therein would have to be followed. But by the express words of regulation 44(ii), this enquiry has been obviated and if it is found in the instant case that the penal action hag been brought against the respondent by the Customs Authorities for activities amounting to misconduct within the meaning of Cl. (xxiv) of regulation 42, then, as already pointed out, the requirements of the Second Schedule need not have been complied with. Indeed the very purpose behind framing regulation 44 (ii) is the same as in the case of rule 14 (i) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, minus the requirement to consider the circumstances of the case before imposing punishment, as in Chellappan case [1976 — I L.L.N 69] (vide supra). As already pointed out by the Supreme Court, in the case of a conviction for conduct which amounts to misconduct under the rules, if a fresh departmental enquiry is again required to be made, it will lead to unnecessary waste of time and expense and a fruitless duplication of the same proceeding all over again, in order to obviate which the provisions of proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, were made. Notwithstanding the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal proceeding, the order of the Additional collector of Customs, which levied a penalty of Rs. 20,000 on him continued to bind him and was effective against him. The acquittal by the criminal Court did not relieve the respondent of the liability which he had incurred as a result of the order of the Additional Collector of Customs. He was bound to pay that penalty and that penalty was based on the finding that he was concerned in smuggling of diamonds. If expressly by regulation 44(ii) action is permitted to be taken on the basis of such an order, it is difficult for us to appreciate how the respondent's claim that he was entitled to show to the disciplinary authority that he was not guilty could be canvassed successfully. To adopt any such course would be to render not only regulation 44(ii) otiose but it will give discretion to the disciplinary authority to go into the correctness of the order of a statutory authority, which could be set aside only by one of the hierarchy of authorities under the relevant Act. The contention that the order was itself based on hearsay evidence can also not be entertained because in so far as the respondent was concerned, the order had become binding on him and he was subjected to payment of penalty on a finding that he was concerned in smuggling. It was an order by an authority with jurisdiction and on the ground that it was based on some material which was inadmissible, it cannot be collaterally challenged. If the challenge to the order was that it was based on some inadmissible evidence, it had to be made before the appropriate forum and unfortunately for the respondent, not only had his appeal and revision failed but even this Court has found that the proceedings taken against him were well founded and had no infirmity in them. It will not, therefore, be possible to accept the contention that the respondent was entitled to show to the disciplinary authority that the order of the Additional Collector of Customs was wrong.

    69. For the same reasons it is also difficult for us to appreciate how the learned single Judge could have taken the view that the order of the Additional Collector of Customs was perverse. As already pointed out, it continued to be binding against the respondent and that order could be set aside only by a regular appeal proceeding or a revisional proceeding or in writ jurisdiction of this Court directed against that order and there was no other manner in which any person affected thereby could ignore that order. Further the learned Judge did not have the entire material on which that order was passed. With great respect to the learned single Judge, therefore, we are unable to accept the view taken by him that the order of the Additional Collector of Customs was a void order or an illegal order or had been cassed on inadmissible evidence.

    70. It was only at almost the end of the argument that the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the regulations were ultra vires the Acts and illegal, they are ultra vires of Arts. 14, 16, 19(1) (f) and Art. 31 of the Constitution and that the regulations were also unreasonable. The petition does not disclose the grounds on which these challenges are based and how the regulations are either in excess of the statutory power or ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution or unreasonable As a matter of fact the Constitution itself seems to recognize the principle that where there is a conviction by a criminal Court for a conduct which can amount to misconduct, no enquiry proceeding need be taken in respect of that misconduct. Such provisions are now uniformly found in several service rules. Unless, therefore, adequate data is made available, it will not be possible to go into these challenges.

    71. The order of removal is not an order which is based merely on the fact that the respondent has been penalized. The order shows that the disciplinary authority had applied its mind to the facts of the case because the findings recorded by the Additional Collector of Customs are that the respondent had brought from abroad and cleared out of Customs without divulging the true contents of the coat, diamonds and foreign exchange. The fact that penalty has been imposed for this conduct has also been referred to and if for such an offence, a person has been removed, it would, in our view, not be proper exercise of discretion under Art. 226 to quash the order of removal on the ground that he was not heard on the question of punishment by the disciplinary authority. It appears to us that having regard to the nature of the punishments permissible, removal is the lighter of the two punishments between removal and dismissal, which has been awarded by the disciplinary authority. Even otherwise, therefore, we would not have been inclined to interfere with the order of removal.

    72. Some argument was advanced by Sri Nariman that the petition should be rejected on the ground of delay. We do not consider it proper to hold that the learned Judge should have rejected the petition on that short ground. It appears to us that the respondent carried the impression that he was entitled to the benefit of the order of acquittal by asking for revocation of his order of removal. It is important to bear in mind that the approached the authorities only after he was acquitted by the criminal Court because that, according to him, gave him a right of reinstatement. It is true that he had not earlier approached, but probably it would have been a futile exercise earlier to ask for revocation of the order of removal. In any case, his claim for reinstatement had to be decided on its own merits and it would not be proper to exercise our discretion to hold that the petition should have been rejected outright on the ground of delay.

    73. In the result, the appeal is allowed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

    74. Sri Rana requests for leave to appeal to Supreme Court. It appears to us that regulation 44(ii) on its plain language bears the meaning which we have given to it. We are, therefore, not inclined to grant leave to the respondent to appeal to the Supreme Court.

    75. Sri Rana requests that the amounts which are already lying deposited by the appellant so far and lying in deposit should not be allowed to be withdrawn back by them because the respondent proposes to approach the Supreme Court. We, therefore, direct that the appellant shall not withdraw any amount which is lying in deposit in this Court till 15 February, 1982. Sri Vahanvati wants it to be clarified that the respondent shall also not withdraw any amounts. It is obvious that since the appeal has been allowed, the respondent has not any present right to withdraw any amount.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Air India Corporation And Another v. Richard Rashid Khan
    (Dec 16, 1981)