[Having in paragraphs 1 to 20 referred to the facts and considered the following decisions, 47 BLR 825, Institute of Radio Technology v. Pandurang Baburao, AIR 1953 Nag. 144, Balbhadra Beharilal v. Premchand Lalchand, AIR 1951 Nag. 22, Shankarlal Shionorayan Rathi v. Addl. Deputy Commissioner, AIR 1951 Nag. 51, V.M Deshmukh v. K.M Kothari, AIR 1955 Patna 496, Bidubhuscm Sen v. Commissioner of Patna Division, (1967) VIII Gujrat Law Reporter 620, Mohanlal Narottamdas v. Bechardas. Civil Revision Application No. 751 of 1950 decided on 23-11-1950 by Chagla C.J, Jayantilal Muljibhai v. Ochheylal Vithadas Parikh and (1976) 4 SCC 435 : AIR 1976 SC 2368, Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimcmlal Maganlal Tolwdla, the Judgment proceeds:—]
21. I must now proceed to enumerate the propositions which can be said to have been established by the various decisions which I have taken the opportunity of reviewing so far:
(1) The requirement mentioned in section 13(1)(g) must be the requirement by the landlord and not the requirement by somebody else.
(2) The words “for occupation by himself” do not restrict the proposed occupation to the occupation of landlord alone but may include the occupation by members of his family.
(3) When there is a dependant of the landlord the requirement for his occupation may be the requirement by the landlord.
(4) In a given case members of the family of the landlord may not be joint in residence but the condition of the requirement for occupation by himself is satisfied if the members are joint in estate.
(5) In a given case the landlord may be dependent upon a person for whose use and occupation the premises are sought to be recovered. In such a case the condition in section 13(1)(g) can be said to be satisfied if it could be shown that it was necessary for the landlord that the other person should occupy the premises. Implicit in this proposition is the case of an old person requiring the presence of some person in or near the premises which is occupied.
(6) Even if emotionally the landlord feels that a relation of his, such as his daughter or son-in-law, should stay with him, it can be regarded as the requirement by the landlord of the premises for occupation by himself.
(7) In case of non-residential premises if the landlord's interests are shown to be linked with the occupation of those premises by some one for whom he is seeking the possession of the suit premises such as a partner, then it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for occupation by himself is established within the meaning of section 13(1)(g).
(8) If there is a moral or legal obligation on the landlord to provide accommodation to a particular person then the requirement by the landlord for occupation of that person may squarely fall under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act.
22. Underlying the above propositions is the basic fact that the requirement is by the landlord and not by somebody else on his behalf. It may be the requirement for somebody else but not by somebody else. In all cases the requirement must be by the landlord himself. It is also implicit in the above propositions which have emerged from the examination of the various-cases that there must be a nexus between the interests of the landlord and the occupation of the premises by himself or by somebody else. If there is no nexus of the interests of the landlord with the occupation of the premises, then the condition mentioned in section 13(1)(g) cannot be said to have been fulfilled. section 13(1)(g) says that the premises must be reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord. The bona fide requirement is in the first place a state of mind though it may be something more. It must, therefore, be deposed to by the person who is requiring the premises under-section 13(1)(g) namely, the landlord. If the landlord does not step into the witness-box to bring before the Court legal evidence for proving his requirement, then it cannot be said that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises as mentioned in section 13(1)(g). The landlord can delegate the authority to conduct a case but he cannot delegate the duty to depose.
23. While examining the rival contentions of the parties, I have mentioned in sufficient details the evidence that has come on record in this case. However, it would be useful if I enumerate again the facts which have been established. The respondent, who is the landlady, has not been examined in support of her case nor has she been examined as a witness on commission. On this ground alone the suit of the respondent ought to have been dismissed because the bona fide requirement which, as I have mentioned above, is a state of mind and something more must be proved in this case. Ramanlal, the respondent's son, is said to be her constituted attorney but that could only be for the purpose of conducting the case but his evidence cannot be substituted for the legal evidence of the landlady herself.
24. Even if the material which has been brought on record by the examination of Ramanlal in support of the respondent's case is considered, it does not show that:
(a) the respondent is a dependent on Ramanlal or on his business or that Ramanlal is depending on the respondent for his livelihood or on any part of her income;
(b) any inter-relationship between the interests of the respondent and the occupation of the suit premises by Ramanlal exists;
(c) that there is any obligation on the part of the respondent to provide accommodation to Ramanlal (the will at the most speaks of provision of certain monetary assistance).
Considering all the facts and circumstances which have been brought on record in legal evidence I am satisfied that the case of the respondent does not fall under one or the other of propositions enumerated by me above. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the respondent has failed to prove the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises for occupation by herself or for any other person within the meaning of section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act. Therefore, the suit will have to be dismissed.
25. In view of the fact that the suit is liable to be dismissed, it becomes unnecessary to refer to the question of comparative hardship. If, however, that question is to be decided, I am inclined to agree with the finding of the learned appellate Judge who has by decreeing the suit for part of the premises only struck a just balance between the hardship that may be caused to Ramanlal and to the petitioners.
26. In the result, this petition must succeed. The decree passed by the learned 2nd Extra Joint Judge of Pune in Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1977 is set aside and the decree passed by the Additional Judge of the Court of Small Causes in Regular Civil Suit No. 3146 of 1974 is restored. On the facts and circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs in all the Courts.
Petition allowed.