AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion — Second Bail Application

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second application for bail by the original accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 7: Dilip Shankar Koli, Vishnu Haram Rajkumar, Bhaskar Krishna Uparkar, Hirakant Shankar Koli, Anthony Pascal Koli and Hareshwar Gotya Shankar. The same accused, together with Ashok Balkrishna Vaiti (accused No. 8), had earlier applied for bail in Criminal Application No. 532 of 1980. By an order dated April 24, 1980, this Court rejected bail for accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 7 and granted bail to accused No. 8, Ashok Balkrishna Vaiti. The accused challenged that order before the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1892 of 1980; the Supreme Court permitted withdrawal of the petition, observing that the petitioners could apply again if fresh conditions arose.

The present second bail application was heard by the Court with Mr. Ram Jethmalani acting for the petitioners and Mr. S.S. Parkar representing the State as Public Prosecutor. The petitioners relied on four purported fresh conditions in support of their claim for bail. The Court considered those grounds, reviewed the police statements and the Supreme Court judgment in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, and refused to grant bail while issuing directions for an expedited trial and reasonable facilities for the accused in custody.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether fresh conditions have arisen since the Supreme Court's order that would justify granting bail to the accused who were earlier refused bail by this Court.
  2. Whether the Supreme Court judgment in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab materially alters the position on bail so as to support grant of bail to the petitioners.
  3. Whether the externment of an important prosecution witness (Shreenath Narayan Shivadikar) and certain police statements not previously before the Court reduce the prima facie case against the accused and thus justify bail.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Accused's) Arguments — Mr. Ram Jethmalani

  • Four fresh conditions have arisen since the Supreme Court's order and these justify reconsideration and grant of bail to the present accused persons.
  • The four specific conditions relied upon were:
    • That more than three months had elapsed since the Supreme Court's order;
    • That chances of acquittal had increased because the main prosecution witness, Shreenath Narayan Shivadikar, had been externed from the limits of Greater Bombay;
    • That the recent Supreme Court judgment in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab changes the law on bail in a manner favourable to the accused;
    • That certain police statements, though in existence, were not before this Court at the time of its earlier order and their reading shows no prima facie case against the accused.
  • More broadly, counsel contended that courts are permitting bail more liberally in recent trends and that citizens' liberty should not be restrained more than is absolutely necessary.

State / Prosecution's Arguments — Mr. S.S. Parkar

  • The externed witness, though externed, is expected to be examined at the trial in support of the prosecution case; his externment therefore does not negate the prosecution case or make bail appropriate.
  • The police statements criticized by the petitioners were, in fact, available earlier and do not eliminate a prima facie case; one such statement (of Shreenath Narayan Shivadikar) implicates some of the present accused and was in existence when the earlier order was passed.
  • There is additional material not before the Court earlier: accused Nos. 4 and 5 (Bhaskar Krishna and Hirakant Shankar) were allegedly involved in an earlier murder while on bail in that earlier matter, and on investigating materials they also stand implicated in the present offence — a circumstance adverse to the petitioners.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 81; AIR 1980 SC 1632 The decision mainly concerned anticipatory bail, but contained observations on principles governing bail generally. The Court reviewed the judgment and concluded that it was mainly a decision on anticipatory bail and, although it contained observations on bail principles (including reference to prior authorities), it did not aid the petitioners sufficiently to warrant changing the earlier refusal of bail.
K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor, AIR 1931 All 504 (33 Cri LJ 94) (SB) — (referred to in Sibbia) Authority cited for the proposition that the power to grant bail is wide and not governed by a hard and fast rule; discretion must be exercised judiciously. The Court noted that the observations reiterate the flexible position in matters of bail and the absence of rigid rules; however, the Court held that this flexibility did not persuade it that fresh conditions existed to justify bail in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each of the grounds advanced by the petitioners in turn and explained why none warranted revisiting the earlier order refusing bail:

  1. Period elapsed since the Supreme Court order:

    The Court acknowledged that more than three months had elapsed since the Supreme Court's order but found that this lapse of time was not so long or comparatively fair and reasonable as to, by itself, justify reconsideration of the earlier rejection of bail.

  2. Externment of the prosecution witness (Shreenath Narayan Shivadikar):

    The Court held that externment of the witness cannot by itself be a circumstance favouring the accused because, according to the Public Prosecutor, the witness would still be examined at trial. The Court emphasized that the witness's evidence, when led and subjected to cross-examination, must be judged on its merits and that externment has limited relevance to the ultimate evaluation of that evidence.

  3. Reliance on Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia:

    The Court examined the Supreme Court's ruling in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and concluded that it was primarily concerned with anticipatory bail. While Sibbia contains observations on bail principles and refers to earlier authorities (including K.N. Joglekar), those observations merely reiterate the flexible nature of bail discretion. The Court found that this did not materially assist the petitioners in proving that fresh conditions had arisen to warrant bail.

  4. Police statements not previously before the Court:

    The Court considered the statement of Shreenath Narayan Shivadikar and concluded that a fair reading implicated not only accused No. 8 but also some of the present accused. The Court noted that this statement was in existence when the earlier order was passed, and the earlier order itself had referred to this and other statements recorded during investigation.

  5. New investigative material adverse to petitioners:

    The Court accepted the Public Prosecutor's point that accused Nos. 4 and 5 were allegedly involved in an earlier murder and that they were on bail in that earlier matter at the time the present offence occurred; the investigation implicates them in the present offence as well. The Court treated this as a material circumstance that arises against rather than in favour of the accused.

  6. Overall assessment and discretionary nature of bail:

    The Court reiterated that there is no rigid, scientific formula governing bail — each case must be decided on its particular facts and circumstances. Considering all material, including the earlier findings that there was "ample material" to find the accused surrounded the taxi and sufficient grounds to hold them guilty for purposes of the bail application under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the Court found no reason to alter its earlier view.

  7. Directions to protect liberty and ensure speedy trial:

    While refusing bail, the Court acknowledged the importance of liberty and the trend towards more liberal granting of bail, but balanced this against community security and the specific facts. To avoid restraining liberty more than reasonably necessary, the Court directed the Sessions Court to take up Sessions Case No. 207 of 1980 for expeditious trial, to conduct the trial day-to-day, and to conclude it by December 31, 1980. The Court also directed that reasonable facilities be provided to accused in custody to prepare their defence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court refused to grant bail to the present accused persons and declined to reconsider its earlier order dated April 24, 1980 refusing bail.

Immediate consequences and directions:

  • The Sessions Court was directed to take up Sessions Case No. 207 of 1980 for hearing and trial expeditiously, to conduct the trial day-to-day, and to dispose of the case by December 31, 1980.
  • The Court directed that all reasonable facilities be given to the accused persons in custody to prepare their defence and to instruct their counsel.
  • The rule earlier issued on the petition was discharged subject to these directions.
  • The Court observed that if at the end of the trial the accused were acquitted, their liberty would have been restrained for only about a month and a half from the date of the order; if convicted, continuation in detention would be justified.

The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent; it applies existing discretionary principles governing bail to the specific facts and materials before the Court and issues procedural directions to expedite trial and protect defence rights while maintaining the earlier refusal of bail.

    Dilip Shankar Koli And Others v. The State Of Maharashtra .

    1. This is a second application for bail by original accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 7 viz., Dilip Shankar Koli, Vishnu Haram Rajkumar, Bhaskar Krishna Uparkar, Hirakant Shankar Koli, Anthony Pascal Koli and Hareshwar Gotya Shankar. Earlier, these very accused persons along with one Ashok Balkrishna Vaiti (accused No. 8) had moved this Court for a similar relief of being released on bail. The said proceeding was numbered as Criminal Application No. 532 of 1980. By its detailed order dated April 24, 1980, this Court rejected the application for bail by the aforesaid accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 7. This Court, however, granted bail to the aforesaid original accused No. 8 Ashok Balkrishna Vaiti on certain terms and conditions. This order of April 24, 1980, refusing to grant bail to the present accused persons was challenged by them before the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1892 of 1980. Upon hearing counsel, the Supreme Court passed the following order on the said petition:

    “The petitioners seek leave to withdraw the petition for special leave to appeal. Nothing stands in the way of their applying again if fresh conditions arise.:’

    2. As indicated, the petitioners have now moved this Court by way of the present second application. In support of the application, I have heard Mr. Ram Jethmalani, the learned counsel for the petitioners. The State is represented by the learned Public Prosecution, Mr. S.S Parkar. Contention of Mr. Jethmalani, the learned counsel, is that four fresh conditions have arisen after the Supreme Court's aforesaid order and in view of these four fresh conditions, the present accused persons are entitled to bail. The said four conditions as enumerated by the learned counsel are as follows:—

    (a) More than three months have elapsed advance the date of the Supreme Court's order.

    (b) Chances of acquittal have increased by virtue of the fact that the main prosecution witness Shreenath Narayan Shivadikar has been externed from the limits of Greater Bombay.

    (c) There is now a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 81 : AIR 1980 SC 1632 : (1980 Cri LJ 1125), which, according to the learned counsel, considerably alters the position in matters of bail and consequently comes to the aid of the present accused in support of their present application.

    (d) Certain statements recorded by the police though actually in existence were, however, not before this Court when this Court rejected bail by its order dated April 24, 1980 and reading of the said statements shows no Drima facie case against the accused.

    3. I have considered each of the aforesaid grounds. I have also gone througli the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh's case supra. I have also gone through the police statements. In my view, however, I find no good reason to take any different view of the matter than the one already taken by this Court earlier and embodied in its order dated April 24, 1980. In my view, the aforesaid enumeration of circumstances by the learned counsel hardly results in the creation of fresh conditions as such. Even otherwise, change of circumstances, if at all, by virtue of the aforesaid enumeration of purported fresh conditions do not, in my opinion, make any material difference so as to warrant taking different view of the matter than the one already taken by this Court by its order dated April 24, 1980.

    4. It is no doubt true that after the Supreme Court's order, a period of three months have elapsed. This, however, is not lapse of such a great time or even comparatively fair and reasonable time so as to by itself warrant reconsideration of the earlier rejection of bail to the present accused persons. Again the circumstance that an important prosecution witness has been externed recently from the limits of Greater Bombay also cannot be a relevant ground on the question of bail to the present accused persons. That the aforesaid witness has been externed cannot by itself be a circumstance in favour of the present accused, persons Mr. Parkar, the learned Public Prosecutor, states that though externed, the said witness is going to be examined at the trial in support of the prosecution case. The evidence of the said witness when given and on being subjected to cross-examination will have to be considered on its own merits and the fact that the witness is an externee could have very limited relevance while considering his evidence on its own merits. This circumstance also, therefore, is not such a circumstance as to warrant reconsideration of the prayer for bail.

    5. Coming to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh's case supra, I do not see how it can come to the aid of the learned counsel in support of the present application. It was a decision mainly in relation to anticipatory bail, but observations undoubtedly have been made on principles governing bail. Some of these tests are well settled tests and in para 27 of its judgment, the Supreme Court has referred to the ruling of the Allahabad High Court in K.N Joglekar v. Emperor, AIR 1931 All 504 : (33 Cri LJ 94) (SB) (on which the learned counsel laid great emphasis) to the effect that—

    “Section 498, which corresponds to the present section 439 of the code, conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the Court that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by S. 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously.”

    6. Rather than supporting the contention of the learned counsel the aforesaid observations once again, if one may say so, reiterate the flexible position in matters of bail. There is no scientific formula in this behalf, nor are there any rigid principles as such. There is no uniform test which alone can govern matters of bail. Indeed, a matter of bail is one where the position will always depend on the facts and facts of each case and the circumstances of each case. Indeed, in the very same proceedings, circumstances can go on changing one way or the other and there can be no dispute that bail once refused can be later on given, nor any dispute that bail even given can be subsequently cancelled Each case, therefore, now as before has to be decided on the facts and circumstances arising at the relevant time for decision in each case. As indicated, I do not see how reliance on this judgment can help the petitioners in persuading this Court to hold that the conditions as existed when this Court passed its earlier order on April 24, 1980 refusing bail or when the Supreme Court passed its order on 1st August, 1980 permitting special leave petition to be withdrawn has undergone a change or in successfully contending that fresh conditions have arisen.

    7. Coming to the last circumstance, I have gone through the statement of Shreenath Narayan Shivadikar. A fair reading of the said statement must result in an irresistible conclusion that the witness involves not only the original accused No. 8 Ashok but also some of the present accused persons. As already stated, this statement was in existence at the time when this Court passed its earlier order. And still further, this Court's earlier order itself indicates a reference not only to the statement of this person but also a reference to the statement of certain other persons recorded in the course of investigation.

    8. I am in agreement with the finding ultimately reached by this Court in its order dated April 24, 1980 to the following effect:

    “There is ample material for the present to find that all the accused had surrounded the taxi in which the deceased and two other injured persons were travelling at the material time. I, therefore, find that there are sufficient grounds to hold all the persons guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code. Of course, this observation is being made only for the purpose of this bail application.”

    9. That apart, Mr. Parkar, the learned Public Prosecutor, has drawn the attention of this Court to another material circumstance which was not before this Court when it passed its earlier order on April 24, 1980 and which order also received, if one may say so, tacit approval of the Supreme Court which permitted the special leave petition from this order to be withdrawn and this circumstance is that the present accused Nos. 4 and 5, Bhaskar Krishna and Hirakant Shankar, were also involved in an earlier offence of murder and it is while they were on bail in the said matter that the present offence of murder has taken place and in the latter offence also, as per the investigating materials, the said accused also stand implicated. In all these circumstances, fresh conditions, if at all, have arisen against the accused rather than in their favour. In this view of the matter, the earlier order rejecting bail does not, in my view, deserve any reconsideration.

    10. Mr. Jethmalani, the learned counsel, however, contended that Court cannot ignore recent trends in the matter of granting bail more liberally than before nor can the Court permit liberty of citizens to be restrained more than is absolutely necessary. I am in agreement with this contention. Liberty of a citizen is undoubtedly of importance but the same has to be in a matter as of this nature balanced with the security of the community. But with a view that this liberty is not restrained more than what may be said to be reasonably necessary, I would direct the Sessions Court to take up Sessions Case No. 207 of 1980, registered in pursuance of the present offence, for hearing and trial expeditiously and to hold the; trial day-to-day and to dispose of the same expeditiously and in any event by December 31, 1980. If at the end of the trial, the accused stand acquitted, their liberty would have been restrained only for a period of a month and half as from now. But if the accused stand convicted at the end of the trial,.their continuation in detention must be then said to be justified.

    11. One more direction is given to the effect that all reasonable facilities shall be given to the accused persons, who are in custody, in order to prepare their defence and in order to instruct their counsel in that behalf. Subject to the direction given above, rule earlier issued on this petition stands discharged.

    12. Order accordingly.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Dilip Shankar Koli And Others v. The State Of Maharashtra .
    (Nov 13, 1980)