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  • gift-tax.6. Section 3 of the G.T Act
  • s. 48 of the Partnership Act.
  • s. 2(xxiv) of the G.T Act.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • gift-tax.6. Section 3 of the G.T Act
  • s. 48 of the Partnership Act.
  • s. 2(xxiv) of the G.T Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns Premji Trikamji Jobanputra, the assessee, who started a cloth business as a sole proprietor in 1946. Over time, partners were admitted, and two key partnership deeds dated July 15, 1960, and February 18, 1961, are relevant. The 1961 deed reconstituted the firm by admitting a new partner and three minors (including the assessee's two minor sons) to the benefits of the partnership, entitling them to shares of the profits but not liabilities. For assessment year 1962–63, the assessee declared gifts to his minor sons including a value for goodwill. The gift-tax officer (GTO) and appellate authorities disputed the valuation and applicability of gift-tax on the goodwill transferred to the minors. The Tribunal held that the minors were admitted only to the benefits of the partnership and no gift of goodwill was made, thus excluding goodwill from the gift-tax assessment. The revenue challenged this view, leading to a reference to the court for determination of whether the assessee owned a transferable portion of goodwill assignable to his minor sons attracting gift-tax.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the assessee, having reduced his share in the goodwill from 50% to 30% upon reconstitution of the firm and admitting his minor sons to the benefits of the partnership, made a gift of goodwill attracting gift-tax under the Gift-Tax Act.
  2. Whether the admission of minors to the benefits of the partnership amounts to a transfer of property or gift within the meaning of the Gift-Tax Act.
  3. Whether the Tribunal's view that no ownership of any particular portion of goodwill existed to be assigned to the minors was legally justified.
  4. What factual determinations are necessary to decide if a gift of goodwill occurred, including valuation of assets versus liabilities and presence or absence of capital contribution by minors.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The Tribunal erred in holding that no gift was made by the assessee when his minor sons were admitted to the benefits of the partnership.
  • The admission of minors with shares in profits represents a gift of a 3/5ths share of the assessee’s goodwill.
  • The question should be considered at the point of reconstitution, not after the partnership begins functioning.
  • The reduction in the assessee’s share and admission of minors constitutes a transfer of goodwill attracting gift-tax.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The Tribunal correctly held that admission of minors to the benefits of the partnership was a voluntary act of all major partners, not a gift by the assessee alone.
  • No partner has a specific right to individual partnership assets during the subsistence of the partnership; rights are limited to profit shares.
  • Minors admitted to benefits cannot be held liable for losses beyond their share of profits and accumulated amounts.
  • The Tribunal was right in concluding that no immediate gift of goodwill occurred upon admission of minors.
  • There was no transfer of ownership of goodwill to minors, only a sharing of profits contingent on partnership dissolution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CGT v. Chhotalal Mohanlal, [1974] 97 ITR 393 (Gujarat High Court) Whether admission of minors to benefits of partnership amounts to a gift; interpretation of "transfer of property" under s. 2(xxiv) and gift under s. 2(xii) of the Gift-Tax Act. The court noted that a mere reconstitution and admission of minors does not necessarily constitute a gift unless there is a voluntary transfer without consideration. The definition of transfer is wide and each case depends on its facts.
Ramniklal Chhotalal v. CGT, [1977] 106 ITR 799 (Gujarat High Court) Effect of reconstitution admitting minor son of retiring partner; whether this amounts to a gift by the retiring partner. The court held that admission of minor son by continuing partners could not be considered a gift by the retiring partner without transfer of share, highlighting the need to scrutinize actual transfer.
Addl. CGT v. A.A Annamalai Nadav, [1978] 113 ITR 574 (Madras High Court) Whether capital contribution by minors and major son admitted to partnership negates the element of gift under the Gift-Tax Act. The court found that where capital contribution and consideration exist, no gift arises. The case is distinguishable as minors contributed capital, negating a gift of goodwill.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the statutory definition of "gift" under s. 2(xii) and the concept of "transfer of property" under s. 2(xxiv) of the Gift-Tax Act. It identified four essentials for a gift: a voluntary transfer of existing movable or immovable property without consideration.

The goodwill of a partnership qualifies as property and thus can be subject to gift-tax if transferred as a gift. The court analyzed the facts of the reconstitution of the firm where the assessee’s share in profits (and thus goodwill) was reduced from 50% to 30%, and his two minor sons were admitted with 15% each.

The court emphasized that the critical question is whether this reconstitution resulted in a gift by the assessee to his minor sons. It rejected the Tribunal’s approach that focused only on the rights and liabilities during the subsistence of the partnership, clarifying that the issue is the nature of the transaction at the moment of reconstitution.

The court held that if the value of the assets including goodwill exceeds liabilities and there is no capital contribution or other consideration by the minors, the reduction in the assessee’s share in favor of his minor sons amounts to a voluntary transfer (gift) of goodwill.

The court found that neither the GTO, AAC, nor the Tribunal properly considered these factual determinations, and the Tribunal erred in law by overlooking the distinction between the reconstitution transaction and subsequent partnership operations.

In reviewing precedents, the court recognized that admission of minors to partnership benefits does not automatically constitute a gift; rather, the facts and circumstances must be examined, particularly whether there was a transfer without consideration.

The court concluded that the question of gift depends on factual inquiries: the net value of assets over liabilities and the presence or absence of capital contributions by minors. Only after such determination can it be concluded whether a gift of goodwill occurred.

Holding and Implications

The court answered the referred question in the negative, holding that the Tribunal’s view that the assessee had no ownership of any particular portion of goodwill assignable to his minor sons was not legally justified. However, whether a gift of goodwill occurred depends on factual determinations as specified.

The case is remitted for determination of relevant facts:

  • Whether the value of the assets including goodwill exceeds the liabilities of the earlier firm.
  • Whether the minors admitted to the benefits of the partnership made any capital contribution or there was any other consideration.

Only based on these findings can it be concluded if a gift of goodwill took place attracting gift-tax liability.

The court ordered that each party bear its own costs. No new legal precedent was established beyond clarifying the proper legal approach and factual considerations in such partnership reconstitution cases involving minors and gift-tax.

    Commissioner Of Gift-Tax, Bombay City-Ii v. Premji Trikamji Jobanputra.

    Kantawala, C.J:— At the instance of the revenue, the following question has been referred to us for our determination:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and particularly having regard to the fact that the assessee himself had estimat-???d the value of the goodwill transferred at Rs. 22,500, the Tribunal had materials before it and was justified in holding in law that the assessee had, at no stage, the ownership of any particular portion of the goodwill which could be assigned to his minor sons and which would attract gift-tax n??? the material years?”

    2. Premji Trikamji Jobanputra, the assessee, started business in cloth in ???he name of M/s. M. Premji & Co. in or about the year 1946 as a sole pro-prietor thereof. After commencement of the business from time to time he ???ook certain others as partners in the business. In the present case, we are ???oncerned with only two of the partnership deeds dated July 15, 1960, and February 18, 1961. By the former deed of partnership, a partnership was formed between the assessee and one A.P Sheth, with effect from the first lay of Vaisakh, Samwat year 2006 (June 1, 1950). Under this deed of part-lership, the two partners were to share the profits and losses in equal pro-???ortions. There was a change in the constitution of the firm with effect ???rom February 15, 1961, and the terms of the said change of the constitution vere put into writing by a new instrument of partnership executed on February 18, 1961. The new instrument of partnership provided that the assessee and A.P Sheth, who were the partners under the earlier deed, offered to admit Manubhai Amritlal Sheth as a partner of the firm on the ???erms and conditions contained in the said partnership deed and Manubhai Amritlal Sheth in his turn accepted the said offer and joined as a partner ???rom February 16, 1961. It further provided that the assessee, A.P Sheth, ???nd M.A Sheth agreed to admit three minors, Manharlal Premji ???obanputra, Arvind Premji Jobanputra and Pankaj Amritlal Sheth, to the ???enefits of the partnership from February 16, 1961, upon the terms and ???onditions contained in the said instrument. The provision about sharing ???he profits and losses was contained in cl. 5 of the deed of the newly con-itituted partnership, the material part thereof is as under:

    “That the profits of the partnership business shall be divided between the parties hereto in the following proportions:

    Rs. (1) Shri Amritlal Premchand Sheth 0.20 (2) Shri Premji Trikumji Jobanputra 0.30 (3) Shri Manubhai Amritlal Sheth 0.10 Minors admitted to benefits of partnership: (4) Manharlal Premji Jobanputra 0.15 (5) Arvind Premji Jobanputra 0.15 (6) Pankaj Amritlal Sheth 0.10 1.00

    And they shall in like proportion bear all losses including loss of capi tal, if any, PROVIDED ALWAYS and it is hereby agreed between the par ties hereto that the said minors, viz., Manharlal Premji Jobanputra, Arvin??? Premji Jobanputra and Pankaj Amritlal Sheth, shall be entitled to t??? benefits of the partnership ONLY and shall not be liable for any losses a??? obligations of the said firm but their share in the profits of the partnershi??? firm ONLY shall be liable for any losses or obligations of the said firm an??? that pending the said minors attaining the age of majority their shares i??? the profits shall be accumulated to the credit of the said minors so as to b??? available to meet their share of loss, if any, incurred by the firm at an??? time during their minority……….”

    3. Clause 6 reads as under:

    “That the reconstituted firm has taken over all the assets and liabilities of the old firm of ‘M. Premji & Co.’ and the reconstituted firm shall be entitled to the benefits of the firm name, goodwill and quota rights of the old partnership business.”

    4. For the assessment year 1962–63, for which the previous year was the period between October 21, 1960, and November 8, 1961, the asses see filed a return under the G.T Act, wherein he firstly showed a sut of Rs. 26,000 as a cash gift to his minor son, Manhar, and also include in his return a sum of Rs. 7,500 as the value of the goodwill he gifte to his minor sons, Manhar and Arvind, who were, inter alia, admitted to th benefits of the partnership. The GTO, while accepting that the value ??? the goodwill was to be assessed to the extent of 2/5ths of the total goodwil computed the quantum of the gift at Rs. 69,184. In an appeal by t??? assessee before the AAC, the quantum of the goodwill was disputed by hi??? but the AAC, for the reasons given in his order, enhanced the value of t??? gift to Rs. 93,398.

    5. In a further appeal by the assessee before the Tribunal, one of the con-tentions taken up by the assessee related to the valuation of the goodwill. However, the Tribunal did not decide this point as it took the view that no gift-tax was attracted by the admission of the minors to the benefits of the partnership. Before the Tribunal, the main contention on behalf of the assessee was that in law no gift-tax could be charged since the goodwill solely belonged to the adult partners and to the minors who were admitted only to the benefits of the partnership. This contention on behalf of the assessee was not accepted by the Tribunal because under the Partnership Act a minor also would be entitled on the dissolution of a firm to a share of the surplus assets which would include the value of the goodwill. However, the Tribunal took the view that no gift was made by the assessee to his minor sons by admitting them to the benefits of the partnership. Firstly, it held that the admission of the minors was by a voluntary act of the three major partners and not by an individual act of bounty by the assessee who was one of the partners. Secondly, it pointed out that during the subsistence of a partnership, having regard to the partnership law, no partner has any particular right to any specific asset of the partnership business. It pointed out that during the subsistence of the partnership no partner can deal with any portion of the assets of the partnership as his own, nor can he assign his interest in any specific item of the partnership to anyone. His right is to obtain such profits, if any, as falling to his share from time to time and upon a dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm which remain after satisfying the liabili-ties as provided by s. 48 of the Partnership Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal took the view that the assessee had at no stage the ownership of any parti-cular portion of the goodwill, if any, of the firm, much less a right to assign any portion of it, to his minor son. In the accounting year all that the minors were entitled to was to participate in the profits. By their admission into the firm, there was no immediate gift of a portion of the goodwill to them, which would attract gift-tax in the material year. The Tribunal further held that there was no gift of goodwill in the accounting year and the value of the goodwill should be excluded entirely from the assessment. Necessary directions were issued to the GTO ???n accordance with the order. It is from this order of the Tribunal that ???he above question has been referred to us for our determination. Mr. Joshi, on behalf of the revenue, submitted that the Tribunal was ???n error in taking the view, that there was no gift to be subjected to tax when, inter alia, the two minor sons of the assessee were admitted to the benefits of the partnership under the partnership deed dated February 18, 961. He urged that the Tribunal was in error in emphasising the rights and liabilities of the partners as also of the minors who are admitted to the benefits of the partnership after the business is carried on. He submitted that the question that has to be considered in the present case is whether there is a gift by the assessee to any of his two minor sons or to both of them at the time when, as a result of the deed of partner-ship, dated February 18, 1961, his two minor sons, Manharlal and Arvind, were admitted to the benefits of the partnership, with the share in profits as provided in the said deed. He submitted that there was a gift of 3/5ths share of the assessee in the goodwill in the earlier partnership. He pointed out that, as indicated by the AAC, the assessee had 50 per cent, share in the goodwill under the deed of partnership dated July 15, 1950, and upon the reconstitution of the firm, there was a gift of 3/5ths share in the goodwill by the assessee in favour of his two minor sons. He submitted that the matter has to be looked at the point of time when the recon-stitution takes place and the Tribunal was in error in really emphasising the rights and liabilities of the partners as well as the minors after the reconstitution of the firm when it started functioning and doing business. In short, his submission is that the Tribunal was in error in taking the view that at no stage the ownership of any particular portion of the good-will could be said to be assigned to the minor sons when they were admitted to the benefits of the partnership which would attract gift-tax in the material year. Mr. Mehta, on the other hand, on behalf of the assessee, submitted that the Tribunal was right in taking the view that when the three minors were admitted to the benefits of the partnership, that was done by a voluntary act of the major partners and there was no question of any gift being made by the assessee, who was one of the three major partners in the newly constituted firm. Even otherwise, he sub-mitted that during the subsistence of the partnership no partner including the minors who were admitted to the benefits of partnership can say that h??? has a specific share in a particular asset belonging to the firm. During th??? subsistence of a partnership, a partner is entitled to his share of profits o: is liable to bear losses, but so far as a minor, who is admitted to the benefits of the partnership is concerned, he cannot be held personally liable, but if there are profits, he is entitled to a proportionate share in the profit but if there are losses suffered by the firm, then his liability will be restricted only to the extent of the minor's interest in the assets of th firm. Upon the dissolution of a firm, he submitted, it is only after the liabilities of the firm are discharged that the partner including the mino who are admitted to the benefits of the partnership will be entitled to have a share in the surplus assets that may be left after the discharge of su??? liability. He, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal was right in holdin??? that during the subsistence of a partnership no partner can say that h??? has a particular or definite share in the individual asset belonging to the partnership. In short, his submission was that the Tribunal, was right in taking the view that upon the admission of the minors to the benefits of the partnership, there was no immediate gift of a portion of the goodwill to them which would attract liability to gift-tax.

    6. Section 3 of the G.T Act is the charging section. Under the said section, subject to the other provisions contained in the Act, there shall be charged for every assessment year commencing on and from the 1st day of April, 1958, a tax, referred to as gift-tax in respect of the gifts, if any, made by a person during the previous year. Under this section, the liability to payment of gift-tax can arise only if there is a gift as contemplated by the Act. The word “gift” is defined in s. 2(xii) of the Act, which provides that under the Act, unless the context otherwise requires, “gift” means the transfer by one person to another of any existing movable or immov-able property made voluntarily and without consideration in money or money's worth. In order that a gift is made within the meaning of the Act, the following essentials are to be fulfilled:

    (1) there must be a transfer by one person to another;

    (2) the transfer should be of any existing movable or immovable pro-perty;

    (3) the transfer must be made voluntarily; and

    (4) the transfer must be made without consideration in money or money's worth.

    7. If all these essentials are fullfilled, then there will be a gift within the meaning of the Act as defined in cl. (xii) of s. 2. As mentioned in cl. (xxii) of s. 2, “property” includes any interest in property, and by this inclusive definition the goodwill of a partnership will be “property”. The expres-sion “transfer of property” is defined in cl. (xxiv) of s. 2 as under:

    “‘Transfer of property’ means any disposition, conveyance, assignment, settlement, delivery, payment or other alienation of property and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes—

    (a) the creation of a trust in property;

    (b) the grant or creation of any lease, mortgage, charge, easement, licence, power, partnership or interest in property;

    (c) the exercise of a power of appointment of property vested in any person, not the owner of the property, to determine its disposition in favour of any person other than the donee of the power; and

    (d) any transaction entered into by any person with intent thereby to diminish directly or indirectly the value of his own property and to in-crease the value of the property of any other person.”

    8. It is on a consideration of these statutory provisions that we have to consider whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is a gift by the assessee in respect of his share in the good-will when his two minor sons, Manharlal and Arvind, were admitted to the benefits of the partnership as a result of which the assessee who had prior to this transaction 50 per cent, share in profits got it reduced to 30 per cent, and the two minor sons, Manharlal and Arvind, were each given 15 per cent, share. It cannot be gainsaid that under the partnership deed dated July 15, 1950, there were only two partners, viz., the assessee and A.P Sheth. Each of them was entitled to eight annas share in the pro-fits and losses and, accordingly, in all the assets of the firm including the goodwill of the business each of them had 50 per cent, share. What we have to consider in the present case is the effect of the new deed of part-nership executed on February 18, 1961. By this deed with effect from February 16, 1961, the two earlier partners, viz., the assessee and A.P Sheth, admitted a third partner, viz., Manubhai Sheth, as a partner therein. These three partners agreed to admit three minors to the bene-fits of the partnership. As a result of this reconstitution, the shares in pro-fits and losses which under the earlier partnership deed were shared equal-ly by the assessee and A.P Sheth were altered. As a result of the new deed, the assessee's share in the profits was reduced from 50% to 30%. A.P Sheth's share in the profits was reduced from 50% to 20%, while Manubhai Amritlal Sheth was given 10% share in the profits. The remaining share in the profits was distributed amongst the three minors who were admitted to the benefits of the partnership. Out of the three minors, two are the sons of the assessee, viz., Manharlal and Arvind, and each one of them has been given 15 per cent, share while Pankaj, who is the son of the other partner, A.P Sheth, has been given 10 per cent, share. What we have to consider is whether by such reconstitution of the firm in the manner indicated above was there any gift of the goodwill of the earlier firm by the assessee to his two minor sons, Manharlal and Arvind, who were admitted to the benefits of the partnership. It cannot be disputed that under the earlier tleed of partnership, which consisted of only two partners, since the two partners had an equal share in the profits and losses including the assets of the firm, each one of them had 50 per cent, share even in the goodwill of the business. When the old firm was reconstitut-ed in the manner indicated above, the share of the assessee was reduced from 50 per cent, to 30 per cent., while the share of the other partner, viz. A.P Sheth, was reduced from 50 per cent, to 20 per cent. By the recon-stitution of the firm two erstwhile partners decided to take a third partner Manubhai Amritlal Sheth, and he was given 10 per cent, share. Thereafter the three major partners in their turn agreed to admit the minors to the benefits of the partnership. However, though apparently it may look that the shares are given to the minors on their admission to the benefits of the partnership as a result of the agreement between the three partners, it is quite evident that the manner in which the quantum of the shares is readjusted will clearly go to indicate that it is a share of the erstwhile partners which has been reduced with a view to confer, inter alia, rights upon the minors who have been admitted to the benefits of the partnership.

    9. If the real nature of the transaction that has been entered into as a result of the reconstitution of the firm shows that so far as the goodwill is concerned, the assessee, who is the father of the two minors, Manharlal and Arvind, has parted with 20 per cent, share in the goodwill in favour of his minor children and the circumstances do not show that there was any consideration for the same, then naturally such transfer of goodwill to the extent of 20 per cent, in favour of the two minor sons by the assessee, who is the father, would amount to a gift in favour of the minors. It should not be overlooked that under the earlier firm the assessee had 50 per cent, share while under the reconstituted firm it has been reduced to 30 per cent. So far as the shares of the two minors, Manharlal and Arvind, who are, inter alia, admitted to the benefits of the partnership are concerned, they are 15 per cent. each. So, at least to the extent to which the 50 per cent, share of the assessee under the earlier partnership has been reduced to 30 per cent., the balance of 20 per cent, is transferred to his minor child-ren. Legally, it would be right to contend that when minors are admitted to the benefits of a partnership all the majors had agreed to the same. But the real nature of the transaction can vary if the facts of a particular case are properly scrutinized and the legitimate inference that can be permissi-ble in law is drawn. However, it should not be overlooked in the present case that neither the GTO nor the AAC nor even the Tribunal has approach-ed the problem from a proper point of view. In the present case, as a result of the constitution of the firm, one major person has been taken up as a partner. He appears to be the brother of one of the erstwhile partners while three minors are admitted to the benefits of the partnership with the consent of these three major partners. Out of the three minors, two are the sons of the assessee while the third minor is the son of another part-ner. If regard be had to the provisions of the deed of partnership dated February 18, 1961, which was to have effect from February 16, 1961, it is quite clear that the newly constituted firm has taken over not only the assets of the old firm but also the liabilities thereof. When such is the position, whether the net result of the transaction will amount to a gift by any partner in favour of any other person will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If the value of the assets including the goodwill of the earlier firm is less than the liability thereof, then there can be no question of gift upon a reconstitution of the firm because the liability exceeds the value of the assets. It is only when the value of the assets including the goodwill exceeds the total liabilities of the earlier firm, that the question of gift of the goodwill can arise. However, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether there has been a gift in respect of the goodwill. If upon the reconstitution of a firm, an erstwhile partner or even a minor who has been admitted to the benefits of a part-nership has contributed any capital or a major partner has agreed to pay something, then it will not be possible to take the view that so far as the goodwill is concerned there has been a gift because in such a case there has been a consideration, if not in money at least in money's worth. Thus, the question whether there has been a gift of 29 per cent, share in the good-will by the assessee to his minor sons will depend upon the determination of two specific questions, viz., (1) whether the value of the assets of the ear-lier firm including the goodwill exceeds the total liabilities of the earlier firm, and (2) whether the incoming partner or a minor who has been admitted to the benefits of the partnership has brought in any capital. So far as the incoming partner is concerned, a further question arises whether there is consideration, if not in money, at least in money's worth. Unless such questions are determined, it would not be possible to lay down as a general rule that there has been a gift in respect of the goodwill whenever a firm is reconstituted as a result of which, inter alia, minors are admitted to the benefits of a partnership and the share in the goodwill of one of the partners is reduced and the same is pro rata given to the minors who are so admitted to the benefits of the partnership. One thing, however, is clear that so far as the Tribunal was concerned, its approach to the problem was entirely erroneous. A well recognized distinction which has been maintained as to the effect of a change in the constitution of a firm while, inter alia, a minor is admitted to the benefits of the partnership and the ultimate result which may flow as a result of the working of the reconsti-tuted firm has been overlooked. The general tenor of the order of the Tribunal proceeds on the footing that if the reconstituted firm carried on business after such reconstitution the alteration would be in respect of the rights and liabilities of the partners including the minors who are admit-ted to the benefits of the partnership. We are not concerned with a question of that type. The material and sole question that has to be considered is whether at the very point of reconstitution of the firm there has been a gift by one partner to the other and, if so, then what is the value of the gift. The view that has been taken by the Tribunal thus appears to be erroneous because the well-recognized distinction which has been pointed out earlier has been overlooked by it. The Tribunal was substantially carried away by the effect of a reconstituted firm carrying on business and thereafter sharing profits or losses or sharing their rights in the property upon the dissolution of a reconstituted firm.

    10. Our attention was invited to the two decisions of the Gujarat High Court and a decision of the Madras High Court. On behalf of the assessee reliance was placed upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CGT v. Chhotalal Mohanlal, [1974] 97 ITR 393. This was a case where the assessee and two other persons, G and P, were partners of a firm having seven annas, four annas and five annas shares, respectively. P retired from the partnership and a new partnership deed was executed on Novem-ber 9, 1960, between the assessee, G, and the assessee's son, R, each of them having 26 per cent, share. The assessee's two minor sons, K and D, were ad-mitted to the benefits of the partnership, their shares being 12 per cent, and 13 per cent., respectively, in the profits. In the assessment year 1963–64, the GTO held that there was a gift by the assessee of a share in the good-will of the firm. On appeal, that decision was reversed by the AAC. However, he took the view that there was a gift of the profits in favour of the minors, K and D, and determined the value of the said gift. On further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal held that the right to share future profits was a future property and, as the right to share the future profits was not an existing property, there was no gift. On a reference, the Gujarat High Court took the view that in the old partnership, the retiring partner, P, had a five annas share (31%). The benefits to which the minors, K and D, were admitted under the reconstituted firm were to the extent of 12% and 13%, respectively, in the profits. R, who joined the new partnership, was given a share of 25%. On those facts it could not be said that the share of 25% given jointly to the two minors was any relinquishment or abandonment by the assessee. Secondly, assuming that the right to a share in the profits of a partnership business is a property, even then, it could not be said that when the firm was reconstituted and the minor sons were admitted to the benefits of the partnership business, there was consequently a relinquishment or abandonment of any debt, contract or other actionable claim or any interest in the property of any person. It cannot be said that when a firm is reconstituted and as a result of its reconstitution, the shares of some partners who have continued after the reconstitution have been diminished, and the new partners who joined have been given some shares by the adjustment of the shares amongst the old partners, there is a transfer of property within the meaning of s. 2(xxiv) of the G.T Act. It could not be said that, when the minors were admitted to the benefits of the partnership, a transaction was entered into between the minors and the adult partners of the firm and s. 2(xxiv)(d) was not applicable. Therefore, there was no transfer of property and without transfer of property, s. 2(xii) of the Act was not attracted. The Gujarat High Court took the view that the benefits of the partnership given to the minors, K and D, was not a gift under the G.T Act. With respect to the learned judge it is difficult to accept as an absolute proposition of law, that when a firm is reconstituted and as a result of its reconstitution shares of some of the erstwhile partners have been diminished and new partners after reconstitution have been given some shares, there can be no question of a transfer of property within the meaning of s. 2(xxiv) of the Act. It will depend upon the facts of each case whether there has been a transfer or not, and whether such a transfer amounts to a gift as defined in s. 2(xii) of the Act. It is also equally difficult to accept the proposition therein laid down that it cannot be said that when the minors are admitted to the benefits of the partnership, a transaction was entered into between the minors and the adult partners of the firm. The definition of the expression “transfer of property” as defined in s. 2(xxiv) is wide enough to include within its scope, inter alia, any assignment, or alienation of property. If upon a proper scrutiny of a particular transaction it appears that the share of a major erstwhile partner is reduced and the share so reduced has been given to his minor children who are admitted to the benefits of the partnership, there may result assignment or alienation of property. In such a case, a transfer of property takes place; if such transfer is effected voluntarily, and without consideration in money or in money's worth, then a gift as defined in s. 2(xii) of the Act will take place. What is required to be seen is whether such a transfer has been effected voluntarily and without consideration in money or money's worth and if that is so, then it will not be correct to take the view that a gift as defined in s. 2(xii) of the Act has not taken place. Reference was also made on behalf of the assessee to another decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramniklal Chhotalal v. CGT, [1977] 106 ITR 799. This was also a case of the reconstitution of a firm as a result of which one of the partners retired and the continuing partners admitted the retiring partner's minor son to the benefits of the partner-ship. The Gujarat High Court took the view that there was only a recon-stitution of the firm and the admission of the minor son of R to the benefits of the partnership with the consent of the continuing partners could not amount to a gift by R in favour of his minor son. In this case also the question was whether R on his retirement from the partnership firm took away his share of profits and the assets of the firm or not? If he has not taken away his share of profits in the assets of the firm on retirement, then one of the two alternative events is deemed to have taken place; either R gifted his share in the profits and the assets to the continuing partners or he indirectly transferred the same to his minor son who was admitted to the benefits of the partnership by the continuing partners. In either of these two cases, it is not possible to take the view that a gift as defined in the Act does not come into play.

    11. Reference was also made on behalf of the assessee to a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Addl. CGT v. A.A Annamalai Nadav, [1978] 113 ITR 574. This case is clearly distinguishable on its own facts. When a sole proprietary concern was converted into a partnership by admitting one of the major sons of the erstwhile partners as a partner and admitting his two minor sons to the benefits of the partnership, the question arose whether there was a gift in respect of the goodwill in favour of the major and the two minor sons. Having regard to the facts, it is quite evident that this was a clear case where there was a consideration in money or money's worth. When the major son was made a partner and when the two minor sons were admitted to the benefits of the partnership there was a capital contribution by each one of them. Secondly, so far as the major son was concerned, he agreed to render services as well as agreed to share the loss. In such a case, as consideration in money or money's worth exists, the concept of a gift of the goodwill does not come into play. Mr. Mehta, however, relied upon the observations at p. 577, where it is stated that as far as the minor sons are concerned, there was absolutely no transfer of any assets as such so that there could be no gift of any goodwill in their favour. This is merely a passing observation and is not the ratio of the case. As we have indicated earlier, since there was a capital contribution not only by the major son who was taken up as a partner but also by the minors who were admitted to the partnership, there was consideration in money or money's worth and one of the essential ingredients to make the transfer, a gift, is lacking in the case. This case, in our opinion, is, therefore, of no assistance to Mr. Mehta. In our opinion, it is not possible to lay down a general rule in a case like this which will be applicable to all cases where there is a change in the constitution of the firm as a result of which a major partner has been introduced and some minors have been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. Whether in the case of such a transaction there would be a gift or not will depend upon the facts of each case, tf, in the present case, when the two minors of the assessee were admitted to the benefits of the partnership as a result of the partnership deed dated February 18, 1961, the question whether there was a gift in respect of the goodwill of the business to the extent of 20 per cent, by the assessee to his ???wo minor sons, Manharlal and Arvind, will depend upon the determina-???ion of the following facts: (1) whether the value of the assets and good-will of the earlier business was in excess of the total liabilities of the ear-ier business, and (2) whether on behalf of the minors, when they were ???dmitted to the benefits of the partnership, there was any capital contribu-???ion. If the value of the assets except the goodwill does not exceed the ???iabilities of the erstwhile firm, then there can be no case of a gift in respect of the goodwill. Similarly, if there is any capital contribution by or on behalf of the minors who are admitted to the benefits of the partnership, there can be no gift in respect of the goodwill. If neither of these two ingredients is present, then on the facts of the present case, so far as the assessee was concerned, by reason of the reconstitution of the firm there was a gift by the assessee of the 20% share in the goodwill in favour of his minor sons, Manharlal and Arvind, and the value to be put on such 20% of the goodwill will depend upon the facts of the case which may be determined having regard to the state of accounts of the partnership.

    12. Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, but the question whether there was a gift or not will depend upon the determination of the facts as we have indicated earlier. Having regard to the state of law in respect of similar transactions, the fair order as to costs will be that each party will bear its own costs.

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    Commissioner Of Gift-Tax, Bombay City-Ii v. Premji Trikamji Jobanputra.
    (Aug 17, 1978)