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  • s. 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • provisions of O. XIX, r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XIX, r. 3(1)
  • s. 85. Section 81 dealt with presentation of petitions; s. 82
  • rules 7 and 9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules.
  • Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules
  • Rule 9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules
  • provisions of s. 81, s. 83 or s. 117. Section 90
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • Act 27 of 1956. As amended sub-s. (3)
  • rule 7 of the High Court Rules
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • s. 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • provisions of O. XIX, r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XIX, r. 3(1)
  • s. 85. Section 81 dealt with presentation of petitions; s. 82
  • rules 7 and 9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules.
  • Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules
  • Rule 9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules
  • provisions of s. 81, s. 83 or s. 117. Section 90
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • Act 27 of 1956. As amended sub-s. (3)
  • rule 7 of the High Court Rules
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Chandurkar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This election petition, filed under s. 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (the Act), challenges the election of respondent No. 1, Ramu son of Mhatang Patel, who was returned from the Melghat (S.T.) Assembly Constituency No. 110 at the General Elections held on March 5, 1972. The petitioner claims to be an elector of that constituency and alleges that respondent No. 1 committed corrupt practices under s. 123(4) of the Act.

The petition was accompanied by an affidavit in the form prescribed by rule 94A (Form 25) of the Conduct of Election Rules, in which the petitioner verified that paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 of the petition were true to his personal knowledge and paragraphs 8 to 11 were true to information received and believed to be true.

Respondent No. 1, in his written statement, contended that the affidavit was defective because it did not state the source of the information and the grounds of belief, and consequently the petition should be rejected without inquiry into the alleged corrupt practices. The parties agreed to treat the question of the affidavit's sufficiency as preliminary issues (Issues 1(a) and 1(b)) and argued those issues first.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the affidavit filed by the petitioner (in Form 25) is defective for failing to disclose the source(s) of information and the grounds of belief.
  2. If the affidavit is defective, whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent No. 1's Arguments

  • The affidavit is defective because it does not disclose the source of information and the grounds of belief for allegations of corrupt practice.
  • Even though Form 25 does not expressly require disclosure of sources, Order XIX, rule 3(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) requires affidavits to be confined to facts of the deponent's own knowledge and, where statements of belief are admitted, the grounds of belief must be stated; therefore the petitioner was duty bound to disclose sources/grounds in the affidavit.
  • Reliance was placed heavily on the Supreme Court decision in Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jagjiwan (1972 1 SCC 826) to support the contention that sources/grounds must be disclosed and non-disclosure amounts to non-compliance with s. 83 of the Act.

Petitioner's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The petitioner filed an affidavit in full compliance with Form 25 prescribed under the Conduct of Election Rules, stating which paragraphs of the petition were true to personal knowledge and which were true to information and believed to be true.
  • Implicit in the record is the position that compliance with Form 25 satisfies the proviso to s. 83(1) with respect to affidavits verifying allegations of corrupt practice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jagjiwan, 1972 1 SCC 826 Discussion that grounds or sources of information should be set out in affidavits in election petitions; held that affidavit is to be modelled on Order XIX of the CPC and that grounds/sources are required where High Court rules required disclosure. The court distinguished Saklecha: it held that the observations in para. 14 of Saklecha must be read in context where Madhya Pradesh High Court rules (rules 7 and 9) positively required disclosure of sources. Thus Saklecha does not establish a universal rule that Form 25 must be supplemented by disclosure of sources in jurisdictions where no such High Court rule exists.
A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 12 Importance of verification: verification tests genuineness and authenticity of allegations and makes the deponent responsible for allegations. The court referred to Nambiar to support the general proposition about the significance of verification in election petitions, i.e., verification promotes responsibility for allegations, but did not use it to override the prescribed Form 25 where Central rules did not require sources.
Murarka Badhey Shyam v. Roop Singh, [1964] A.I.R. S.C. 1545 Held that failure to disclose sources of information and grounds of belief in verification/affidavit is not a fatal defect; non-compliance with s.83 is not necessarily fatal to maintainability of petition. The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to support the view that non-disclosure of sources is not fatal and that defects in verification can be treated as curable rather than attracting dismissal under provisions dealing with presentation or contents of petitions.
Satish Kumar v. Election Tribunal, [1963] A.I.R. Raj. 157 Observed that if an affidavit substantially complies with the prescribed form, it should not be rejected merely because it does not tally in material particulars; substantial compliance is relevant. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that substantial compliance with Form 25 is acceptable and that minor defects can be cured (for example by allowing a further affidavit).
Brij Mohan v. Z.A. Ahmad, [1964] A.I.R. All. 523 Held that the affidavit required by the proviso to s. 83(1) need not necessarily accompany the petition at presentation and the Election Tribunal can receive the affidavit later when the petition is transferred for trial. The court cited this as support for the view that procedural strictness (e.g., absence of affidavit at presentation) should not automatically lead to dismissal and that affidavits may be received later by the Tribunal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a textual and contextual analysis of the statutory scheme, the Conduct of Election Rules (Form 25), the Code of Civil Procedure (Order XIX, rule 3), and the precedents cited by the parties.

Key analytical steps taken by the court:

  1. Distinction between Form 25 and Order XIX, r. 3 CPC: The court observed that Form 25, prescribed by the Central Government under rule-making power (s. 169 of the Act), requires the deponent to state which parts of the petition are true to personal knowledge and which are true to information. Order XIX, r. 3(1) of the CPC generally requires affidavits to be confined to facts of the deponent's knowledge and, where belief is stated, the grounds of belief must be given in interlocutory contexts. The court emphasized that the object and context of affidavits in election petitions differ from affidavits in interlocutory applications under the CPC.
  2. Examination of Saklecha: The court examined Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jagjiwan and noted that the Supreme Court in that case was interpreting provisions in a context where the Madhya Pradesh High Court had specific rules (Rules 7 and 9) that required disclosure of sources/grounds in affidavits. The court read the Supreme Court's para. 14 observations in their factual context and held that Saklecha's requirement flowed from the High Court rules that supplemented Form 25, not from an absolute requirement applicable where no such High Court rule exists.
  3. Purpose of the affidavit in election petitions: The court stressed that the primary purpose of the affidavit required by the proviso to s. 83(1) is to prevent wild allegations of corrupt practices by imposing an element of responsibility (including potential prosecution for false statements) on the deponent; it is not primarily intended to serve as evidentiary material in place of oral or documentary evidence at trial. Consequently, the absence of disclosure of sources does not necessarily render an affidavit defective if it complies with the prescribed Form 25.
  4. Statutory construction regarding consequences of non-compliance: The court noted that s. 86 expressly directs dismissal only for non-compliance with s. 81, s. 82 or s. 117. The proviso to s. 83(1), which requires affidavits alleging corrupt practice, does not itself carry an express statutory consequence of dismissal for non-compliance. The court reasoned that had the Legislature intended nondisclosure of sources to render the affidavit a nullity and the petition incompetent, it could have provided for dismissal in the Act; the omission implies that defects under s. 83 are not intended to attract automatic dismissal under s. 86.
  5. Reliance on precedent holding non-disclosure non-fatal: The court relied on Murarka Badhey Shyam v. Roop Singh to support the proposition that failure to disclose sources of information or grounds of belief in the verification is not a fatal defect and that such defects fall within curable categories. The court also cited decisions (Satish Kumar, Brij Mohan) showing judicial practice of allowing supplementation or later filing of affidavits and of accepting substantial compliance with the prescribed form.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: On these bases—the compliance of the present affidavit with Form 25, the distinct purpose of the election-petition affidavit, the absence of an express statutory sanction of dismissal for non-disclosure in s. 83, and the precedents—the court concluded that the affidavit was not defective for failing to disclose the sources of information and grounds of belief.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Issue No. 1(a): The affidavit is not defective.

Issue No. 1(b): Does not arise; if necessary, answered in the negative (i.e., the petition is not liable to be dismissed on this ground).

Implications:

  • The immediate and direct effect is that the election petition will not be dismissed on the ground that the affidavit failed to disclose sources of information or grounds of belief; the trial of the petition will proceed further on its merits.
  • The court treated compliance with Form 25 as sufficient in the absence of any High Court rule requiring fuller disclosure; defects of the kind alleged are curable and do not automatically render the petition incompetent for want of an affidavit under s. 83.
  • The opinion does not purport to announce a new, sweeping rule beyond the contextual reasoning set out; rather it distinguishes prior decisions (notably Saklecha) on their factual basis (presence of High Court rules requiring disclosure) and relies on earlier authority for the non-fatality of such defects. The decision is therefore limited in scope to the statutory and rule context described in the opinion.

Formal disposition recorded in the opinion: "Answers accordingly" — the preliminary issues were resolved as set out above and the petition proceeds to trial.

    Manohar Narayan Joshi v. Ramu Mhatang Patel

    Chandurkar, J.:— In this election petition, issues Nos. 1(a) and 1(b) have been argued by the parties as preliminary issues. These issues are:

    1.(a) Is the affidavit filed by the petitioner defective?

    (b) If yes, is the petition liable to be dismissed?

    2. The facts, which are not required to be stated in detail, in this case are that respondent No. 1, Ramu son of Mhatang Patel, was elected from the Melghat (S.T) Assembly Constituency No. 110 at the General Elections to the State Legislative Assembly held on March 5, 1972. The petitioner, who claims to be an elector in the said Constituency, has filed this election petition challenging the election of respondent No. 1 on the ground that respondent No. 1 was guilty of corrupt practices under s. 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This election petition is filed under s. 80 of the Act. Section 83 of the Act deals with the contents of an election petition, and under the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 83, where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition is also required ??? by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the all ??? of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. The form ??? is prescribed under rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules, ??? referred to as the Rules). This rule provides that the ??? to in the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 83 shall be sworn before a Magistrate of the first class or a notary or a commissioner of oaths and shall be in Form 25. Form 25 requires statements to be made by the deponent snowing which parts of the statements in the petition are true to the personal knowledge of the deponent and which parts of the statements regarding the particulars of corrupt practices are true to his information. The petitioner in this petition has filed an affidavit along with the petition in which he has stated that the statements made in paras. 4, 6 and 7 of the accompanying petition about the commission of corrupt practices were true to his personal knowledge, while those made in paras. 8 to 11 about the same were true to the information received by him and believed to be true. One of the contentions raised by respondent No. 1 in his written statement filed in reply to the allegations made in the election petition is that the affidavit filed by the petitioner is defective and, therefore, the petition should be rejected without making any inquiry into the allegations with regard to corrupt practices. In view of this contention, the issues which are now being tried as preliminary issues were taken up at the arguments of the parties on these issues. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 contends that the affidavit filed by the petitioner is defective because it was necessary for the petitioner to state the source of information and the grounds of belief on the basis of which the averments with regard to the corrupt practices are made in the petition and were believed by the petitioner to be true. It is not disputed that the affidavit which is filed is in full compliance with the requirements of Form 25 prescribed under the Rules; but what is contended is that though the form does not require the source of information and the grounds of belief to be disclosed in the affidavit, the petitioner was duty bound to disclose these in view of the provisions of O. XIX, r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XIX, r. 3(1) provides that affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted, provided that the grounds thereof are stated. This contention is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jagjiwan . 1972 1 SCC 826. on which respondent No. 1 has placed heavy reliance, and according to the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, the observations made by the Supreme Court in para. 14 of the judgment in that case must be read to mean that in all cases even though the form prescribed by the Central Government under the Rules does not require the source of information to be disclosed, the provisions of O. XIX, r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure require the disclosure of such information, and where such information is not disclosed, there cannot be said to have been any compliance with the provisions of s. 83 of the Act. Since the contention is founded on the decision in Saklecha's case, it is necessary to refer to the facts of that case.

    3. In an election petition the High Court of Madhya Pradesh had held Saklecha guilty of corrupt practice under s. 123(4) of the Act with reference to certain speeches made by him. He was also held guilty of corrupt practice under s. 123(3) and s. 123(2) of the Act. In appeal before the Supreme Court, it appears that one of the contentions raised was that the affidavit filed by the election petitioner before the High Court did not disclose the source of information in respect of the speeches alleged to have been made by the successful candidate. While noticing this contention the Supreme Court referred to rules 7 and 9 framed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in respect of election petitions. Rule 9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules stated that the rules of the High Court shall apply in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Representation of the People Act, 1951, or other rules, if any, made thereunder or of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of all matters including inter alia affidavits. Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules stated that every affidavit should clearly express how much is a statement and declaration from knowledge and how much is a statement made on information or belief and must also state the source or grounds of information or belief with sufficient particularity. The Supreme Court took the view that the High Court rules gave effect to the provisions of O. XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, and though Form 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules required the deponent to state which statements were true to knowledge and there was no specific mention of the source of information in the form, the form of the affidavit and the High Court Rules were not inconsistent. In other words, the Supreme Court held that the requirement of rule 7 of the High Court Rules under which it was necessary to disclose the source of information was not inconsistent with Form 25. Then the Supreme Court discussed the importance of setting out the source of information in affidavits and after referring to some of the decisions of the Supreme Court, it was observed that in A.K.K Nambiar v. Union . [1970] 3 S.C.R 12. it was held that the importance of verification was to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for allegations. Thus far there is no doubt that the Supreme Court was dealing expressly with the requirements of rules 7 and 9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules. The learned counsel, however, relies on the observations in para. 14, from which he wants to spell out the proposition that in every case though the sources of information are not required to be disclosed by Form 25, they must be so disclosed as required by the provisions of O. XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. In para. 14 of the judgment, the Supreme Court was dealing with the contention that nondisclosure of sources of information in the affidavit was a fatal defect and that the petition should not have been entertained. In para. 14 the Supreme Court observed (p. 831):

    “Counsel on behalf of the appellant contended that non-disclosure of the sources of information in the affidavit was a fatal defect and the petition should not have been entertained. It is not necessary to express any opinion on that contention in view of the fact that the matter was heard for several months in the High Court and thereafter the appeal was heard by this Court. The grounds or, sources of information are to be set out in an affidavit in an election petition. Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that the decisions of this Court were not on election petitions. The rulings of this Court are consistent. The grounds or sources of information are to be set out in the affidavit whether the Code applies or not. Section 83 of the Act states that an election petition shall be verified in the manner laid down in the Code. The verification is as to information received. The affidavit is to be modelled on the provisions contained in Order 19 of the Code. Therefore, the grounds or sources of information are required to be stated.”

    4. Now, it is no doubt true that in the concluding part of this paragraph the Supreme Court has observed that the affidavit is to be modelled on the provisions contained in O. XIX of the Code and, therefore, the grounds or sources of information are required to be stated. But on a careful reading of this judgment it appears to me that these, observations must be read in the context of the earlier observations in paras. 11 and 12 of the judgment. In the case before the Supreme Court the rules made by the Madhya Pradesh High Court positively required the statement about the source or grounds of information or belief when the affidavit in support of an election petition was to be filed. It was because of the positive rules made by the Madhya Pradesh High Court that it was found that an additional requirement in addition to the contents of the form prescribed was to be satisfied by the deponent before the affidavit could be said to be proper.

    5. Admittedly, there are no such rules prescribed by the Bombay High Court. The subject of filing the affidavit along with an election petition is not covered by any of the rules which are made by this Court for purposes of dealing with election petitions under the Act. The only additional requirement is contained in rule 5 and that rule provides that every election petition shall, in addition to the contents required by the Act, contain information as to the date of election of the returned candidate or if there be more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of the two dates and shall also show that the election petition is within time as prescribed in s. 81 of the Act. Under the Act the Legislature had left it to the Central Government under s. 169 to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. So far as the procedure before the High Court regarding the trial of election petitions was concerned, under s. 87 of the Act every election petition is required to be tried, as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits; but this is made subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. If the Central Government which was the rule-making authority had intended that the deponent must disclose the source of information as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, then nothing prevented it from making an express provision to that effect in Form 25. The absence of any requirement to disclose the source of information in Form 25 clearly indicates that if the affidavit was made in the prescribed form without disclosing the source of information, the proviso to s. 83(1) must be treated as complied with.

    6. It may be pointed out that the affidavit which is required to be filed along with the election petition is not intended to be used as evidence as is contemplated by O. XIX, r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It provides that where an affidavit is made in support of an interlocutory application, the affidavit containing a statement of his belief may be admitted provided the grounds for that belief are stated. The purpose appears to me to be obvious that on interlocutory applications certain matters are required to be decided on the basis of statements which are made in, the affidavits because evidence is not recorded for deciding interlocutory matters normally. The purpose of being required to file an affidavit in support of an election petition is however, entirely different. The main purpose for requiring an affidavit to be filed in the case of an allegation of a corrupt practice being made is to prevent wild allegations of corrupt practices being made against the successful candidate, so that some restraint is exercised on the person making those allegations, because the deponent is liable to be prosecuted in case those allegations are found to be false. Thus, the affidavit filed in support of an election petition is not intended to be treated as evidence of the facts stated in the affidavit itself because ultimately the election petition is decided on the evidence recorded by the High Court. Thus, it appears to me that in view of the fact that no mention is made in the form prescribed by the Central Government and that the purpose which the affidavit is intended to serve when it is required to be filed along with an election petition, the failure to disclose the source of information does not render the affidavit in any way defective.

    7. There is another reason why I am inclined to take this view. Section 86 of the Act provides that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of s. 81 or s. 82 or s. 117 of the Act. The affidavit is required to be filed by the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 83, because that is the only provision which expressly refers to an affidavit in support of the allegations of corrupt practices. If it was intended that an affidavit which does not disclose the sources of information should be treated as no affidavit at all, with the result that the election petition itself is rendered incompetent, that would have been a defect for which the Legislature would have provided for dismissal of the election petition. The failure to comply with s. 83 does not entail any consequence in the nature of dismissal, or for the matter of that, the consequences are not set out anywhere in the Act at all. Mr. Deshpande, however, contends that the requirement of the affidavit in order to make the petition a valid one is essentially a requirement of s. 81 itself and, therefore, the failure to file a proper affidavit must be treated as a defect in the presentation of the petition, and s. 86 will in such a case be attracted. Section 81 is marginally headed as “Presentation of petitions”. It provides for the presentation of an election petition to the High Court and the period of limitation is stated, and the grounds on which the election may be challenged are also stated. The contents of the petition are, however, separately dealt with independently in s. 83, and it is a part of the provisions regarding the contents of the petition that the proviso regarding affidavit is included and that is restricted only to the averments regarding corrupt practices. Whether a petition complies with s. 83 or not cannot be decided with reference to s. 81 at all. Thus, the Legislature clearly intended that even if there is a defect; in complying with any of the provisions of s. 83, the petition was not liable to be rejected. Thus, apart from the fact that there is no defect in the affidavit since it complies with Form 25, though it is not necessary to decide the second contention raised by Mr. Deshpande, namely, that the petition is liable to be rejected, if necessary, the finding is that the petition is not liable to be rejected.

    8. The view which I am taking is supported by certain observations in the very case on which Mr. Deshpande relied, namely, Saklecha's case. In that case, the Supreme Court observed in para. 15 (p. 831):

    “The non-disclosure of grounds or sources of information in an election petition which is to be filed within forty-five days from the date of election of the returned candidate, will have to be scrutinised from two points of view. The non-disclosure of the grounds will indicate that the election petitioner did not come forward with the sources of information at the first opportunity. The real importance of setting out the sources of information at the time of the presentation of the petition is to give the other side notice of the contemporaneous evidence on which the election petition is based. That will give an opportunity to the other side to test the genuineness and veracity of the sources of information. The other point of view is that the election petitioner will not be able to make any departure from the sources or grounds, if there is any embellishment of the case it will be discovered.”

    9. Now, when the Supreme Court observed that the non-disclosure of the grounds indicated that the petitioner did not come forward with the sources of information at the first opportunity, it appears to me that it was implied in those observations that the sources of information could be disclosed later.

    10. I may usefully refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in which it was held that failure to disclose the sources of information and the grounds of belief in the verification clause or the affidavit is not a fatal defect. That view was taken by the Supreme Court in Murarka Badhey Shyam v. Roop Singh . [1964] A.I.R S.C 1545.. One of the ??? in the verification of the election petition which was pointed out to this Election Tribunal was that though the verification stated that the averments made in some of the paragraphs in the petition were true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner and the averments made in some other paragraphs were verified to be true on the basis of advice and information received by the petitioner from legal and other sources, the petitioner had not stated in so many words that the advice and information received was believed by him to be true. The Election Tribunal took the view that the defect in verification was a matter which came within cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of s. 83 and the defect could be removed in accordance with the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Originally, the provision which permitted dismissal of an election petition for non-compliance with certain provisions was s. 90(3) which provided that the Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of s. 81, s. 82 or s. 117 notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under s. 85. Section 81 dealt with presentation of petitions; s. 82 dealt with parties to the petition; and s. 117 dealt with deposit of security. The contents of the petition were dealt with in s. 83. Clause (c) of sub-s. (1) of s. 83 provided that an election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings. The Election Tribunal in that case had held that the defect did not attract sub-s. (3) of s. 90 inasmuch as that sub-section does not refer to non-compliance with the provisions of s. 83 as a ground for dismissing an election petition. The Supreme Court, referring to this view of the Tribunal, observed in para. 8: “We agree with the view expressed by the Election Tribunal”. The Supreme Court then pointed out that originally sub-s. (4) of s. 90 referred to three sections, namely, ss. 81, 83 and 117, and it provided that notwithstanding anything contained in s. 85 the Tribunal might dismiss an election petition which did not comply with the provisions of s. 81, s. 83 or s. 117. Section 90 was then amended by Act 27 of 1956. As amended sub-s. (3) provided that the Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of s. 81, s. 82 or s. 117 notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under s. 85. Having regard to the fact that s. 83 was omitted from the provision which enabled dismissal of the election petition, the Supreme Court observed (p. 1549):

    “…It seems clear to us that reading the relevant sections in Part VI of the Act, it is impossible to accept the contention that a defect in verification which is to be made in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings as required by cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 83 is fatal to the maintainability of the petition.

    11. In the same case, another argument which was advanced was that an election petition under s. 81 must comply with the provisions of s. 83, and unless it complied with those provisions it was not an election petition under s. 81. This argument was also rejected.

    12. It is really not necessary to refer in detail to some decisions which are cited on behalf of the petitioner. I might, however, refer to two decisions. The first one is the decision of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Satish Kumar v. Election Tribunal . [1963] A.I.R Raj. 157. in which the Division Bench observed (p. 159):

    “…The Legislature also considered it proper that the Central Government should prescribe the form of affidavit so that the petitioner may be able to present affidavit in that form. This does not, however, mean that if an affidavit substantially complies with the form prescribed, it must be thrown out simply because it does not tally with the prescribed form in material particulars.”

    13. In that case, though certain paragraphs of the election petition were stated to be true and correct to the personal knowledge of the petitioner, with regard to para. 5 he has stated that

    “the contents of para. No. 5 and its sub-paras, (a) to (f) are verified as true partly on the basis of my personal knowledge and partly on the basis of the information gathered from my workers.”

    14. The argument was that this part of the affidavit was not in order and that the election petitioner should have stated clearly which facts were true to his personal knowledge and which he believed to be true on the basis of the information gathered from other persons. The election petitioner was permitted to file another affidavit and the High Court declined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Election Tribunal in permitting the filing of another affidavit in the prescribed form according to law.

    15. The Allahabad High Court has gone a little further and has held that even though an affidavit does not accompany the election petition, the affidavit could be allowed to be filed later on by the Election Tribunal to whom the election petition was sent for trial.

    16. In Brij Mohan v. Z.A Ahmad . [1964] A.I.R All. 523. the Division Bench held that it was not mandatory that the affidavit required by the proviso to s. 83(1) should accompany the election petition when the petition was presented before the Election Commission, and that it was open to the Election Tribunal to receive the affidavit when the petition had been transferred to it for trial, and hence the election petition could not be dismissed on the ground that the affidavit as required by s. 83(1) proviso did not accompany the petition but was filed later before the petition came on for trial. The Allahabad High Court also considered the absence of mention of s. 83 in s. 90 which was the section parallel to s. 86.

    17. In the view which I have taken, issue No. 1(a) is answered in the negative. So far as issue No. 1(b) is concerned, the finding is: “Does not arise. If necessary, No”. The trial of the petition will now proceed further.

    18. Answers accordingly.

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    Manohar Narayan Joshi v. Ramu Mhatang Patel
    (Aug 31, 1972)