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  • provisions of Section 40 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act, 1947
  • Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act
  • Rule 4 of Order 41
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Section 40 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act, 1947
  • Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act
  • Rule 4 of Order 41
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal — hearing 12 July 1972)

Factual and Procedural Background

Sonu Puna Patil and Kautik Puna Patil (the plaintiffs) instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 34 of 1960 against Reshmabai (the original defendant) seeking a declaration that a sale deed dated 15 November 1948 in favour of Reshmabai was illegal and for recovery of possession of suit land (Survey No. 19/2, village Bhatpuri, Taluka Parola). The plaint originally alleged the sale deed was benami, sham and without consideration; subsequently (by amendment para. 2-A allowed on 16 March 1961) the plaintiffs pleaded that the sale was void under Section 40 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act, 1947 because it was effected without prior sanction of the Collector or Court.

Reshmabai died during the suit and her four heirs (the present appellants) were brought on record as defendants. The trial Court tried Issues Nos. 2 and 3 (concerning the para 2-A contention) as preliminary issues and decided them in favour of the plaintiffs, declaring the 1948 sale-deed void ab initio and decreeing possession to the plaintiffs subject to deposit of Rs. 1,000 and permitting the defendants to remove standing crops. The trial Court directed parties to bear their own costs.

The defendants appealed to the District Court (Civil Appeal No. 183 of 1962); the Assistant Judge, Dhulia dismissed that appeal by order dated 10 July 1963, confirming the trial Court's judgment and directing parties to bear their own costs. The defendants then filed this second appeal in the High Court.

On 12 July 1972, at the hearing of the second appeal, it was pointed out that the first respondent to the second appeal, Sonu Puna Patil (Original Plaintiff No. 1), had died on 10 October 1968 and that the appellants' Advocate had been informed on 4 February 1972 but had not taken steps to bring Sonu's heirs on record. The Court held that the appeal had abated as far as Sonu was concerned. The remaining question was whether the appeal had abated as to the second respondent (Kautik) and, if it had not abated, whether the appeal could properly proceed only against the second respondent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second appeal, having abated as to the deceased first respondent (Sonu), had also abated as to the surviving respondent (Kautik).
  2. If the appeal had not abated as to the surviving respondent, whether the High Court could proceed with and decide the appeal only against the surviving respondent — i.e., whether the appeal could be allowed as to one co-plaintiff while it had abated as to the other, without producing inconsistent or contradictory decrees.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent No. 2's Arguments (Mr. Ganpule)

  • Contended that the appeal could not be proceeded with only against the second respondent because permitting the appeal to be allowed only as regards the second respondent would result in two inconsistent decrees in the same matter remaining on the record.
  • Relied on several Supreme Court decisions, commencing with State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram (AIR 1962 SC 89), as supporting the proposition that an appeal should not proceed in such circumstances.

Appellants' Arguments (Mr. Kotwal)

  • Relied on decisions from other High Courts — notably Johan Uraon v. Sitaram Sao (AIR 1964 Pat. 31) (Patna High Court) and Abdul Hamid v. Durga Charan Das (AIR 1967 Cal 116) (Calcutta High Court) — to argue that the appeal could be proceeded with despite the death of one plaintiff whose heirs were not substituted.
  • Requested further time for argument on the point; the matter was kept back for further argument and re-argued subsequently.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89 Laid down tests to decide whether a court can proceed with an appeal when one of the parties has died: (a) whether allowing the appeal would create a decree conflicting with the decree that has become final as to the deceased, (b) whether appellant could have obtained necessary relief against remaining respondents alone, and (c) whether any decree against surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, would be ineffective. The Court applied these tests (particularly the first test) and held that proceeding only against the surviving respondent would result in inconsistent decrees; therefore the appeal could not proceed.
Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 Applied the principle that where a joint decree has become final as to one co-party, a second appeal may abate in its entirety when part of the decree has become final by abatement. The Court cited this authority as reinforcing the view that a joint and indivisible decree, partly final by abatement, cannot be effectively reversed only as to surviving parties.
Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehari Lal, AIR 1963 SC 1901 Held that the appellate court has no power under Order 41 Rule 4 to proceed and reverse a decree in favour of all plaintiffs or defendants when part of the decree has become final by abatement. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the appellate Court cannot continue the appeal in a manner that would reverse the decree only as to some co-plaintiffs while leaving a final decree undisturbed as to others.
Union of India v. Shree Ram Bohra, AIR 1965 SC 1531 Confirmed that where an appellant fails to implead heirs of a deceased respondent in time, the appeal as to those heirs abates and the appeal against the other respondents may become incompetent. The Court cited this case as further authority that abatement as to one party can render continuation of the appeal as to others incompetent.
Shri Chand v. Jagdish Pershad, AIR 1966 SC 1427 Explained that the tests in Nathu Ram are not cumulative and that satisfying any one test may suffice to hold that an appeal has abated in its entirety. The Court referenced this decision to show that meeting even one of the Nathu Ram tests (here, the risk of inconsistent decrees) is sufficient to dismiss the appeal.
R.P. Gupta v. Murli Prasad, AIR 1972 SC 1181 (1973) 2 SCC 9 Quoted and approved Nathu Ram principles and their explanation in Shri Chand's case; majority judgment endorsed the principles. The Court cited this recent Supreme Court authority as affirming the Nathu Ram principles which it applied to the present facts.
Johan Uraon v. Sitaram Sao, AIR 1964 Pat. 31 (Patna High Court) Patna High Court Division Bench addressed a somewhat similar situation where one of several plaintiffs died during the second appeal and the High Court proceeded with and disposed of the second appeal. The judge considered and discussed this authority (relied on by appellants) but observed that the Division Bench had not fully considered all relevant observations in the Supreme Court's decision in AIR 1962 SC 89.
Abdul Hamid v. Durga Charan Das, AIR 1967 Cal 116 (Calcutta High Court) A single Judge of the Calcutta High Court reversed a subordinate Judge and held surviving appellants could sue a trespasser for the benefit of all co-owners, in a case where some appellants died during the appeal. The judge noted this decision but observed that the learned single Judge did not appear to have been drawn to the Supreme Court decisions cited earlier; the present Court did not follow it in preference to Supreme Court authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps, using only the reasoning contained in the opinion:

  1. Established the procedural fact that the first respondent (Sonu) had died and that no steps had been taken to bring his heirs on record; accordingly, the appeal had abated as regards Sonu.
  2. Framed the remaining question: whether the appeal could be proceeded with solely against the surviving respondent (Kautik), or whether the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety because of consequences arising from the abatement as to Sonu.
  3. Recalled and summarized the authoritative tests laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram (AIR 1962 SC 89) — tests that inquire, inter alia, whether allowing the appeal as to the surviving respondent would produce a decision in conflict with the final decree as regards the deceased, thereby creating inconsistent decrees.
  4. Reviewed subsequent Supreme Court decisions (Ram Sarup, Rameshwar Prasad, Union of India v. Shree Ram Bohra, Shri Chand, R.P. Gupta) that reiterated or explained the Nathu Ram principles, including the proposition that an appellate court has no power under Order 41 Rule 4 to reverse and vary a decree in favour of all plaintiffs or defendants when part of the decree has become final by abatement.
  5. Applied those principles to the facts: the plaintiffs Sonu and Kautik jointly obtained a joint and indivisible declaration and decree for possession which was subsequently confirmed by the lower appellate Court. Because the decree is joint and indivisible and Sonu's part of the decree must now stand (the appeal abated as to him), allowing the appeal only as to the surviving co-plaintiff would create inconsistent outcomes — Sonu (or his heirs) would retain the declaration and possession while Kautik would be held not entitled to the same relief.
  6. Concluded that proceeding with the appeal only against the second respondent would violate the first Nathu Ram test (risk of two inconsistent decrees) and therefore the appeal could not be continued solely against the surviving respondent.
  7. Considered the subordinate High Court authorities cited by the appellants (Patna and Calcutta decisions) but noted that those decisions did not fully engage with or consider the Supreme Court authorities relied upon; the present Court followed the Supreme Court authorities.
  8. The Court expressly did not decide whether Kautik could have maintained the action originally without impleading Sonu; rather, the Court confined itself to the established fact that the action had been jointly commenced and a joint and indivisible decree had been obtained and confirmed, and that the appeal as framed could not be continued only as to one co-plaintiff.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal cannot be proceeded with only against the second respondent and must be dismissed.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The decree in favour of the deceased first respondent (Sonu) — being final as the appeal abated as to him — must stand and cannot be modified by this Court now.
  • The appeal is dismissed insofar as it attempts to proceed only against the surviving respondent; the Court directed that the parties should bear their own costs of the second appeal.
  • The opinion follows and applies existing Supreme Court authorities; it does not purport to lay down a new precedent but applies established principles (noting that certain High Court decisions advanced contrary approaches without engaging fully with the Supreme Court's rulings).

Order: Dismissal of the second appeal; parties to bear their own costs.

    Reshmabai And Others v. Sona Puna Patil And Another

    1. This second appeal reached hearing before me on 12th July, 1972 when it was pointed out that the first respondent to this second appeal, Sonu Puna Patil (Original Plaintiff No. 1 in Regular Civil Suit No. 34 of 1960) had died on 10th October, 1968. It was further stated that although intimation to this effect had been conveyed to the appellants' Advocate on 4th February, 1972 no steps have been taken by the appellants to bring Sonu's heirs on the record. On this admitted position I held that the appeal had abated as far as the first respondent Sonu was concerned. The question then remained to be considered was whether the appeal had abated qua the second respondent and even if it be held that it had not abated could it be proceeded with against the second respondent

    2. Mr. Ganpule on behalf of the second respondent contended that the appeal could not be proceeded with only against second respondent because if it was proceeded with and allowed this would result in two inconsistent decrees Sn the same matter remaining on the record. After this contention was stated Mr. Kotwal and Mr. Ganpule asked that the matter may be kept back for a few days and on their joint application it was kept till today for further arguments on this point

    3. In order to appreciate the point It will be necessary to state a few facts. Sonu Puna Patil and Kautik Puna Patil filed regular civil suit No. 34 of 1960 againsj one Reshmabai widow of Anna alias Ananda Patil. She died during the pendency of the suit and after her death her four heirs who are the appellants before me were brought on record of the suit as defendants. In the suit the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the sale of the suit land effected by them on 15th November, 1948 in favour of Reshmabai was illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also sought to recover possession of the suit land bearing survey No. 19/2 situated within the limits of village Bhatpuri in Taluka Parola. In the plaint as it was originally filed the sale deed was attacked as benami sham, bogus and without any consideration. It was further alleged that there was specific agreement that it was not to be acted upon. It was claimed that despite the sale deed the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession of the suit land but during their absence for about six years prior to the institution of the suit. Reshmabai had trespassed thereupon and was thereafter in possession of the suit land as a trespasser. Hence the plaintiffs brought the suit for a declaration that the sale deed was not binding on them and for recovering possession of the suit land. The suit was filed in 1960. no 16th March, 1961 the plaintiffs filed an application seeking an amendment of the plaint by adding para. 2-A. The application was allowed although vehemently opposed on behalf of the defendants. The amendment was carried out and by the said amendment the plaintiffs contended that the sale deed executed by the two plaintiffs in favour of Reshmabai was also hit by the provisions of Section 40 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act, 1947 as the two plaintiffs were then parities to a proceeding under the said Act and as the sale of the suit land was effected without the previous sanction of the Collector or the Court In their written statement the four defendants (heirs of Reshmabai) denied all these contentions of the plaintiffs. It was also contended that the claim in suit was barred by limitation.

    4. Ultimately certain issues were framed by the trial Court. Issues Nos. 2 and 3 pertained to the further pleas raised by the plaintiffs in the newly added para. 2-A of the plaint These two issues were as follows:—

    “2. Do plaintiffs prove that they were debtors under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act at the time of the suit sale-deed If yes do they further prove that the suit sale-deed is void in view of the provisions of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act?”

    5. The trial Court directed these two issues (Issues Nos. 2 and 3) to be tried as preliminary issues and on considering the material placed before it held in favour of the plaintiffs on both these issues. Having decided these two issues in favour of the plaintiffs, it granted to the plaintiffs by its order dated 26th April, 1962 a declaration that the sale-deed (Exhibit 32) executed by the plaintiffs on 15th November, 1948 in respect of the suit land in favour of Reshmabai was void ab initio and not binding on the plaintiffs. The defendants were further ordered and decreed to deliver possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs on the plaintiffs depositing a sum of Rupees 1,000/- to be paid to the defendants. It was further observed that if there were standing crops the defendants should be permitted to remove the standing crops. As however, the plaintiffs had succeeded on a plea taken at a late stage the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

    6. Being aggrieved by this decision and order the defendants preferred an appeal to the District Court at Dhulia which was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 183 of 1962. By his order dated 10th July, 1963, the learned Assistant Judge. Dhulia dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court However, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case he directed the parties to bear their own costs of civil appeal No. 183 of 1962 also. This second appeal has been filed in this Court from the decision of the learned Assistant Judge dismissing the defendants' appeal to the District Court

    7. The question is whether the defendants can now proceed with this appeal it having been held on 12th July, 1972 by me that the same has abated as far as respondent No. 1 is concerned. Mr. Ganpule submitted that it was not competent for this Court to proceed further with this appeal and he relied on a number of decisions of the Supreme Court in this connection commencing with its judgment in State Of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89.

    8. In Nathu Rama's case the State of Punjab had preferred an appeal to the High Court against a joint award made in favour of two brothers Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram who were the co-respondents to the appeal. During the pendency of that appeal Labhu Ram died and his heirs were not brought on the record. The High Court held that the appeal abated against Labhu Ram and the effect of such abatement was that the appeal against Nathu Ram also abated. Accordingly the High Court dismissed the appeal. The State moved the Supreme Court which upheld the decision of the High Court. Raghubar Daval, J., speaking for the Supreme Court laid down the principles applicable in the following words:—

    “The question whether a Court can deal with such matters or not will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It may however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the Court in deciding upon this question are whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. The test to determine this has been described in diverse form Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which will be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject-matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent: (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against these respondents alone who are still before the Court, and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be Ineffective that is to say it could not be successfully executed.”

    9. These principles were once again considered by the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 where the Court was considering an appeal from a pre-emption decree preferred by the vendees. The appellants were five in number of whom one died during the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court It was held that as the decree was a joint one and since a part of the decree had become final, by reason of the abatement, the entire appeal must be held to be abated.

    10. The principles laid down in Nathu Ram's case, AIR 1962 SC 89 were also reiterated in Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehari Lal, AIR 1963 SC 1901. In this case nine persons including one Kedar Nath had instituted a suit for ejectment and for recovery of rent against two defendants on the allegation that defendant No. 1 was the tenant-in-chief who had sub-let the premises to defendant No. 2. The suit for ejectment was decreed against both the defendants and for arrears of rent against defendant No. 1. On appeal by defendant No. 2 the District Judge set aside the decree for ejectment against defendant. No. 2 and confirmed the rest of the decree against defendant No. 1. Being aggrieved by this decision of the District Judge the nine original plaintiffs filed a second appeal in the High Court Kedar Nath was appellant No. 3 in this second appeal and during the pendency of the same he died. His heirs were not brought on the record within the time permitted and accordingly the appeal abated as far as Kedar Nath was concerned. When the appeals of the appellants other than Kedar Nath came up for hearing a preliminary objection was taken for the respondent that the entire appeal had abated. The Allahabad High Court held following a Full Bench decision also of the Allahabad High Court that the appeal must be dismissed inasmuch as the interest of the surviving appellants and the deceased appellant was joint and indivisible, and as in the events of the success of the appeal there will be two inconsistent and contradictory decrees. Being aggrieved by this decision of the High Court, the eight surviving plaintiffs moved the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court following its earlier decision in Nathu Ram's case held that Kedar Nath's appeal had abated and the decree in favour of the respondents had become final as against his legal representatives. It was observed further that it was against the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure to hold that Rule 4 of Order 41 empowered the Court to pass a decree in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased Kedar Nath even though the decree against him had become final. The decisions of the various High Courts cited at the Bar have been considered by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case, AIR 1963 SC 1901 and the correct view expounded in the following words:

    “the appellate Court has no power to proceed with the appeal and to reverse and vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants under 0. LI. R 4.”

    11. It may be mentioned as a matter of interest that the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts had taken a different view but the view taken by the other Courts was preferred by the Supreme Court and declared to be correct.

    12. The point once again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Shree Ram Bohra, AIR 1965 SC 1531. There the two plaintiffs had sued the Union of India for the recovery of Rs. 13,448/- as damages. The suit was decreed and the defendants were directed to pay to the plaintiffs the sum with interest. The Union of India appealed to the Patna High Court and during the pendency of the appeal one of the plaintiffs Bilas Rai died. After a lapse of more than a year the Union of India presented an appication for setting aside the abatement, for condonation of delay and for bringing the heirs of Bilas Rai on record thereafter. This application was resisted and was not granted by the High Court. When the appeal came for hearing before the High Court, a preliminary objection was taken that the appeal had become incompetent and was liable to be dismissed. This objection was upheld by the. High Court and aggrieved by the dismissal of its appeal the Union of India moved the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that there was a decree in favour of the two plaintiffs which had been appealed against that on the death of one of them it was necessary for the appellant to implead his heirs and legal representatives within time. That, it has failed to do so with the result that its appeal against the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased respondent was held to have abated. The result of such abatement according to the Supreme Court was that the appeal against the other respondents became incompetent.

    13. In Nathu Ram's case, AIR 1962 SC 89 three tests were indicated. In Shri Chand v. Jagdish Pershad, AIR 1966 SC 1427. Shah, J. fas he then was) speaking for the Supreme Court observed that the three tests suggested by Raghubar Daval, J. in Nathu Ram's case. AIR 1962 SC 89 were not cumulative tests and even if one of them was satisfied the Court might having regard to all the circumstances hold that the appeal has abated in its entirety.

    14. All these authorities have been noted and the three principles once again enunciated in a fairly recent decision of the Supreme Court in R.P Gupta v. Murli Prasad, (1973) 2 SCC 9 : AIR 1972 SC 1181. where the principles enunciated in Nathu Ram's case and the further explanation thereof in Sri Chand's case, AIR 1966 SC 1427 were quoted with approval by the majority judgment. It may be pointed out that even the minority judgment approves of the principles. Mathew. J., who gave the dissenting judgment only differed from the majority in the application of these principles.

    15. Now let us try and apply these principles to the facts of the present case. Sonu and Kautik jointly sued as plaintiffs and in their suit sought a declaration that the sale deed which they had executed in 1948 in favour of Reshmabai who was the original defendant to the suit was void. The two plaintiffs also sought to recover possession of the suit land from Reshmabai alleging that she had forcibly dispossessed the plaintiffs about six years prior to the filing of the suit and was a trespasser thereupon. They succeeded in obtaining a declaration and a decree for possession from the trial Court which declaration and decree have subseauently been confirmed by the lower appellate Court This decree is joint and indivisible. The short point is whether the Court can proceed with the second appeal today and reverse this decree which would mean a reversal only as far as the second respondent is concerned since the appeal has been declared to have been abated as far as respondent No. 1 is concerned. I am afraid this cannot be done inasmuch as doing so would amount to violation of the first test laid down in Nathu Ram's case by the Supreme Court namely the bringing on record two inconsistent decrees. In case the second appeal were to be proceeded with and allowed, the declaration and order for possession obtained by Sonu will stand and will enure to the benefit of his heirs whereas Kautik who has the same right as Sonu’ and stood in the same position would be held by this Court not to be entitled to the same declaration nor to an order for possession.

    16. Mr. Kotwal appearing for the appellants referred me to Johan Uraon v. Sitaram Sao, AIR 1964 Pat. 31. where a Division Bench of the Patna High Court was considering a somewhat similar position. Four plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants demanding possession of certain land. A decree was granted to the plaintiffs by the trial Court from which the defendants preferred an appeal which was, allowed by the subordinate Judge. Ranchi, who dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs thereafter moved the High Court in second appeal. During the pendency of the second appeal, one of the plaintiffs died and his heirs were not substituted as party appellants. Ultimately the High Court heard and disposed of the second appeal. It set aside the decision of the lower appellate Court and directed the lower appellate Court namely the subordinate Judge to reconsider the defendant's appeal. It was heard by another subordinate Judge who came to the conclusion different from his predecessor. He affirmed the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the defendants' appeal. Thereafter the defendants moved the High Court in second appeal. They urged that the original decision of the High Court given in the earlier second appeal and all subsequent proceedings thereafter should be disregarded inasmuch as the second appeal has abated in toto after the death of one of the plaintiffs appellants whose heirs were not brought on record during the period allowed by the Code of Civil Procedure. This contention was rejected by the Division Bench in para. 7 of the above report and Mr. Kotwal very strongly relied on these observations. It is true that the Division Bench of the Patna High Court considered the judgment in AIR 1962 SC 89. But, with respect it may be stated that all the relevant observations in the said judgment have not been considered while disposing of this point

    17. The same appears to be the position in respect of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court also relied on very strongly by Mr. Kotwal. This is Abdul Hamid v. Durga Charan Das. AIR 1967 Cal 116. A single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Abdul Hamid's case was considering a revision application filed against a decision of a lower appellate Court namely, the subordinate Judge who had held that where two of the five appellants died during the pendency of their appeal arising out of a suit instituted by them for recovery of Khas possession of a certain plot of land, reckoning the sole defendant as a trespasser thereon and if the appeal against these two dead appellants abated the whole appeal must be deemed to have abated. The judgment of the subordinate Judge was reversed by the single Judge of the Calcutta High Court who held that the surviving appellants were entitled to sue the trespasser for the benefit of all the co-owners. With respect to the learned Judge Ms attention does not appear to have been drawn to any of the decisions of Supreme Court mentioned earlier in this judgment

    18. I am not considering the question whether Kautik could have maintained the action and sought declaration and possession without impleading his co-owner Sonu. The position is that the action has been commenced jointly by these two brothers as co-plaintiffs and they have obtained a decree in their favour which decree has been subsequently confirmed by the lower appellate Court and which decree, joint and indivisible is challenged in the 9 second appeal. As far as Sonu is concerned, the decree in his favour both for declaration and possession must now stand since the appeal as far as he is concerned has been declared to have abated. If that is so it will not be possible for this Court now to modify that decree directly or indirectly.

    19. In my view the position is so obvious that it does not require further elaboration. Bearing in mind the nature of the claim in suit and the decree that has been passed by the trial Court in favour of both the respondents, which is joint and indivisible it must be held that the appeal cannot be proceeded with only against the second respondent and must be dismissed. However, the proper order of costs seems to be to direct the parties to bear their own costs of the second appeal. There will be an order accordingly.

    20. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Reshmabai And Others v. Sona Puna Patil And Another
    (Jul 14, 1972)