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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are a registered firm engaged in manufacturing and marketing bidis. For the assessment year 1960-61 the firm claimed Rs. 49,440 as a deduction for advertisement expenses (printing and distribution of calendars), which the Income-tax Officer allowed; the petitioners appealed other disallowed deductions and that appeal remains pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. For the assessment year 1962-63 the firm claimed Rs. 1,17,924 for similar advertisement expenses, which the Income-tax Officer also allowed; again, an appeal by the petitioners against other disallowed deductions is pending.

The petitioners were served with two notices dated 15 July 1968 under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, stating that the successor Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for the years 1960-61 and 1962-63 within the meaning of section 147. The reasons recorded under section 148(2) were initially not communicated but were later furnished and considered by the court.

In respect of assessment year 1960-61, the recorded reason states that on critically examining deductions claimed for advertisement expenses in the assessment year 1963-64, the respondent found that a sum of Rs. 63,000 claimed for 1963-64 was "totally bogus" and "therefore every reason to hold that fictitious expenses in the form of calendar distributions were made to the profit and loss accounts to reduce the profit." For 1962-63 the same statements appear, with an additional statement that purchases were inflated by over Rs. 50,000 showing purchases from one Dullabhai Haribhai, an intermediary of ordinary means.

At the outset, the respondent's counsel (Mr. Natu) stated that both notices were issued under clause (b) of section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; consequently the court tested the validity of the notices on that footing.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the reasons recorded by the Income-tax Officer can sustain the validity of the notices dated 15 July 1968 issued under section 148 (read with clause (b) of section 147) for assessment years 1960-61 and 1962-63.
  2. Whether the "information" relied upon by the Income-tax Officer for issuing a notice under section 148 must be information obtained aliunde (i.e., from an external source) rather than merely a reappraisal of the officer's own conclusions in proceedings for a subsequent year.
  3. Whether the information on which the notices are founded must relate to the particular assessment year to which the notices themselves relate (i.e., whether information arising from a subsequent assessment year can, as such, justify reopening earlier assessment years under section 147(b)).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Applicant's) Arguments (as presented by Mr. Bobde)

  • The information relied upon by the Income-tax Officer for issuing notices under section 148 must be information obtained aliunde (from an external source) and not merely derived from the officer's own order in proceedings for a subsequent year.
  • The information on which the notices are founded must relate to the particular assessment year to which the notices relate; information relating to a different (later) year cannot, by itself, give the officer even a prima facie reason to believe that income escaped assessment in an earlier year.

Respondent's Position (as presented by Mr. Natu and as recorded)

  • Counsel stated that both notices were issued under clause (b) of section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • The reasons recorded indicate that, on examining the assessment year 1963-64, the respondent found Rs. 63,000 claimed for advertisement expenses in 1963-64 to be "totally bogus" and therefore had reason to hold that fictitious expenses had been introduced into profit and loss accounts to reduce profit; for 1962-63 there was an additional finding of inflated purchases (over Rs. 50,000) from a named intermediary.
  • The respondent professed to act on information which came to his hands in the assessment for the year 1963-64 and relied on that information as the basis for issuing the notices for the earlier years.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v. A. Raman & Co. (Supreme Court) The condition vesting the Income-tax Officer with jurisdiction under clause (b) of section 147 has two branches: (i) the officer has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment; and (ii) that it is in consequence of information that he has reason so to believe. "Information" must mean instruction or knowledge derived from an external source (aliunde). The High Court may ascertain whether the officer had any information and may determine whether from that information the officer may have reason to believe; however, the High Court cannot set aside a notice by reappraising the evidence if the officer had, prima facie, information giving reason to believe. The court relied upon these tests from A. Raman & Co. to examine whether the respondent had information (aliunde) and whether that information related to the assessment years in question such that the respondent could be said, prima facie, to have had reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. The court applied the principle that the information must be external and relevant to the specific year under challenge.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. A. J. Zavery (Division Bench of this High Court) Held that a decision of a higher tribunal as to the correct factual or legal conclusion may constitute "information" within the meaning of the corresponding provision in the earlier statute (section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922), which corresponded to section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court also observed an inclination to treat a mere change of opinion by the officer as not amounting to information sufficient to reopen an assessment. The present court noted the observations in A. J. Zavery but did not consider it necessary to discuss the decision at length. The court relied on the related principle that a mere change of opinion will not normally amount to information justifying reopening; it found that the respondent in the present case professed to act on information from the assessment for 1963-64 rather than on a mere change of opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reference to the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in A. Raman & Co.'s case. It accepted as correct the submission that "information" for the purposes of clause (b) of section 147 must be information obtained aliunde (from an external source) and not merely a reappraisal or change of the officer's own view. The court noted the two-branch condition: (i) the officer must have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and (ii) that this reason must be in consequence of information.

The court addressed a central factual/legal contention: whether information arising in relation to a subsequent assessment year (1963-64) could, by itself, furnish a prima facie reason to believe that income had escaped assessment in earlier years (1960-61 and 1962-63). The petitioners contended that circumstances in a later year may not exist in an earlier year and thus information about a later year cannot automatically justify reopening an earlier year's assessment.

Applying the A. Raman tests, the court held that the information relied upon to issue a notice under section 147(b) must relate to the assessment year to which the notice pertains. The court allowed that such information might be obtained at any time after the relevant year (i.e., information may come to light subsequently), but emphasized that the information must nonetheless relate to the particular earlier year. The court concluded that if the respondent attempted to rely solely on information pertaining to a subsequent assessment year (1963-64) in order to reopen assessments for earlier years, he could not be said, even prima facie, to have had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment in those earlier years.

On this basis the court found the impugned notices to be invalid.

The court also considered the respondent's oral application for a certificate under article 133(1)(b) and (c) for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. It held there was no material to grant a certificate under clause (b) and declined to certify under clause (c) that the case was fit for appeal; the court offered the respondent an opportunity to file an affidavit for clause (b) but, on the application as it stood, refused certification under both clauses.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition succeeds. The court made the rule absolute in terms of prayer (i) of the petition and ordered that the respondent must pay the petitioners' costs of the petition.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The notices dated 15 July 1968 under section 148 (read with clause (b) of section 147) impugned in the petition were held invalid to the extent they were founded on information relating solely to a subsequent assessment year (1963-64) rather than to the specific assessment years (1960-61 and 1962-63) to which the notices related. The respondent was ordered to pay the petitioners' costs and the rule made absolute in terms of the petition's prayer (i).
  • Broader legal implication as applied by the court: The court reiterated the principle from the Supreme Court in A. Raman & Co. that information for the purposes of section 147(b) must be information (aliunde) and, importantly, must relate to the assessment year sought to be reopened; information about a later year cannot, by itself, provide even a prima facie reason to believe that income escaped assessment in an earlier year.
  • Precedential effect: The court applied existing Supreme Court authority in reaching its decision; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts before it.

    Ramkrishna Ramnath v. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle-Iii, Nagpur

    1. The petitioners in this case are a registered firm carrying on the business of manufacturing and marketing bidis. The petitioners filed their return for the assessment year 1960-61 in which they claimed a deduction of Rs. 49,440 in respect of advertisement expenses in the form of the printing and distribution of calendars of the firm for that year, and that deduction was allowed by the Income-tax Officer who made the assessment. As, however, certain other deductions claimed by the petitioners were not allowed by the Income-tax Officer, the petitioners filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, which, we are informed, is still pending. We are not concerned in this case with the assessment year 1961-62. For the assessment year 1962-63 also the petitioners filed their return in which they claimed a deduction of Rs. 1,17,924 on account of advertisement expenses in the form of the printing and distribution of calendars for that year, and the deduction was also allowed by the Income-tax Officer who made the assessment. Certain other deductions claimed by the petitioners having, however, been disallowed, an appeal was filed by the petitioners before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which is also still pending. The petitioners were thereafter served with two notices, both dated 15th July, 1968, under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, stating that the successor of the Income-tax Officer who made the assessment for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1962-63 had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax for those years had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of that act. Though the reasons which the Income-tax Officer is required to record under section 148(2) of the Act were not initially communicated to the petitioners, the same have now been furnished along with the supplement affidavits, and we have looked into the same. As far as assessment year 1960-61 is concerned, what has been recorded by the respondent by way of reasons for issuing the notice under section 148 in respect of that year is that he had occasion to critically examine the deductions claimed in respect of advertisement expenses for the assessment year 1963-64 and it was noticed that the sum of Rs. 63,000 which was claimed in respect of those expenses during the year 1963-64 was totally bogus and that the respondent had

    "therefore every reason to hold that fictitious expenses in the form of calendar distributions were made to the profit and loss accounts to reduce the profit"
    . In the reasons, which were recorded by the respondent in respect of assessment year 1962-63 precisely the same statements appear, but there is an additional statement to the effect that the assessees are also found to have inflated their purchases by over Rs. 50,000, showing purchases from one Dullabhai Haribhai who was an intermediary and a man of ordinary means. The short question which arises for our consideration is whether the reasons so recorded by the respondent can sustain the validity of the notices dated 15th July, 1968, which are sought to be impugned in the present petition. At the very outset of the argument of this petition before us, a statement was made from the Bar by Mr. Natu on behalf of the respondent that both the said notices have been issued under clause (b) of section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and we are, therefore, only concerned with testing the validity of the impugned notices on that footing.

    2. Mr. Bobde on behalf of the petitioners has sought to impeach the validity of these notices under section 148 on two grounds; (1) that the information which is relied upon by the Income-tax Officer for issuing the notice under section 148 must be information which he has obtained aliunde and not merely by looking at his own order made in proceedings for a subsequent year; and (2) that the information on which the issue of the said notices is founded must relate to the particular year to which the notices themselves relate. It is necessary for us to refer only to two of the cases which were cited before us in the course of the hearing of this petition. The first of them is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax, Gujarat v. A. Raman & C.. and Co. which was a case under clause (b) of section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It has been stated in the judgment in that case (at page 15) that the condition which invests the Income-tax Officer with jurisdiction has two branches : (i) that the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, and (ii) that it is in consequence of information that he has reason so to believe. It is further stated in the judgment in the said case that the expression "information" in the context in which it occurred, must mean "instruction or knowledge derived from an external source" concerning facts or particulars, or as to the law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment. Mr. Bobde's contention that the information which is relied upon for issuing a notice under section 148 must be information obtained aliunde is, therefore, clearly correct, and, indeed, that is also the plain meaning of the word "information". The Supreme Court has then proceeded to lay down in the said case what is the ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in a case in which the validity of a notice under section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is sought to be challenged. It has been stated in the judgment in that case that the court may, in the exercise of its powers, ascertain whether the Income-tax Officer had in his possession any information, and may also determine whether from that information the Income-tax Officer may have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. It is further stated that if the Income-tax Officer has information from which it may be said, prima facie, that he had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, it is not open to the High Court, exercising powers under article 226 of the Constitution, to set aside or vacate the notice for reassessment on a reappraisal of the evidence (at page 16). It is clarified a little later in the judgment in the said case that in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution the taxpayer may challenge the validity of a notice under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the ground that either branch of the condition precedent does not exist, but an investigation as to whether the inferences raised by the Income-tax Officer from the information are correct or proper cannot be made. Another decision that was cited before us was that of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. A. J. Zavery, but all that was held in that case was (at page 613) that a decision of a higher tribunal as to the correct factual or legal conclusion would constitute information within the meaning of section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which, it may be stated corresponded to section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We do not think it necessary to discuss that decision, as no such question arises in the present case, but what has been relied upon by Mr. Bobde is the observation which has been made in that case that this court has always been inclined to take the view that a mere change of the opinion on the part of the Income-tax Officer or his successor in office will not amount to information which entitled him to reopen the assessment under section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In our opinion, what the respondent has sought to do in the present case is not the result of a mere change of opinion, but he has professed to act on the footing of information which has come to his hands in the assessment for the year 1963-64.

    3. We must, therefore, proceed to consider the present case in the light of the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in A. Raman & Co.'s case. It has been strongly contended by Mr. Bobde that the information on which the respondent has claimed to issue the impugned notices under section 148 being information relating to a different year, and not to the years in respect of which the impugned notices were issued, it cannot be said that he had, even prima facie, any reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment in the years to which those notices relate. Mr. Bobde has contended that the circumstances existing in a later year may not exist in a previous year and that the respondent could not possibly have any reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment in the assessment year 1960-61 or 1962-63, merely because of some information which came to his hands in respect of the assessment year 1963-64. In our opinion, this contention of Mr. Bobde is clearly right and we hold that the information on which a notice under section 147(b) is issued must relate to the assessment year to which that notice relates though, of course, it might very well have been obtained at any time subsequent thereto and may have come to the knowledge of the Income-tax Officer in the course of the assessment proceedings relating to a subsequent year. If from information which relates to a subsequent assessment year, the respondent sought to resort to proceedings under section 147, clause (b), against the petitioners in respect of earlier years, in our opinion, he could not be said, even prima facie, to have had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment in the years to which the impugned notices relate.

    4. In the result, this petition must succeed and we make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (i) of the petition. The respondent must pay the petitioner's costs of this petition.

    5. At this stage, Mr. Natu applies orally for a certificate under article 133(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution for the purpose of filing an appeal to the Supreme Court from our decision. There is no material before us as far as clause (b) of article 133(1) is concerned and we cannot grant a certificate under that clause. We are prepared to give Mr. Natu an opportunity of filing an affidavit for that purpose, but we are asked to decide the application, as it stands. As far as clause (c) of article 133(1) is concerned, it is not every question of law decided by a High Court that would bring the matter within that clause and we are unable to certify that the present case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court within the terms of clause (c).

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    Ramkrishna Ramnath v. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle-Iii, Nagpur
    (Feb 18, 1969)