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  • Provinces Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1954.
  • determine.4. Section 70 of the Land Revenue Code
  • sub-section and s. 70 of the Land Revenue Code
  • Section 13(a), (b)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • Provinces Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1954.
  • determine.4. Section 70 of the Land Revenue Code
  • sub-section and s. 70 of the Land Revenue Code
  • Section 13(a), (b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Patel, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent No. 1 owned two survey numbers (204 and 221) in village Bhadgaon, Jalgaon District, each held as Class V Inam measuring 6 acres 15 gunthas and 6 acres 4 gunthas respectively. After the Bombay Paragana and Kulkami Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950, these lands were resumed by the Government and then re-transferred to respondent No. 1 on payment of an occupancy price equal to twelve times the full assessment.

The petitioner obtained a decree in Regular Suit No. 57 of 1950 and initiated execution against these two survey numbers by attachment and sale (Darkhast No. 218 of 1958). Respondent No. 1 contended the lands were re-granted on limited (non-transferable) tenure and thus inalienable without the permission of the Collector under s. 4(2) of the Abolition Act.

Procedural history:

  • The Civil Judge, Junior Division (judgment dated 1 April 1960) directed sale to proceed but deferred the question of Collector's permission.
  • Respondent No. 1 appealed to the District Court (Appeal No. 185 of 1960); the District Judge (15 June 1961) set aside the Civil Judge's order, holding no sale could proceed without Collector's sanction.
  • The petitioner filed a second appeal (Second Appeal No. 1463 of 1961). V. S. Desai, J. (1 February 1963) set aside the District Judge and restored the Civil Judge's order, holding that the question of sanction could arise only after sale was effected and before confirmation; the Civil Court was directed to proceed with execution from the prior stage.
  • Following that judgment, the petitioner applied to the Collector for sanction. The Collector rejected the application on the ground that only the holder of the land could make an application for permission to transfer (under s. 4(2)) and that respondent No. 1 did not seek permission.
  • The petitioner appealed to the Commissioner; the Commissioner confirmed the Collector's decision. The petitioner challenged the Collector's and Commissioner's orders before the court in this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether lands re-granted on limited tenure under s. 4(2) of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkami Watans (Abolition) Act are liable to sale in execution by a Civil Court without prior sanction of the Collector.
  2. Whether the statutory scheme (s. 4(2) of the Act read with s. 70 of the Land Revenue Code) requires an application for sanction to be made only by the holder of the land, thereby barring a decree-holder or the court (or someone authorized by the court) from seeking that sanction in execution proceedings.
  3. Whether the Collector and Commissioner were justified in rejecting the petitioner's application solely on the ground that the decree-holder was not competent to make the application for transfer/sanction.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent No. 1's Arguments

  • The respondent contended that the re-granted lands were held on a limited tenure and were inalienable without the prior permission of the Collector under s. 4(2) of the Abolition Act; therefore, they could not be sold in execution.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner proceeded in execution and, after being directed by the Civil Court to obtain sanction, applied to the Collector for permission to transfer/sell the lands.
  • Implicit in the petitioner's stance (and in the remedial direction sought) was that, because execution is coercive and the owner will not voluntarily apply for sanction, the Court can (and should) authorize the decree-holder or another to apply to the Collector for the required sanction.
  • Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Vaidya) relied on two Supreme Court decisions to support that principle (see precedents below).

Counsel for the Opposing Side (as presented)

  • Mr. Gumaste contended that the petitioner had previously made an application on 29 September 1961 which was disposed of on 5 February 1962, and therefore the subsequent application was not competent. The court noted that the actual record of an order was not produced and that there was only an intimation in Marathi without a Collector's order evidencing final disposal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati v. Dr. C.L. Katial, [1964] A.I.R. S.C. 978 The Court can enforce contractual or equitable obligations by directing a party to make necessary applications for governmental sanction; the tribunal can require the defendant to apply to the appropriate authority and leave the ultimate decision to that authority. The court relied on this case to show that a court can require (or compel) a party to take steps to obtain statutory sanction and, by analogy, that a court executing a decree can ensure the necessary application for transfer/sanction is made even though the owner would not voluntarily cooperate.
Dy. Director of Consolidation v. Deen Bandhu, [1965] A.I.R. S.C. 484 A revenue authority must act according to the principles prescribed by the applicable statutory provision and cannot refuse or reject applications on arbitrary grounds unrelated to the statute (here, under the United Provinces Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954, s. 13). The court cited this decision to support the proposition that the Collector/Revenue authority cannot reject an application on grounds alien to the statutory criteria; therefore, rejection on the sole ground that only the holder may apply was erroneous if the statute did not prescribe that limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by analysing the relevant statutory provisions:

  • s. 4(2) of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkami Watans (Abolition) Act provides that occupancy re-granted under sub-section (1) "shall not be transferable or partible by metes and bounds without the previous sanction of the Collector" and except on payment of such amount as the State Government may determine.
  • s. 70 of the Land Revenue Code provides that where an occupancy is not transferable without prior Collector sanction and such sanction has not been granted to a transfer made or ordered by a Civil Court, (a) the occupancy shall not be liable to the process of any Court and such transfer shall be null and void; and (b) upon receipt of a certificate from the Collector that such sanction has not been granted, the Court shall remove any attachment or set aside any sale affecting such occupancy.

Applying those provisions, the court observed that although s. 4(2) does not explicitly refer to transfer by execution process, the combined operation of s. 4(2) and s. 70 makes occupancy non-transferable without prior sanction and renders it not liable to sale by execution unless appropriate sanction is obtained. However, the court emphasised that this statutory non-transferability was not intended as an absolute bar to alienation in all circumstances—the statute itself contemplates transfers with Collector sanction.

The court addressed who may apply for that sanction in execution proceedings. It reasoned that execution is a coercive process used because a judgment-debtor will not comply voluntarily; when a court sells property in execution, it does so against the holder's will, and the holder thus will not apply for permission required to make that sale possible. Given that practical context, the court concluded that the Civil Court must be permitted to obtain the necessary sanction to effectuate execution. The court held that although the Court itself is not required to file the application, it may (and implicitly by prior judicial orders did) authorise the decree-holder or another person to make the application on its behalf.

The court found both the Collector and the Commissioner in error for rejecting the petitioner's application exclusively on the ground that only a holder could make the application. The court relied on the two Supreme Court precedents cited by Mr. Vaidya:

  • Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati v. Katial — to show that a court can require a party to apply for government sanction where necessary to enforce rights or obligations; and
  • Dy. Director of Consolidation v. Deen Bandhu — to show a revenue authority may not reject applications on arbitrary grounds and must act in accordance with the statutory scheme governing the grant or refusal of permission.

The court examined the procedural record regarding a prior application allegedly disposed of on 5 February 1962 and found no conclusive record of a final Collector's order; rather, only an intimation in Marathi was produced. The Commissioner had directed the Collector to give a hearing and decide the matter; therefore, the Collector was bound to decide on the merits and could not decline on the basis that he had no power to review a prior order. The Collector's further basis for refusal — that respondent No. 1 did not want permission to transfer — was inapposite because the sale was not voluntary but an execution sale against the holder's will.

The court also noted that the Commissioner's affidavit did not identify any statutory principle or rational ground justifying rejection of the application. Since the orders under review rested solely on the competence argument (that only a holder could apply) and no other legally sufficient grounds were advanced, the court concluded those orders could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the orders of the Collector and the Commissioner and directed the Collector to issue the necessary sanction to transfer the property to enable the Civil Court to sell the same in execution of the decree upon the petitioner paying the requisite amount. The petitioner was awarded his costs from respondent No. 2. The opinion concludes with "Orders set aside."

Implications: The direct effect is that the Collector must grant the required sanction so that the execution sale may proceed, subject to the petitioner paying the prescribed amount. The opinion resolves the immediate dispute between the parties by removing the Collector's and Commissioner's refusals. The opinion does not purport to lay down any broader novel precedent beyond its application of s. 4(2), s. 70 and the authorities it relied upon; its practical consequence is limited to enabling the execution sale to proceed in this case.

    Tukaram Zipru Wani v. Baban Dhondu Deshmukh

    Patel, J.:— This petition arises out of an execution proceeding commenced by the petitioner against his judgment-debtor respondent No. 1.

    2. Respondent No. 1 was the owner of two lands survey numbers 204 and 221, measuring 6 acres 15 gunthas and 6 acres 4 gunthas, in the village of Bhadgaon in Jalgaon District. He held these lands as Class V Inam. In 1950, the Bombay Paragana and Kulkami Watans (Abolition) Act was passed, as a result of which the lands became resumed by the Government. They were re-transferred to respondent No. 1, on his paying occupancy price equal to twelve times the amount of the full assessment. The petitioner obtained his decree in Regular Suit No. 57 of 1950 and sought to proceed in execution against these two survey numbers by attachment and sale of the properties in Darkhast No. 218 of 1958. Respondent No. 1 contended that these lands could not be sold as they were re-granted to him on limited tenure and were inalienable under the provisions of s. 4, sub-s. (2) of the Act without the permission of the Collector for the transfer of the same. The learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, by his judgment and order dated April 1, 1960, directed the sale of the properties to proceed, deferring the matter of obtaining the permission of the Collector to a later date. Respondent No. 1 went in appeal to the District Court, being Appeal No. 185 of 1960. The learned District Judge by his judgment dated June 15, 1961, set aside the order of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, and held that the properties could not be sold as no sanction of the Collector was obtained. The petitioner filed a second appeal, being Second Appeal No. 1463 of 1961 which was heard by V.S Desai J. on February 1, 1963. The learned Judge set aside the judgment of the District Judge and restored that of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, holding that the question of sanction could arise only after the sale was effected and before it was confirmed. He directed the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, to proceed with the execution of the decree from the stage at which it was left. After this judgment, the petitioner made an application to the Collector for sanction of the sale. The Collector after giving a hearing to the petitioner rejected his application on the ground that only a holder of the land could make an application for permission to transfer the land under s. 4(2) of the said Act, on paying Nazarana for the same, and that respondent No. 1 did not want permission to transfer the land. He also observed that he had rejected similar application previously and that he had no right under the Land Revenue Code to review his order. The petitioner went in appeal to the Commissioner who confirmed the judgment, rejecting it on almost the same ground. The petitioner seeks to challenge this order.

    3. Section 4, sub-s. (2), of the said Act is as follows:

    “The occupancy of the land re-granted under sub-section (1) shall not be transferable or partible by metes and bounds without the previous sanction of the Collector and except on payment of such amount as the State Government may by general or special order determine.”

    4. Section 70 of the Land Revenue Code which has got a bearing on this question is as follows:

    “In any case where an occupancy is not transferable without the previous sanction of the Collector, and such sanction has not been granted to a transfer which has been made or ordered by Civil Court or on which the Court's decree or order is founded,

    (a) such occupancy shall not be liable to the process of any Court, and such transfer shall be null and void, and

    (b) the Court, on receipt of a certificate under the hand and seal of the Collector, to the effect that any such occupancy is not transferable without his previous sanction and that such sanction has not been granted, shall remove any attachment or other process placed on or set aside any sale of, or affecting, such occupancy.”

    5. It is true that in sub-s. (2) of s. 4, there is no reference to transfer or partition by execution process. But then, the combined effect of this sub-section and s. 70 of the Land Revenue Code is that, as the occupancy is made by statute non-transferable and non-partible, it is not liable to be sold or partitioned by execution of an order of a Court. This, however, does not mean that an application should be made only by the holder of the land.

    6. It must at once be apparent that the provision as to non-transferability was not made in the interests of dishonest judgment-debtors. Paragana Vatandars were required to pay only twelve times the assessment as occupancy price, and in view of the fact that the price charged was low, it is possible that the Government intended to regrant the land on what is known as new tenure, which means non-partible and non-alienable tenure. But then it does not mean that, under no circumstances, the land was intended to be unalienable. The land could be alienated with the sanction of the Collector. Inasmuch as, by s. 70 of the Land Revenue Code, this provision was applicable also to sales and transfers by orders of Court, advisedly apparently no provision is made in s. 4 of the said Act that an application for transfer shall necessarily be made by the holder of the land.

    7. As regards the question as to who should be able to make an application for this purpose one has to consider the nature of execution process. Whenever a decree the being executed, it means that the judgment-debtor is not prepared to carry out the terms of the decree, and it is the coercive process of the Court which enforces the execution of its decree. When property is sold by the Court in execution of a decree against the owner or holder of the land, it is against the will of the owner. The owner would never be willing to apply for sanction to transfer the land. In view of the fact that the Court is selling the property against the will of the owner who does not and will not co-operate, it is the Court who must obtain the sanction of the relevant authority. It is true that the Court, being in a peculiar position, cannot be required to file an application before the Collector but it can authorise someone or even the decree-holder to obtain the required sanction on its behalf. Since the Court has stayed the execution proceedings to enable the decree-holder to make this application, it must necessarily follow that, impliedly it permitted the decree-holder to obtain sanction for sale of the property from the Collector, and accordingly the petitioner filed the present application.

    8. Having regard to the scheme of these provisions, and there being nothing in s. 4(2) of the Act which prevents any one on behalf of the Court from making an application, in our view, both the Collector and the Commissioner were in error in holding that the application must fail only on that ground.

    9. Mr. Vaidya relies in support of his contention on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati v. Dr. C.L Katial . [1964] A.I.R S.C 978. and Dy. Director of Consolidation v. Deen Bandhu . [1965] A.I.R S.C 484.. The first case arose out of a contract entered into by the appellant before their Lordships with the respondent to sell to the respondent a house which stood on a plot granted by the Government. According to the terms of the contract, the vendor had to obtain the necessary permission from the Government for the sale within certain time. She made an application for the necessary permission, but for some reason of her own she withdrew that application. Eventually, the respondent filed a suit for specific performance of the contract. The trial Court dismissed the suit but the High Court decreed the same. Their Lordships observed (p. 979):

    “…the Court has got to enforce the terms of the contract and to enjoin upon the defendant-appellant to make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner. It will be for the Chief Commissioner to decide whether or not to grant the necessary sanction.”

    10. They confirmed on this ground the decree of the High Court. In the second case, a question arose under the United Provinces Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1954. An application for transfer of certain land was made by the owner for the purpose of an exchange. Section 13(a), (b) and (c) laid down the principles for granting or refusing the permission. The Settlement Officer, for reasons alien to that section, rejected the application. The Supreme Court held that the rejection was improper and directed that the application should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of s. 13 of the Act.

    11. In the first case, the rights between the parties arose out of a contract, and naturally, therefore, the Court insisted on the defendant being forced to make an application for permission for the transfer. The second case illustrates the point that the Revenue authority cannot refuse to make an order on arbitrary grounds but must act on the basis of the principle laid down by the relevant section and that if it acts on grounds other than those on which it is entitled to act, the order must necessarily be regarded as bad.

    12. In the affidavit, the only ground in support of the orders under review that is mentioned is that the decree holder was not competent to make an application. No other reasons are suggested for rejecting the same and none is apparent from any of the orders of the authorities. It is clear, therefore, that the order cannot be allowed to stand.

    13. Mr. Gumaste contends that the petitioner had made an application on September 29, 1961, and it was disposed of on February 5, 1962, and, therefore, the second application is not competent. Except for the reference to the order, none has been produced before us from the record. When we called upon Mr. Gumaste to produce the relevant record he only showed us the record which contains a copy of an intimation in Marathi to the petitioner, without there being an order as such by the Collector. The real position is that the petitioner had filed an appeal against the decision of the Collector dated February 5, 1962, before the Commissioner.

    14. The Commissioner directed the Collector to give a hearing and thereafter decide the matter. If that is so, the Collector was bound to obey the order of the Commissioner and could not avoid deciding the matter as he did, saying that he had no power to review his prior order. It also appears from the order of the Collector now made that he refused to make the necessary order because respondent No. 1 who is the holder of the land did not want permission for transfer. This is not a case of voluntary transfer. The Court is selling the property against his will, and his volition in the matter has no place.

    15. We have been read the affidavit of the Commissioner in answer to the rule. He has not referred to any principle or any rational reason on the basis of which the said prayer could possibly be rejected. If the law itself does not prescribe any principle on the basis of which the Collector has to make a decision or order, then the section itself may be of doubtful validity. If the principles are prescribed, then it is not the contention of Mr. Gumaste that any would be violated by the making of the order.

    16. We, therefore, set aside the orders made by the authorities below and direct the Collector to issue the necessary sanction to transfer the property in order to enable the Civil Court to sell the same in execution of the decree on the petitioner paying the requisite amount. The petitioner will get his costs from respondent No. 2.

    17. Orders set aside.

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    Tukaram Zipru Wani v. Baban Dhondu Deshmukh
    (Jul 20, 1965)