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  • provisions contained in sub-section (4) of section 72 of the M.Z.P & P.S Act 1961
  • s. 72(1) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961,
  • s. 44 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act (7 of 1922)
  • Section 49 makes similar provisions as s. 72
  • Panchayat Samitis. Sub-section (1)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • provisions contained in sub-section (4) of section 72 of the M.Z.P & P.S Act 1961
  • s. 72(1) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961,
  • s. 44 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act (7 of 1922)
  • Section 49 makes similar provisions as s. 72
  • Panchayat Samitis. Sub-section (1)
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Kotval, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This special civil application concerns a motion of no-confidence under section 72 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 ("the Act") initiated by two members of the Gram Panchayat of Shirpur in Dhulia District; the petitioner is one of them.

On 2 March 1964 a notice under s.72(1) was given in the prescribed form (Zilla Parishads Presiding Authorities (No-confidence Motion) Rules, 1962), reciting grounds of alleged misconduct against both the chairman (respondent No.1) and the deputy chairman (respondent No.2). The signatories requested the chairman to convene a meeting to consider the motion.

The chairman issued notices on 11 March 1964 calling a special meeting to consider the no-confidence motion against him on 15 April 1964 at 4 p.m. and a separate meeting to consider the motion against the vice-chairman on 16 April 1964 at 9 a.m. The petitioner challenged the validity of those notices and the subsequent meetings.

The petitioner also forwarded a requisition to the Divisional Commissioner (respondent No.4). The Commissioner admitted receiving an application from the petitioner and another member on 13 March 1964 asserting prior requisitions had been submitted and requesting action. The Commissioner took the view that the chairman had acted validly and therefore did not exercise the power under s.72(4) to convene the meeting himself.

The petitioner moved the court challenging (a) whether the chairman complied with s.72(2) by "convening" the meeting, and (b) whether the Commissioner, having received a requisition, was bound to convene a meeting under s.72(4) when the chairman had failed to convene one within the statutory time.

Outcome in brief: The Court found the chairman failed to "convene" as required; the Commissioner therefore ought to have convened the meeting under s.72(4). The April meetings were declared illegally convened; the petitioner was directed to make a fresh request to the Commissioner, who must proceed under s.72(4). The petition was allowed and there was no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the chairman complied with s.72(2) of the Act by issuing notices on 11 March 1964 for meetings on 15 and 16 April 1964 — i.e., whether issuing those notices amounted to "convening" a special meeting "within ten days of the receipt of the notice".
  2. What is the meaning of the word "convene" as used in sub-sections (2) and (4) of s.72 — whether it is satisfied by issuing a notice or requires actually calling together (convoking) the assembly.
  3. Whether, having received a requisition (as admitted by the Commissioner), the Commissioner was bound under the latter part of s.72(4) to convene the special meeting when the chairman had failed to convene it within the statutory period.
  4. Whether the meetings held on 15 and 16 April 1964 were validly convened and, if not, the legal effect of any business transacted at those meetings (including passed resolutions).
  5. As a subsidiary point: whether one meeting could have considered both no-confidence motions (against chairman and deputy chairman) or whether two separate meetings were required.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The chairman was required by s.72(2) to "convene a special meeting" within ten days of the receipt of the notice and he did not do so; merely issuing notices for dates in April did not amount to convening within ten days.
  • Because the chairman failed to convene, the Commissioner (respondent No.4) was bound by s.72(4) to convene a special meeting within ten days of receiving the requisition; the petitioner says such a requisition was presented to the Commissioner and the Commissioner should have acted.
  • The two separate meetings convened by the chairman were unnecessary — both motions could have been considered at a single meeting — and the chairman's actions indicated improper motive to assist the vice-chairman; consequently, only one meeting should be ordered now (though the petitioner offered to make a fresh request to the Commissioner if required).

Respondents' / Chairman's and Commissioner's Arguments

  • The chairman (through counsel Mr. Vaidya) submitted that by issuing the notices on 11 March 1964 he had "convened" the special meetings within the meaning of s.72(2) and had therefore complied with his duty.
  • The Commissioner took the view that because the chairman had convened meetings within ten days from receipt of the notice, it was unnecessary for the Commissioner to act under the latter part of s.72(4); accordingly, he did not convene a meeting himself.
  • Respondents further argued that construing "convene" to require calling the assembly together within ten days could create practical difficulties in relation to other provisions of the Act (notably s.49 read with s.111(4)) — for example, difficulty in giving "ten clear days" notice — and that this practical difficulty weighed in favor of a narrower meaning that might permit mere issuance of notice to suffice. The Court addressed and rejected this as a reason to depart from ordinary meaning.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sukhdeo v. Arrah Municipality, [1956] A.I.R. Pat. 367 The meaning of words like "call a special meeting" / "call" in municipal statutory context: "call" interpreted to mean "summon" or to call together the members, not merely to announce that a meeting will be held at some future date. The Court relied on this decision to show that where a comparable verb was held to imply calling the body together, an even stronger case exists that "convene" requires calling the assembly together rather than merely issuing a notice. The Patna High Court's interpretation supported the Court's conclusion about "convene".
Rex v. Smith, Jebb & Sykes 634 Used to support the lexical distinction between being "convened" (applied to aggregate bodies/assemblies) and being "summoned" (applied to individuals); supports the construction that "convene" applies to assemblies being brought together. The Court cited this authority (via Stroud's Judicial Dictionary) to reinforce the point that "convened" properly applies to assemblies and implies convoking the body; this informed the Court's textual construction of s.72.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by textual and contextual construction of the word "convene" in s.72(2) and (4). The key steps of reasoning are:

  1. Lexical meaning: The Court observed that "convene" is not defined in the Act and therefore must bear its ordinary English meaning. It consulted the Oxford Dictionary which gives senses including "to come or bring together" and "to cause to come together; to convoke." The Court concluded that "convene" in relation to a meeting carries the idea of actually calling together (convoking) the members of the assembly, not merely issuing a notice.
  2. Judicial dictionaries and authorities: The Court relied on Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, which stresses a difference between "convened" and "summoned" — that "convened" is properly applied to aggregate bodies (a Board, an Assembly) whereas individuals are "summoned" or "notified". The Court also referenced Rex v. Smith as an authority supporting that distinction.
  3. Statutory context: The Court compared the language of s.72 (which uses "convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti") with other provisions of the Act. Section 111(3) (applied to Panchayat Samitis by s.118) uses the phrase "issue notice calling a special meeting" in a different context (Zilla Parishad), demonstrating the Legislature's awareness of different formulations — i.e., the Act itself distinguishes between "convening" and "issuing notice". This supported the Court's conclusion that "convene" goes beyond merely issuing notice.
  4. Precedent application: The Court considered Sukhdeo v. Arrah Municipality, where the Patna High Court construed "call a special meeting" to mean summoning/assembling the members, not merely announcing that a meeting would be held. The Court treated that decision as reinforcing the textual conclusion that "convene" requires bringing the body together.
  5. Addressing practical difficulty argument: Respondents argued this interpretation would make compliance with similar provisions (notably s.49 read with s.111(4) requiring ten clear days' notice) difficult. The Court acknowledged the operational difficulty but held that a practical difficulty in implementation does not justify departing from the plain grammatical meaning of the word "convene".
  6. Application to facts: Applying that construction, the Court concluded that the chairman's act of issuing notices on 11 March 1964 for meetings on 15 and 16 April 1964 did not amount to "convening" a special meeting within ten days of receipt of the notice as required by s.72(2). Therefore, the chairman failed in his statutory duty.
  7. Consequence for the Commissioner: Because some members had forwarded a requisition to the Commissioner (admitted by the Commissioner) and because the chairman had failed to convene the meeting, the latter part of s.72(4) required the Commissioner to convene a special meeting within ten days of receipt of such communication and to authorize a presiding person. The Commissioner did not do so because he erroneously believed the chairman had complied; the Court held this view to be incorrect and that the Commissioner had therefore also failed to perform the statutory duty.
  8. Relief and practicality: The Court considered whether it should order the Commissioner to convene a meeting immediately, but noted the ten-day statutory period runs from receipt of the requisition and that events since then made strict retrospective enforcement unnecessary. The petitioner offered to make a fresh request; the Court found that to be an appropriate remedy and directed the petitioner to make a fresh requisition, upon which the Commissioner must act in accordance with s.72(4).
  9. Effect on meetings and resolutions: The Court declared that the meetings convened by the chairman for 15 and 16 April 1964 were illegally convened, and held that any business transacted at those meetings was illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court declined, at that stage, to decide whether one meeting could have addressed both motions, leaving that decision to the Commissioner when he convenes the meeting(s).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition allowed. The Court held that the chairman (respondent No.1) failed to perform his duty under s.72(2) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, because issuing notices for future dates did not constitute "convening" the special meeting within ten days. Consequently, the Commissioner (respondent No.4) should have, but did not, exercise the power under the latter part of s.72(4) to convene the meeting after receiving the requisition.

Direct implications and orders:

  • The meetings convened by the chairman for 15 and 16 April 1964 were declared illegally convened.
  • Any business transacted or resolutions passed at those meetings were held to be illegal and without jurisdiction.
  • The petitioner is directed to make a fresh request/requisition to the Commissioner under s.72(4) to call a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti.
  • Upon receipt of such a fresh requisition, the Commissioner must proceed in accordance with s.72(4): convene the special meeting within the statutory period, appoint the time and place (office of the Panchayat Samiti) and authorize an appropriate person to preside.
  • The Court declined to order whether one meeting or two should be held to consider the two motions; that determination is left to the Commissioner when exercising his statutory duty.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The opinion focused on statutory construction and the parties' rights under s.72. The Court applied ordinary-English and contextual statutory interpretation to clarify that "convene" requires calling the assembly together; beyond the direct relief granted, the judgment does not purport to establish broader legal doctrines beyond the construction applied to the statutory provisions at issue.

    Popat Ragho Patil v. Damu Shankar Patil

    Kotval, J.:— We are concerned in this special civil application with a resolution of no-confidence sought to be tabled by two members of the Gram Panchayat of Shirpur in Dhulia District. Of the two members the petitioner is one. A notice necessary under s. 72(1) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, was given on March 2, 1964. It recited several grounds of misconduct on the part both of the chairman and the deputy chairman of the Panchayat Samiti. With these grounds we are not here concerned, because what is in dispute is the subsequent procedure that was followed both by the chairman and by the divisional commissioner. The notice under s. 72(1) was given in the form prescribed by the rules known as Zilla Parishads Presiding Authorities (No-confidence Motion) Rules, 1962, framed under s. 274(2)(x). After reciting the various grounds upon which the signatories desired to move the no-confidence motion, they requested the chairman to convene a meeting for the purpose of considering the no-confidence motion. The chairman is respondent No. 1 before us and the vice-chairman respondent No. 2.

    2. On receiving the notice the chairman in his turn issued on March 11, 1964, a notice calling a special meeting to consider the motion of no-confidence against him on April 15, 1964, at 4 p.m in the office of the Panchayat Samiti. On the same day he also issued another notice calling a separate meeting on April 16, 1964, at 9 a.m in the office of the Panchayat Samiti to consider the motion of no-confidence against the vice-president. One of the principal points argued in this special civil application is as to the validity of the action of the chairman in issuing notices for April 15 and 16, 1964. It is the case of the petitioner that the chairman of the Samiti should have convened the meeting of the Samiti within 10 days of the receipt of the notice as required by s. 72(2) of the Act and that in issuing a notice convening the meetings on April 15 and 16, 1964, the chairman failed to discharge his duty under s. 72(2) and indeed acted contrary to law. In that view it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that under sub-s. (4) of s. 72 the Commissioner, who is respondent No. 4 before us, was bound to convene a meeting of the Panchayat. Samiti for consideration of the said motion within 10 days of the receipt of a requisition by him to consider the no-confidence motion. The petitioner says that such a requisition was given. The requisition is not before us, but in para. 2 of the Return, the Commissioner, Bombay Division, has admitted as follows:—

    “I say that an application signed by Sarvashri Popat Ragho Patil (the petitioner) and Poulad Tathu Patil was presented to me on 13th March, 1964. It was represented therein that on 2nd March, 1964 the petitioner along with other 8 members of the Panchayat Samiti, Shripur had sent to the Block Development Officer and Secretary, Panchayat Smiti, Shripur requisitions for convening a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti, Shripur, for consideration of motions of No-confidence in the Chairman as well as Deputy Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti”.

    3. The Commissioner has further stated that the petitioner had pointed out to him that the chairman of the Panchayat Samiti had convened two separate meetings on April 15, 1964 and April 16, 1964, for consideration of the said motions but that, those meetings were purposely delayed and that the chairman had thereby misconducted himself. The petitioner had also prayed before the commissioner that the proposed meetings should be declared illegal.

    4. It appears, however, that respondent No. 4 considered that the action taken by the chairman was a valid action under law and, therefore, he on his part did not consider it necessary to act under the second part of sub-s. (4) of s. 72. That is also the stand which the commissioner has taken in this Court. He has stated that the action taken by the chairman of the Samiti in convening the two meetings on April 15, 1964, and April 16, 1964, was a valid action. He has stated in para. 7 as follows:

    “I say that the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of section 72 of the m.z.p & p.s act 1961 empowers the commissioner to convene a special meeting for consideration of a No-confidence motion in cases where the chairman of the Panchayat Samiti fails to comply with the directions issued under section 72(2) of the said Act. Here in the present case, as the chairman had convened meetings within 10 days from the receipt of the notice, no action under section 72(4) could be taken”.

    5. That is precisely the stand which the petitioner challenges in the present petition.

    6. Now, s. 72 provides for the motion of no-confidence against the chairman and deputy chairman of Panchayat Samitis. Sub-section (1) requires that a motion of no-confidence in either of these two officials must be made by a requisition of not less than one-fourth of the total number of the members after giving a notice in the prescribed form. On giving a notice sub-s. (2) requires that the chairman of the Panchayat Samiti shall convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti to consider such motion within 10 days of the receipt of the notice and the crucial question involved in the petition is whether the chairman did comply with sub-s. (2) and whether he convened a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti as prescribed thereunder. In case the chairman fails to convene a meeting, sub-s. (4) comes into play and sub-s. (4) prescribes that if no such meeting is convened by the chairman within the period specified in sub-s. (2), all or any of the members who have given notice of motion of no-confidence may forward to the commissioner a copy of the notice (together with a copy of the motion) and request him to convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti. The commissioner shall within ten days of the receipt of such communication by him convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti for the consideration of the motion at the office of the Panchayat Samiti at a time appointed by him, and shall authorise such person as he deems fit to preside over such meeting.

    7. Now, there is no dispute in the present case that the members or some of the members who had given the notice of motion of no-confidence did move the commissioner to convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti, That, as we have shown, is admitted by the commissioner himself in his return in para. 2. If that be so, and if it be established that the chairman failed to convene a meeting as he was bound to do under sub-s. (2) of s. 72, then the commissioner was bound to act under the latter part of sub-s. (4) and himself convene a special meeting after appointing a time and authorising a person to preside over it. The commissioner says that he did not do this, because in his view the chairman of the Panchayat Samiti had done all that he is required to do under sub-s. (2).

    8. On behalf of the petitioner emphasis was laid upon the words used in sub-s. (2) of s. 72, “The Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti shall convene a special meeting….within ten days of the receipt of the notice.” It was argued that all that the chairman did within the prescribed ten days was to issue notices of meetings for April 15 and 16, 1964, and that he did not “convene” the special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti as he was required to do under law. On behalf of the chairman Mr. Vaidya has, on the other hand, submitted that by issuing the notices on March 11, 1964, the chairman had convened special meetings of the Panchayat Samiti and he had, therefore, fully complied with the requirement of sub-s. (2) of s. 72.

    9. That leads us to a consideration of the meaning of the word “convene” as used in sub-s. (2) as also in sub-s. (4) of s. 72. It is nowhere defined and obviously, therefore, it must carry the normal connotation that it carries in the English language. In the Oxford Dictionary, Vol. II, the word “convene” has been shown to carry several shades of meaning e.g (a) to come or bring together (b) of a collective body: to assemble for united action; to meet in a convention. Where it is used as a transitive verb, the meaning is given as “to cause to come together; to convoke” and the illustrations given there are “with all due speed I will convene The Doctors of Theology” and “Fifty Bishops of the neighbouring dioceses were convened”. In the case of collective bodies or an assembly or a meeting, the illustration is given, “The Senate was convened by the tribunes.” Considering any one or more of these shades of meaning, it is clear that the expression “convene” cannot apply exclusively to the mere giving of a notice to call a body together, but that there is implicit in any shade of meaning of the word “convene” the idea of actually calling together that association or body of individuals. Reference was also made to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. I, page 624. But there, the meaning is not explained, but one aspect of that meaning has been stressed which assists in the construction of the section before us. It has thus been explained,

    “There is an obvious difference between ‘convened’ and ‘summoned’….‘convened’ is applied, properly, not to individuals but, to aggregate bodies. A Board is ‘convened’; an Assembly is ‘convened’; a Senate is ‘convened’; but A is not ‘convened,’ he is ‘summoned, warned, or noticed’.”

    and reference is made to Rex v. Smith . Jebb & Sy. 634..

    10. It seems to us that when the word “convene” was advisedly used both in sub-s. (2) and sub-s. (4) of s. 72, the legislative draftsman had in mind this connotation of the word “convene” and used it advisedly in the context of a meeting or a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti. In our opinion, the using of the word “convene” with reference to a meeting or a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti can only mean the calling together of the members of that Panchayat Samiti. We cannot accept the argument that it only implies the giving of a notice to call a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti and it is here that the distinction which has been drawn in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary becomes important. The word “convened” as pointed out by Stroud can only be with reference to an assembly and not with reference to an individual. Therefore when the expression is used “convene a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti” it can only imply ‘convene’ a meeting of that assembly which is the Panchayat Samiti.” The meaning of the word “convene” is, therefore, in our opinion, clear that the members of the assembly known as the Panchayat Samiti shotdd be called together or “convoked”.

    11. We are fortified in this view by a consideration of other provisions of the Act itself. Section 111 deals with the procedure for calling a meeting of the Zilla Parishad and s. 118 applies the self-same procedure to meetings of the Panchayat Samitis. In dealing with the power of the President to fix the dates of meetings and his duty to call meetings of the Zilla Parishads, sub-s. (3) of s. 111 prescribes

    “The President shall fix the dates for meetings, and may, whenever he thinks fit and shall, upon the written request of not less than one-fifth of the Councillors, and within seven days from the receipt of such request, issue notice calling a special meeting”. The expression here used is not “shall convene a special meeting”, but in contra-distinction with the words used in s. 72, sub-ss. (2) and (4) “convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti”, the words used are “issue notice calling a special meeting”. Thus the Act itself draws a distinction between convening a special meeting and issuing a notice calling a special meeting. It would thus appear that the idea of convening a meeting does not stop at merely issuing a notice of that meeting but actually calling it together or convoking it.

    12. In Sukhdeo v. Arrah Municipality . [1956] A.I.R Pat. 367., there came up before the Patna High Court a question of the construction of s. 44 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act (7 of 1922) in which the words used were “call a special meeting”. Sub-Section (2) of that section was as follows:

    “(2) If the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman fails to call a special meeting within fifteen days after any such requisition has been made, the meeting may be called by the persons who signed the requisition.”

    and it was urged before a Division Bench of that Court, as it has been urged before us in the present case, that by the word “call” was intended “announce a meeting to be held” or in other words “give notice of a meeting”. Their Lordships answered the point as follows (p. 370):

    “Mr. S.N Dutta wants to interpret the word ‘call’ to mean ‘announce a meeting to be held’. According to him, if the Chairman had announced within 15 days of the receipt of the requisition that a meeting was going to be held irrespective of the fact whether that date fell within or without the period of 15 days from date of the receipt of the requisition, he has satisfied the requirements of S. 44 sub-s. (1) and, accordingly, the requisitionists had no jurisdiction to call a meeting…

    The word ‘call’ has been given the meaning ‘summon’ in the Oxford English Dictionary which will signify issuing of summons for assembly. It is true that the word ‘call’ and the word ‘hold’ are not exactly synonymous, but, in my opinion, they convey the same meaning. A meeting is ‘held’ by persons attending it and, therefore, the word (hold) could not be used with exact accuracy in the section.”

    13. It seems to us that the word “call” as used in that enactment is more expressive than the word “convene” in favour of the argument that it implies only the giving of a notice, but even there, the Patna High Court held that the word implied the calling together of the members. With stronger reason, therefore, it seems to us that where the word used is “convene” it can only mean to bring the assembly known as Panchayat Samiti together. At any rate, it cannot mean that the mere giving of a notice is sufficient as was contended.

    14. It was then argued on behalf of the respondents that if this is the interpretation of the word “convene” as used in sub-s. (2) and (4) of s. 72, then it would not be possible to implement other provisions of the Act, for instance, s. 49(2) where the same word is used. Section 49 makes similar provisions as s. 72 but for a motion of no-confidence against a president or a vice-president of a Zilla Parishad and sub-s. (2) of s. 49 provides:

    “The President shall convene a meeting of the Zilla Parishad to consider the motion within ten days of the receipt of notice.”

    15. Mr. Vaidya argues that s. 111(4) prescribes notice of ten clear days for a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad and that provision read along with sub-h. (2) of s. 49 would make it impossible for the President to comply with the latter provision of law, if the interpretation of the word “convene” is to call a meeting of the Zilla Parishad, because the President would not be in a position to give ten clear days' notice after the receipt of the notice of motion of no-confidence.

    16. The difficulty pointed out by Mr. Vaidva is undoubtedly there, but it is not, in our opinion, an insuperable difficulty. It does not render the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 49 impossible to implement but undoubtedly makes the position of the President somewhat difficult if by the word “convene” is understood the calling of a special meeting within ten days of the receipt of the notice. This is a matter with which we are not, however, directly concerned. It may be that when making the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 49 the legislative draftsman over-looked the difficulty that would arise, but for the reason that difficulties would arise in the implementation of the other provisions of the Act, we cannot give to the expression used in s. 72, “convene a special meeting” any meaning other than what the plain English requires and merely to obviate difficulties.

    17. In our opinion, the expression, “convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti” in sub-s. (2) and sub-s. (4) of s. 72 clearly implies that the chairman must call that body together before the expiry of ten days from the receipt of si notice, otherwise he is not complying with that requirement of the law. Upon the facts which we have already stated, it is clear beyond doubt that there was a failure on the part of the chairman to convene the meeting as required by law. We must, therefore, hold that respondent No. 1 failed to perform his duty under sub-s. (2) of s. 72. If that be so, then it is not in dispute that the provisions of sub-s. (4) would come into play and sub-s, (4) provides that if no such meeting is convened by the chairman within the period prescribed, then the members who had given the notice of motion of no-confidence may call upon the commissioner to convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti. It is also not in dispute here that the commissioner was so called upon, but he did not comply with the requisition of the petitioner and others, because of the view which he took that the chairman had acted within his powers—a view which we have already held was erroneous. In that view, it must also be held that the commissioner failed to perform his duty as required by the latter part of sub-s. (4) of s. 72. That sub-section says that

    “…The Commissioner shall, within ten days of the receipt of such communication by him, convene the special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti for the consideration of the motion at the office of the Banchayat Samiti at a time appointed by him, and shall authorise such person as he deems fit to preside over such meeting”.

    18. We think that in the circumstances the commissioner ought to have convened the meeting himself, in accordance with the above provision.

    19. The question then arises, what should now be done having regard to the findings which we have given and to the events that have subsequently transpired. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that the commissioner should now be called upon to convene a meeting as he is enjoined to do by the latter part of sub-s. (4) of s. 72. On behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, however. Mr. Vaidya has pointed out that the duty of the commissioner was to convene the special meeting within ten days of the receipt of “such communication by him”, that is to say, within ten days of the receipt of the requisition by the movers of the no-confidence motion to call a meeting. Mr. Vaidya says that in the events that have transpired, this is now impossible. Normally, we should have thought that where an official enjoined to perform a particular duty fails to perform it upon an erroneous view of law, the parties should be remitted to the position which they occupied when that error of law was initially committed. But it is not here necessary to go as far as that, because on behalf of the petitioner Mr. Paranjpe has offered that if necessary the petitioner would be willing to make a fresh request to the commissioner to convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti. We think that would in the circumstances be not only a proper but a desirable course. Accordingly, we declare that the meetings convened by respondent No. 1 for April 15 and 16, 1964, were illegally convened. It appears that some resolutions were passed at those meetings regarding which also the petitioner has made certain averments and the respondents have controverted them. It is not necessary to go into that controversy, but it must be held that whatever business was transacted at those meetings was illegal and without jurisdiction since the meetings themselves were not validly convened. We now direct the petitioner to make a fresh request to the commissioner to call a special meeting under the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 72, and if such a request is made, the commissioner shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 72. A minor issue between the parties still remains to be determined. When the petitioner and others gave notice of the motion of no-confidence, respondent No. 1, as we have said, issued notice on March 11, 1964, convening two meetings, one on April 15, 1964, to consider the no-confidence motion against himself and the other on April 16, 1964, to consider the no-confidence motion against his colleague the vice-chairman. This action of the chairman has also been challenged in this petition and on behalf of the petitioner it has been urged that it was quite unnecessary to call two meetings and that both the resolutions could have been discussed at one and the same meeting. It has also been alleged by them that this action was taken by the chairman himself with a view to assist his vice-chairman and that they intended and in fact did each preside at the meeting which considered the no-confidence motion against the other. Since we have held those meetings illegal, the same request has been made before us on behalf of the petitioner that we should order that only one meeting should now be held. We do not think that at the present stage we need go into this question, for, as we have said, consequent upon the failure of the chairman to perform his duty, the commissioner ought to have called the meeting and we have now directed him accordingly. It would, therefore, be in the first instance for the commissioner to decide for himself whether he should in the circumstances order one meeting to be or two meetings to be held as the case may be. That by the Act is his duty and we do not think that we are called upon to pronounce upon it at the present stage. In any case as soon as the petitioner or other member gives a requisition the commissioner must call one or more meetings as the case may be in compliance with s. 72(4). The petition is allowed subject to the directions given above. There shall be no order as to costs.

    20. Petition allowed.

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    Popat Ragho Patil v. Damu Shankar Patil
    (Jun 17, 1964)