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citation codes
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  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
  • Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • Section 2(g)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
  • Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • Section 2(g)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was employed as a carpenter by the respondent. While removing centering of a chajja it collapsed and fell on him, causing serious injuries for which he was hospitalized for seven months. A medical certificate stated the disability at 65 per cent. The appellant claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, seeking Rs. 3,185 based on the certificate. The respondent denied that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, alleged the appellant acted contrary to instructions and was negligent, and pleaded that it had paid Rs. 2,850 in aggregate to the appellant.

The learned Commissioner found the accident arose out of and in the course of employment, held the respondent liable, rejected the respondent's proof of payment of Rs. 2,850, placed the appellant in the wage group Rs. 80–100, and, on the basis of 65% permanent partial disablement, awarded Rs. 2,730 and Rs. 25 costs.

The appellant appealed. Mr. Kamerkar (for the appellant) contended the Commissioner erred in the disability assessment and award amount and that penalty for delaying payment should have been imposed. An application was made to amend the claimed amount (substituting Rs. 4,900 for Rs. 3,185) on the ground of a mistake in computing the claim and because the Registrar had previously asked that the claim be reduced from an earlier figure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Commissioner was in error in holding the disability at 65% and in awarding Rs. 2,730 for permanent partial disablement.
  2. Whether a penalty for delaying payment of compensation should be imposed.
  3. Whether the appellant's application to amend the claim (substituting Rs. 4,900 for Rs. 3,185) should be allowed.
  4. How to construe the Act's definitions of "partial disablement" and "total disablement"—specifically whether "total disablement" refers to physical incapacity to do any work or to inability to obtain work (loss of earning capacity).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Kamerkar)

  • The learned Commissioner was wrong in holding the disability to be 65% and in awarding only Rs. 2,730.
  • Penalty for delayed payment of compensation should have been imposed on the respondent.
  • Application to amend the claim: the appellant made a mistake in computing the claim based on the medical certificate; he should be allowed to amend the claimed amount to Rs. 4,900. The Registrar had previously asked the appellant to reduce a larger claimed figure, and an affidavit from the adviser's Cassier supports that the figure was reduced from Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 3,185 at the Registrar's instruction.

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Israni and respondent's pleaded case)

  • The respondent denied that the injury was caused by reason of the employment and pleaded that the appellant acted contrary to instructions and was negligent in performing the work.
  • The respondent pleaded that it had paid an aggregate sum of Rs. 2,850 to the appellant (which the Commissioner found not proved by the respondent).
  • Opposed the amendment application on grounds of delay and limitation.
  • Emphasised textual interpretation of the word "all" in "incapacitates a workman for all work," contending that total disablement requires incapacity to do any work.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ball v. William Hunt & Sons, Ltd. [1912] A.C. 496 Holds that "incapacity for work" includes inability to get work; "There is incapacity for work when a man has a physical defect which makes his work unsaleable in any market reasonably accessible to him." The court relied on this authority to interpret "incapacitates a workman for all work" as referring to inability to obtain work that is reasonably saleable in the market, rather than mere physical incapacity to perform tasks.
E.I Ry. v. Maurice Cecil Ryan. [1937] A.I.R Cal. 526 Holds that loss of earning capacity must be estimated, not mere loss of physical capacity. Applied to demonstrate that a workman may be "totally disabled" under the Act if, despite some physical capacity, he cannot obtain any suitable employment; cited in support of interpreting disablement with reference to earning capacity.
Rukiyabai v. George D'Cruz. [1961] A.I.R Ker. 108 Applied the same principle as in E.I Ry. v. Maurice Cecil Ryan regarding loss of earning capacity. Noted as endorsing the principle that total/partial disablement is to be assessed with reference to loss of earning capacity rather than solely physical incapacity.
General Manager, G.I.P Ry. v. Shankar. [1950] A.I.R Nag. 201 Contains observations that "Disablement must be of such a character that the person concerned is unable to do any work." The court treated these observations as fact-specific; it observed they were made in context where alternative employment was available and refused, and therefore they should not be read as endorsing a strictly physical-incapacity interpretation of "all work."
Kali Das v. S.K. Mondal. [1957] A.I.R Cal. 660 Disapproved the procedure of deciding the nature of disablement solely on the basis of a medical certificate. The court relied on this authority to hold that the medical certificate can describe the injury and physical effects but that the Court must determine whether disablement is partial or total, taking into account evidence on nature of injury, work capacity and availability of employment; the Commissioner had adopted the wrong procedure.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed several matters in sequence:

  1. Amendment application: The court examined the affidavit evidence (Cassier) and documents showing the claim figure had been altered from "Rs. 4000" to "Rs. 3185" and correspondence where Rs. 7,000 was previously claimed. It applied the principle that amendments should generally be allowed unless they change the cause of action or are not bona fide. The court found no new cause of action nor limitation bar and accepted that the appellant had been misled by the medical certificate; accordingly the amendment was allowed.
  2. Statutory construction: The court analysed Section 4 and the definitions in Section 2(g) and 2(l) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Reading the definitions together, the court observed:
    • For scheduled injuries, whether disablement is partial or total depends on whether the aggregate percentage equals or exceeds 100%.
    • For non-scheduled injuries, the difficulty is greater because both "total" and "partial" disablement refer to earning capacity rather than mere physical incapacity.
    • The definition of "partial disablement" expressly references reduction in earning capacity; "total disablement" must likewise be read with reference to the worker's ability to obtain work that is reasonably saleable in the market.
    • The phrase "incapacitates a workman for all work" should not be understood as referring to physical incapacity to perform any task but to incapacity to obtain employment for the workman in the market accessible to him.
  3. Precedents: The court relied on Ball v. William Hunt & Sons to support the marketability/earning-capacity interpretation, cited E.I Ry. v. Maurice Cecil Ryan and Rukiyabai v. George D'Cruz for the principle that loss of earning capacity must be estimated, and treated General Manager, G.I.P Ry. v. Shankar as fact-specific rather than laying down a rule of physical incapacity. The court also invoked Kali Das v. S.K. Mondal to criticise the Commissioner's reliance solely on the medical certificate.
  4. Procedure and remittal: The court found the Commissioner had followed an incorrect procedure by proceeding only on the medical certificate and not framing the issue on the nature of disablement. The medical certificate was described as incomplete. The court concluded that a proper inquiry was necessary and remitted the specific issue as to whether the appellant had suffered permanent total or partial disability and, if partial, its extent, directing further evidence and certification within two months.
  5. Penalty for delay: The question of penalty had been argued, but the court reserved decision on that point and stated it would deal with it when finally deciding the matter after remittal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court remitted the issue of whether the appellant has suffered permanent total or partial disability (and, if partial, its extent) for fresh inquiry and allowed the amendment of the claim.

Direct consequences and instructions:

  • The application to amend the claimed amount was allowed.
  • The following issue was remitted to the Commissioner for fresh determination: "Whether the appellant has suffered permanent, total or partial disability and if partial what is the extent?"
  • The parties are permitted to lead such evidence as they desire before the Commissioner, who must certify the finding within two months from receipt of the writ.
  • The question of imposing a penalty for delayed payment was not decided and is to be considered by the court when it finally decides the matter after the remittal.
  • No broader precedent beyond the interpretations and procedural directions stated was declared; the decision's immediate effect is to require further fact-finding and to allow amendment of the claim in this case.

    Ahmed Abdul v. H.K Sehgal

    Patel, J.:— This is an appeal by a workman under the Workmen's Compensation Act. He was working as a carpenter with the respondent. While removing the centering etc. of a chajja it collapsed and fell on him and he was seriously injured. He was in hospital for seven months. The doctor gave a certificate that the disability was 65 per cent. The appellant claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. He claimed a sum of Rs. 3,185 relying on this certificate. The respondent denied theft the injury was caused by reason of the employment and alleged that he acted contrary to instructions. He also attributed his own negligence in the doing of the work and pleaded that he had paid in the aggregate a sum of Rs. 2,850 to the appellant.

    2. The learned Commissioner held that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment, that the respondent was liable and he had not proved that the amount of Rs. 2,850 was paid by him to the appellant. He held that the appellant fell within the wage group of Rs. 80-100 and on the basis of 65 per cent, permanent partial disablement awarded Rs. 2,730 and Rs. 25 as costs. Mr. Kamerkar has contended (1) that the learned Commissioner was in error in holding that the disability was 65 per cent, aud awarding only an amount of Rs. 2,730 and (2) that penalty for delaying the payment should have been imposed.

    3. In his application the appellant had claimed Rs, 3,185 on the basis that he was earning daily Rs. 3.50 and that would work out at 65 per cent, permanent partial disability. Mr. Kamerkar has made an application for amendment of the claim by substituting the amount of Rs. 4,900 on the basis of total disability for the amount of Rs. 3,185. He contends that the appellant committed a mistake in computing the claim relying on the medical certificate and in the interest of justice he should be allowed to amend the claim. His adviser Cassier has filed his affidavit. He says that he had claimed Rs. 4,000 but the Registrar asked him to reduce the claim to Rs. 3,185 which he did. In this he is supported by the application where the figure of “Rs. 4000” has been scored out and substituted by the figure “Rs. 3185”. In the correspondence the appellant had claimed Rs. 7,000.

    4. Mr. Israni has opposed the application on the ground of delay and limitation. Generally amendment application should be granted unless it changes the cause of action or the application is not bona fide. It ought not to be rejected only on the ground of delay. In the present case new cause of action is not sought to be added. There can be no question of the bar of limitation. As the appellant was misled by the medical certificate I would allow the amendment.

    5. The next question is one of construction of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 4 provides for payment of compensation in cases of death, permanent total disablement and permanent partial disablement. Section 2(g) and (l) define “partial disablement” and “total disablement”. The definitions so far as relevant are:

    “(g) ‘partial disablement’ means,…where the disablement is of a permanent nature, such disablement as reduces his earning capacity in every employment which, he was capable of undertaking at that time: provided that every injury specified in Schedule I shall be deemed to result in partial disablement.”

    “(l) ‘total disablement’ means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement: provided that permanent total disablement shall be deemed to result from permanent total loss of sight of both eyes or from any combination of injuries specified in Schedule I. when the aggregate percentage of the loss of earning capacity, as specified in that Schedule against those injuries, amount to one hundred per cent.”

    6. Reading the definitions together would show that in the case of scheduled injuries disablement is parital or total according as the total percentage of all of them together is less than or equal to 100 per cent. Difficulty arises only in the case of non-scheduled injuries. Both total and partial disablement has reference to earning capacity. In the definition of “partial disablement” there is direct reference to the earning capacity of the workman while in the case of “total disablement” it is referred to in the case of scheduled injuries. Moreover, the underlying purpose of the Act is to make some provision for a workman who is disabled from earning by work. Merely being physically capable cannot enable him to earn which he can do only if there are persons who would employ him. If there is such incapacity that he cannot get employment for any work he can undertake it would be total permanent disability. The words “incapacitates a workman for all work” therefore cannot mean any and every work which he may do but means such work as is reasonably capable of being sold in the market. In other words they do not mean “incapacitate to work”. The words do not have reference to physical incapacity.

    7. Mr. Israni lays emphasis on the word “all” before the word “work” and contends that in order that a workman should be totally disabled he must be incapable of doing any work. Looking to the purpose which the Act was intended to serve and the context in which the words are used, I am not prepared to accept the contention.

    8. In Ball v. William Hunt & Sons, Ltd. . [1912] A.C 496., a workman was blind of one eye. But the defect was not visible and he was to all outward appearances a two eyed man. He sustained an employment injury as a result of which the defective eye had to be removed with the consequence that he could not get employment though physically he was as well as before. The House of Lords held that “incapacity for work” included inability to get work or in other words “There is incapacity for work when a man has a physical defect which makes his work unsaleable in any market reasonably accessible to him.”

    9. In E.I Ry. v. Maurice Cecil Ryan . [1937] A.I.R Cal. 526., under this section it was held that loss of earning capacity has to be estimated and not loss of physical capacity. A workman employed by the Railway Company was injured. Surgeon certified his incapacity at 50 per cent, and declared him fit for sedentary work i.e lowest grade in the employment. He was engaged as a clerk but after trial he was declared unfit for that work also. It was held to be total disablement under the Act. The same principle was applied in Rukiyabai v. George D'Cruz . [1961] A.I.R Ker. 108.

    10. In General Manager, G.I.P Ry. v. Shankar . [1950] A.I.R Nag. 201. the workman claimed compensation as for total disablement. The learned Judge said (p. 202):

    “…But this inability did not imply his inability to do other work. Disablement must be of such a character that the person concerned is unable to do any work.”

    11. Mr. Israni has naturally very strongly relied on this passage. The observations must be read in the context of the facts of the case. The workman though incapable of working as a fireman as before was yet capable of working as a bearer which employment was offered to him but he refused. Under the circumstances the learned Judge held that he was entitled to compensation on the basis of partial disablement only. It is difficult to hold that the learned Judge when he made the observations above intended to refer to physical incapacity.

    12. In the present case the issue as to the nature of the disability was not framed and the case proceeded only on the basis of the medical certificate, a procedure which was strongly disapproved, with respect, rightly in Kali Das v. S.K Mondal . [1957] A.I.R Cal. 660.. The certificate of a medical expert can only say what the injury is, its effect temporary or total on the limb and to an extent the physical incapacity of the man. It is, however, for the Court to find having regard to the evidence before it whether the workman has suffered partial or total disablement. The Court must take into account the nature of the injury, the nature of the work which the workman was capable of undertaking and its availability to him. In this connection the employer's willingness to employ him in any other alternative employment may have relevance. In my view, the learned Commissioner adopted a wrong procedure in dealing with the case.

    13. Medical certificate appears to be incomplete and does not show which of the particular limbs are affected and to what extent. I understand that the appellant had to be brought to Court supported and on crutches. Prima facie the disablement is much more serious than certified and I think proper inquiry is necessary.

    14. I remit the following issue:

    “Whether the appellant has suffered permanent, total or partial disability and if partial what is the extent?”

    15. The parties will be allowed to lead such evidence as they desire and the Commissioner will certify the finding within two months from the writ reaching him. The question of penalty has been fully argued before me but I will deal with the question when I finally decide the matter.

    16. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Ahmed Abdul v. H.K Sehgal
    (Apr 20, 1964)