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citation codes
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  • provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, section
  • s. 96(3) of our Act. Section 38 of the English Act
  • ss. 35, 36 and 38 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930.
  • ss. 94 and 95 of our Motor Vehicles Act, s. 38
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95,
  • clause (b) of sub-section(2) of section 96.
  • s. 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • ss. 35 and 36 of the English Act
  • s. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • sub-section (4) of section 95
  • clause (b) of sub-section (2)
  • Motor Vehicles. Section 94
  • Sub-section (2) of s. 96
  • Sub-section (5) of s. 95
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, section
  • s. 96(3) of our Act. Section 38 of the English Act
  • ss. 35, 36 and 38 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930.
  • ss. 94 and 95 of our Motor Vehicles Act, s. 38
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95,
  • clause (b) of sub-section(2) of section 96.
  • s. 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • ss. 35 and 36 of the English Act
  • s. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • sub-section (4) of section 95
  • clause (b) of sub-section (2)
  • Motor Vehicles. Section 94
  • Sub-section (2) of s. 96
  • Sub-section (5) of s. 95
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These two appeals (Nos. 10 and 11 of 1962) arise from two suits (Nos. 70 and 71 of 1959). The suits were filed by the heirs of Daooji Badhamohan Meherotra (who died) and by Murli Dholandas (who suffered serious injury) for damages resulting from a motor accident on March 13, 1958. On that date both Meherotra and Murli accompanied the defendant Pesumal on a drive from Bombay to Poona in a motor car belonging to Shamdas Nathumal Asvani. The defendant Pesumal was driving the car with Asvani's consent and knowledge. The plaintiffs alleged rash and negligent driving by Pesumal and that the car collided with a truck between mile-stones 93 and 94.

The plaintiffs served a notice under s. 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act on New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd., which had insured Asvani in respect of the car. The insurance company obtained a Chamber Summons for discharge of that notice; Mr. Justice Tarkunde allowed the Chamber Summons and discharged the notice. The defendant Pesumal appealed from that order. The appeals and the Chamber Summons proceedings before the trial judge form the procedural context of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. (the respondent insurer) is liable under s. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act notwithstanding the proviso in clause 3 of its policy (the driver-extension avoidance clause) that excludes drivers who are "entitled to indemnity under any other policy".
  2. Whether the policy clause in section III (the non-avoidance clause) and s. 96(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act render ineffective any policy condition (such as the clause 3 proviso) that would otherwise avoid the insurer's statutory liability to injured third parties.
  3. Whether the defendant (appellant) had the necessary locus/standing to appeal against the order discharging the notice issued to the insurer.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent (New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd.) — principal contentions

  • The insurer relied on the proviso in clause 3 (the driver-extension clause) of its policy, which states that the company will indemnify any permitted driver "provided that such Driver… is not entitled to indemnity under any other policy." The insurer contended that this proviso excluded liability because the defendant was insured by another company (Indian Trade & General Insurance Co. Ltd.) under a vehicle-extension clause.
  • It was argued that because the defendant had insurance under his own policy (albeit covering a different car), New Asiatic was discharged from liability by virtue of the proviso in clause 3.
  • Mr. Advani (for the respondent) also relied on English authority under ss. 35–38 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, urging that the position of driver-extensions can permissibly be qualified by a provision excluding a driver who holds personal insurance.
  • Respondent further argued that the proviso effectively created a situation equivalent to the driver not being insured by New Asiatic at all, and therefore New Asiatic could not be made liable under the statutory notice procedure.
  • It was also contended that the defendant lacked a sufficient interest to appeal the discharge of the notice (i.e., that discharge did not affect the defendant's rights).

Appellant (Defendant Pesumal) — principal contentions

  • The defendant maintained (in affidavit before the Chamber Summons) that he was included within the class of persons insured by New Asiatic and denied that he was not entitled to indemnity from that company.
  • He claimed that both New Asiatic and his own insurer (Indian Trade & General) should be liable for any decree or judgment passed against him.
  • On the question of appealability, the defendant asserted that the discharge of the notice adversely affected his position in relation to the ultimate decree and therefore he was aggrieved and entitled to appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by examining the policy terms and the statutory scheme in Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, with a focus on ss. 94, 95 and 96.

(1) Policy clauses identified:

  • Clause 3 (driver extension) contained a proviso (the "avoidance clause") that excluded indemnity for any driver who was "entitled to indemnity under any other policy".
  • Clause 4 (vehicle extension) in the defendant's own policy with Indian Trade & General provided indemnity to the defendant in respect of his own vehicle or in certain situations for driving a private motor car not belonging to him.
  • Section III of the New Asiatic policy contained a clause (here termed the "non-avoidance clause") stating that "Nothing in this Policy or any endorsement hereon shall affect the right of any person indemnified by this Policy or any other person to recover an amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, section 96," subject to repayment obligations by the insured to the company of sums that would not have been payable but for s. 96.

(2) Statutory construction and effect:

  • The Court emphasized that ss. 94 and 95 require insurance "in relation to the use of the vehicle" which is being used at the time of the accident; the statutory focus is on insurance with respect to the specific vehicle in use, not simply on a driver's general insurance unconnected to the vehicle involved.
  • Section 95(5) (mentioned as creating absolute liability) and s. 96 make the insurer liable on a judgment as if it were a judgment-debtor in respect of liabilities covered by s. 95(1)(b), subject to the conditions and permissible defences enumerated in s. 96(2).
  • Because the defendant's policy with Indian Trade & General insured him in respect of another vehicle (and not in respect of the vehicle involved in the accident), that other insurer's policy did not, in the Court's view, fall within s. 95(1) and s. 96(1) in relation to the accident vehicle. Consequently, statutory liability under s. 96 attached only to the insurer that had insured the vehicle actually being used (New Asiatic).

(3) Interaction of policy clauses and statute:

  • The non-avoidance clause in the New Asiatic policy (Section III) expressly preserved the right of persons to recover under s. 96; therefore, if s. 96 rendered the company liable, the proviso in clause 3 could not relieve the company from that statutory liability as against the plaintiffs.
  • Independently, s. 96(3) was relied upon as decisive: it renders ineffective any policy condition that purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured other than the specific conditions listed in s. 96(2)(b). The avoidance clause in clause 3 is not one of those enumerated exceptions, and therefore is ineffective as against the statutory liabilities covered by s. 95(1)(b).
  • The Court rejected the respondent's argument (advanced by Mr. Advani) that s. 96(3) did not apply because the avoidance clause was not in conflict with the limited conditions in s. 96(2)(b). The Court held that the statutory language of s. 96(3) plainly applies to any condition "other than those in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 96" and thus the proviso falls within the class of condition rendered of no effect for the purposes of statutory liability to third parties.

(4) Other submissions:

  • The Court distinguished relevant English law: though ss. 35 and 36 of the English Road Traffic Act resembled ss. 94 and 95 of the Indian Act, the English s. 38 differed materially from Indian s. 96(3), and therefore English authorities were of no assistance on the Indian statutory text.
  • The Court rejected the contention that the statutory scheme permitted any insurance (even one not related to the vehicle in use) to satisfy ss. 94/95 by reading "the vehicle" in s. 95(1) as "any vehicle". The Court held that the statutory language and scheme required the insurance to be in respect of the vehicle being used when the accident occurred.

(5) On the appealability/locus issue:

  • The Court held that the defendant was aggrieved by the discharge of the notice because he had asserted in affidavit that he was entitled to indemnity from New Asiatic and that discharge of the notice would render his position insecure vis-à-vis any ultimate decree. Therefore the defendant had a right to appeal the order discharging the notice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. is liable under s. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act for liabilities arising from the accident involving the vehicle it had insured; the proviso in clause 3 (the avoidance clause) is ineffective as against the plaintiffs for the purposes of statutory liability. Accordingly, the prayers (a) and (b) of the Chamber Summonses in both suits fail and are dismissed.

Implications / Consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The respondent insurer (New Asiatic) remains liable to the plaintiffs under s. 96; the proviso in clause 3 cannot be relied upon to avoid that liability as against the plaintiffs. It remains open between the insurer and the defendant (Pesumal) for the insurer to seek recovery from the defendant if appropriate, but the Court expressly declined to decide any question of subrogation or right of repayment in those inter-party relations in the present proceeding.
  • Procedural directions: The Chamber Summons prayers (e) and (d) were to be heard by the learned trial Judge and dealt with as justice may require. Cross-objections of respondent No. 1 were dismissed with costs. The respondent company was ordered to pay the costs of both appeals and of the hearing of the Chamber Summonses before the trial Judge, as directed by Mr. Justice Tarkunde. Specific costs were fixed at Rs. 250 in each appeal; Chamber Summons costs to be paid to the plaintiffs; appeal costs to be paid to the appellant-defendant; liberty given to appellant's attorneys to withdraw the security furnished.
  • No broader legal precedent was expressly claimed to be set by the opinion beyond its statutory interpretation; the decision rests on the Court's construction of the Motor Vehicles Act and the particular policy clauses before it. The opinion does not state that it is establishing a novel rule of law beyond its application to the facts and policy language in this case.

Order: As recorded in the opinion, prayers (a) and (b) of the Chamber Summonses are dismissed; further directions and costs as set out above. "Order accordingly."

    Pesumal Dhanmal Aswani v. The New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd.

    Patel, J.:— These two appeals, Nos. 10 and 11 of 1962, arise out of two suits Nos. 70 and 71 of 1959 filed by the heirs of one Daooji Badhamohan Meherotra and by one Murli Dholandas respectively for damages in respect of a car accident which resulted in the death of Daooji and serious injury to Murli while the car was being driven by the defendant Pesumal.

    2. The short facts are that both the deceased Meherotra and Murli Dholandas accompanied the defendant on March 13, 1958, on a motor drive from Bombay to Poona by a motor car belonging to one Shamdas Nathumal Asvani. The defendant was in charge of the car and he was driving it with the consent and knowledge of Shamdas Nathumal Asvani. The plaintiffs allege that he was driving it rashly and negligently and while doing so, between mile-stones 93 and 94 there was a collision between the car and a motor truck bearing No. BYT2216 as a result of which Meherotra died and Murli Dholandas suffered severe injuries. The heirs of Meherotra, and the injured Murli Dholandas have filed these two suits respectively and claimed damages from the defendant. The plaintiffs got a notice issued to the New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. under s. 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act since this company had insured Asvani in respect of the car which was being driven by the defendant. After the notice was received, the New Asiatic Insurance Co. took out a Chamber Summons for the discharge of the notice. It came before Mr. Justice Tarkunde who agreed with its contentions and discharged the notice. The defendant Pesumal has appealed against the order of the learned Judge.

    3. The contention urged on behalf of the insurer was that the insurance policy did not cover the defendant because of the proviso contained in cl. 3 which was a driver extension clause. Clause 3 reads thus:

    “In terms of and subject to the limitations of the indemnity which is granted by this section to the insured the Company will indemnify any driver who is driving the Motor Car on the Insured's order or with his permission provided that such Driver—

    (a) is not entitled to indemnity under any other policy.”

    4. We may call this proviso the avoidance clause. The insurer-respondent places reliance on this clause. Clause 3 extends the insurance cover to any driver who is not the owner of the car and indemnifies him if he is driving the motor car on the order of the insured or with his permission provided that he is not entitled to indemnity under any other policy. Clause 4 is the vehicle extension clause which indemnifies the insured, in the present case the owner of the car which was involved in the accident, whilst he drove personally a private motor car not belonging to him and not hired to him under a hire-purchase agreement. At the relevant time the defendant himself was insured in respect of a car owned by him with the Indian Trade and General Insurance Co. Ltd. whose policy also contained similar vehicle extension clause. Because of the indemnity provided by the vehicle extension clause in his policy in respect of his own vehicle with Indian Trade and General Insurance Co. Ltd. the respondent plausibly contended that it was discharged from all liability under cl. 3 of the policy issued by it. The learned Judge relied upon the proviso contained in cl. 3 of that policy and held that as the defendant was insured by the Indian Trade & General Insurance Co. by its cl. 4 in respect of a car not belonging to him, the respondent Company, i.e the New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd., was relieved of its liability to indemnify the defendant.

    5. It may, however, be noted that the attention of the learned Judge does not seem to have been invited to one important clause in the policy. That clause is contained in section III of the policy at p. 70 of the Paper Book in Appeal No. 10 of 1962 and reads as follows:

    “Nothing in this Policy or any endorsement hereon shall affect the right of any person indemnified by this Policy or any other person to recover an amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, section 96.

    But the Insured shall repay to the Company all sums paid by the Company which the Company would not have been liable to pay but for the said provisions.”

    6. We may advisedly call this clause the non-avoidance clause. It is clear from this clause that if under s. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act the respondent company is liable to the plaintiffs then nothing contained in the policy will relieve it of its liability. The question, therefore, whether the proviso in cl. 3 of the policy is void is irrelevant if we come to the conclusion that the respondent-company is liable under s. 96.

    7. In order to consider the liability of the Insurance Companies, one has to consider the scheme of Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act and particularly that of ss. 94, 95 and 96. Heading of the Chapter is “Insurance of Motor Vehicles”. Section 94 makes it an offence for any person who uses a vehicle except as a passenger or who causes or allows any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person a policy of insurance which, complies with the requirements of that Chapter. By the very language, the section requires that there must be an insurance policy in relation to the vehicle which is being used and not that a driver is insured against claims for damages in respect of any vehicle whether used or unused. Section 95 which lays down the requirements of the policy, by cl. (b) of sub-s (1), requires that the policy must insure the person or classes of persons against any liability which may be incurred by them in respect of death or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Again, the emphasis is on the use of the vehicle and not on the use of any vehicle. Sub-section (2) provides the nature of the liability that is required to be covered by the insurance policy. Sub-section (5) of s. 95 creates an absolute liability in the insurer to indemnify the persons insured in respect of the liability covered by the policy notwithstanding anything contained anywhere in any law. Section 96 makes the insurer liable on judgment as if he were a judgment-debtor, if recovered against the insured or against the class of persons insured by the policy in respect of liability covered by s. 95(1)(b) on certain conditions being satisfied. Sub-section (2) of s. 96 lays down the conditions for such liability and also enumerates the defences which are open to the insurer to take if it brings itself on record as a defendant in pursuance of a notice to be issued under the earlier part of sub-s. (2).

    8. Reading the sections together it is clear that the insurance is required by s. 95(1) to be in respect of the vehicle which is being used and while driving which the accident is committed. Mere insurance of the driver of a vehicle without reference to the use of any particular vehicle against claims made against him by reason of an accident that he may commit does not, in our opinion, make the insurer liable directly to the person who has suffered the injury. The liability of the insurer arises only if it has insured the driver in respect of the vehicle by the use of which the accident is committed. That being so, inasmuch as the policy issued by the Indian Trade and General Insurance Co. Ltd. by cl. (4) insured the defendant not in respect of the vehicle which was involved in the accident but in respect of another vehicle it would not be covered by s. 95(1) and consequently by s. 96(1), and that company would not be affected by the notice issued under sub-s. (2) of s. 96. The statutory liability under s. 96 in our opinion, attaches only to the respondent company. Thus, the respondent company being liable Under s. 96 the non-avoidance clause applies notwithstanding the avoidance clause contained in the proviso to cl. 3 of the policy. It is possible that as between the respondent and the appellant-defendant, the latter may be liable to repay any sum which the respondent company may be required to pay to the plaintiffs in these suits. That, however, is not a matter to be decided in the present proceeding and we do not express any opinion on that question.

    9. Even apart from this non-avoidance clause, s. 96(3) is a complete answer to the respondent company's challenge to the notice. Section 96(3) provides:

    “Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) of section 95 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any conditions other than those in clause (b) of sub-section (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95, be of no effect:”

    10. It is clear from the wording of this clause that any condition restricting or avoiding the statutory liability of the insurer as provided in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 95 which is not one of the conditions specified in cl. (b) of s. 96(2) must be regarded as ineffective for the purposes of the Act, though it may be binding between the company and the persons insured. Now, the only conditions mentioned in cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 96 are three: (i) that which excludes the use of the vehicle for hire or reward if the policy does not cover the risk and use for organised racing or speed testing; in the case of public service vehicle a purpose not permitted by the permit; (ii) that which excludes driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licenced or by a disqualified person during the period of disqualification; (iii) that which excludes liability for injury which is caused by or is contributed to by conditions of war, riot or civil commotion. It cannot be gainsaid that the avoidance clause in the policy in the present case is not covered by any of these conditions and that is not even the contention of the respondent company. Since that clause seeks to avoid a liability covered by s. 95(1)(b) it is ineffective, so far as the plaintiffs are concerned.

    11. Mr. Advani, however, argued that sub-s. (3) of s. 96 avoided such conditions as were contrary to those contained is s. 96(2)(b) and that the clause with which we are concerned was not in any manner in conflict with any of those conditions and that, therefore, sub-s. (3) of s. 96 could not apply. We are afraid, we cannot accept his contention for the obvious reason that the clause in question provides a condition “other than those in clause (b) of sub-section(2) of section 96”. In order to accept the argument we will have to substitute different words for the words actually used in the provision for which there is no justification.

    12. It was then contended that the proviso (avoidance clause) created a situation similar to the one where a person was not insured at all and, therefore, the respondent was not liable. According to the learned counsel, it is not compulsory under s. 94 or s. 95 for the insurance company to insure a driver of a vehicle while insuring the motor car and its owner and the effect of the avoidance clause in cl. (3) is much the same as if the insurance company had not agreed to indemnify the driver in which case, it is argued, no notice could have been sent to the insurance company. It seems the argument found favour with the learned Judge. We may, however, answer it by an analogy that no insurance company is bound to insure any owner of a motor vehicle. If an owner drives a motor vehicle which is not insured, he is liable to penalty but in the nature of things, no insurance company can be made liable. That, however, is not the question. The question is, having issued the policy, whether the respondent is entitled to impose any condition in the policy which in any manner restricts the cover of the insurance, and if it cannot be permitted to do so in the case of the owner of the car, it cannot certainly be asserted that it can be permitted to do so in the case of any other class of drivers in respect of whom the policy covers the risk, in both cases by reason of s. 96(3).

    13. The learned Judge says in his judgment:

    “If the defendant…had been one of the persons insured by the policy issued by the petitioners…sub-s. (3) of s. 96 might have prevented them from having recourse to those conditions…”

    14. With respect, it may be that the policy was issued to Asvani but as a driver of the vehicle, the defendant has been insured by the respondent. If the defendant had not got a car of his own and did not hold an indemnity in respect of such a car it could not have been said that the respondent had not insured the defendant. The section itself distinguishes between the “person to whom policy is issued” and “persons insured” and the defendant falls in the latter class. The learned Judge further on says that s. 95 does not require that the policy must extend to other drivers. It must be noted that s. 94 refers to the persons to be insured and s. 95 refers to the liability required to be covered. Both enable the insurer to extend the indemnity to other driver and if the indemnity is so extended the case falls within s. 96(1) and the company becomes liable and s. 95(1)(b) is not relevant except for determining whether the indemnity under the policy falls within the ambit of that section. The contention that the defences available to the insurer control the terms of the policy is also unsound. It does not affect the question of liability. Under s. 96(3) requirements for its applicability are that (1) a certificate must have been issued to the person who has effected the insurance, and (2) restrictions of the insurance of the persons insured other than those in cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 96. As we have pointed out, the defendant is one of the class of persons insured and avoidance clause being not one of the conditions in cl. (b) of s. 96(2), s. 96(3) applies.

    15. It was strenuously urged by Mr. Advani on behalf of his client that the scheme of ss. 94, 95 and 96 was not to require the insurance of any particular class of persons in connection with the vehicle causing the accident but if there was an insurance which indemnified either the owner or the driver against liability irrespective of the vehicle, then the conditions of the section were satisfied. To accept this argument would require our substituting for the word “the” appearing in the words “use of the vehicle in a public place” in cl. (b) of s. 95(1) the word “a” or “any”. We have not been pointed out either from the scheme of the Chapter or any part of the Motor Vehicles Act anything which could persuade us to do such violence to the language of the statute. Reasonably and fairly read, ss. 94 and 95 mean that the owner and the person who drives the car have to be insured in respect of the vehicle by the use of which accident or death occurs. We cannot, therefore, be justified in reading the section as contended for by Mr. Advani.

    16. Mr. Advani relied upon the view taken by the English Courts under ss. 35, 36 and 38 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. The view is that the extension in connection with a driver of a vehicle is qualified by a permissible provision requiring that the permitted driver does not himself hold a personal insurance policy. It is sufficient in this connection to point out that though ss. 35 and 36 of the English Act so far as relevant are almost in similar terms as ss. 94 and 95 of our Motor Vehicles Act, s. 38 is materially different from s. 96(3) of our Act. Section 38 of the English Act renders ineffective any condition in a policy providing for the avoiding of the liability in the event of specified thing being done or omitted to be done after the happening of the event giving rise to a claim under the policy in connection with the claims as are mentioned in para. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 36, which is entirely different from saying that no condition which is not one of those in s. 96(2)(6) shall be effective in displacing the liability under s. 95(1). In our opinion, the view of the British Courts as aforesaid can, therefore, be of no assistance in the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Indian statute.

    17. Lastly it is argued, which is almost an argument of despair, that the appeal by the defendant is incompetent. It is contended that the notice was got issued by the plaintiff on the respondent company which was discharged by the order of the learned Judge, that the defendant could not in any way be said to be affected in his rights by the discharge of that notice and that, therefore, he had no right to appeal. In this connection it is necessary to refer to the defendant's affidavit in answer to the Chamber Summons taken out by the respondent. In answer to a contention on behalf of the respondent, in para. 7 he denied that the defendant was not entitled to an indemnity from the respondent or that he was not included within the class of persons insured by it. He claimed to render both the respondent company as also his own insurance company liable for any decree or judgment that might be passed against him. Since to discharge the notice as against the respondent company would render his position very insecure in relation to the ultimate decree, it must be held that he is a person who is aggrieved by the order made by the learned Judge and, therefore, entitled to appeal.

    18. In the result, prayers (a) and (b) of the Chamber Summons in both the suits will fail and are dismissed. The learned trial Judge before whom the Chamber Summonses will now be placed will hear them as regards the prayers (e) and (d) therein and make such orders as the justice of the cause may require. Respondent No. 1 company will pay the costs of both the appeals and also of the hearing of the Chamber Summonses before the learned Judge as directed by Mr. Justice Tarkunde by his order dated September 12, 1961.

    19. The costs will be Rs. 250 in each. Chamber Summonses' costs to be paid to the plaintiffs and the costs of the appeals to be paid to the appellant-defendant. Cross-objections of respondent No. 1 are dismissed with costs. Liberty to the appellant's attorneys to withdraw the amount of security furnished by him.

    Solicitors for the appellants: Mulla & Mulla & Craige Blunt & Caroe.

    Solicitors for the respondents: Hiralal Shroff & Co.: Nandlal & Co.

    20. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Pesumal Dhanmal Aswani v. The New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd.
    (Apr 8, 1963)