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  • Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955, and Bombay Act XV of 1957. It was cl. (1) of sub-s. (2A) of s. 34 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Sub-section (2A) and cl. (1)
  • provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
  • provisions of s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act,
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  • Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955, and Bombay Act XV of 1957. It was cl. (1) of sub-s. (2A) of s. 34 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Sub-section (2A) and cl. (1)
  • provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
  • provisions of s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act,
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — Datar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The land in dispute comprises Survey No. 60 and Hissa No. 1 of Survey No. 31 at Mouje Rai. These two survey parcels originally belonged to a person (the original owner whose name does not appear in the record) who, in execution proceedings, was the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor had leased the two surveys to opponent No. 1 (the protected tenant).

In execution of a decree against the judgment-debtor the properties were put up for sale and were purchased by the present petitioner at a court auction on November 28, 1955. Because the opponent-tenant was in possession at the time of the auction, symbolic possession was delivered to the auction purchaser on June 15, 1956 under O. XXI, r. 96, Civil Procedure Code.

The petitioner gave notice on December 13, 1956 to opponent No. 1 terminating the tenancy under sub-section (2) of s. 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, alleging he required the lands for his own cultivation. On March 26, 1957 the petitioner applied for possession under s. 29 read with s. 31(1) of the Act.

On preliminary issues the Tenancy Awal Karkun held that the petitioner did not own the lands on the date referred to in clause (d) of s. 31A (the Tenancy Awal Karkun referred to January 1, 1952) and accordingly rejected the application on December 16, 1957. The petitioner appealed (Tenancy Appeal No. 4 of 1958) to the District Deputy Collector, who agreed with the Tenancy Awal Karkun and dismissed the appeal on February 24, 1958. The petitioner then filed a revision under s. 76 with the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, which summarily dismissed the revision on June 16, 1958.

The petitioner moved to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution seeking relief from the summary dismissal by the Tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether clause (d) of s. 31A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act requires that the claimant's own name must stand in the record of rights on 1 January 1952 and throughout the period up to the appointed day (June 15, 1955), or whether it is sufficient if the claimant's predecessor-in-title (the person from whom the claimant derives title) had his name in the records for that period.
  2. Whether an auction purchaser (transferee) who acquires the judgment-debtor's right, title and interest at a court sale (purchased on November 28, 1955, with symbolic possession June 15, 1956) is to be regarded as the "landlord" for the purposes of s. 31A and therefore entitled to rely on the record entries of the predecessor-in-title.
  3. Whether the application of s. 3 of the Tenancy Act (making certain provisions of the Transfer of Property Act applicable) and s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act supports the petitioner's claim that he "became the landlord" with all rights of the former landlord from the date of auction sale.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that clause (d) of s. 31A does not require that the petitioner's own name appear in the record of rights on 1 January 1952 and during the period up to the appointed day; it is sufficient that the petitioner's predecessor-in-title (here, the judgment-debtor) had his name entered in the record of rights for that period.
  • Relying on s. 3 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, petitioner submitted that provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act apply so far as they are not inconsistent with the Tenancy Act, and under s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act the transferee (the auction purchaser) becomes invested with the rights of the transferor; thus the petitioner became the landlord entitled to apply under s. 31.
  • The petitioner relied on the decision in Khalilulla Hasmiya v. Yesu (1956, 59 Bom. L.R. 201) to support the proposition that a claimant may claim through a lessor whose name appeared in the record on 1 January 1952 even though the claimant's own name did not.

The opinion does not set out detailed arguments advanced by opponent No. 1 or other respondents; the Tenancy Awal Karkun and the District Deputy Collector held the petitioner did not own the lands on the relevant date, but their detailed submissions are not recorded in this text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khalilulla Hasmiya v. Yesu, 1956 59 Bom. L.R. 201 Held that the statutory provision (then s. 34(2A)(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act) required only that the person who was the lessor on 1 January 1952 have his name entered in the record of rights; it did not require that the claimant's own name appear on that date so long as the claimant could claim through the lessor whose name did appear. The court applied the reasoning of this decision to clause (d) of s. 31A, concluding that a transferee (here, an auction purchaser who stepped into the rights of the original landlord) may rely on the record entry of the predecessor-in-title; hence the petitioner satisfied the clause (d) condition by showing his predecessor's name appeared in the record on the relevant dates.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by sequentially addressing the legal character of the petitioner's title, the effect of statutory transfer principles, and the interpretation of clause (d) of s. 31A.

1. Nature of Title Acquired at Auction: The court observed that at a court sale the auction purchaser acquires the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor. In this case the judgment-debtor's interest was that of a landlord vis-à-vis the protected tenant (opponent No. 1). The court relied on provisions of Civil Procedure Code (s. 65 and O. XXI, r. 96) indicating that the judgment-debtor's interest is transferred to the auction purchaser from the time of sale. Thus the petitioner "stepped into the shoes" of the original landlord and, as against opponent No. 1, must be regarded as the landlord from the time the lands were sold in court auction.

2. Application of Transfer of Property Act: The petitioner relied on s. 3 of the Tenancy Act to invoke the applicability of certain provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and specifically on s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act which recognizes that a transferee acquires the rights of the transferor. The court accepted that under these provisions the transferee (the petitioner) possesses the rights of the original landlord and thereby "became the landlord" in respect of the lands.

3. Interpretation of Clause (d) of s. 31A: The court examined clause (d), which requires that "The land leased stands in the record of rights ... on the 1st day of January, 1952, and thereafter during the period between the said date and the appointed day in the name of the landlord himself, or of any of his ancestors, or if the landlord is a member of a joint family, in the name of a member of such family."

The court observed that an earlier decision (Khalilulla Hasmiya v. Yesu) had interpreted an analogous provision to mean that it is sufficient if the person who was the lessor on January 1, 1952 had his name entered in the record; the claimant need not personally have been the person named then so long as the claimant could trace title through that lessor. The court found the language of the amended clause (d) to retain the substance of the earlier wording and concluded that the Khalilulla decision's reasoning applied equally to transferees as it did to heirs or joint-family members.

The court further reasoned that no principled distinction exists between succession (inheritance) and transfer: in either case the claimant derives the landlord's interest from the original landlord. The legislature explicitly mentioned heirs and joint-family members but (in the court's view) saw no need to make an express provision for transferees because transferees obtain the landlord's rights under s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. Clause (d) requires that the name of the person who was the landlord on the relevant date appear in the record; if the claimant is a successor-in-title or transferee it is sufficient that the predecessor-in-title's name so appears.

Applying this analysis to the facts, the court noted it was admitted that the name of the petitioner's predecessor-in-title (the judgment-debtor) stood in the record of rights on January 1, 1952 and during the period up to the appointed day. Therefore, the condition in clause (d) was satisfied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the petitioner satisfied the condition in clause (d) of s. 31A by showing that his predecessor-in-title's name stood in the record of rights on the relevant date and during the relevant period. Accordingly, the Court set aside the orders of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal and the lower revenue authorities and remanded the matter to the Tenancy Awal Karkun for disposal in accordance with law.

Core Ruling: Orders set aside and case remanded to the Tenancy Awal Karkun for further proceedings.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The petitioner's satisfaction of clause (d) means the preliminary rejection of his application by the Tenancy Awal Karkun and the affirmations of that rejection by the District Deputy Collector and the Bombay Revenue Tribunal were set aside.
  • The matter is remanded to the Tenancy Awal Karkun to proceed in accordance with law on the petitioner's application for possession under the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act.
  • Costs of the petition were ordered to abide the result before the Tenancy Awal Karkun.

The opinion does not outline broader doctrinal or institutional implications beyond the interpretation and application of clause (d) to transferees; it resolves the parties' rights as above and applies existing precedent.

    Waman Ganesh Joshi v. Ganu Guna Khapre

    Datar, J.:— Survey No. 60 and Hissa No. 1 of survey No. 31 situate at Mouje Rai, originally belonged to one person, whose name does not appear in the record, but, who, in some execution proceedings, was the judgment-debtor. It appears that the judgment-debtor had leased the two Survey numbers to opponent No. 1. In execution of a decree obtained against the judgment-debtor the two survey numbers were put up for sale and were purchased by the present petitioner in court auction on November 28, 1955. As the opponent-tenant was on the lands at the time of court auction, symbolical possession was delivered to the auction purchaser on June 15, 1956, under the provisions of O. XXI, r. 96, Civil Procedure Code.

    2. On December 13, 1956, the petitioner gave a notice to opponent No. 1 for terminating, his tenancy under the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, on; the ground that he required the lands for his own personal cultivation. On March 26, 1957 the petitioner applied for possession of the lands from opponent No. 1 under the provisions of s. 29 read with s. 31(1) of the Act. The Tenancy Awal Karkun, before whom the application came up for hearing on the preliminary issues, held that the said lands were not owned by the petitioner on the date mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 31A of the Act. The Tenancy Awal Karkun, when he referred to the date mentioned in cl. (d) referred to the 1st day of January 1952. Accordingly, he rejected the application on December 16, 1957. The petitioner thereafter preferred tenancy appeal No. 4 of 1958 in the Court of the District Deputy Collector, Ratnagiri. The District Deputy Collector agreed with the view of the Tenancy Awal Karkun and dismissed the appeal on February 24, 1958. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Bombay Revenue Tribunal under s. 76 of the Act, in revision, against the order passed in appeal by the District Deputy Collector. The Tribunal agreed with the view taken by both the Tenancy Awal Karkun and the District Deputy Collector and summarily dismissed the revision application on June 16, 1958. It is against the summary dismissal of the revision application that the petitioner has come to this Court under the provisions of art. 227 of the Constitution. Mr. Rangnekar, who appears for the petitioner, has contended that under the provisions of cl. (d) of s. 31A, it is not necessary that the name of the petitioner himself should stand in the record of rights on the 1st day of January 1952, and thereafter during the period between the said date and the appointed day. It is enough if the petitioner is able to show that his predecessor-in-title, who, in this case, was the judgment-debtor as mentioned above, bad got his name entered in the record of rights on the 1st day of January 1952 and thereafter during the period between the said date and the appointed day. The appointed day, it may be noted, is June 15, 1955. It is not disputed that since before the 1st day of January 1952 till the appointed day, June 15, 1955, the name of the judgment-debtor stood in the record of rights as the kabjedar or the occupant of the said lands. It is also not disputed that during this period and till the auction purchase, the judgment-debtor was the landlord of the present opponent No. 1. Now, s. 31A of the Act provides that the right of a landlord to terminate a tenancy for cultivating the land personally under s. 31 shall be subject to certain conditions of which we are concerned in the present case only with the one mentioned in cl. (d) thereof which states:

    “The land leased stands in the record of rights or in any public record or similar revenue record on the 1st day of January, 1952, and thereafter during the period between the said date and the appointed day in the name of the landlord himself, or of any of his ancestors, or if the landlord is a member of a joint family, in the name of a member of such family.”

    3. The argument of the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner is that by reason of s. 3 of the Act, the provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, are made applicable to the tenancies and leases of lands to which the Tenancy Act applies in so far as those provisions are not inconsistent with the provisions of the tenancy act, and in view of s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, the petitioner himself became the landlord having possessed all the rights of the former landlord (the judgment-debtor) since the date of his auction purchase.

    4. It is true that the petitioner purchased the lands in question in court auction. But at the court sale what passed to the auction purchaser was the right, title and interest of the original judgment-debtor. It is obvious that in the present case, the right, title and interest of the original judgment-debtor was that of a landlord in regard to the said lands and as against the rights of the protected tenant, viz., opponent No. 1. The provisions of s. 65 and of O. XXI, r. 96, Civil Procedure Code refer to the interest of the judgment-debtor as vested in and transferred to the auction purchaser from the time when the property is sold. It is, therefore, clear that the rights of the original judgment-debtor were transferred to the petitioner and the petitioner stepped into the shoes of the original landlord as against opponent No. 1. Now, if the petitioner's position was that of a landlord, then he would be regarded as such landlord from the time when the lands were sold in court auction.

    5. Mr. Rangnekar says that if the petitioner was thus the landlord from November 28, 1955, and was entitled to apply for possession of the lands under s. 31 of the Act, the condition mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 31A would be fulfilled and he would have the right to terminate the tenancy merely on his showing that the lands stood in the record of rights on the 1st day of January 1952 and thereafter during the period between the said date and the appointed day in the name of his predecessor-in-title who alone was (and the petitioner was not) the landlord on the said date and during the said period. According to him it will not be necessary (and indeed in conceivable cases may not be possible, as in the present case when the petitioner's rights have validly come into existence after the appointed day) to show that the petitioner's own name stood in the record of rights on the date and during the period mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 31A. In support of his contention he has relied upon a decision of this Court in Khalilulla Hasmiya v. Yesu . 1956 59 Bom. L.R 201.. Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was), who delivered the judgment of the Bench in that case, was considering the corresponding clause in s. 34 as it stood before the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955, and Bombay Act XV of 1957. It was cl. (1) of sub-s. (2A) of s. 34 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Sub-section (2A) and cl. (1) read as follows:

    “If the landlord bona fide requires the land…, then his right to terminate the tenancy shall be subject to the following conditions, namely,

    (1) The land held by the protected tenant on lease stands in the record of rights in the name of the landlord on the 1st day of January, 1952 as the superior holder.”

    6. It was held that s. 34(2A)(1) of the said Act merely requires the claimant for possession of the land under s. 34 of the Act to show that the person who was the lessor of the tenant on January 1, 1952, had taken care to have his name entered in the record of rights as superior holder. This section does not necessarily require that it is the claimant whose name must appear in the record of rights on January 1, 1952, as superior holder. All that this section requires is that whosoever was the lessor or the landlord on January 1, 1952, must have his name entered as a superior holder in respect of his land. Where, therefore, a claimant whose name does not stand in the record of rights on January 1, 1952, as superior holder, seeks to evict the tenant, he must show that he claims through the lessor whose name stood in the record of rights on January 1, 1952.

    7. It is true that cl. (1) of sub-s. (2A) of s. 34 has now been amended and we have to deal with the amended cl. (d) of s. 31a of the present act. But even in the amended clause, the words of the original cl. (1) of sub-s. (2A) of s. 34 are substantially retained and, with respect, we are of the view that the decision in the aforesaid case still holds good in so far as cl. (d) of s. 31a of the present act deals with the condition that the name of the landlord must stand in the record of rights on the date and during the period specified in the clause. It is true that in the aforesaid case the learned Judges were considering the claim of persons who had inherited the (landlord's), interest from their father whose name had stood in the record of rights on the 1st day of January 1952 as superior holder. But the reasoning upon which their decision is founded applies, in our view, with equal force even to the case where the claimant, as in the present case, claims through the original landlord not by succession but by a transfer. The cases of an heir and of a member in a joint family are now expressly provided for by the introduction of the words “of any of his ancestors, or if the landlord is a member of a the name of a member of such family in cl. (d) of s. 31A of the Act. In the case above-mentioned it was observed that January 1, 1952, was chosen arbitrarily as the appointed day and the provision in question seemed to require that it must clearly appear that either the claimant or his predecessor appeared in the record of rights as the superior holder, and this observation of the learned Judges applies as much to the case of a transferee from the original landlord whose name stood in the record of rights at the relevant time as it did to the case of succession which was before them. It seems to us that in view of the provisions of s. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act under which the transferee in the position of the present petitioner having possessed all the rights of the original landlord himself became the landlord, the Legislature thought it unnecessary to make an express provision in the amended cl. (d) in the case of the transferee, as in the cases of an heir and a joint family member.

    8. Besides, we do not see why any distinction in principle should be made between the case of an heir and that of a transferee. In one case the property of the original landlord is taken by succession and in the other, by transfer. But the interest in either case is the same—that of the original landlord. If in the case of a claimant who has succeeded to the property of his ancestor after the appointed day, the condition mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 31A of the Act would be regarded as having been complied with by the claimant merely showing that the name of his ancestor stood in the record of rights on the date and during the period specified in the clause, we do not see why the same result should not follow in the case of a transferee similarly situated. We have looked to the relevant provisions of the tenancy act and we do not see any provision whereunder transfers have been, absolutely prohibited. In fact, with the permission of proper revenue authorities transfers are allowed even under the provisions of the present Act. If, therefore, transfers are allowed and if an assignee or a transferee has come to possess all the rights of the original landlord after the 1st day of January 1952 or indeed after the relevant period mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 31A, we do not think why such assignee or transferee should not stand on the same footing as an heir who has succeeded to his ancestor or as a member in a joint family.

    9. It may also be noted that cl. (d) of s. 31A clearly shows that it is the name only of that person who was the landlord on the date and during the period specified in that clause that should appear in the record of rights. If such landlord is himself the claimant, all that he has to show is an entry in his name in the record of rights only on the date and during the period specified in the clause. If, however, the claimant is his successor-in-title or his transferee all that he has still to show is only an entry in the name of his predecessor-in-title on the relevant date and during the relevant period. Indeed, the Act cannot expect such a claimant to do the impossible and call upon him to show an entry in his own name for a period during which he was not, but his predecessor-in-title was, the landlord.

    10. We are, therefore, of the view that the term “landlord” occurring in cl. (d) of s. 31A of the Act includes any person from whom or through whom a landlord derives his right as such landlord and that for proper compliance with the conditions mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 31A, it is sufficient if either the name of the claimant or that of his predecessor-in-title stands in the record of rights or any public record or similar revenue record on the 1st day of January 1952 and thereafter during the period between the said date and the appointed day.

    11. In the present case, it is admitted that the name of the petitioner's predecessor-in-title stood in the record of rights on the date and during the period specified in the clause. It must, therefore, be held that the condition mentioned in the clause has been complied with by the petitioner.

    12. Accordingly, we set aside the orders of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal and the lower revenue authorities and remand the case to the Tenancy Awal Karkun for disposal of the application in accordance with law.

    13. Costs of this petition will abide the result before the Tenancy Awal Karkun.

    14. Orders set aside: case remanded.

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    Waman Ganesh Joshi v. Ganu Guna Khapre
    (Apr 7, 1959)