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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Income-tax Act by section 4 and clause (b) of section 15
  • s. 35(10) of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section (10) of s. 35
  • sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act,
  • s. 28 of the Finance Act of 1956 whereby s. 35(10)
  • section and the provisions of sub-section (1)
  • section 13 of the Amendment Act.
  • Finance Acts of 1948 to 1955
  • Finance Act of 1956
  • FINANCE ACT 1950
  • Finance Act of 1952.
  • Finance Act, 1956.
  • FINANCE ACT 1951
  • (2) Section 35(10)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Income-tax Act by section 4 and clause (b) of section 15
  • s. 35(10) of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section (10) of s. 35
  • sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act,
  • s. 28 of the Finance Act of 1956 whereby s. 35(10)
  • section and the provisions of sub-section (1)
  • section 13 of the Amendment Act.
  • Finance Acts of 1948 to 1955
  • Finance Act of 1956
  • FINANCE ACT 1950
  • Finance Act of 1952.
  • Finance Act, 1956.
  • FINANCE ACT 1951
  • (2) Section 35(10)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition involves the New Shorrock Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd., a textile manufacturer with registered office at Ahmedabad, challenging the validity and application of section 35(10) of the Income-tax Act introduced by the Finance Act, 1956. The dispute concerns assessment years 1950–1951, 1951–1952, and 1952–1953, during which the Income-tax Officer allowed a rebate of one anna per rupee on undistributed profits under various Finance Acts. Subsequently, for the assessment year 1953–1954, the company declared dividends out of reserves formed from profits of earlier years on which rebates had been allowed. The Income-tax Officer invoked section 35(10) to recompute tax by reducing the rebates previously allowed, contending that the rebates were incorrectly granted because the amounts had been used for dividends. The company challenged the authority to apply section 35(10) retrospectively to assessments finalized before the section came into force, raising constitutional and procedural objections.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 35(10) of the Income-tax Act, introduced by the Finance Act of 1956, applies retrospectively to assessments finalized before its commencement.
  2. Whether the application of section 35(10) to recall rebates previously allowed constitutes reopening or alteration of final assessments contrary to principles of finality.
  3. Whether section 35(10) is ultra vires the Constitution, including alleged violation of fundamental rights and Article 265.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • Section 35(10), introduced only in 1956, cannot apply retrospectively to assessments completed and finalized before April 1, 1956.
  • The assessments for the years 1950–1953 had become final and conclusive before the section came into force and thus cannot be reopened or altered.
  • Application of section 35(10) violates constitutional provisions, including fundamental rights and Article 265.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Section 35(10) is a deeming provision that creates a legal fiction, treating rebates previously allowed as having been granted by mistake if the amounts were subsequently used for dividends.
  • The power to recompute tax by reducing the rebate is a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record and does not constitute reopening or reassessment.
  • The section applies to rebates allowed in assessments from 1948 to 1955 inclusive, regardless of when the assessments were finalized.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalkar [1953] S.C.R 773 Interpretation and application of statutory fictions or deeming provisions The Court relied on this precedent to affirm that when a statute enacts a deeming provision, the court must give full effect to it and apply the legal fiction to its logical conclusion.
East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952] A.C 109 Consequences of treating an imaginary state of affairs as real under statutory provisions The Court cited Lord Asquith’s observation to support the interpretation that once a legal fiction is established, all inevitable corollaries must be acknowledged and applied.
Whitney v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue 1924 10 T.C 88 Stages in the imposition of tax and statutory interpretation to ensure workability of taxation statutes The Court used this precedent to clarify that assessment is particularization of liability and that recomputation of rebates under section 35(10) is not reassessment but a rectification.
Chatturam v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar [1947] F.C.R 116 Retrospective operation of taxation provisions and finality of assessment orders The Court found no support for the petitioner’s argument in this case and observed that finality of orders can be overridden by section 35 powers.
Venkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1958 34 I.T.R 143 Effect of retrospective amendments and finality of income-tax orders under section 35 The Court relied on this decision to hold that orders under section 35 are not final and can be modified even by retrospective amendments if within the scope of rectification of mistakes apparent from the record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by emphasizing the strict interpretation required in taxation statutes, quoting Justice Rowlett that only what is clearly stated in the statute can be applied, with no room for implied meanings or equity. The Court then analyzed the language of section 35(10), which creates a statutory fiction deeming rebates previously granted as incorrect relief if the amount was subsequently used for dividends. This fiction authorizes the Income-tax Officer to recompute tax by reducing the rebate as if correcting a mistake apparent from the record.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that section 35(10) cannot apply retrospectively to finalized assessments. It held that the section’s language explicitly covers rebates allowed in assessments from 1948 to 1955 and applies whenever the amounts are subsequently used for dividends, regardless of when the assessments were finalized. The date April 1, 1956, when the section came into force, is relevant only as the date from which the Income-tax Officer may exercise the power, not as a limitation on the scope of the section’s application.

The Court explained that the power under section 35(10) is not to reopen or reassess the entire income but to rectify the mistake of having allowed a rebate on undistributed profits that were later used for dividends. This recomputation is limited to reducing the rebate and does not disturb the original computation of income or overall assessment. Thus, the finality of the assessment orders remains intact in substance.

The Court also noted that statutory fictions such as this are to be given full effect, including their inevitable consequences, citing authoritative precedents. It observed that the doctrine of finality does not prevent the operation of section 35(10) and that the section is a curative provision designed to prevent abuse of rebates granted in the past.

Regarding the constitutional challenge, the Court noted that these arguments were not pressed before it and thus did not consider them in detail.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the petition with costs, holding that section 35(10) of the Income-tax Act applies to rebates allowed in assessments finalized before its commencement and authorizes the Income-tax Officer to recompute tax by reducing rebates deemed to have been incorrectly granted.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the validity and retrospective operation of section 35(10) in the limited context of rectifying rebates previously allowed on undistributed profits subsequently used for dividends. The ruling clarifies that such recomputation does not constitute reopening or reassessment of the entire income and does not violate principles of finality. No broader constitutional invalidity was established, and no new precedent beyond the interpretation of section 35(10) was set.

    The New Shorrock Spg. And Mfg. Company Limited v. N.V Raval

    S.T Desai, J.:— This petition for a writ of certiorari or a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition raises a rather important question of the construction of s. 35(10) of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section (10) of s. 35 was introduced by amendment brought about by the Finance Act, 1956. We shall have occasion to refer to the amendment little later in our judgment. The facts succinctly stated are these. The petitioner, the New Shorrock Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd., which carries on business of manufacturing and selling textiles, has its registered office at Ahmedabad. Respondent No. 1 is the Income-tax Officer having jurisdiction to assess the petitioner. The assessment years in respect of which this petition arises are 1950–1951, 1951–1952 and 1952–1953.

    2. For the assessment year 1950–1951 (previous year ending December 31, 1949) the Income-tax Officer had passed an order on January 18, 1951, assessing the total income of the petitioner-mills at Rs. 30,30,822. At that time, in accordance with the provision contained in cl. (1) of the proviso to para. B of Part I of the Schedule to the Finance Act of 1950, he allowed the rebate of one anna in a rupee on the undistributed profits of Rs. 6,43,621. The rebate so allowed amounted to Rs. 40,226. It will be convenient to reproduce the provision of law relating to that rebate. It is to be found in the First Schedule to the Finance Act of 1950:

    “In the case of every company—…

    (i) where the total income, as reduced by six and a half annas in the rupee and by the amount if any, exempt from income-tax, exceeds the amount of any dividends (including dividends payable at a fixed rate) declared in respect of the whole or part of the previous year for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1951, and no order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, a rebate shall be allowed at the rate of one anna per rupee on the amount of such excess.”

    3. For the assessment year 1951–1952 (previous year ending December 31, 1950) the Income-tax Officer passed an order on January 31, 1952, and assessed the total income of the petitioner-mills at Rs. 27,43,730. In that year also he allowed similar rebate of one anna per rupee. That was under cl. (i) of the proviso to Para. B of Part I to the Schedule to the Finance Act, 1951, and it was on the undistributed profits of Rs. 4,01,348 and amounted to Rs. 25,084.

    4. For the assessment year 1952–1953 (previous year ending December 31, 1951), the Income-tax Officer assessed the total income of the petitioner-mills at Rs. 34,51,284. In that year also he allowed similar rebate of one anna per rupee, which was under cl. (i) of the proviso to Para. B of Part I of the Schedule to the Finance Act of 1952. In that year, the undistributed profits of the mills company came to Rs. 8,07,363 and the amount of rebate allowed for that year was Rs. 50,460. It may be mentioned that in respect of the assessment for the first two years, there was subsequent review in 1954 of the orders, but that is immaterial for the purpose of this petition.

    5. For the assessment year 1953–1954 (previous year ending December 31, 1952) the assessment order showed that the petitioner-mills had incurred losses. The mills, however, declared and paid dividends aggregating to Rs. 10,92,000 for the accounting year ending December 31, 1952, and the dividends were paid out of profits made by the company in the earlier years. The balance-sheet of the company for the year ending December 31, 1952, stated that the dividends had been distributed from:

    “(a) Profits of the aforesaid year and/or

    (b) the reserves formed out of the profits or accumulated profits of the following ‘previous years’ which have been subjected to tax.

    Year ending .. .. .. .. .. 31-12-1937 Year ending .. .. .. .. .. 31-12-1949 Year ending .. .. .. .. .. 31-12-1950 Year ending .. .. .. .. .. 31-12-1951”

    6. In March 1958 respondent No. 1 called upon the petitioner-mills to show cause why action should not be taken under s. 35(10) of the Act, as, according to him, dividends declared by the mills for the assessment year 1953–1954 aggregating to Rs. 10,92,000 had come out of reserves of earlier years on which rebate of one anna in the rupee for the years 1950–1951, 1951–1952 and 1952–1953 had been allowed on undistributed profits. There was some correspondence and ultimately respondent No. 1 passed orders on the mills company under s. 35(10) of the Act, terms of which sub-section are as follows:

    “Where, in any of the assessments for the years beginning on the 1st day of April of the years 1948 to 1955 inclusive, a rebate of income-tax was allowed to a company on a part of its total income under clause (i) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the relevant Schedules to the Finance Acts specifying the rates of tax for the relevant year, and subsequently the amount on which the rebate of income-tax was allowed as aforesaid is availed of by the company, wholly or partly, for declaring dividends in any year, the amount or that part of the amount availed of as aforesaid as the case may be, shall, by reason of the rebate of income-tax allowed to the company and to the extent to which it has not actually been subjected to an additional income-tax in accordance with the provisions of clause (ii) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the Schedules to the Finance Acts above referred to, be deemed to have been made the subject of incorrect relief under this Act, and the Income-tax Officer shall re-compute the tax payable by the company by reducing the rebate originally allowed, as if the re-computation is a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of this section and the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply accordingly, the period of four years specified therein being reckoned from the end of the financial year in which the amount on which rebate of income-tax was allowed as aforesaid was availed of by the company wholly or partly for declaring dividends.”

    7. The mills company challenged the right of respondent No. 1 to pass those orders and raised before him various contentions, which it is not necessary to set out here. In the petition, the mills company has raised various contentions, one of them being that s. 35(10) of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution being in contravention of certain fundamental rights there guaranteed and being in violation of the provisions of art. 265 of the Constitution. One of the contentions set out in the petition is that the provisions of s. 35(10) being added only by the Finance Act of 1956 had no application to the case of the mills company because to apply the provisions of s. 35(10) to the mills company would be to give retrospective operation to those provisions. The contention is that the provisions of s. 35(10) became operative only from April 1, 1956, and the original assessment order had been made much before that and the assessments had become final and conclusive before April 1, 1956. Very briefly stated the contention is that those assessments cannot be affected or touched or altered in any manner by any subsequent legislation introduced for the first time by s. 35(10) in 1956.

    8. The contentions relating to ultra vires and violation of fundamental rights have not been urged before us by Mr. Kolah, learned counsel for the petitioner-mills. The only contention which is pressed before us, it is said, falls under two heads: (1) the assessments in question had become final before April 1, 1956, and on a proper construction of s. 35(10) those assessments do not fall within the purview of the section: (2) Section 35(10) properly read is not intended to have any retroactive operation. It seems to us that these are phases of the same argument. It will be convenient to set out here s. 28 of the Finance Act of 1956 whereby s. 35(10) was introduced for the first time in the Income-tax Act:

    “The amendments made in the Income-tax Act by section 4 and clause (b) of section 15 shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April 1955 and the amendments made by sections 3 to 27 inclusive shall come into force on the 1st day of April 1956.”

    9. The amendment by way of introduction of s. 35(10) was brought about by s. 19. It is one of the provisions which s. 28 says “shall come into force on the 1st day of April 1956”. There is no dispute, and there can be no dispute, that, s. 35(10) came into force on April 1, 1956, but the dispute is as to the precise effect of the coming into force of that section on April 1, 1956, in the light of the provisions of s. 35(10) itself. In a case of the nature before us the prospective or retrospective operation of s. 35(10) cannot depend merely on the word “shall come into force on the 1st day of April 1956” if there is something in s. 35(10) itself which shows that the rule laid down in it was to become operative in respect of certain matters of previous years. The major premise of Mr. Kolah's argument is that the assessment of the mills company was changed by the provisions contained in sub-s. (10). It is said that the assessment is sought to be altered and affected by those provisions. He has drawn our attention to instances where the Legislature in giving retrospective operation to a provision of law had used certain words. He has asked us to contrast those words with the words in s. 28 “shall come into force on the 1st day of April 1956”. At one stage of the argument the suggestion seemed to us to be that assessments which had been completed before April 1, 1956, could not be touched by the amended provisions introduced by incorporating s. 35(10), but when the argument was developed Mr. Kolah stated that in a sense s. 35 did apply to completed assessments and in a sense it did not apply to completed assessments, and the distinction rather fine or perhaps overrefined is that s. 35(10) could apply only in respect of assessments completed before April 1, 1956, if dividend was declared after April 1, 1956. Otherwise s. 35(10), it is said, would not apply. Now, as we shall presently point out the language of the section is quite clear and it is difficult to see on what principle or authority or reason this arbitrary distinction is to be drawn.

    10. Before we proceed to examine the language of s. 35(10) and analyse the section we would like to preface our judgment with a few general observations. We have often quoted and we may quote once again the celebrated observations of Mr. Justice Rowlett which have now become classical:

    “In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.”

    11. One safe and infallible principle which is of guidance in these matters is to read the words through and see if the rule is clearly stated. If the language employed gives the rule in words of sufficient clarity and precision, no more requires to be done. Indeed, in such a case the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise: Absoluta, sententia expositore non indiget. The language used by the Legislature best declares its intention and must be accepted as decisive of it. We may permit ourselves to make some further observations of the nature we have made before about the interpretation of provisions said to be retroactive in their operation. The general rule indubitably is that where a statute is passed altering the law it is to be presumed as intended to apply to a state of facts coming into existence after the Act. It is a fundamental and a firmly established rule of interpretation that a statute which deals with matters of substantive law—and taxation is a matter of substantive law— would not be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary implication. Now, the use of the expression “retrospective operation” is at times vague and misleading. In a broad general sense it may be right to say that a statute has retrospective, operation when it purports to touch facts or events which took place before the enactment came into force. It is sometimes used in a different sense when vested rights are sought to be affected. It is sometimes loosely used in the context of certain fictions of law which the lawmaker deems it necessary to introduce in existing laws for the purpose of setting certain matters right or avoiding certain mischief which might be possible but for the change in the law; and this is done by laying down that certain facts or things which did not in fact exist shall be deemed to have existed. This last need not necessarily be called retrospective legislation. It may be more appropriate to describe it as ex post facto legislation of a curative nature. It is unsusceptible of dispute that s. 35(10) lays down a fiction of law. It is also unsusceptible of dispute that by the fictio juris the Legislature has laid down a rule which is intended to embrace rebates which were granted in the past before the commencement of the rule. The inherent oppressiveness—or at least hardship—of retroactive operation in case of statutes creating new penalties or liabilities or ex post facto deprivation of concessions in matters of taxation and other matters has always induced Courts to view changes in law aimed so to operate, with extreme care and to express the inhibition in unmistakable terms. In examining the language of s. 35(10) and in reaching a conclusion as to the meaning of the language fairly read, we shall be doing so in the light of the observations just made.

    12. Section 35 deals with rectification of mistake. Section 35(10) is intended to lay down certain provisions in respect of rebate on income-tax allowed to a company on a part of its income by virtue of the concessions given by the Finance Acts of 1948 to 1955 and as the initial words clearly show it deals with rebates granted in respect of any of the assessments for the years 1948 to 1955 inclusive. Then it proceeds to state the condition in which or the event on the happening of which the rebate is to be deemed to have been given by a mistake apparent from the record. That condition or event is that the company to which such rebate of income-tax had been allowed has availed of the amount on which the rebate was allowed, meaning thereby the undistributed profits, for declaring dividends in any subsequent year. The expressions “subsequently” and “for declaring dividends in any year” in the sub-section have reference to the words “in any of the assessments for the year beginning on the 1st day of April of the years 1948 to 1955 inclusive.” That, in our judgment, permits of no doubt and little debate. We leave out certain words in sub-s. (10) which deal with matters of detail, and doing so, we find that the words that follow are the crucial words. They are made in the context of rebates made and the amount of undistributed profits on which rebates were granted being availed of by the company for paying dividends in subsequent years, and the crucial words are that in such a case the amount of undistributed profits availed of by the company on which rebate had been allowed “shall be deemed to have been made the subject of incorrect relief under this Act”. In such a case the Income-tax Officer is authorised to recompute the tax payable by the company by reducing the rebate originally allowed as if the recomputation is a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record. The substance of the matter, evidently, is that something which had in fact not taken place, something which was not incorrect when done, relief which was correctly given when it was given, all that is to be deemed to have been made the subject of an incorrect relief under the Act and it is to be deemed that the recomputation necessary for the purpose of setting the matter right is nothing more than a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record. It may be said that rebate which was the subject-matter of the relief is to be recalled because of an event which subsequently happened and although the rebate was granted strictly in accordance with the provisions relating to the concessions made by the Finance Act during the relevant year and even though there was no mistake in the matter of granting that rebate or relief, what was done is nevertheless to be deemed to have been made by mistake. In modern statutes the expression “deemed” is used a great deal and for many purposes. It is at times used to introduce artificial conceptions which are intended to go beyond legal principles or to give an artificial construction to a word or phrase. It is not possible to list the purposes for which legal fictions may be created by statute. We had occasion in tax cases to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalkar . [1953] S.C.R 773 where their Lordships observed (p. 778):

    “…When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion.”

    13. Then their Lordships proceeded to quote certain observations of Lord Asquith which have now become classical. In East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council . [1952] A.C 109, at p. 132., Lord Asquith observed:

    “If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it…The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.”

    14. Far from there being any prohibition in the present ease, the statute enjoins, that what when done was not a mistake, what was correct relief granted according to the provisions of the finance acts in operation at the relevant times, shall nevertheless be deemed to have been made by mistake and the relief granted shall be deemed to have been incorrectly granted. By virtue of this deeming provision, the granting of rebate must be assumed even factually to have been made as a result of a mistake apparent from the record although in fact and in truth no such mistake had ever been made. Therefore, the crucial question that we have to put to ourselves is: what is the point of time at which the mistake was made and the relief incorrectly given? The first of April 1956 has no cogency to the point under consideration. It is a date after which the Income-tax Officer can sit down for the first time to think as to what is it that is to be deemed by him to have taken place by or through a mistake. Apart from that, April 1, 1956, the date so strongly relied on by Mr. Kolah, has no bearing on the interpretation of this section. Indubitably the section says that relief which was properly given, which was legally given, is to be deemed to have been incorrectly given. Rebate which was justifiably granted and correctly granted is to be deemed to have been granted under a mistake apparent on the record. As already stated we put to ourselves the question as to when the rebate can be said to have been incorrectly given: when was the relief granted by a mistake? And the answer inescapably must be that it was when the relief was granted by permitting rebate, and if that be the true position—and we have no doubt that it is so—it is extremely difficult to see how the principles of construction and the inhibition against retroactive operation can have any real effect on or can in any manner govern the enactment we are called upon to interpret. The language of s. 35(10) is very clear. It is one of those few sections in the Act which do not permit of any doubt as to what the lawmaker intended. It is not possible to see any difficulty of ascertainment of what the Legislature has said it meant. Therefore, on a fair reading of s. 35(10) it seems to us that the Income-tax Officer had the power to pass those orders.

    15. But it is said by Mr. Kolah that there are decisions which are indicative of the contrary view. Before we examine those decisions, we may refer to certain general observations of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue . 1924 10 T.C 88, at p. 110., where the eminent Judge very vividly and clearly brought out the three stages in the imposition of a tax:

    “…Once that it is fixed that there is a liability, it is antecedently highly improbable that the statute should not go on to make that liability effective. A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. Now, there are three stages in the imposition of a tax: there is the declaration of liability, that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are liable. Next, there is the assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment. That, ex hypothest, has already been fixed. But assessment particularises the exact sum which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay.”

    16. The declaration of liability of the assessee-mills was by the statute itself. The assessment in respect of the relevant years was made much prior to 1956. But says Mr. Kolah, that assessment is being altered and affected by giving effect to s. 35(10). In our opinion it would not be accurate to say that the effect of s. 35(10) is to assess the mills company over again or to re-open the assessment already made. It is stressed that some change or some alteration is being made. Of course, some change or alteration is being made. That is the very purpose of s. 35(10). But the question is what is the nature of that change or alteration. The assessment, strictly speaking, is not being changed or affected. There is only recomputation of a restricted nature vis-a-vis the rebate. What is permitted to be done by operation of the deeming provision is that the rebate is wholly or partially to be recalled as it is to be deemed to have been allowed through a mistake and relief which was granted, is to be deemed to have been incorrectly granted. Therefore, in our opinion, it would not be correct to say as learned counsel strongly asserted that his assessment was being disturbed and/or in a sense he was being assessed over again. Nor can it be said that the finality of that assessment has been really affected. The assessment depended on the income of the company for the relevant years. There is to be no recomputation of the income of the company for the relevant years. That has already been done. The only thing to be done is to ascertain what was the amount of undistributed profits in respect of which rebate had been granted that was availed of by the company wholly or partially for declaring dividend in any subsequent years. That is not assessment. There is not a word in s. 35(10) which would even faintly suggest that there was to be anything of the nature of assessment, in the sense in which that expression is to be understood in the present context. The order made by the Income-tax Officer may be considered. In effect the original order of assessment as made said: This is your income. This is the amount of tax you have to pay after bringing into play the various provisions of the Income-tax law having bearing on your assessment. The dividend you have declared leaves undistributed profits. In accordance with law, I give you a rebate or a drawback or a discount and shall only recover from you the balance after subtracting the amount of such drawback from the amount of tax which you are liable to pay and bound to pay. It is difficult to see how this restricted recomputation can properly be said to be alteration or modification or any change in the assessment actually made. But even assuming that this can be regarded as an alteration in the assessment finally made in the earlier years, that does not affect the conclusion we have reached on the question of construction of s. 35(10). In a broad general sense, it is true that there is finality about an order of assessment. Whatever be the position in law as to this doctrine of finality—and it is not necessary for us in this petition to examine the matter in detail—one thing is clear that s. 35 can operate despite any such broad doctrine. Question of rectification obviously would only arise in case of an assessment which is finalised. Section 34 which deals with the re-opening of assessments when income has escaped assessment also has bearing on this doctrine of finality.

    17. To turn to the decisions to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. Kolah. In Chatturam v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar . [1947] F.C.R 116., the Federal Court had occasion to consider certain principles of taxation and a dispute about, retrospective operation of certain provisions. There is nothing in the observations there made which lend any support to the argument of Mr. Kolah. Particular reliance was placed by counsel on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Venkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. . 1958 34 I.T.R 143. Statutes which give retrospective operation to their provisions may have different objects in view and the purpose may be to lay down different rules. Mr. Kolah is right when he says that in case of different enactments different words are used in giving retrospective operation. Now, the meaning of the words employed in s. 35(10) and the question whether the rule laid down in those words is to affect any rebates granted in the past can only be determined from the words themselves and the object of the rule if there is language appropriate to that object or purpose. Other enactments with different objects in view and intended to serve different purposes would necessarily have been enacted in different language. Therefore, comparison of the language of one enactment whereby retroactive operation was sought to be given by the lawmaker is of little guidance in matters of this type and it is unnecessary for us to examine the provision which required to be considered in the case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. There are, however, certain observations in that case, which, we may respectfully say so, afford guidance on the question before us and we may quote them. Before doing so, we may observe that, they were made in a different contest (p. 147):

    “…The argument for the respondent is that the assessee has obtained a right under the order passed by the Income-tax Officer to claim credit for the specified amount under section 18A(5) and the said right cannot be taken away by the retrospective operation of section 13 of the Amendment Act. The same argument is put in another form by contending that the finality of the order passed by the Income-tax Officer cannot be impaired by the retrospective operation of the relevant provision. In our opinion, this argument does not really help the respondent's case because the order passed by the Income-tax Officer under section 18A(5) cannot be said to be final in the literal sense of the word. This order was and continued to be liable to be modified under section 35 of the Act. What the Income-tax Officer has purported to do in the present case is not to revise his order in the light of the retrospective amendment made by section 13 of the Amendment Act alone, but to exercise his power under section 35 of the Act; and so the question which falls to be considered in the present appeal centres round the construction of the expression “mistake apparent from the record” used in section 35. That is why we think the principle of the finality of the orders or the sanctity of the existing rights cannot be effectively invoked by the respondent in the present case”.

    18. It is true that the observations, as we have already said, were made in a different contest.

    19. But we have quoted these observations solely for the purpose of showing that the doctrine of finality is not of the nature sought to be made out by learned counsel.

    20. In the result, the petition fails and will be dismissed with costs.

    21. Petition dismissed.

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    The New Shorrock Spg. And Mfg. Company Limited v. N.V Raval
    (Nov 6, 1958)