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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (husband and wife) instituted Special Suit No. 6 of 1952 in the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Nasik, seeking partition and separate possession of the husband's half-share in certain properties. While the suit was pending, the parties reached a written compromise. Defendant 3 was a minor and was represented by defendant 1 (his father); the Court authorised defendant 1 to enter and sign the compromise on behalf of defendant 3. The plaintiffs' pleader filed a document (purshis Ex. 60) asserting that no compromise terms had been agreed.

The compromise terms were settled on 15-7-1953. On 16-7-1953 plaintiff 1 and defendant 1 filed a written record of compromise (Ex. 64), signed by defendant 1, plaintiff 1, and defendant 1 acting for the minor defendant 3; the plaintiffs' pleader did not sign. The trial Judge inquired of plaintiff 1 in Court whether, despite his pleader's objection, he was willing to abide by the compromise; plaintiff 1 answered in the affirmative. The Judge allowed time for consideration, read and explained the terms again, and plaintiff 1 reiterated that he had voluntarily entered into the compromise.

The Judge ordered the compromise to be recorded as regards plaintiff 1 and directed both men to bring their wives to sign. Defendant 2 (the defendant-wife) appeared on 18-7-1953, had the compromise read and explained to her, and put her thumb impression on the document.

On 20-7-1953 plaintiff 1 submitted Ex. 66, claiming that his signature had been obtained by deception and undue pressure and that he derived no benefit; he asked the Court not to sanction the compromise and to fix the suit for hearing. Plaintiff 2 submitted Ex. 65 similarly requesting that the Court not sanction the compromise.

The trial Judge heard the applications and rejected them, holding that plaintiff 1 could not resile from the voluntarily entered compromise and that plaintiff 2 had no separate interest adversely affected by the compromise (her ornaments were accepted as hers and were no longer part of the joint family property). The Judge deleted defendants 4 to 21 from the record and directed that a decree in terms of the compromise between plaintiffs and defendants 1, 2 and 3 be drawn up. The plaintiffs appealed against the orders rejecting Exs. 65 and 66.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the written compromise (Ex. 64) was a concluded, recordable agreement despite the plaintiffs' pleader's objection and the fact that plaintiff 2 had not signed when plaintiff 1 signed.
  2. Whether plaintiff 1's consent to the compromise was procured by deception or undue influence such that the compromise should not be recorded.
  3. Whether plaintiff 2, who had not signed the compromise but whose ornaments were accepted as hers, could challenge the compromise.
  4. Whether the trial Judge erred in ordering the deletion of defendants 4 to 21 from the suit record and whether that direction could be challenged in the present appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • Because the compromise terms were not signed by both plaintiffs at the time plaintiff 1 signed (plaintiff 2 had not then signed), there was no concluded compromise; until defendant 2 (plaintiff-wife) subscribed her signature, the document only recorded negotiations and did not constitute a binding agreement.
  • Plaintiff 1's signature on Ex. 64 was procured by deception and undue pressure; particulars were given in submissions that defendant 1 was the elder brother, plaintiff 1 was only 26 and of weak intellect, and that these circumstances supported a claim of undue influence.
  • The trial Judge should not have deleted defendants 4 to 21; even if there was an adjustment between the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3, the plaintiffs were entitled to proceed against other defendants unless a proper decree in their absence had been concluded and appealed from.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments in the appeal beyond the trial Judge's findings and the court's analysis based on the record and submissions of the appellants' counsel.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sourendranath v. Tarubala Dasi, AIR 1930 PC 158 Authority that an agreement to compromise a suit must be established by the general principles governing the formation of contracts; special rules govern its enforcement. The Court relied on this authority (as cited in Mulla's commentary) to support the proposition that when a compromise is denied, the Court must decide whether the alleged agreement was made and whether it is lawful, considering vitiating factors such as fraud or undue influence.
Privy Council (statement cited in Mulla's commentary) The Privy Council observed that an agreement to compromise must be established by general contract principles, though its enforcement has special rules. The Court quoted this principle (via Mulla) to explain the test under O. 23, R. 3 Civil P.C.: the Court must be satisfied both that an agreement adjusting the suit exists and that it is a lawful agreement; this informed the Court's review of the plea of undue influence and the requirement for particulars/evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining whether a concluded and lawful agreement existed and whether any vitiating factors (fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence) were pleaded with particulars and proved.

Fact-finding: Ex. 64 was signed in Court by plaintiff 1 and defendant 1 (including defendant 1 acting for the minor defendant 3). When the compromise was placed before the Judge, the Judge directly questioned plaintiff 1 about his willingness to abide by the terms despite his pleader's objection; plaintiff 1 affirmed his consent. The Judge then allowed about two hours for consideration, re-explained the terms, and plaintiff 1 again stated that he had voluntarily entered into the compromise. Defendant 2 later signed (put thumb impression) on 18-7-1953 after the Judge had directed wives to appear and after the terms had been read to her.

On the contention that no concluded agreement existed until defendant 2 signed, the Court rejected that contention. The Court accepted the trial Judge's view that plaintiff 2 had no present interest in the suit property after her ornaments had been accepted as her own (Ex. 41) and therefore her refusal to sign could not affect the finality of an agreement otherwise proved to have been arrived at between plaintiff 1 and the contesting defendants.

On the plea of deception and undue influence, the Court emphasised that Ex. 66 did not set out particulars of the alleged deception or the nature of the undue influence, nor did it allege that defendant 1 was in a position to dominate plaintiff 1's will or that defendant 1 obtained any benefit by so doing. The mere facts that defendant 1 was plaintiff 1's elder brother and that plaintiff 1 was 26 and of alleged weak intellect did not establish a relationship of loco parentis or justify an assumption of undue influence.

The Court observed that plaintiff 1 had counsel present who declined to sign the consent terms; the Judge had given time for independent advice and plaintiff 1 had the opportunity to follow his lawyer's advice but chose not to. The Court held that the absence of independent advice did not, without more, prove the procurement of consent by undue influence.

The Court analysed the relevant rule (O. 23, R. 3, Civil P.C.) as requiring the Court to be satisfied both that an agreement adjusting the dispute exists and that it is a lawful agreement. The Court cited Mulla's commentary (which in turn cites the Privy Council and the Sourendranath case) to explain that where a compromise is denied, the Court must decide whether the alleged compromise was made and whether it is vitiated by illegality, fraud, or the like. Applying this test and noting the absence of particulars or supporting evidence for fraud or undue influence, the Court concluded that the trial Judge was correct to record the compromise.

On the deletion of defendants 4 to 21, the Court held that the order directing deletion amounted to a decree within the meaning of S. 2, sub-s. (2), Civil P.C.; if the plaintiffs were aggrieved by that decree their remedy was to appeal against it. The Court refused to entertain that grievance in the present appeal because there was no competent appeal filed against the order deleting those defendants; accordingly the present appeal was confined to the challenge to the order recording the compromise.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The appellate court affirmed the trial Judge's recording of the compromise and dismissed the appeal with costs. The Court found no sufficient particularisation or evidence of deception or undue influence to vitiate the agreement; it held that plaintiff 2's non-signature at the time plaintiff 1 signed did not prevent the existence of a concluded agreement and that the trial Judge had given plaintiff 1 opportunity to consider and obtain advice.

Implications: As a direct consequence, the compromise between the plaintiffs and defendants 1, 2 and 3 stands recorded and a decree in its terms was to be drawn up; the trial Court's deletion of defendants 4 to 21 was treated as a decree that, if aggrieved, required a separate appeal (which was not before the appellate court). The opinion does not state any broader novel legal principle beyond the application of established rules under O. 23, R. 3, Civil P.C. and existing authority concerning when a compromise should be recorded and when allegations of undue influence require particulars and proof.

Disposition in the opinion: Appeal dismissed with costs.

    Misrilal Jalamchand And Another v. Sobhachand Jalamchand And Others,

    The plaintiffs who are husband and wife, respectively, filed Special Suit No. 6 of 1952 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Nasik, for a decree for partition and separate possession of their one half share in certain properties. During the pendency of the suit it appears the parties arrived at a compromise and the terms of the compromise were reduced to writing.

    2. Defendant 3 who was a minor was represented by defendant 1 his father; and the Court authorised defendant 1 to enter upon and sign the compromise terms on behalf of defendant 3. It appears that the pleader who appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs regarded the terms of the compromise as unfavourable to the plaintiff and he filed purchis Ex. 60 stating that no compromise terms were arrived at between the parties.

    3. It may be mentioned that the compromise terms were settled on 15-7-1953. After the purshis Ex. 60 was filed by the pleader for the plaintiffs the suit stood adjourned for hearing to 22-7-1953. On 16-7-1953, plaintiff 1 and defendant 1 appeared before the Court and filed in Court a writing incorporating the terms of compromise. It was recorded at Ex. 64.

    4. Exhibit 64 was signed by defendant 1, plaintiff 1 and defendant 1 acting for and on behalf of the minor defendant 3. The pleader for the plaintiffs did not sign the compromise terms Ex. 64. The learned Judge thereupon asked plaintiff 1, who was present in Court before him, whether in spite of the objection of his pleader he was willing to abide by the terms of the compromise and it appears plaintiff 1 replied in the affirmative.

    5. The learned Judge then gave time to the parties to think over the matter. He then again called the parties before him after about two hours and the terms of the compromise were read out and explained to the parties. The learned Judge again asked plaintiff 1 whether he still accepted the terms of compromise. Plaintiff 1 told the learned Judge that he had voluntarily entered into the compromise.

    6. Thereupon the learned Judge ordered the compromise to be recorded so far as plaintiff 1 was concerned, and directed plaintiff 1 and defendant 1 to bring their respective wives before the Court to sign the terms of compromise. On 18-7-1953, defendant 2 appeared before the Court. The compromise was read over to her and explained to her, and thereafter she put her thumb impression on the compromise terms in the presence of the learned Judge.

    7. On 20-7-1953, plaintiff 1 submitted Exhibit to the Court stating that the Court had not passed final orders on the consent terms which were submitted on 16-7-1953, that his signature was obtained on the compromise terms by deceiving him and by bringing undue pressure upon him and that seeing that he was ailing defendant 1 and persons with him had taken advantage of his ignorance.

    8. Plaintiff 1 also stated that he did not admit the compromise terms and that he had not benefited in any way under the compromise. He prayed that the Court should not sanction the aforesaid compromise, and that the suit should be fixed for hearing. Plaintiff 2 also submitted an application Ex. 65 requesting the Court not to sanction the compromise.

    9. The learned Judge heard the parties on both the applications Exs. 65 and 66. He held that it was not open to plaintiff 1 to resile from the compromise which he had entered into with defendant 1. In his view the compromise effected by plaintiff 1 was voluntarily entered into by him and after understanding what the terms of the compromise were. The learned Judge set out the history of the case in para. 3 of his order and observed that the compromise was effected voluntarily after he had understood all the terms thereof.

    10. On the application filed by plaintiff 2, the learned Judge observed that it was not clear why plaintiff 2 was added as a party to the suit, but presumably she was so added because she had claimed certain ornaments on her person. He then observed that by compromise Ex. 64, it was agreed that the ornaments on the person of plaintiff 2 did not form part of the joint family property.

    11. In the view of the learned Judge plaintiff 2 was not affected adversely by the compromise and that she had no separate existence apart from her husband and she was therefore not entitled to challenge the compromise and therefore the application filed by her was liable to fail.

    12. Accordingly he rejected the application filed by the two plaintiffs challenging the compromise. The learned Judge then passed an order deleting the names of defendants 4 to 21 from the array of defendants and directing that the compromise as arrived at between the plaintiffs and defendants 1, 2 and 3 be recorded and a decree in terms of the compromise be drawn up. Against the orders rejecting the applications Exs. 65 and 66 filed by plaintiffs 1 and 2 this appeal has been preferred.

    13. (15-9-1955) Mr. Tarkunde who appears on behalf of the plaintiffs has contended that as the compromise terms were not signed by the two plaintiffs and that only plaintiff 1 signed the compromise terms and that when plaintiff 1 signed the terms defendant 2 had not signed those terms, there was no concluded compromise.

    14. Mr. Tarkunde submitted that the agreement in which were recorded the terms of compromise could not be regarded as concluded so long as defendant 2 had not signed those terms, and it was open to plaintiff 1 to resile from those terms. In substance Mr. Tarkunde argued that until defendant 2 assented to the terms by subscribing her signature there were mere negotiations and there was no concluded agreement. It is difficult to agree with that contention.

    15. It is true that plaintiff 2 has not signed the consent terms. But I agree with the view of the learned Judge that plaintiff 2 had no present interest in the suit property after her claim in the ornaments on her person was accepted by Ex. 41 an this particular suit. Evidently she could not file a suit for partition of the properties of the joint family of plaintiff 1 and defendant 1.

    16. It is true that the ornaments which were on the person of plaintiff 2 were the subject-matter of the suit; but by the agreement of compromise those ornaments were accepted as belonging to plaintiff 2 and thereafter there was no further interest of plaintiff 2 remaining in the suit which enabled her by refusing to consent and subscribing her signature to the terms to affect the finality of the agreement, if it is otherwise proved to have been arrived at between plaintiff 1 and the contesting defendants.

    17. Defendant 2 has signed the terms of compromise on 18-7-1953. But it cannot from that circumstance be inferred that till 18-7-1953 there was no concluded agreement till that date. What was signed by defendant 2 on 18-7-1953 was merely a record of the terms of compromise which was already concluded.

    18. The mere fact that defendant 2 signed the terms of compromise on 18-7-1953 would not justify the Court in holding that till that date (18-7-1953) there was no concluded agreement. Even if defendant 2 had not signed the terms of compromise, a consent decree according to those terms could have been passed.

    19. Mr. Tarkunde then urged that the consent of plaintiff 1 to the terms of compromise was procured by deception and undue influence. In Ex. 66 plaintiff 1 has stated that his signature had been obtained on the compromise by deceiving him and by bringing undue pressure on him. What the deception was has, however, not been set out in the application, nor has the nature of undue influence been set out in the application.

    20. No particulars of the alleged deception have been furnished nor is it stated as to how plaintiff 1 was induced by exercise of undue influence to assent to or to subscribe his signature to the terms of compromise recorded in Ex. 64. Mr. Tarkunde urged that defendant 1 was the elder brother of plaintiff 1, and plaintiff 1 was only 26 years of age at the date of the agreement, and that plaintiff 1 was a man of weak intellect.

    21. It is submitted that having regard to these circumstances and having regard to the terms of Ex. 64 the Court should have held that the signature of the first plaintiff on Ex. 64 must have been procured by undue influence.

    22. There is no allegation in Ex. 66 that defendant 1 was in a position to dominate the will of plaintiff 1 and that he obtained any benefit by availing of that position. The circumstance that plaintiff 1 was a young man of about 26 years of age and defendant 1 was his elder brother does not justify the Court in assuming that undue influence must have been exercised over plaintiff 1 by defendant 1. It cannot be said that qua plaintiff 1, defendant 1 was in a position of loco parentis.

    23. In the absence of any particulars of fraud and undue influence and any evidence in support of the plea of exercise of undue influence, the lower Court was in my judgment right in recording the terms of compromise.

    24. It has to be noted that when the terms of compromise were presented in Court by plaintiff 1, the learned Judge enquired of plaintiff 1 whether he was willing to abide by these terms, notwithstanding his pleaders' refusal to sign the consent terms. Plaintiff 1 stated before the Court that he was willing to sign the terms.

    25. Even thereafter the learned Judge gave him two hours to consider his position and the terms, and even thereafter plaintiff 1 expressed his willingness to abide by those terms. Mr. Tarkunde says that plaintiff 1 had no opportunity of obtaining any independent advice.

    26. But evidently plaintiff 1 had engaged a lawyer and his lawyer declined to sign the consent terms. There was ample opportunity for plaintiff 1 to accept the advice of his lawyer; and if he did not choose to do so it cannot be said that he had no opportunity of obtaining independent advice.

    27. Plaintiff 1 had an opportunity of obtaining independent advice and he refused to listen to that advice; it is not open to plaintiff 1 to turn round and contend that the agreement which has been entered into should be set aside on the ground that because he had in fact no independent advice, it was procured from him by the exercise of undue influence.

    28. Mr. Tarkunde contended that the learned trial Judge should not have recorded any finding on the question whether there was or was not any undue pressure or undue influence as set up by plaintiff 1 in his application. Under O. 23, R. 3, Civil P.C, a Court is required to order that an agreement or a compromise be recorded, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise.

    29. The Court has to record the compromise only if it is satisfied that there has been adjustment of the suit by a lawful agreement. The Court has in recording a compromise to consider two questions (i) whether there has been an agreement adjusting the dispute in suit and (ii) whether the agreement is lawful agreement.

    30. For coming to a conclusion, whether there is an agreement, the Court has not merely to consider the question whether the parties in fact have arrived at an agreement, but the Court must also consider the question whether the agreement is a lawful agreement as observed by Sir Dinshah Mulla in his commentary on O. 23, R. 3, Civil P.C under the heading “Where a compromise set up by one party is denied by the other” at page 982 Edn. 12.

    “The words ‘where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part’ clearly show that the Court has power under this rule, where an agreement or compromise is denied, to decide whether as a fact, the alleged agreement or compromise was made, and if it is satisfied that it was made to record it. The Privy Council have said that an agreement to compromise a suit must be established by general principles which govern the formation of contracts, although there are special rules governing its enforcement which arise out of its intrinsic nature.”

    31. The learned author has referred to Sourendranath v. Tarubala Dasi, AIR 1930 PC 158 (A). It is clear that when the Court is required to satisfy itself as to the existence of an agreement and is further required to satisfy itself that there is a lawful agreement adjusting the suit the Court must on an application to record compromise consider, especially where a plea of undue influence is raised, whether the agreement is not vitiated on any ground such as illegality fraud, misrepresentation etc.

    32. Mr. Tarkunde contended that in any event the learned trial Judge was in error in directing the names of defendants 3 to 21 to be deleted.

    33. Mr. Tarkunde contended that even if there was an adjustment of the suit between the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3, the plaintiffs were entitled to proceed with the suit against those defendants. But the order passed by the learned Judge directing that the names of defendants 4 to 21 be deleted from the record of the suit must amount to a decree within the meaning of S. 2, sub-s. (2), Civil P.C; and if the plaintiffs are aggrieved by the passing of such a decree their remedy is to appeal against that decree. They cannot make that grievance a ground in the present appeal which must be limited to the challenge which was made against the order recording the compromise arrived at between the plaintiffs and defendants 1, 2 and 3.

    34. Whether such an appeal, if filed, may be affected by the terms of compromise entered into between the parties and defendants 1, 2 and 3 is a matter on which I need express no opinion in this case, because before me there is no competent appeal filed against defendants 4 to 21.

    35. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.

    H.G.P
    Appeal dismissed.
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    Misrilal Jalamchand And Another v. Sobhachand Jalamchand And Others,
    (Sep 15, 1955)