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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Chagla, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This reference posed the single question whether the assessee is entitled to deduct one-half of the urban immoveable property tax when determining the bona fide annual value of property belonging to the assessee under the Income Tax Act. The question required construction of the third proviso to s. 9(2) of the Income Tax Act (text reproduced in the opinion).

The opinion sets out the legislative and statutory background: the urban immoveable property tax was imposed under the Bombay Finance Act, 1932 (charging section s.22), with municipal authorities appointed to collect the tax (see s.24AA). The opinion also recounts relevant legislative history: a Bombay High Court view that the tax was not an "annual charge" under s.9(1)(iv), the contrary view of the Supreme Court in New Piece Goods Bazaar Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, and the subsequent enactment of an explanation to s.9(1)(iv) and the third proviso to s.9(2) by the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act (LXXI of 1950).

The reference culminates in an interpretive dispute over the meaning of the word "levied" in the third proviso to s.9(2) — whether it means "impose" or "collect" — and the court was required to answer that question. The court answered the reference in the negative and ordered the assessee to pay costs. The opinion lists parties' counsel: Attorney for the Applicant: N.K. Petigara; Attorneys for the Respondent: B. Kanga and Girdharlal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of determining the bona fide annual value of a property under the third proviso to s.9(2) of the Income Tax Act, the assessee is entitled to deduct one-half of the urban immoveable property tax levied in respect of the property.
  2. What is the proper construction of the word "levied" in the third proviso to s.9(2): does it mean "impose" (i.e., the authority that imposes the tax) or "collect" (i.e., the agency that collects the tax)?

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent / Department (as summarized in the opinion)

  • The Department contended that the word "levy" in the proviso should be read to mean "impose" (the opinion explicitly states this as the Department's contention).
  • Mr. Joshi (referred to in the opinion) argued that, under the Bombay Finance Act, collection is not always carried out by the municipality; the Collector or some other authority may be the collecting authority. He pointed out that construing "levy" as "collect" would produce an anomalous result where entitlement to deduction would depend on which agency collected the tax.

Applicant / Assessee (as summarized in the opinion)

  • Mr. Palkhivala, for the assessee, contended that "levy" in the context of the Income Tax Act should be given the meaning "collect".
  • He advanced that although in the Bombay Finance Act "levy" clearly meant "impose", the term might have a wider connotation in the Income Tax Act and hence could be read as "collect".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bombay High Court (unnamed decision) Held that the urban immoveable property tax and the municipal property tax were not "annual charge" within s.9(1)(iv), so tax paid by owner was not a permissible allowance under s.9(1). The opinion records this view as background: it was one of the reasons Parliament amended the Income Tax Act, leading to the explanation to s.9(1)(iv) and the third proviso to s.9(2).
New Piece Goods Bazaar Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay (Supreme Court) Held that both the urban immoveable property tax and the municipal property tax were "annual charge" under s.9(1)(iv). The Supreme Court decision prompted legislative amendment (the explanation to s.9(1)(iv)) and is cited to explain why Parliament inserted the explanation and the third proviso to s.9(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds methodically, focusing on statutory construction and legislative history rather than expanding facts beyond the record. The key steps in the court's reasoning are:

  1. Textual starting point: The court reproduces the third proviso to s.9(2) and identifies three conditions required before a deduction can be made: (1) the tax must be levied by a local authority; (2) the tax must be levied under a law authorising such levy; and (3) the owner must discharge the part of the tenant's liability (the deemed one-half) to claim the deduction.
  2. Central interpretive question: The court frames the dispute over whether "levied" in this context means "impose" or "collect". It notes correctly that "levy" can be used in both senses in different contexts, and so context must resolve the meaning here.
  3. Statutory comparison within the taxing statute: The court examines the Bombay Finance Act, 1932, which imposes the urban immoveable property tax (s.22) and then assigns collection duties (s.24AA) to municipal authorities. The Act itself distinguishes clearly between the act of levying (imposition by the Legislature) and the act of collecting (exercise by municipal authority). The court takes this internal statutory distinction as significant.
  4. Legislative history and purpose: The court traces the history of the proviso — the Bombay High Court view, the Supreme Court decision in New Piece Goods Bazaar, and the parliamentary response (explanation to s.9(1)(iv) excluding such taxes from "annual charge" plus the limited relief in the third proviso to s.9(2)). The court reads these amendments as reflecting a deliberate and limited legislative compromise: Parliament excluded taxes levied by local or other authorities from allowable annual charges but granted a narrow relief only for taxes imposed by a local authority, and then only to the extent of one-half and subject to the landlord's payment requirement.
  5. Contextual and intra-provisonal consistency: The court emphasises that the proviso requires that the taxes be "levied by any local authority ... under the law authorising such levy." This wording, the court reasons, makes it necessary that there be power to impose (i.e., the local authority must be authorised by law to impose the tax) and that the authority actually exercise that power. It follows, the court holds, that "levied" cannot coherently be read as "collected" in this context because the proviso focuses on the authority to make the levy and the exercise of that power.
  6. Practical anomaly avoided by construing "levy" as "impose": The court accepts the point (attributed to Mr. Joshi) that under the Bombay Finance Act collection may be entrusted to different authorities (sometimes the Collector, sometimes the municipality, or others). If "levy" meant "collect", entitlement to deduction would depend on which agency collected the tax — an arbitrary result. Reading "levy" as "impose" yields a uniform rule based on who has statutory authority to impose the tax, which is a more principled and natural construction.
  7. Use of municipal statute language for support: The court refers to the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Chapter VIII) provisions (s.139, s.140) that explicitly speak of taxes which "may be levied" by the municipality, reinforcing that in municipal legislation "levy" denotes the power to impose a tax.
  8. Conclusion of interpretation: On textual, contextual, and purposive grounds, the court determines that "levy" in the third proviso to s.9(2) means "impose" and not "collect".

Holding and Implications

Holding: Answer to the reference: IN THE NEGATIVE. The court holds that "levied" in the third proviso to s.9(2) means "impose" and, on that construction, the assessee is not entitled to deduct half the urban immoveable property tax for determining the bona fide annual value of the property.

Direct consequences recorded in the opinion:

  • The court answered the reference in the negative.
  • The assessee was ordered to pay the costs (the opinion states "Assessee to pay the costs" and repeats "Assessee to pay.").

Broader implications: The opinion does not set out any extended discussion of broader legal consequences beyond resolving the reference on statutory construction. The decision applies the construction that "levied" means "impose" in the context of the third proviso to s.9(2), producing a rule that eligibility for the specific deduction turns on whether a local authority is authorised to impose the tax and has imposed it; the opinion does not elaborate further on precedent-setting beyond that construction.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City, Bombay v. Zorastrian Building Society, Limited, Bombay

    Chagla, C.J:—

    The question that arises in this reference is whether the assessee is entitled to deduct half the urban immoveable property tax for the purpose of determining the bona fide annual value of the property belonging to the assessee. This question can be determined on a construction of the third proviso to s. 9(2) of the Income Tax Act and that provides:

    “Provided further that where the property is in occupation of a tenant and the taxes levied by any local authority in respect of the property are under the law authorising such levy, payable wholly by the owner or partly by the owner and partly by the tenant—

    (a) one-half of the total amount of such taxes or one-eighth of the annual value of the property whichever is less, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in such law, be deemed to be the tenant's liability of such taxes, and

    (b) in determining the annual value of the property with reference to the rent payable by the tenant a deduction shall be made equal to the part, if any, of the tenant's liability which is borne by the owner.”

    Therefore, before a deduction can be made for the purpose of ascertaining the bona fide annual value, the conditions necessary are: (1) that there must be a tax levied by a local authority (2) the tax must be levied by the local authority under some law which authorises the local authority to levy the tax, and (3) that exemption which can only be up to one-half can only be claimed provided the landlord discharges any part of the tenant's liability with regard to that tax which is deemed to be one-half.

    Now, the whole question turns on the meaning to be given to the expression “levied”. It is contended by the Department that “levy” in this context means “impose” and it is contended on behalf of the assessee by Mr. Palkhivala that “levy” means “collect”. It is undoubtedly true that “levy” has been used in both senses depending upon the context in which the expression is used, and what we have to decide is whether in the context in which this expression is used it means “collect” or it means “impose”. Now, this urban immoveable property tax in respect of which exemption is claimed by the assessee was imposed by the Bombay Finance Act, 1932, and the charging section is s. 22 which provides that there shall, subject to the provisions of s. 23, be levied and paid to the Provincial Government a tax on buildings and lands hereinafter called the urban immoveable property tax. The Legislature having levied this tax, it set up a machinery for the collection of the tax and the agent that it appointed for collection of the tax was the Bombay Municipality. Section 24AA provides;

    “The collection of the urban immoveable property tax under s. 24 and the recovery of the penalty under s. 24A on behalf of any municipality shall be made by the appropriate municipal authority appointed to collect the property tax on behalf of such municipality under the law under which such municipality is constituted.”

    Therefore, as far as this particular Act is concerned, a clear distinction is drawn between the levying of a tax and the collecting of a tax. But levying is by the Provincial Legislature for the purposes of the Provincial Government, and the collection is by the municipality. As far as the Bombay Finance Act, 1932 is concerned, it could not possibly be urged that the expression “levy” used in this Act meant to collect, because the Legislature has drawn a clear distinction between “levy” in the sense of “impose” and “collection” in its normal natural sense. But what is urged is that whatever may be the meaning of “levy” in the bombay finance act, the expression has a wider connotation in the Income Tax Act.

    Now, in order to understand this contention, it is necessary to look at the legal history of the enactment of this proviso. This proviso was enacted by the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act (LXXI of 1950) and it came to be enacted under the following circumstances. The Bombay High Court took the view that the urban immovable property tax and the property tax levied by the municipality was not an annual charge within the meaning of s. 9(1)(iv) and therefore the tax paid by an owner on a property was not a permissible allowance under s. 9(1). The supreme Court in New Piece Goods Bazaar Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay,(2) took a different view and the view it took was that both the urban immoveable property tax and the property tax levied by the municipality was an annual charge. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court an explanation was added by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, to which reference has just been made, to s. 9(1)(iv), and the explanation provided that:

    “for the purposes of cl. (iv) of this sub-section the expression “annual charge” does not include any tax in respect of property or income from property levied by a local authority or a State Government or the Central Government.”

    Therefore, the Legislature made it perfectly clear that whether the tax was levied by a local authority or a State Government or the Central Government, the tax could not be claimed as a permissible allowance under s. 9(2). But the Legislature was anxious to give some relief to the tax payer and that relief was granted by enacting at the same time the third proviso to s. 9(2). But the relief that the Legislature granted was a limited relief. The relief was not with regard to what was covered by the new explanation to s. 9(2)(iv). The Legislature did not intend that the property owner should have relief with regard to all taxes levied by a local authority, a State Government or the Central Government, and therefore in the proviso to s. 9(2) it only gave relief with regard to a tax imposed by a local authority and even there the relief was not with regard to the whole of the tax, the relief was only to the extent of half the tax which was deemed to be payable by the tenant with this further condition that half must be paid by the landlord in order to claim exemption for the purpose of determining the annual letting value.

    Now, the language used by the Legislature in the case of the explanation to s. 9(1)(iv) and in the third proviso to s. 9(2) is significant. In the case of the explanation the Legislature has dealt with the tax imposed by any of the three authorities, a local authority, a State Government or the Central Government. In the case of the third proviso to s. 9(2) it has confined itself to the tax levied by a local authority. It is urged that there is no reason why the expression “levy” should not be construed as meaning “collect.” In the first place, it is difficult to understand why the Legislature should have emphasised the question of collection of a tax. It seems to be immaterial as to which is the agency selected for the collection of a tax. What is more material and more relevant is to consider the authority which imposes the tax, and therefore from that point of view it is impossible to accept the construction that both in the explanation to s. 9(1)(iv) and in the third proviso to s. 9(2) the Legislature was applying its mind to the agency which would be collecting the tax and not the authority which would be imposing the tax. But there is this further difficulty in the way of accepting the construction suggested by Mr. Palkhivala. When we again turn to the third proviso it states:

    “Provided further that where the property is in occupation of a tenant and the taxes levied by any local authority in respect of the property are, under the law authorising such levy…”

    Therefore it is necessary that there must be a levy under a law which authorises the local authority to make that levy. It is impossible to suggest that in this context “levy” can mean “collection”. The municipality must be given the power to impose the tax and it must exercise that power. If “levy” is used in the latter part of the proviso and the only possible meaning to give to it is “imposition”, then it is not possible to give a different meaning to the very word “levy” when it is used for the first time in the proviso. Therefore, to repeat what we have already said, the two conditions which the Legislature was emphasising were that a law must authorise the local authority to impose a tax and in pursuance of that authority the local authority must impose the tax. The position would be made clear if we turn to the City of Bombay Municipal Act. Chapter VIII deals with municipal taxes and s. 139 refers to the various taxes which can be imposed by the Bombay Municipality, and then we have a heading “Property Taxes leviable” and s. 140 deals with the taxes which may be levied on buildings and lands by the municipality and shall be called the property tax. So this Chapter deals with the power of the Bombay Municipality to levy taxes. The Bombay Municipality is authorised by this law to levy these taxes and it was these taxes which the Legislature was contemplating when it enacted the third proviso to s. 9(2) permitting a property owner to claim half of this tax as a deduction for the purpose of ascertaining the bona fide annual letting value.

    Now, there is another anomaly which would arise if we were to accept Mr. Palkhivala's contention. As pointed out by Mr. Joshi, under the bombay finance act it is not always the municipality that collects the tax. In some cases the power to collect is given to the Collector and not to a local authority, and there may be cases where there may be no municipality, in which case the collecting authority will be someone else. If Mr. Palkhivala's contention were to be accepted, it would result in this rather curious situation that wherever there is a municipality and where the municipality is the collecting authority, then the property owner will be entitled to deduct half of the urban immoveable property tax, but where the collecting authority is the Collector or some authority other than the local authority, the property owner would not be entitled to make the deduction. Such a construction would be opposed to principle, but if we accept the construction that the material question is not the collecting of the tax but the imposing of the tax, then the property owner will be entitled to some relief or suffer from the same disability, whoever the collecting authority might be. Therefore, looking at the matter from every point of view, it seems to us that the only natural and proper construction which could be placed upon the expression “levy” used in the third proviso to s. 9(2) is “impose” and not “collect” and admittedly if that is the construction then the assessee is not entitled to the relief which he has sought.

    The result is that we must answer the question submitted to us in the negative. Assessee to pay the costs.

    Attorney for the Applicant: N.K Petigara.

    Attorneys for the Respondent: B. Kanga and Girdharlal.

    Assessee to pay.
    P.M.P
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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City, Bombay v. Zorastrian Building Society, Limited, Bombay
    (Aug 26, 1954)