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  • sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 1 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914 or(ii)
  • sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 1 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914,
  • s. 27(a)(i) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914;
  • s. 1(1) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914,
  • s. 27 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914.
  • s. 27(2) of the English Act. Section 27 of the English Act
  • Indian Naturalization Act the Adaptation Order
  • s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act 1926
  • s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act
  • ss. 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the Foreigners Act.
  • sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act
  • Indian Naturalization Act of 1926,
  • Indian Naturalization Act of 1916,
  • Indian Naturalization Act (Act VII
  • s. 6 of the General Clauses Act
  • s. 2(a)(i) of the Foreigners Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • s. 27 of the English Act
  • Foreigners Act, s. 2(a)(i)
  • s. 1(1)(b) of that Act.
  • s. 7(2) of that Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 1 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914 or(ii)
  • sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 1 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914,
  • s. 27(a)(i) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914;
  • s. 1(1) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914,
  • s. 27 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914.
  • s. 27(2) of the English Act. Section 27 of the English Act
  • Indian Naturalization Act the Adaptation Order
  • s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act 1926
  • s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act
  • ss. 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the Foreigners Act.
  • sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act
  • Indian Naturalization Act of 1926,
  • Indian Naturalization Act of 1916,
  • Indian Naturalization Act (Act VII
  • s. 6 of the General Clauses Act
  • s. 2(a)(i) of the Foreigners Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • s. 27 of the English Act
  • Foreigners Act, s. 2(a)(i)
  • s. 1(1)(b) of that Act.
  • s. 7(2) of that Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chagla, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit in which the plaintiff challenged an order dated 22 October 1951 issued by the Union of India under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Foreigners Act. The order required the plaintiff not to remain in India after the expiry of one month from service, to depart from India by the Port of Bombay, and not thereafter to re-enter India.

At first instance the learned Judge held that the plaintiff was a citizen of India by reason of domicile and having been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution. The learned Judge rejected the plaintiff's contention that he was born in the territory of India, but nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff could not be externed under the Foreigners Act.

On appeal the central contest was whether the plaintiff could be treated as a "foreigner" within the meaning of the Foreigners Act so as to permit the Government to extern him. Relevant factual material in the opinion includes:

  • The plaintiff was born on 18 April 1920.
  • The plaintiff's father, Mahomed Hussein Haji, was described in his naturalization certificate (dated 21 July 1915) as a native of Yezd (Persia) and an inhabitant of Bombay on 20 June 1915; the certificate recited birth at Yezd in 1880 and arrival in Bombay in 1906.
  • The 1915 certificate was issued by the Government of India under Act XXX of 1852, certified the father to be deemed to be a natural-born subject of His Majesty as if born within the territories subject to the Government of India, and has not been revoked.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff is a "foreigner" within the meaning of the Foreigners Act and therefore liable to be externed under the Order of 22 October 1951.
  2. Whether the plaintiff acquired, by virtue of his father's naturalization certificate and the relevant provisions of the Indian Naturalization Act (including s. 7(2) of the 1926 Act), the status, rights and privileges of a British subject such that he cannot be treated as a foreigner under the Foreigners Act.
  3. Whether, by defining "British subject" with reference to s. 27 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, the Indian law required compliance with the conditions of s. 1(1)(b) of the English statute for establishing the status of a natural-born British subject.
  4. Whether the repeal or adaptation of the Indian Naturalization Act (or other adaptations under the Constitution) had the effect of extinguishing rights already acquired under that Act.
  5. Whether the Government could deprive the plaintiff of any deemed certificate or the rights derived therefrom (for example by revocation under relevant provisions) so as to render him a foreigner.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Union of India) — principal arguments as recorded

  • Mr. Desai (for the Union) argued that the plaintiff did not satisfy the conditions in s. 1(1)(b) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914 for being a natural-born British subject, despite father being a British subject and the plaintiff being born outside His Majesty's dominions.
  • He contended that the Indian Naturalization Act was repealed or adapted under the Constitution (exercise of powers under art. 372(2)) and consequently the plaintiff could no longer claim privileges under s. 7(2) of that Act.
  • It was also contended that the father may have subsequently acquired Iranian citizenship, and that such change of nationality could operate to take away rights, with the consequence that the son could lose attendant rights derived from the father's certificate.
  • Mr. Desai submitted that it would be anomalous if a son, not being the direct holder of a certificate, could continue indefinitely to enjoy rights conferred on the father despite acquiring other citizenship; implicitly he relied on mechanisms (or the lack of them) to show the Government could act now to extern the plaintiff.

Respondent (Plaintiff) — principal contentions as recorded

  • The plaintiff's primary contention (accepted by the Court for the purposes of the appeal) was that, although he may not be an Indian citizen, he is a British subject by virtue of his father's naturalization certificate and the operation of s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act (1926), and therefore not a "foreigner" within the meaning of the Foreigners Act.
  • Implicit in the plaintiff's position was reliance on the effect of the father's 1915 certificate (which remains in force and was not revoked) to confer on the plaintiff, as a child born after grant, the rights, privileges and capacities of a British subject.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing the statutory definitions and the interplay between the Foreigners Act, the Indian Naturalization regime, and the English statutes referred to in the Indian definitions.

  1. The Court began with the premise that the Foreigners Act permits externment only of a person who is a "foreigner" as defined by the Act; therefore, before upholding the Government's order to extern the plaintiff the Court had to be satisfied that the plaintiff was a "foreigner".
  2. The pre-adaptation definition of "foreigner" (as in Act III of 1864 / Act XXXI of 1946) excluded a person who had been granted a certificate of naturalization as a British subject. After adaptation the Foreigners Act was modified so that one of the categories excluded from the term "foreigner" was a person who "is not a citizen of India" and also (by retained provisions) persons who were natural-born British subjects.
  3. The Court examined the father's naturalization certificate (dated 21 July 1915) issued under Act XXX of 1852 and noted that it remained in force and had never been revoked. The plaintiff was born on 18 April 1920, thus after the grant of the father's certificate.
  4. The Court relied on s. 7(1) and s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act (1926). Section 7(1) deems a person to be a British subject on grant of a certificate; s. 7(2) provides that a child born subsequent to the grant shall be entitled to the same rights, privileges and capacities and be subject to the same obligations as the person to whom the certificate was granted, provided the parent retained those rights at the date of the child's birth. It was undisputed that the father retained those rights when the plaintiff was born.
  5. The Court then considered the definition of "British subject" in the Indian statute, which expressly adopts the definition in s. 27 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914. Section 27 of the English Act contains the definition of "British subject", and thus the Indian law equates those naturalized under Indian law with persons falling within that English statutory definition.
  6. Mr. Desai's argument that the plaintiff did not meet the conditions of s. 1(1)(b) of the English Act (which sets out categories of persons deemed natural-born British subjects) was addressed by the Court. The Court held it was unnecessary to compel satisfaction of the specific conditions in s. 1(1)(b) because the Indian legislature, by defining "British subject" with reference to s. 27 of the English Act, intended to give the same status, rights and privileges to those Indians brought within that definition. In effect, the Indian Naturalization Act treats a person who becomes a British subject by naturalization (and children born after grant under s. 7(2)) as falling within the category of a natural-born British subject for the purposes of Indian law and the Foreigners Act.
  7. The Court therefore concluded that the plaintiff could not be considered a "foreigner" under s. 2(a)(i) of the Foreigners Act (the provision excluding natural-born British subjects from the definition of "foreigner") nor under the alternative approach that his father's rights were transmitted to him by s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act.
  8. The Court addressed Mr. Desai's contention that repeal or adaptation of the Indian Naturalization Act by the President under art. 372(2) of the Constitution had extinguished rights acquired under that Act. The Court relied on art. 367 (bringing the General Clauses Act, 1897 into play for interpretation) and s. 6 of the General Clauses Act to conclude that rights and privileges acquired under a repealed statute are saved unless the adaptation order expressly provides otherwise. The Adaptation Order in repealing the Indian Naturalization Act had not taken away rights already acquired; the Foreigners Act adaptations retained the protective definitions (ss. 2(a)(i) and (ii)).
  9. On the contention that later acquisition of Iranian citizenship by the father (or by the plaintiff) would operate to deprive them of rights, the Court observed that revocation under the Indian Naturalization Act is governed by s. 9(1): a certificate revoked under the Act causes the former holder to cease to be deemed a British subject. Hence, absent revocation, the father remained a British subject. For the plaintiff, on attaining majority s. 8(7) deems the child to be a person to whom a certificate has been granted, and the Government retains the power to revoke that deemed certificate; if revoked, the plaintiff would cease to be deemed a British subject.
  10. The Court considered these statutory mechanisms sufficient to meet the public policy and administrative concerns highlighted by Mr. Desai (for instance the possibility of a son retaining rights indefinitely despite acquiring another citizenship) because the Government could, if satisfied of good reasons, revoke the deemed certificate once the son attained majority.
  11. The Court expressly stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether the learned Judge below was correct in holding that the plaintiff had become an Indian citizen by reason of domicile and ordinary residence for five years prior to the Constitution's commencement; that question was left open.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Court concluded against the Union of India and held that the plaintiff could not be externed under the Foreigners Act because he is a British subject (and, in the view of the Court, falls within the category of a natural-born British subject for the purposes of the Foreigners Act and the relevant Indian statutes).

Direct consequences and orders

  • The appeal "fails and must be dismissed with costs" (the Court dismissed the Government's appeal).
  • The Prothonotary was ordered to issue a direction under section 82 (procedural/decretal provision invoked by the Court) giving the Union Government one month's time to satisfy the decree for costs in the suit and of the appeal after the issue of an allocatur.
  • Liberty was granted to the respondent's attorneys to withdraw the sum of Rs. 500 deposited in Court.
  • Attorneys recorded in the opinion: for the appellant, D.P. Sethana; for the respondent, Jani & Merchant.

Broader implications

The Court did not pronounce a further constitutional or precedential rule beyond its statutory interpretation and its conclusion in favour of the plaintiff on the particular facts. It expressly left open the question whether the plaintiff had in fact become an Indian citizen by domicile and prior residence as found by the learned Judge below. The decision's practical effect is to prevent the Government from executing the externment order against the plaintiff in the absence of revocation of the naturalization certificate (or the deemed certificate) by the competent authority; no new broad precedent beyond the statutory interpretations relied upon was declared.


Note: This summary has been prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those expressly stated therein.

    Union Of India v. Hasanali Mohamed Hussein Shariffi

    Chagla, C.J:—

    This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff to challenge an order dated October 22, 1951 issued by the Union of India. The order is issued under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act and it calls upon the plaintiff not to remain in India after the expiry of one month from the date on which the order was served on him, and it also calls upon him to depart from India by the Port of Bombay and not thereafter to re-enter India. Various contentions were urged before the learned Judge below. The learned Judge held that the plaintiff was a citizen of India by reason of the fact that he was domiciled in India and he had been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution. It was urged by the plaintiff that he was born in the territory of India. That contention was rejected by the learned Judge. Having held that the plaintiff was a citizen as defined by art. 5 of the Constitution, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff could not be externed under the Foreigners Act.

    Turning to the Foreigners Act, the Act does not authorise the Government to extern all non-citizens. The only person who could be externed under the provisions of the foreigners act is a person who is a foreigner as defined by the Act. Therefore, it is possible for a person not to be a citizen and yet not to be a foreigner within the meaning of the Act. Therefore we have to be satisfied that the plaintiff is a foreigner before we can uphold the order of the Government of India to extern him from this country. The Foreigners Act was adapted by the President under art. 372(2) of the Constitution, and before adaptation the material section was in the following terms:

    “‘Foreigner’ means a person who—

    (i) is not a natural-born British subject as defined in sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 1 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914 or

    (ii) has not been granted a certificate of naturalization as a British subject under any law for the time being in force in British India, or

    (iii) is not a ruler or subject of an Indian State, or

    (iv) is not a native of the Assam tribal areas: Provided that any British subject who, under any law for the time being in force in British India, ceases to be a British subject shall thereupon be deemed to be a foreigner.”

    Now, by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950, cls. (iii) and (iv) were deleted and a new cl. (iii) was added to the following effect: “is not a citizen of India”. What is contended on behalf of the plaintiff is that even though the plaintiff may not be an Indian citizen, he is a British subject and therefore not a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act. In order to appreciate this contention one or two relevant facts might be stated. Both the plaintiff and the plaintiff's father hail from Iran and the contention of the defendant is that both of them were born in a place in Iran called Yezd. The plaintiff was born on April 18, 1920 and the plaintiff's father is still alive and is at present in Iran. On July 21, 1915 a naturalization certificate was issued to the plaintiff's father by the Government of India and that certificate describes him as a native of Yezd in Persia and an inhabitant of Bombay on June 20, 1915, and the certificate recites that he was born at Yezd in the year 1880, that he came to Bombay in the year 1906, that he was carrying on trade as a tea shop keeper and that he desired permanently to settle in Bombay. It further recites that the memorial presented by the memoralist was duly verified by oath on June 20, 1915. The certificate therefore certifies that Mahomed Hussein Haji is deemed to be a natural-born subject to His Majesty, as if he had been born within the territories subject to the Government of India. It is admitted that this certificate is still in force and has never been revoked, and the question that we have to consider is, what is the effect of this certificate upon the rights of the plaintiff who was born to Mahomed Hussein Haji subsequent to the grant of this certificate, because as pointed out he was born on April 18, 1920.

    Now, this certificate was issued under Act XXX of 1852. That Act was subsequently repealed and the Indian Naturalization Act of 1926 (VII of 1926) took its place, and s. 7 of that act deals with the effect of grant of certificate and sub-s. (1) of that section provides that a person to whom a certificate of naturalization has been granted shall be deemed to be a British subject and be entitled to all the rights, privileges and capacities of a British subject born within British India except such rights, privileges or capacities, if any, as may be withheld from him by the certificate. In this case no right, privilege or capacity has been withheld from the father of the plaintiff. The right conferred upon a person obtaining a certificate can also be conferred upon a child who was born prior to the grant of that certificate provided that child has been included in the certificate. Then sub-s. (2) deals with a child born subsequent to the grant of the certificate and that section provides that the child shall be entitled to the same rights, privileges and capacities and be subject to the same obligations, duties and liabilities to which the person who was granted the certificate was at that date entitled and subject, and the material provision is that at the date of the birth of the child the person to whom the certificate was granted should have retained the rights, privileges or capacities of a British subject. Now, it is not disputed that when the plaintiff was born in 1920 the plaintiff's father retained all the rights, privileges and capacities of a British subject. “British subject” is defined in s. 2(a), and it means a British subject as defined in s. 27 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914. It is therefore clear that if the father was given the privilege or right as a British subject not to be under a liability of being externed from India, and if he had that right when the plaintiff was born to him, that right or privilege could be exercised by the plaintiff.

    Turning to the definition of “foreigner” at the date when the naturalization certificate was issued, that definition is to be found in Act III of 1864 which is the same as in Act XXXI of 1946. The definition in that Act provided that a foreigner shall denote a person who has not been granted a certificate of naturalization as a British subject under any law for the time being in force in British India. This again is not disputed by Mr. Desai on behalf of the Union of India that as far as the father was concerned, he having been granted a certificate of naturalization was not a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act and he could not be externed from the country. If therefore the father was granted that right and privilege under the Foreigners Act and if he retained that right and privilege when the plaintiff was born, in view of s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act 1926 the plaintiff continues to enjoy that right and privileges and he cannot be looked upon as a foreigner and cannot be externed. It would be for the appellant to satisfy us that under some law that right or privilege has been taken away from the plaintiff. We shall presently deal with the interesting arguments advanced by Mr. Desai to satisfy us that right and privilege has been taken away, but before we go to that aspect of the case it is necessary to consider another definition under the Foreigners Act which in our opinion also prevents the appellant from exercising its power under the Foreigners Act. Under cl. (i) of s. 2(a) a natural-born British subject as defined in sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 1 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, is not a foreigner, and therefore if the plaintiff can be looked upon as falling within the ambit of cl. (i) he would not be liable to be proceeded against under this Act. Turning again to the Indian Naturalization Act of 1926, the expression “British subject” is defined and the definition is:

    “British subject means a British subject as defined in s. 27 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914”,

    and turning to that English statute, s. 27 is the section containing definitions and “British subject” is defined as a person who is a natural-born British subject. Therefore, if the plaintiff becomes a British subject by reason of the fact that his father had a naturalization certificate issued to him and he was born at a time when his father still continued to hold the naturalization certificate, he became a British subject by reason of s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act and by reason of the definition of “British subject” he became a British subject as defined in s. 27(a)(i) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914; in other words, he could be looked upon as a natural-born British subject.

    Now, the answer given to this argument by Mr. Desai is that s. 1(1) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, defines a “natural-born British subject”, and the definition is:

    “The following persons shall be deemed to be natural-born British subjects, namely:—

    And the relevant clause is (b):

    “(b) Any person born out of His Majesty's dominions, whose father was a British subject at the time of that person's birth and who fulfils any of the following conditions, that is to say:”

    Mr. Desai concedes that the plaintiff was born out of his Majesty's dominions and his father was a British subject, but his contention is that the conditions laid down in cl. (b) are not satisfied. There are four conditions in the Act as amended at the relevant date and the one we are concerned with is condition (2), viz. “whose father was a person to whom a certificate of naturalization had been given”, and Mr. Desai with considerable force contends that although a certificate of naturalization was given to the father of the plaintiff it was not a certificate of naturalization as contemplated by the English statute. But in our opinion it is not necessary to look at the definition of “natural-born British subject” given in this statute. By reason of “British subject” being defined in the Indian Naturalization Act as “a British subject defined in s. 27 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914”, the definition of a “natural-born British subject” must be deemed to be satisfied and the legislature did not contemplate that the conditions mentioned in s. 1(1)(b) of the English statute should be satisfied. The object of defining “British subject” as “a British subject defined in s. 27 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914” was to give him the same status, the same rights and the same privileges which a British subject as defined in s. 27 of the English Act would have. It was not contemplated by the legislature that it would be necessary for such a British subject, before he was looked upon as a British subject as defined in s. 27 of the English Act, to satisfy the conditions laid down in s. 1(1)(b) of that Act. Therefore, turning again to the Foreigners Act, s. 2(a)(i) defines a foreigner as a person who is not a natural-born British subject as defined in sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 1 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914. In the case of the plaintiff, he is a natural-born British subject as defined in that section, firstly by reason of the definition of a “British subject” in the Indian Naturalization Act of 1916, and secondly by reason of the definition of a “British subject” given in s. 27(2) of the English Act. Section 27 of the English Act defines “British subject” as a person who in fact is a natural-born British subject, and sub-s. (1) confers that status upon persons who by legal fiction are considered to be natural-born British subjects, and the Indian law puts a person who becomes a British subject by reason of naturalization in the category of a natural-born British subject. Therefore, in our opinion it is not possible for Mr. Desai to contend that the plaintiff would not fall in the category of s. 2(a)(i) of the Foreigners Act because he does not satisfy the conditions laid down in sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 1 of the English statute. He must be deemed to have satisfied those conditions because, as already pointed out, the Indian Naturalization Act looks upon a person who has received a certificate of naturalization as a British subject and a British subject as defined in s. 27 of the English statute.

    Therefore, whether one looks at the matter from the point of view of the case of the plaintiff falling under s. 2(a)(i) of the Foreigners Act or from the point of view of the right and privileges conferred upon the plaintiff's father being continued to be held by the plaintiff by reason of s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act, the plaintiff cannot be considered to be a foreigner against whom any order can be issued by the Union. Indeed, we would require very strong argument from counsel for the Union of India to be satisfied that a British subject can be proceeded against under the Foreigners Act, because Mr. Desai's contention really comes to this that although the plaintiff's father was a British subject and the plaintiff is a British subject by reason of s. 7(2) of the Indian Naturalization Act, yet today in view of the Constitution it is open to the Government to extern him under the Foreigners Act.

    Now, the argument of Mr. Desai is based on one or two considerations. In the first place, he contends that the Indian Naturalization Act (Act VII of 1926) was repealed by the President exercising his powers under art. 272(2) of the Constitution, and Mr. Desai says that the plaintiff is no longer entitled to claim any privilege under s. 7(2) of that Act. The answer to that contention is very simple. Under art. 367 it is provided:

    “Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under art. 372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India.”

    Therefore, in interpreting this Constitution we must consider the effect of any repeal by the Constitution of any previous law as if the Constitution was a law passed by the legislature and s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applied. Under s. 6 the rights and privileges under a repealed statute are saved unless the contrary is provided by the legislature. But Mr. Desai says that the repeal of the Indian Naturalization Act is not by the Constitution, but is by adaptation by the President under art. 372(2). But art. 372(2) gives the power to the President of repealing any law in force, and we have to interpret this art. 372(2) in the light of the General Clauses Act, and it is clear that when the President exercising his power under this article repeals a law in force, the rights and privileges acquired by any person under the law repealed are preserved unless there is a provision to the contrary in the adaptation order. Now, in repealing the Indian Naturalization Act the Adaptation Order has in no way taken away the rights already acquired and as far as the Foreigners Act is concerned far from the Legislature intending to take away the rights of British subjects it has retained ss. 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the Foreigners Act. Therefore, neither the repeal of the Indian Naturalization Act, nor the adaptation of the Foreigners Act discloses any intention on the part of the President to take away the rights of British subjects already acquired under the laws repealed or modified.

    It is then urged by Mr. Desai that it is open to him to satisfy us that after the naturalization certificate was granted to the father of the plaintiff he has acquired Iranian citizenship and therefore he has lost his rights and thereby the son has also lost his rights. Now, the Indian Naturalization Act provides for the revocation of a certificate issued to any person under that Act and the effect of the revocation is provided for by s. 9(1) and that is: “Where a certificate is revoked under s. 8, the former holder thereof shall cease to be deemed to be a British subject.” Therefore, unless there is revocation of the certificate the holder of the certificate must continue to be a British subject. It is then urged by Mr. Desai that a very curious result would follow if it is held that the son acquires the rights of his father as he had them at his birth and as the son himself is not the holder of a certificate he can go on enjoying those rights and notwithstanding his acquiring a citizenship of another country no action could be taken against him under the Foreigners Act. There is again a simple answer to this difficulty suggested by Mr. Desai. Under s. 8(7) when a child of a person to whom the naturalization certificate has been issued attains majority he must be deemed to be a person to whom a certificate of naturalization has been granted and it is open to the Government to revoke the certificate which the son is deemed to hold under s. 8(7). Therefore it is perfectly competent for Government, if it is satisfied that good reasons exist for doing so, to revoke the certificate deemed to be held by the plaintiff, and if such action is taken by Government then the plaintiff would cease to be deemed to be a British subject and whatever rights he has as a British subject under the Foreigners Act can no longer be enjoyed by him.

    In the view that we have formed, in our opinion it is unnecessary to consider whether the learned Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff had become a citizen of India by reason of domicile and continuing to live in India for five years prior to the coming into force of the Constitution. We are deciding against the Union of India on the sole ground that the plaintiff is a British subject and action cannot be taken against him under the Foreigners Act. We do not decide and we leave the question open as to whether the plaintiff has become an Indian citizen as held by the learned Judge below.

    The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    Prothonotary to issue a direction under s. 82 giving the Union Government one month's time to satisfy the decree for costs in suit and of the appeal after the issue of an allocatur.

    Liberty to the respondent's attorneys to withdraw the sum of Rs. 500 deposited in Court.

    Attorney for the appellant: D.P Sethana.

    Attorneys for the respondent: Jani & Merchant.

    Appeal dismissed.
    P.M.P
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    Union Of India v. Hasanali Mohamed Hussein Shariffi
    (Feb 26, 1954)