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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit filed by a person claiming to be the adopted son of Baswant, seeking a half share in the family property of which Baswant was a member at the time of his death in 1939. The principal defendant, Adiveppa (defendant No. 3), is the son of Babu, who was allegedly murdered by Baswant on 6th November 1926. The plaintiff's adoption is said to have taken place shortly after the murder, during an emergency. The defendant contested the fact of adoption and argued that even if adoption was proved, Baswant's act of murdering Babu would disqualify both Baswant and the adopted son from claiming any share in the family property by survivorship. The trial court found the adoption to be proved but held that the criminal court's judgment convicting Baswant was insufficient proof of murder for the purposes of disqualification. Consequently, the trial court allowed the suit. Defendant No. 3 has appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the fact of adoption by Baswant of the plaintiff is legally established.
  2. Whether the act of Baswant allegedly murdering Babu disqualifies Baswant or his adopted son from claiming a share in the family property by survivorship or inheritance.
  3. Whether the adoption itself is invalid on the ground that a murderer cannot adopt.
  4. Whether the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience exclude a murderer and his adopted son from succession or survivorship in the family property.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The fact of the plaintiff's adoption by Baswant is not proved.
  • Even if the adoption is proved, Baswant's act of murdering Babu disqualifies both Baswant and the adopted son from claiming any share in the family property.
  • The adoption itself would be invalid because a murderer cannot validly adopt.
  • The disability arising from murder is akin to absolute disabilities such as insanity or blindness, which preclude succession and survivorship.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The adoption of the plaintiff by Baswant is clearly proved by the evidence.
  • The criminal court's conviction of Baswant is insufficient legal proof of murder for disqualification purposes.
  • There is no principle in Hindu law or statutory law that a murderer is absolutely disqualified from property rights in general; the disqualification only applies to taking advantage of the murderer's wrongful act.
  • The plaintiff is not seeking to take advantage of the murder but is claiming a share in the family property by survivorship based on a vested right existing before the murder.
  • The adoption is valid; there is no foundation for the contention that a murderer cannot adopt.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Lalla Laljee Sahye Principle that disability affecting succession also affects survivorship, illustrated in a case of insanity. Used to explain the appellant's argument that murder should cause similar disqualification, but the court distinguished murder as a qualified disability rather than an absolute one.
Kenchava v. Girimallappa Principle that a murderer cannot take advantage of his own wrong, based on justice, equity, and good conscience. Accepted by the court as establishing that murderers are excluded from inheritance/survivorship of the murdered person's estate, but this does not extend to all property rights or general succession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first affirmed the trial court's finding that the adoption of the plaintiff by Baswant was proved based on the evidence. It then considered the legal effect of Baswant's alleged murder of Babu on the rights of Baswant and his adopted son to claim a share in the family property.

The court noted that the only evidence of murder was the criminal court's conviction, which legally is insufficient to establish murder for the purpose of disqualification in civil succession matters. However, for argument's sake, the court assumed Baswant to be the murderer and examined the legal consequences.

The court rejected the suggestion that a murderer is absolutely disqualified from property rights similar to persons suffering from absolute disabilities like insanity or blindness. Instead, it recognized the disqualification as a qualified one, grounded not in Hindu law itself but in principles of justice, equity, and good conscience, as affirmed by the Privy Council in Kenchava v. Girimallappa.

The court emphasized that the disqualification applies to preventing a murderer from taking advantage of his wrongful act, specifically to inheritance or survivorship of the murdered person's estate. However, the plaintiff here was not seeking to take advantage of the murder but was claiming a share in the family property by survivorship based on a vested right existing prior to the murder.

The court found no authority or principle to extend the disqualification to general property rights or to the plaintiff's claim. It also rejected the argument that the adoption itself was invalid because Baswant was a murderer.

Accordingly, the court held that neither Baswant nor his adopted son was disqualified from claiming their share in the family property by survivorship, and thus dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs payable by defendant No. 3.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff, as the adopted son of Baswant, is entitled to a half share in the family property by survivorship despite the allegation that Baswant murdered Babu. The court clarified that the disqualification of a murderer from inheritance or survivorship applies only to claims that would take advantage of the murderer's wrongful act and does not extend to general property rights or claims based on vested rights prior to the murder. The decision does not establish any new precedent beyond affirming the limits of the disqualification principle grounded in justice, equity, and good conscience.

    Adiveppa Babu Shintre v. Veerbhadrappa Baswantappa Shintre

    Macklin, J.:—

    This appeal arises out of a suit by a person claiming to be the adopted son of one Baswant for a half share in the property of the family of which Baswant was a member at the time of his death in 1939. The principal defendant is one Adiveppa, defendant No. 3. He is the son of Babu, who is said to have been murdered by Baswant on the 6th November 1926. The adoption of the plaintiff is said to have taken place in the emergency arising out of the murder (only two days after the murder); and it is the defendant's case that the fact of the adoption is not proved; and that even if proved, the fact of the adoptive father being the murderer of Babu would prevent either the adoptive father or the adopted son from taking a share in the family property even by survivorship. The trial Court has found the fact of the adoption proved. On general grounds of law the learned Judge seems to be of the opinion that the plaintiff would not be entitled to succeed by survivorship if it were proved that his father Baswant had murdered Babu. But the only evidence in support of the murder was the judgment of the criminal Court; and the learned Judge (quite rightly) held it to be insufficient to establish the murder against Baswant or his adopted son. In the result he held that the plaintiff suffered no disability by reason of his father being a murderer, and he allowed the suit. This appeal has been presented by defendant No. 3.

    As to the fact of the adoption, there is very little doubt as to its really having taken place in the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff. Having discussed evidence, the Court held the adoption proved.

    The next question is the validity of the adoption in view of the fact that Baswant is said to have murdered his consin Babu just before. On this point the learned Judge citing the arguments raised before him says, quite rightly, that a murderer, even if not disqualified under Hindu law from succeeding to the estate of the person murdered, is so disqualified upon the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, and that no title to the estate of the person murdered can be claimed through the murderer, who should be treated as non-extinct when the succession opens on the death of his victim and cannot be regarded as a fresh stock of descent; and the learned Judge goes on to say that the disability which excludes a person from inheritance also excludes him from a share in joint family property on partition. But he refuses to recognise Baswant or his son as being under any disability to take a share on partition in the family estate, because he holds that there was no legal proof before him of Baswant being in fact the murderer.

    It is true that the only evidence put forward in the case was the judgment under which Baswant was convicted and sentenced. In strict law that is not enough to prove that he murdered Babu; the utmost that it proves is that he was convicted and sentenced for the murder of Babu. But it is convenient for the sale of argument to treat Baswant as the proved murderer of Babu; and on that assumption we propose to deal with the argument that Baswant, and through Baswant his adopted son, is disqualified from partition. A suggestion was made that the adoption itself would be invalid on the ground that murderer cannot adopt at all. But there does not seem to be any foundation for such a suggestion. The principal contention is that a murderer suffers from the same sort of disability as a person who is insane or blind, and that person suffering under any disability as regards succession suffers under the same disability as regards survivorship also. For this latter proposition I may refer to Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Lalla Laljee Sahye. That was a case of insanity, but the principle which it enunciates appears to be correct. But the difficulty of accepting learned Counsel's argument on this point is that so far as we are aware there is no principle upon which any disability arising by reason of murder can be on the same footing as a disability arising from insanity or blindness or the other absolute disabilities dealt with in the Hindu law. The disability arising against a murderer is not an absolute disability at all. It is only a qualified disability; and even so it does not appear to have any foundation in Hindu law, but is grounded upon the rules of justice, equity and good conscience. This was recognised by the Privy Council in Kenchava v. Girimallappa where their Lordships said (p. 574):—

    “There is much to be said for the argument of the Subordinate Judge that the principles of jurisprudence which can be traced in Hindu law would warrant an inference that according to that law a man cannot take advantage of his own wrong, and that if this case had come under consideration by the Hindu sages they would have determined it against the murderer. But it is unnecessary so to decide, because the alternative is between the Hindu law being as above stated or being for this purpose non-existent, and in this latter case the High Court have rightly decided that the principles of equity, justice and good conscience exclude the murderer.”

    We may therefore take it that the rules of justice, equity and good conscience exclude a murderer from taking any share either by inheritance or by survivorship in the estate of the person whom he has murdered; and the same disability would apply to a son, whether genetive or adopted.

    But here there is no question of the murderer or his son taking advantage of the murderer's wrongful act. The plaintiff is not asking for a share either by inheritance or by survivorship in the estate of the murdered man or his son. All that the plaintiff is seeking to do is to attain by survivorship the share on partition in the property belonging to both branches of the family in which his father Baswant had a vested right before the murder was committed. We are not aware of any general disqualification in a murderer. Neither in the texts nor in the text books, nor again in the statute law or the reported decisions is there any suggestion that a murderer ipso facto forfeits his right to property in general. What is stated is that he cannot take advantage of his act. In the present case the share which the plaintiff is now claiming would have been exactly the same even if the murder had never been committed, neither more nor less.

    It is also argued that an enemy of a father is excluded, from the estate of the father. But we are not aware of any authority which would justify us in extending that principle of Hindu law to enemies of an uncle or of a cousin and even if we should so extend the principle, it would still not be a case of taking advantage of the murder. The principle underlying the disqualification against a murderer is simply this that a murderer may not take advantage of the murder; and, if in any particular case there is no question of his taking advantage of the murder, we do not see how he can be excluded either from succession or from survivorship.

    In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs payable by defendant No. 3.

    Appeal Dismissed.
    J.G.R
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    Comments

    Adiveppa Babu Shintre v. Veerbhadrappa Baswantappa Shintre
    (Jan 15, 1947)