1. The learned Special Judge, Nasik, in Special Case No. 1 of 1981, by his judgment and order dated 1st July, 1981 convicted the appellant-accused for an offence punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The appellant was also convicted for an offence punishable under Section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three months. Substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

2. It was the prosecution case that complainant-Balasaheb Shinde (P.W 1) was carrying on wholesale business in country liquor at Manmad as one of the partners of P.B Shinde & Company.

3. He was to receive a certain quota of country liquor from Pravara Nagar Sugar Factory, Pravara Nagar, Dist. Ahmednagar, as per the directions of the Superintendent of the Prohibition and Excise, Nasik. However, the appellant who was then working as Inspector of Prohibition and Excise at Malegaon Division, was alleged to have demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs. 2,000/- as illegal gratification on 18th June, 1980 at Manmad for release of the said liquor. A successful trap was arranged against him when a sum of Rs. 2,000/- smeared with anthracene powder was recovered from him. He was accordingly prosecuted and tried and was convicted and sentenced as stated above which has been impugned in this appeal.

4. The defence of the appellant was that he had neither demanded nor accepted illegal gratification of any amount much less of Rs. 2,000/- from the complainant. He, however, admitted that on 18th June, 1980, at about 10.30 a.m he did accept Rs. 2,000/- from the complainant but the said amount was given to him by the complainant for being paid to one Ram Pawar. In other words, the defence of the appellant was that the amount of Rs. 2,000/- recovered from him was not the bribed money but it was taken by him from the complainant for and on behalf of Ram Pawar who had sent a chit (letter) with the complainant to him requesting that he (appellant) should send his (Pawar's) amount of Rs. 2,000/- along with the complainant.

5. Mr. Dudhat, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, urged that in view of the fact that the appellant admitted the prosecution story that the amount of Rs. 2,000/- was recovered from him during the trap, the only point that arises for consideration of this Court is whether the defence has been able to rebut the presumption that can be raised against the appellant under section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act by a reasonable and probable explanation. The contention of the learned Counsel is that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant did tender reasonable and probable explanation as to how an amount of Rs. 2,000/- was recovered from him and that being so, on the doctrine of preponderance of probability, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. I find lot of substance in the submission of Mr. Dudhat, for, the evidence on the record shows that complainant Balasaheb Shinde had admitted in the cross-examination that the appellant had brought a chit from one Ram Pawar of Malegaon requesting Balasaheb Shinde to hand over an amount of Rs. 2,000/- due to him to the appellant for the purpose of it being delivered to the said Ram Pawar at Malegaon. He further admitted that he read the contents of the chit and immediately threw it away and that in the said chit Ram Pawar had demanded back from him the advance of Rs. 2,000/- which he had paid to him towards two barrels of country liquor. He also admitted in the cross-examination that it was written in the said chit that the amount of Rs. 2,000/- may be sent along with the appellant, if possible. Since the defence of the appellant is that he had accepted Rs. 2,000/- for and on behalf of Ram Pawar, it is quite possible in view of the above said admissions given by the complainant that the story put up by the appellant may be true. In the background of such admissions on the part of the complainant, the conclusion is irresistible that the defence taken by the appellant is reasonable and probable, although Mrs. Belose, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on behalf of the State, vehemently urged that the sending of chit and demand of Rs. 2,000/- by Ram Pawar may only be a co-incident, and had the defence been true that Ram Pawar had requested the complainant to repay the loan of Rs. 2,000/- through the appellant, the appellant could have immediately stated so before the police at the time of the trap. I do not say for a moment that the contention raised by Mrs. Belose is baseless but in a criminal trial and more so in a case like the one on hand, when the accused is able to show a reasonable and probable defence, he is entitled to benefit of doubt on the doctrine of preponderance of probability. That is so because for all that we know that the story put up by the defence may be true or may be false but a possibility cannot be altogether ruled out that in view of the admissions by the complainant, as stated above, the defence may be true. It is under these circumstances that I say that the appellant here is entitled to benefit of doubt. The Supreme Court in case of V.D Jhingan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1762 had observed that the burden of proof lying upon the accused under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act will be satisfied if he establishes his case by a preponderance of probability as is done by a party in civil proceedings and that it is not necessary that he should establish his case by the test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Man Singh v. Delhi Administration, (1979) 3 SCC 425 : AIR 1979 SC 1455, the Supreme Court had said that it was sufficient if the accused offers a probable explanation or defence and strict standard of proof about such a defence was not necessary. Therefore, on this point alone, the appellant in this case is entitled to an acquittal.

6. To be fair to Mrs. Belose, however, I would like to deal with one more of her arguments before I part with the matter. Her submission is that although as per the English version of the evidence of the complainant it appears that he has stated that the appellant had agreed to have accepted the amount of Rs. 2,000/- but in the Marathi version it appears that the accused had agreed to accept the bribed money and that Being so, the submission of Mrs. Belose is that in view of the admission by the accused he should be convicted. I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the submission of Mrs. Belose in this regard because although the panch witness has also given evidence in Marathi as brought to my notice by Mrs. Belose, a perusal of the original panchanama does not show that the appellant had agreed that he had accepted the bribed money. If what the complainant and the panch witness stated in the Marathi version of the deposition was true, then similar or same averment was expected in the original panchanama itself. That being not so, I am unable to find any substance in the argument of Mrs. Belose. But that apart, the record admittedly does not show that when the appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this circumstance that is now sought to be used against the appellant that he had admitted that he accepted bribed money was put to him. If this particular circumstance is now sought to be pressed into service with a view to convict the appellant, the legal position is that the said circumstance should have been put to the appellant when he was examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code to explain the same. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Harijan Magha Jesha v. State Of Gujarat., (1979) 3 SCC 474 : AIR 1979 SC 1566, that circumstance against the accused which was not put to him in his statement under Section 313 cannot be permitted to be relied on by the prosecution in order to convict him. In another case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : AIR 1984 SC 1622, the Supreme Court after referring to the earlier judgments had reiterated that circumstances which were not put to the accused while being examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be used against him. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in a recent case of Balu Ramu Macchi v. State of Gujarat, 1986 Cri. L.J 983, had also observed that circumstances not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be used against him. In this view of the settled position in law on this point, it is difficult to agree with the submission of Mrs. Belose that since the accused had admitted of having received bribed money he should be convicted. That is so because such a circumstance was not put to him when he was examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

7. In this view of the matter, the appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The convictions recorded by the learned Special Judge, Nasik for offences punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the sentences inflicted on him are quashed and set aside and he is acquitted. Fine if paid by the appellant shall be refunded to him. He is on bail. His bail bond stands cancelled.

Appeal allowed.