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Summary of the Opinion (Dr. Couto, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a non-resident Indian residing in Dubai, challenged by writ petition the Detention Order dated 14 February 1986 issued under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA). A landing of contraband gold occurred on 8 and 29 August 1985 at Daman, and 250 gold lagadies were recovered by Customs. Investigation implicated Ramji Sukar Tandel, Bhula Bhagwan Tandel, Kasamali Gulam Rasul, Babu Soma and the petitioner. Detention orders (noted in the opinion as issued on 2 February 1986 for the named persons and the petitioner's order dated 14 February 1986) were issued against these persons. Writ petitions filed on behalf of Ramji Tandel, Bhula Tandel and Kasamali Rasul were admitted and, by judgment dated 28 April 1986, those Detention Orders were quashed because relevant and material documents had not been placed before the Detaining Authority, vitiating its subjective satisfaction. The Detention Order against Babu Soma was revoked by the Advisory Board. Separately, Customs adjudication proceedings (Show Cause Notices under Section 124 of the Customs Act dated 11 April 1986) were issued against twelve persons in connection with the same landing; no Show Cause Notice was issued to the petitioner. In the adjudication proceedings a Collector observed that the department had not attempted to identify the petitioner in Dubai, and full particulars had not been furnished by Ramji Sukar to enable summons from Dubai.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 (and a writ of habeas corpus) is maintainable on behalf of a prospective detenu who has not surrendered to authorities and on whom the Detention Order has not been served.
  2. Whether a defective verification (verification made by the petitioner's wife rather than the petitioner himself) renders the petition non-maintainable.
  3. Whether the Detention Order dated 14 February 1986 issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act is vitiated because the material placed before the Detaining Authority was the same as the material in respect of which other Detention Orders had been quashed (on account of omission of relevant documents and possible duress in the statements relied upon).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The petition is premature and not maintainable because the petitioner has not surrendered to the Customs Authorities and the Detention Order and grounds for detention have not been served on him; accordingly, a writ of habeas corpus should not be entertained.
  • The High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 only in the rarest of rare cases and when the Detention Order is ex facie ab initio null and void (relying on Vedprakash Devkinandan Chiripal v. State of Gujarat).
  • The petition's verification is defective because the verification was made by the petitioner's wife instead of the petitioner himself, contrary to Rule 6 of Chapter III of the Appellate Side Rules; this defect renders the petition non-maintainable.
  • Reliance was placed on precedents (including Vedprakash and a Division Bench decision in Yogesh Kantilal Patel) to support the contentions on maintainability and the circumstances in which the Court should exercise extraordinary jurisdiction.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Reliance on several Division Bench decisions of the Bombay High Court to contend that a petition filed by or on behalf of a prospective detenu is maintainable even if the person has not surrendered and even if the Detention Order and grounds have not been served.
  • The defective verification is a technical irregularity which should not defeat the petition, relying on authorities that allow overlooking of such technical defects when liberty is at stake.
  • On the merits, the Detention Order against the petitioner was based exclusively on the same material as the Detention Orders previously quashed (those issued against Ramji Sukar Tandel, Bhula Bhagwan Tandel and Kasamali Gulam Rasul). Those earlier Detention Orders were quashed because two vital documents (a truncated Magistrate's order and medical certificates showing injuries) had not been placed before the Detaining Authority; similarly, the petitioner's Detention Order must be quashed.
  • The petitioner was implicated on the basis of a statement of Ramji Sukar recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, and that statement had been alleged to have been obtained under duress — making the statement a vital piece of evidence that the Detaining Authority ought to have considered along with the omitted documents.
  • The fact that no Show Cause Notice was issued against the petitioner in the customs adjudication proceedings was submitted as corroboration that there was insufficient material to support the Detention Order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vedprakash Devkinandan Chiripal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 Guj 253 (Full Bench, Gujarat) Held that ordinarily a prospective detenu who has not surrendered and has not been served with the Detention Order cannot invoke Article 226, except in exceptional/rarest of rare cases where the Detention Order is ab initio void. The court examined this authority, observed that its conclusions were fact-specific, and distinguished it on the facts of the present case; it did not accept Vedprakash as a bar to entertaining the petition here.
Yogesh Kantilal Patel v. Home Secretary, Home Department, Government of Maharashtra (Crl. Writ Petn. No. 1364 of 1986) Referenced on the question whether the High Court can exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction when a prospective detenu has not surrendered; cited for a cautious approach that such jurisdiction should be exercised when circumstances require. Referred to by parties and noted among the authorities addressing maintainability; used in the court's survey of authorities but not accepted as limiting the Court's jurisdiction in the present facts.
Jayantilal Bhagwandas Shah v. State of Maharashtra (1981 Cri LJ 767 / 161) Sets out the scope of Article 21 and Article 226: High Courts may issue writs (including habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari) to protect Article 21 rights and may act to protect persons against the prospect of illegal detention. The court relied strongly on this decision to support the proposition that the High Court may entertain petitions to protect liberty even when the prospective detenu is not yet in custody; the decision was treated as authoritative on the breadth of Article 226.
Lachmandas Naraindas Jiwanani v. Union of India (Crl. Appln. No. 69 of 1980) Listed among decisions following the principle in Jayantilal that the High Court can act to protect liberty even in prospective detention situations. Invoked as part of the line of Division Bench authorities supporting the Court's jurisdiction to entertain petitions by prospective detenu.
Sukhramdas Prabhudas Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (Crl. Writ Petn. No. 622 of 1982) Listed among authorities following Jayantilal's formulation on Article 21 and Article 226. Noted as one of several Division Bench decisions that justify the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to protect liberty before actual detention.
Mohideen Tayab Sony v. K.K. Dwivedi (Crl. Writ Petn. No. 1380 of 1986) Listed among authorities supporting the same general principle about protecting liberty under Article 226. Referred to as part of the body of authorities relied on by the Court to reject the maintainability objection.
Sayed Iqbal v. State of Maharashtra (Crl. Writ Petn. No. 1159 of 1986) (reported (1988) 1 Bom CR 66) Used to support that technical defects (e.g., in verification) should not bar relief and to support the view that petitions by prospective detenu can be maintainable. The court cited this decision to justify overlooking the defective verification and to support maintainability in the circumstances.
Manoharlal Narang v. Union of India (Spl. Civil Appln. No. 2752 of 1975, ILR (1987) Bom 1) Holds that a writ petition is not premature merely because the Detention Order has not been served and the person has not been arrested; fundamental rights permit approaching Court before loss of liberty. The court expressly agreed with and adopted the reasoning in Manoharlal Narang to reject the objection of prematurity.
Maganbhai v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCC 400 : AIR 1969 SC 783 (Supreme Court) Holds that Courts may issue a writ of mandamus when fundamental rights are directly and substantially invaded or are in imminent danger of being so invaded. This Supreme Court principle was noted (particularly in the discussion of the Gujarat Full Bench decision) as supporting a liberal interpretation permitting preventive relief where liberty is in imminent danger.
Mhoiuddin Tayab Sony v. The State of Maharashtra, 1980 Cri LJ 1040 Holds that technical defects (such as delay, laches, or irregular verification) should not prevent relief where liberty is involved; the Court should ensure safeguards are observed and not deny relief on technicalities. The court relied on this decision to hold that the defective verification (made by the petitioner's wife) was an irregularity that could be overlooked in the interest of protecting liberty.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two stages: first addressing preliminary objections to maintainability, then considering the merits.

On Preliminary Objections (Maintainability):

  • Prematurity / Non-surrender objection: The court emphasized that COFEPOSA is preventive legislation that affects the fundamental right to liberty; when fundamental rights (particularly Article 21) are involved, the High Court's power under Article 226 must be available to protect those rights. While a writ of habeas corpus traditionally requires detention, the power to examine the legality of an order affecting liberty cannot be limited solely because the prospective detenu has not surrendered or the Detention Order has not been served. The court relied on a line of Division Bench authorities (notably Jayantilal Bhagwandas Shah and Manoharlal Narang) to hold that the High Court may entertain petitions by prospective detenu to prevent illegal deprivation of liberty.
  • Distinguishing Vedprakash: The court considered the Gujarat Full Bench in Vedprakash, which took a more restrictive approach, allowing such petitions only in exceptional cases where the Detention Order is ab initio void. The court concluded that Vedprakash's observations were fact-specific and did not represent an absolute bar; the balance between individual liberty and public interest must be struck at adjudication and the Court should not close its doors to those who approach to safeguard liberty.
  • Defective verification objection: The court acknowledged that Rule 6 requires verification by the petitioner himself and that here verification was by the petitioner's wife, making it irregular. However, citing authorities (including Mhoiuddin Tayab Sony), the court treated this as a mere technical defect which should not defeat consideration of a petition where liberty is at stake. Accordingly, the court overruled the verification objection.

On Merits:

  • The court noted (and accepted as undisputed) that the material placed before the Detaining Authority in the petitioner's case was the same material relied upon for the Detention Orders that had earlier been quashed in Writ Petns. 6, 7 and 8 of 1986. Annexure B to the petition was the common judgment quashing those Detention Orders.
  • The earlier Division Bench judgment had found that an order of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Daman, had been truncated when submitted to the Detaining Authority and that a relevant portion showing possible physical ill-treatment of Ramji Tandel had been omitted. Further, medical certificates evidencing injuries (caused by hard/blunt objects) were not placed before the Detaining Authority. Those documents were held to support the allegation that the statement recorded by the Customs under Section 108 of the Customs Act may have been extorted under duress; because those documents were vital to the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction, their absence vitiated that satisfaction and required quashing of the orders.
  • The court observed that the petitioner had been implicated by Ramji Sukar Tandel's statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act. Given the Division Bench's finding that there was some support for the allegation that Tandel's statement may have been obtained under duress (based on the Magistrate's order and medical certificates), the court held that the statement was a vital piece of evidence which should have been considered in the light of those documents. Because those documents were not placed before the Detaining Authority, the subjective satisfaction was vitiated in the petitioner's case as well.
  • The court also noted corroborative circumstances: the Detention Order against Babu Soma had been revoked by the Advisory Board and no Show Cause Notice had been issued to the petitioner in the customs adjudication proceedings — facts relied on by the petitioner to show insufficient material to support detention.
  • On the totality of these considerations, the court concluded that the petition succeeds and that the Detention Order dated 14 February 1986 must be quashed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The rule is made absolute and the Detention Order dated 14 February 1986 issued against the petitioner under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act is hereby QUASHED AND SET ASIDE. The court ordered that no action pursuant to the said Order shall be taken by the concerned authorities.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioner's Detention Order (14 February 1986) is quashed and set aside; the authorities are directed not to take any action pursuant to that Order.
  • On broader law: The court reinforced the view (expressed in prior Division Bench decisions) that the High Court may, in appropriate circumstances, entertain petitions under Article 226 on behalf of prospective detenu who have not surrendered and where Detention Orders have not been served, particularly where fundamental rights are at stake and where the material before the Detaining Authority is shown to be vitiated. The court distinguished the more restrictive approach of the Gujarat Full Bench (Vedprakash) as fact-specific and held that the balance between individual liberty and public interest is to be struck at the time of adjudication rather than by closing the Court's doors at the threshold.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down a new or broader precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts before the court; its direct consequence is the quashing of the petitioner's Detention Order and the prohibition of any action under that order.

Order accordingly.

    Hiralal Somabhai Damania v. Dr. Gopal Singh And Others

    Dr. Couto, J.:— The petitioner, a non-resident Indian citizen staying at Dubai, challenges by this writ petition the Detention Order dt. 14th Feb., 1986 issued by the first respondent under S. 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, (‘COFEPOSA’ Act for short).

    2. The facts that led to the issuance of the said Order need not be stated in detail. Suffices to say that a landing of contraband gold took place on Aug. 8, 1985 and August 29, 1985 at Daman and 250 gold lagadies were recovered by the Customs Authorities. Investigation was initiated by the said authorities and it appears that as a result thereof, it was found that one Ramji Sukar Tandel, one Bhula Bhagwan Tandel, one Kasamali Gulam Rasul and one Babu Soma/and the petitioner were involved in the smuggling of the said gold. Accordingly, the first respondent issued orders of Detention on Feb. 2, 1986 against the aforesaid persons under s. 3(1) of the cofeposa act. Writ Petitions challenging the respective Orders of Detention were filed before this Court on behalf of Ramji Tandel, Bhula Tandel and Kasamali Rasul. The said Writ Petitions were admitted and registered, respectively, under Nos. 7, 6 and 8 all of 1986. By judgment dt. April 28, 1986, the Division Bench of this Court quashed the aforesaid Orders of Detention on the ground that relevant and material documents were not placed before the Detaining Authority and, therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the said authority while issuing the Detention Orders was vitiated. As regards Babu Soma, his case came before the Advisory Board and the Order of Detention issued against him was revoked on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board.

    3. The Customs Authorities also initiated adjudication proceedings against twelve people by issuing Show Cause Notices to them under S. 124 of the Customs Act on April 11, 1986. These proceedings were initiated on the basis of the landing of the aforesaid gold at Daman. No Show Cause Notice of any kind and on any ground was issued to the petitioner. The said proceedings were ultimately ended and an adjudication order imposing some penalties against the persons to whom the Show Cause Notices had been issued were imposed. While discussing the evidence on record, admittedly, it has been urged that no attempt had been made by the Department to identify the sender of the gold, namely the petitioner herein. The Collector who has adjudicated the said proceedings while dealing with the said submission observed that: “Next argument is that the department has not attempted to identify Hirabhai Somabhai Damania of Dubai. This argument has no force since the customs laws do not extend beyond the shores of this country. Further, the full particulars of Hirabhai Somabhai have not been furnished by Ramji Sukar to enable the department to summon him from Dubai. Therefore this portion of the statement is not of a nature that could easily be corroborated”.

    4. The above facts are not at all denied by the respondents in their return and Mr. A.T Kamat, Under Secretary (Home Department), Government of Goa, confines himself to raise the question of the maintainability of the petition. He submits that the petition is premature and not maintainable as the petitioner has not surrendered to the Customs Authorities, nor the Order of Detention has been served on him. Further, according to Mr. Kamat, the petition is not maintainable also on the ground that though the petition was filed by the prospective detenu, the verification was not done by him but by his wife. However, the facts abovementioned had not been at all denied and therefore, we can safely proceed on the basis that the said facts are admitted as correct.

    5. Before proceeding to deal with the merits of this petition, it is necessary and expedient to deal first with the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents. Mr. Bhobe, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the petition is premature and, therefore, not maintainable since the Detention Order and the grounds for the detention had not yet been served on the petitioner and further he has not surrendered to the concerned authorities. He submitted, therefore, that a writ of habeas corpus is not at all maintainable, and the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution in cases like the one at hand. Such powers could be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases and when the Detention Order is ex facie ab initio null and void. In this connection, Mr. Bhobe placed strong reliance on the decision of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in ‘Vedprakash Devkinandan Chiripal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 Guj 253. He further submitted, placing reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1364 of 1986 (Yogesh Kantilal Patel v. Home Secretary, Home Department, Government of Maharashtra) delivered on Dec. 17th, 1987, that although, the High Court can exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution even when the prospective detenu has not surrendered, such powers should be exercised only when the circumstances of the case so required. The learned counsel further contended that the verification of the petition is defective and in contravention of R. 6 of Chapter III of the Appellate Side Rules of this Court. Therefore, according to them, the petition on this count also is not maintainable.

    6. Mr. Karmali, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, joined issue and placing reliance on the decisions of the several Division Benches of this Court to which we will make reference in due course, contended that the objections raised by Mr. Bhobe had been already set to rest and it is now well settled by this Court that a petition filed by or on behalf of a prospective detenu is maintainable, even if the said person has not surrendered to the concerned authorities and the Detention Order and the grounds were not served on him. Equally, according to the learned counsel, the second objection raised on behalf of the respondents had been set to rest by the Division Bench of this Court in several judgments of this Court, inter alia, in ‘Jayantilal Bhagwandas Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cri LJ 767 and in Crl. Writ Petn. No. 1159 of 1986 Sayed Iqbal v. State of Maharashtra decided on Aug. 21st, 1987.*

    7. We find no force at all in the above, preliminary objections praised on behalf of the respondents. As regards the first objection, we may point out that the COFEPOSA Act is a preventive piece of legislation which affects the fundamental right of liberty of a citizen. When fundamental rights, specially the fundamental right to liberty, are involved, it is manifest that there should be no bounds for the exercise by the High Court of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution in order to protect and safeguard those fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Of course, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be entertained unless and until a person surrenders to the concerned authorities and is already under detention. But the power of the Court to examine and to adjudicate in the question of the legality of an Order which affects the liberty of a citizen cannot be limited by the fact that the prospective detenu has not surrendered to the concerned authorities or that the Detention Order was not served on him. We are supported in this view by several decisions of the Division Benches of this Court. It is not necessary for us to make a detailed reference to all these authorities, but we may advert in particular to Jayantilal Bhagwandas Shah's case (1981 Cri LJ 161), (Bom) (above), for in the said case, the law on the subject was laid down in a very expressive) manner. Bharucha, J., speaking for the Court in that case has observed as under:—

    “Article 21 of the Constitution enshrines the most inherently fundamental of human rights, the right to life and personal liberty. It declares that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Under the provisions of Article 21, as we read it, every person has the right to safeguard his freedom and to regain it if he has illegally been made to lose it. Art. 226 of the Constitution clothes the High Courts with authority to issue to any person or authority throughout the territories inflation to which they exercise jurisdiction, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of the rights conferred, inter alia, by Article 21. Article 226 is couched in language wide enough to protect a person against an illegal invasion of his right to freedom by protecting him while still free and by regaining his freedom for him if he has already been wrongfully detained. We cannot countenance and do not accept the Advocate-General's submission that the High Courts are impotent to give relief against the prospect of illegal, detention. We are satisfied that the High Courts may under the provisions of Article 226 issue a direction, order and writ in the nature of mandamus and/or certiorari quashing an illegal order of detention and may by direction, order and writ in the nature of prohibition enjoin the person threatening the illegal detention from executing the threat.

    8. The view so expressly recorded by the Division Bench in Jayantilal's case was followed by other Division Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Crl. Appln. No. 69 of 1980, Lachmandas Naraindas Jiwanani v. Union of India, Crl. Writ Petn. No. 622 of 1982, Sukhramdas Prabhudas Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, Crl. Writ Petn. No. 1380 of 1986, Mohideen Tayab Sony v. K.K Dwivedi; Crl. Writ Petn. 1159 of 1986 (reported in (1988) 1 Bom CR 66), Sayed Iqbal v. State of Maharashtra, Crl. Writ Petn. No. 1364 of 1986 (reported in 1988 Cri LR (Man) 230), Yogesh Kantilal Patel v. Home Secy. Similarly, in Spl. Civil Appln. No. 2752 of 1975 (reported in ILR (1987) Bom 1), Manoharlal Narang v. Union of India, judgment delivered on July 8th 1980, the Division Bench of this Court negatived the contention that a Writ Petition was not maintainable and was premature when the Detention Order has not yet been served on the petitioner and he has not been arrested under the same. The Division Bench observed that under a Detention Order, a person is sought to be deprived of his liberty and as laid down in Art. 21 of the Constitution, such order can be made only under a law enacted for the purpose and after complying with the provisions of such law. It further observed that it may happen that an order is passed without there being a statute to support it or it may be passed without complying with the provisions of the statute, if any. The order may also be passed against a wrong person and for a wrong purpose and, therefore, to insist in such cases that the person against whom the order is passed must first submit to the same and lose his valuable liberty before approaching the Court is to insist upon an unreasonable unwarranted and illegal condition. The Division Bench further said that there is no support for such proposition in our legal system and that on the other hand the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly by Articles 14, 19 and 21, confer on any person to be likely to be affected by such order an implicit right to approach the Court and knock at its door at any time, and the Court will not and cannot refuse relief to such person by insisting that he first surrenders his liberty. With respect, we are in full agreement with the above observations made in Manoharlal Narang's case (above).

    9. It is true that in Vedprakash's case, (AIR 1987 Guj 253) (above), the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court appears to have struck a slightly different note, since it was held that in cases where the prospective detenu has not surrendered nor has been served with the Detention Order he cannot ordinarily invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, for only in exceptional cases and in rarest of rare cases, wherein the order of Detention appears to be ab initio void, he can invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, under Art. 226 of the Constitution. However, on going through the judgment delivered by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the said case, one finds that those observations were made on the facts of that particular case. In fact, Vedprakash's case (supra) was one where the prospective detenu was indulging in blackmarketing and was consistently avoiding the service of the Order of Detention. The Full Bench while considering the law in the facts of that case, had made a reference to Jayantilal's case, (1981 Cri LJ 767) (Bom) and other authorities, inter alia, of the Supreme Court. The Full Bench observed in para 41 of the report that the observations made in Writ Petition No. 622 of 1982 by the Division Bench of this Court had to be read subject to certain limitations which emerge from the Constitutional scheme and the necessity to strike a balance between the conflicting interest of individual liberty on the one hand and interests of nation and the society on the other. Therefore, the Full Bench quoted with approval the observations made by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 841/85 to the effect that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, when the Detention Order is not executed and the person concerned is not put under detention. However, the Division Bench observed that such petitions can be entertained in the rarest of rare cases, meaning by that the Detention Order is ex facie null and void. The Full Bench made also a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in ‘Maganbhai v. Union of India’, (1970) 3 SCC 400 : AIR 1969 SC 783. In that case, Hidayatullah, C.J, speaking for the Court, observed that the Courts may issue a writ of mandamus at the instance of a party whose fundamental rights are directly and substantially invaded or are in imminent danger of being so invaded. The Full Bench inferred from such observation that it is permissible to interpret Article 21 of the Constitution liberally as conferring right upon any individual to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to safeguard his liberty even in cases where there is imminent danger to his liberty being invaded in future. Then, the Full Bench concluded that ordinarily a detenu cannot seek a writ of mandamus in cases where he has not surrendered nor has been served with an Order of Detention and he cannot ordinarily invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, but in exceptional cases and in the rarest of rare cases wherein the Order of Detention appears to be ab initio void, the detenu can do so. It can be seen from the above observations of the Full Bench that there is no substantial divergence with the view of the Division Benches of this Court. Besides, with respect, we feel that striking the balance between the conflicting interest of the individual on the one hand and the interests of the nation and the society on the other has to be done at the time of the adjudication of the petition and the Court should not close its doors to a citizen who approaches. It to safeguard and protect his fundamental right to liberty. We, therefore, find no force in the first preliminary objection raised by the respondents.

    10. As regards the second objection, viz., the defective verification, it is no doubt true that as per Rule 6 of Chapter III of the Appellate Side Rules, the verification has to be done by the petitioner himself and that in the present case though the petition was filed by the prospective detenu himself, the verification was done by his wife. Such Verification is therefore irregular but we are of the view that such technical defect should not and cannot come on the way of our looking into the merits of the petition, as the liberty of the petitioner is involved. Pertinent in this respect are the observations made in ‘Mhoiuddin Tayab Sony v. The State of Maharashtra’, 1980 Cri LJ 1040. Dharmadhikari J., speaking for the Court and negativing the preliminary objections to the maintainability of the Writ Petition on the ground of delay and laches observed in para 12 of the report as under:—

    The powers exercised under the COFEPOSA Act are extraordinary in nature. It involves liberty of a subject and it is bounden duty of the Court to satisfy itself that all safeguards provided by the law have been carefully observed and that the subject is not, deprived of his right to liberty otherwise than in accordance with law. When a question of liberty of a person is involved in a petition like this, then in our opinion reliefs cannot be denied to the petitioner on such a technical ground.”

    11. Though these observations were made as regards laches, in our view, they apply on all fours to the second objection raised on behalf of the respondents as regards the defective verification. That is a mere irregularity which can be overlooked. Relevant also is to be noted that in Jayantilal's case, (1981 Cri LJ 767) (Bom) (above), and with respect rightly, it has been observed that if the High Court is exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction on the basis even of a letter or a postcard, the, exercise of the said powers should not be barred on a technical ground of a defective ‘verification. We are also supported by the ‘decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sayed Iqbal's case, (1988) 1 Bom CR 66 (above). We, therefore, dismiss as without force the second objection to the maintainability of this petition, and now turn to the merits of the petition.

    12. Though several grounds of challenge had been advanced at hearing of this petition against the Detention Order, Mr. Karmali with his habitual fairness, restricted his attack mainly to two grounds. He first contended that it is an admitted position that the Detention Order issued against the petitioner was based exclusively on the same grounds on which Detention Orders were issued against Ramji Sukar Tandel, Bhula Bhagwan Tandel, Kasamali Gulam Rasul and Babu Soma. The said Detention Orders had been quashed by this Division Bench by judgment dt. April 28th, 1986, on the ground that two vital and essential documents, which could have influenced the Detaining Authority in the formation of this subjective satisfaction had not been placed before it and, therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at to issue the Detention Orders had been vitiated. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that since the material which is the basis for issuing the Detention Order against the petitioner is the same and since it is not challenged that the petitioner was implicated on the basis of a statement of Ramji Sukar Tandel recorded by the Customs Authorities under Section 108 of the Customs Act and this Court has found that the allegation made by the said Tandel that the said statement has been obtained under duress, the judgment of the Division Bench is attracted and the Detention Order issued against the petitioner has necessarily to be quashed on the same grounds. He also submitted that it is an admitted fact that the Detention Order issued against Babu Soma was revoked in view of the report of the Advisory Board, that there was no sufficient cause for his detention. The learned counsel added that the inference that there is no sufficient material to support the Order of Detention is corroborated by the circumstance that adjudication proceedings under the provisions of the customs act had not been initiated against the petitioner although Show Cause Notices had been issued under S. 124 of the Customs Act against 12 persons, inter alia against Ramji Sukar Tandel Bhula Bhagwan Tandel, Kasamali Gulam Rasul, as well as by the observations quoted above made by the learned Collector while parsing the adjudication Order.

    13. We already mentioned that there was no denial on the part of the respondents that the material submitted to the Detaining Authority and which is the basis for the issuance of the Detention Order against the petitioner is the same which was the basis for the Detention Order against Ramji Tandel, Bhula Tandel, Kasamali Gulam Rasul and Babu Soma. Annexure ‘B’ to the petition is the common judgment delivered by this Division Bench in Writ Petitions 6, 7 and 8 of 1986, whereby the Detention Orders issued against Ramji Tandel, Bhula Tandel, Ksamali Rasul were quashed. A persual of the said judgment makes it clear that an order made by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Daman, was truncatedly submitted to the Detaining Authrity and a relevant portion of the Order which was showing that there had been some physical ill-treatment of Ramji Tandel had been omitted. Further, the medical certificates which were showing that the said Tandel had sustained some injuries which were caused by some hard and blunt object were also not placed before the Detaining Authority. The Division Bench held that these two documents were to some extent supporting the allegation made by Ramji Tandel that his statement recorded by the Customs Authorities has been extorted under duress. Therefore, the Division Bench held that those two documents were vital for the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and consequently quashed the Detention Order. What the Division Bench observed in the said Writ Petitions fully and squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. In addition, we may point out that it is not disputed that the petitioner has been implicated in the smuggling of gold above referred to by Ramji Tandel in the statement made by him to the Customs Authorities under, Section 108 of the Customs Act. If there are doubts as to whether or not the said statement was obtained under duress and if the Division Bench in the aforesaid Writ Petitions held that the allegation of the said Ramji Tandel of having been ill-treated gets to some extent Support in the order of the Magistrate and the medical certificates, it is obvious that the Said statement also is a vital piece of evidence which had to be looked into-by the Detaining Authority in the light of the order of the Magistrate and the medical certificates. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that this petition succeeds, and the Detention Order dt. Feb. 14th, 1986, issued against the petitioner under s. 3(1) of the cofeposa act is liable to be quashed and set aside. The result, therefore, is that, the rule is made absolute and the aforesaid Order of Detention is hereby quashed and set aside and no action at all pursuant to the said Order be taken by the concerned authorities.

    14. Order accordingly.

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