The action of the respondents, in rejecting the petitioner's request for grant of NOC for using the subject land for a different purpose, vide proceedings dated 04.03.2013 and memo dated 24.06.2011 relying on an earlier memo dated 24.04.2008, is questioned in this writ petition as being illegal and arbitrary. A consequential direction is sought to have the orders dated 04.03.2013 and 24.06.2011, as also the memo dated 24.04.2008, set aside and to direct the respondents to grant NOC, for utilization of the subject land for the purpose sought for, without reference to the restrictions imposed earlier while granting exemption under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the 'Act').

Facts, in brief, are that SIFCO Limited, (a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956), filed their statement under Section 6(1) of the Act declaring that the properties in Sy.Nos.89, 93, 94, 96, 101 and 105, covering an extent of 1,02,168 square meters at Fathenagar Village, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District was in excess of the ceiling limit. They also filed an exemption application before the Commissioner of Industries for grant of exemption. The Government, vide G.O.Ms.No.1577 dated 23.09.1978, granted exemption of the entire extent of 1,02,168 square meters subject to the condition that an extent of 45,944 square meters in Sy.Nos.101, 105 and part of Sy.No.96 of Fathenagar should be utilized for the manufacture of time pieces and defense computer fuses for rotors; and the remaining land of an extent of 56,224 square meters in Sy.Nos.93, 94 and 96 of Fathenagar, should be used for future expansion or for other purposes connected with the industry. SIFCO Ltd was granted exemption under Section 20 (1) (a) of the Act, vide G.O.Ms.No.1577 dated 23.09.1978, for an extent of 45,944.00 square meters in Survey Nos.101, 185 and a part of 96 of Fathenagar - Sanathnagar Village and an extent of 56,224.00 square meters in Survey Nos.89, 93, 94 and a part of 96 of Fathenagar - Sanathnagar Village in Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration subject to the conditions that (a) it should not be leased out or sold without the permission of the Government; (b) the land should be utilized, for the purpose for which it is retained, within two years from the date of grant of exemption failing which the exemption granted shall stand cancelled and the excess land will be subject to the provisions of the Act; and (c) the land may be mortgaged to any bank as defined in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act for the purpose of raising finance for the industry. Alleging violation by them, of the conditions of G.O.Ms.No.1577 dated 23.09.1978, a show-cause notice was issued to SIFCO Ltd on 09.10.1986. In response thereto, SIFCO Ltd filed their explanation on 09.10.1988 seeking condonation of the delay in utilizing the land.

While matters stood thus, SIFCO Ltd was amalgamated with Consolidated Coffee Ltd in the year 1989 pursuant to the scheme of amalgamation being sanctioned by the Bombay and Karnataka High Courts. Consequent upon sanction of the said scheme of amalgamation the subject lands, exempted under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act, stood transferred in favour of Consolidated Coffee Ltd. The name of Consolidated Coffee Ltd was later changed to Tata Coffee Ltd and a fresh certificate of incorporation dated 11.08.2000 was issued by the Registrar of Companies.

The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (Act 15 of 1999) (hereinafter called the "Repeal Act") was enacted to repeal the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The Repeal Act was adopted in the Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Assembly on 27.03.2008. Circular instructions were thereafter issued, vide Memo dated 24.04.2008, including, among others, that all cases, in which orders were passed under Section 20 (1) of the Act, shall be saved and further action should be continued in future in those cases only as if the Principal Act had not been repealed. As they continued to be in possession of the subject lands, even after the Act was repealed, the petitioner sought a No-Objection Certificate ("NOC" for short) from the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District for utilization of the subject lands for the purpose of development of a housing scheme including providing of shelter to the weaker sections of society. As the Joint Collector, vide Memo dated 20.12.2010, informed them that an NOC could not be granted unless the State Government accorded permission, the petitioner submitted their representation dated 03.01.2011 requesting the Government to grant permission for issuing an NOC. By its memo dated 24.06.2011, the Government rejected the petitioner's request for change of land use; and the Special Chief Secretary & Chief Commissioner of Land Administration was requested to inform the petitioner that the exemption, which was given under Section 20 of the Act in favour of SIFCO Ltd, held good and was saved; their request for change of land usage did not, therefore, deserve consideration; and there was no provision to grant permission or to issue No Objection Certificate under the Repeal Act. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner filed W.P. No.5135 of 2013 before this Court. During the pendency of the Writ Petition the 2nd respondent informed them, vide proceedings dated 04.03.2013, that their request for permission for change of land usage deserved no consideration as the exemption granted earlier under Section 20 (1) (a) of the Act held good and stood saved; and there was no provision to grant permission or to issue a No Objection Certificate under the Repeal Act.

Sri Avinash Desai, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that even if vesting of the subject lands in the petitioner, consequent upon its amalgamation with SIFCO Ltd, is held to be a "transfer", the property continued to remain with the petitioner after the repeal of the Act; and the respondents had acted illegally in rejecting the petitioner's request for change of land use on an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the Repeal Act.

On the other hand Learned Government Pleader for Revenue (Assignment) would draw attention of this Court to the averments in the counter-affidavit in support of her submission that, in view of Section 3(1)(b) and Section 3(2)(a) of the Repeal Act, the land, covered by the order of exemption under Section 20 of the Act, was saved; consequently the provisions of the Principal Act was attracted; in view of the non-obstante clause under Section 42 of the Act, transfer of exempted land, (which belonged to the State Government under the provisions of the Act), to the petitioner, without obtaining prior permission of the Government, was void; as such the petitioner has no valid title over the land; and the application seeking conversion, therefore, necessitated rejection.

Section 42 of the Act stipulates that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a Court, tribunal or other authority. While it is debatable whether the subject land which stood vested in Consolidated Coffee Ltd, pursuant to the scheme of amalgamation being sanctioned by the Bombay and Karnataka High Courts, would amount to a 'transfer', even if it is presumed that, in view of Section 42 of the Act, the provisions of the Act would apply notwithstanding anything contained inconsistent therewith in the Companies Act, 1956, and that the subject lands must be held to have been transferred, the impugned proceedings, wherein it was held that the exemption granted under Section 20 of the Act would survive the repeal of the Act, would still be required to be set aside.

Under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act, notwithstanding anything contained in any of the previous provisions of Chapter-III of the Act, (i.e., Sections 3 to

19), where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied that, having regard to the location of such land and the purpose for which it was being or was proposed to be used, it was necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, the Government may by order exempt, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act. The proviso to Section 20(1) requires an order, under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act, to be made only after recording reasons for doing so in writing. Section 20(2) of the Act empowers the State Government, if at any time it is satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which any exemption was granted under clause (a) or clause

(b) of Section 20 (1) has not been complied with by any person, to withdraw, by order, such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal. On an order of withdrawal, of the earlier order of exemption, being passed the provisions of Chapter III would apply accordingly.

After the surplus land of SIFCO Ltd was transferred in their favour neither Consolidated Coffee Ltd nor the petitioner herein filed the statement required to be filed under Section 15 of the Act. Section 15(1) of the Act stipulates that if, on or after the commencement of the Act, any person acquires any vacant land the extent of which, together with the extent of vacant land already held by him, exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling limit then he shall, within three months of the date of such acquisition, file a statement, before the competent authority having jurisdiction, specifying the location, the value and such other particulars as may be prescribed of all the vacant lands held by him; and to also specify the vacant lands, within the ceiling limit, which he desires to retain.

The question which necessitates examination is whether, consequent on the Act being repealed, failure to file the statement under Section 15 of the Act would justify rejection by the State Government of their request for grant of NOC when, admittedly, the State Government has not passed any order under Section 20(2) of the Act, withdrawing the earlier exemption granted in favour of SIFCO Ltd, when the Act was still in force and had not been repealed.

Unless an order is passed by the State Government, withdrawing the order of exemption granted earlier, the provisions of Chapter III of the Act (Sections 3 to 19) would not apply as the non-obstante clause in Section 20(1) of the Act gives it overriding effect over the other provisions of Chapter III of the Act. As Section 15 also forms part of Chapter III of the Act, the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act would, as long as it is in force, not require the person, acquiring any vacant land, to file a statement under Section 15 of the Act. Even if SIFCO Ltd is presumed to have violated Section 15 of the Act, in not filing the statement prescribed thereunder, all that the respondents appear to have done is to issue a show-cause notice to which the petitioner submitted a reply. Admittedly the order of exemption granted in favour of SIFCO Ltd was not withdrawn much less before 27.03.2008 from which date the Act stood repealed in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The order of exemption continued to remain in force notwithstanding the petitioner's failure to comply with the stipulations of Section 15 of the Act. The only manner in which the petitioner could have been proceeded against, for their failure to file the statement as required under Section 15 of the Act, was if an order had been passed by the Government, under Section 20(2) of the Act withdrawing the exemption granted earlier under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act.

The statement of objects and reasons for the Repeal Act (Act 15 of 1999) shows that the proposed repeal of the Act, along with some other incentives and simplification of administrative procedures, was expected to revive the stagnant housing industry and provide affordable living accommodation for those who were in a state of under served want and were entitled to public assistance; the repeal would, however, not affect land on which building activity had already commenced; and, for that limited purpose, exemptions granted under Section 20 of the Act will continue to be operative. Section 1(2) of the Repeal Act makes it applicable to such of the States which adopt the Repeal Act by a resolution passed in that behalf under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India. The Repeal Act was adopted by the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature with effect from 27.03.2008. Consequently the principal Act ceased to remain in force thereafter. Section 3(1)(b) of the Repeal Act, however, saves the validity of any order granting exemption under Section 20(1), or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary. Section 3(1)(c) of the Repeal Act provides that any payment made to the State Government, as a condition for granting exemption under Section 20(1), shall be not be affected by the repeal of the Principal Act. Likewise, in view of Section 3(2)(a) of the Repeal Act, the repeal of the Principal Act would not affect any land, which is deemed to have vested in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority. It is evident, therefore, that it is only if possession of the land, vested in it, had been taken over by the State Government before 27.03.2008 would such vesting, in view of Section 3(2)(a) of the Repeal Act, not be affected by the Repeal of the Act.

A Learned Judge of this Court, in Surender Raj Jaiswal v. Government of A.P.1, after noting the provisions of Section 20 of the Principal Act and Section 3 of the Repeal Act, observed:

".....From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act of 1999, it is clear that the orders granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the principal Act are saved. It is also clear from a perusal of the provision under Section 3(1)(c) of the Repealing Act that repeal of the principal Act shall not affect any payments made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the principal Act. But, at the same time, the provision under sub-section (2) of Section 20 is not saved. Section 20(1) of the principal Act empowers the Government to exempt any land subject to certain conditions, but under sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the principal Act, the Government was empowered to withdraw such exemption in cases where conditions are violated. A harmonious reading of the provisions under Sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the principal Act, coupled with Section 3 of the Repealing Act, makes it clear that the order granting exemption is saved only with a view to avoid repayment of any amounts collected by the State Government, while granting exemptions. When the principal Act itself is repealed on the ground that it has failed to achieve the objective expected of it, it is not open for the 1st respondent-Government to refuse permission in the instant case, only on the ground that the conditions imposed in the order granting exemption shall continue to operate. In the absence of any saving clause, saving sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the principal Act, even in cases where conditions are violated, Government is not empowered to withdraw the exemptions granted under Section 20(1) of the principal Act, after coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. In the absence of such power, and further, in view of the Repealing Act itself, the conditions imposed in the order granting exemption, have become un-enforceable and are non-est. In the absence of initiation of proceedings or withdrawal of exemption granted under Section 20(1) of the principal Act before the enforcement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, the land, which is exempted, will become a free-hold land, and hence, the stand of the respondents that even after coming into force of the Repealing Act, 1999, the conditions imposed in the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) of the principal Act shall continue to operate, cannot be accepted. The said interpretation will run contra to the very objective of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. Said view also gains support from the other provisions of the Repealing Act, particularly Section 4, which states that all proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act, pending immediately before the commencement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act of 1999, shall stand abated, except in cases where possession is taken by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government on behalf of the competent authority. Having regard to the provisions under Section 20(1) and (2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the provisions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, it is to be held that in cases where the vacant land is exempted under section 20 of the principal act and where such exemption is not withdrawn before the enforcement of the Repealing Act, 1999, such land will become the free-hold land irrespective of any conditions with regard to usage of the exempted land. As held above, as the land in question has become the free-hold land in view of the Repealing Act, 1999, there appears no reason or justification for not granting permission to use the land covered by exemption proceedings, for the purpose of multiplex theatre-cum-shopping complex. In a strict sense, no such permission is necessary, but, when the competent authority under the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act has not received the application, petitioner had to approach the Government, and as permission is denied by mis-construing the various provisions of the Repealing Act, 1999, the impugned order is liable to be set aside....." (Emphasis supplied) The afore-extracted judgment, in Surender Raj Jaiswal1, was confirmed in Appeal by a Division Bench of this Court by its order in W.A.No.951 of 2012 dated 25.07.2012. As noted hereinabove, the order of exemption granted in favour of SIFCO Ltd continued to remain in force till the Act was repealed with effect from 27.03.2008. As the subject lands continued to remain in the possession of the petitioner even thereafter and till date, consequent on the subject lands being transferred to and vested in its favour pursuant to the scheme of amalgamation, the subject lands did not stand vested in the Government under the Act. Even in cases, where an order of exemption has not been passed under Section 20(1) of the Act, it is only such of those ceiling surplus lands which the State Government had taken possession of, under Section 10(6) of the Act before 27.03.2008, which would vest in the Government. As the State Government did not take possession of the subject lands, under Section 10(6) of the Act, before 27.03.2008 the subject lands would still have belonged to the petitioner even if no exemption had been granted in respect of the subject lands. It is difficult to construe Section 3(1)(d) of the Repeal Act as to enable the State Government, after the Act itself has been repealed, to now exercise powers under Section 20(1)(b) of the Act, withdraw the exemption granted earlier, and claim that the subject land vests in it.

Sri Avinash Desai, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would draw attention of this Court to a judgment of the Bombay High Court, in Vithabai Bama Bhandari Indian Inhabitant v. State of Maharashtra2, wherein, though the order of exemption passed under Section 20(1) of the Act was withdrawn even before the repeal of the Act, possession of the land continued to remain with the declarant. The Bombay High Court held that, as a consequence of the Repeal Act, all further proceedings pursuant to the order made by the State Government withdrawing exemption and all further action taken under Section 10(3) of the Act would stand abated, and can no longer be proceeded further; all further proceedings under the provisions of the Principal Act, in relation to the land of the petitioner mentioned in the declaration made under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act, had lapsed; and those lands no longer vested in the State Government. If that be the case, even where the order of exemption was withdrawn, the petitioner cannot be placed on a worse footing.

As an Order under Section 20(2) of the Act, withdrawing the exemption granted earlier under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act, was not passed and, as the petitioner continued to retain possession of the subject land on and after 27.03.2008 when the Act was repealed, the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable to them. In any event the judgment of a coordinate Bench, in Surender Raj Jaiswal1, is binding on this Court more so as the said order has been confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench.

Learned Government Pleader for Revenue (Assignment) would, however, draw attention of this Court to the interlocutory order passed by the Supreme Court, while issuing notice in the S.L.P. filed by the State Government against the order passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.951 of 2012 dated 25.07.2013, directing maintenance of status quo as on that date regarding construction and possession. According to the Learned Government Pleader, as an order of status quo was passed by the Supreme Court in the appeal preferred by the State Government against the order of the Division Bench in W.A. No.951 of 2012 dated 25.07.2012, the judgment, in Surender Raj Jaiswal1, would not bind a co-ordinate Bench of this court.

The order of status quo granted by the Supreme Court is limited to construction and possession by the respondent in the SLP i.e., the respondent in W.A.No.951 of 2012. Even a stay of the operation of an order only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. (M/s. Sree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of SIT Association3; Government of A.P. v. N.Rami Reddy4). The ratio of a judgment is the reasons assigned in support thereof. When a Court of appeal stays the operation of the judgment it stays the further implementation, as between the parties, of the operative portion thereof. When a question of law is decided its ratio cannot be said to be wiped out only because the operation of the said order is stayed. The dicta laid down in a judgment cannot be ignored unless the Court, after hearing a particular case, doubts the correctness of the dicta and thinks it appropriate that it should be reconsidered. (N.Rami Reddy4; K. Yella Reddy V. Registrar APAT5). As the law declared in Surendra Raj Jaiswal1 would bind a coordinate Bench, the impugned proceedings dated 24.06.2011 and 04.03.2013 must be, and are accordingly, set aside. The first respondent shall consider the petitioner's representation for grant of NOC afresh in accordance with law, and in the light of the observations made hereinabove, at the earliest in any event not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

____________________________ RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J Date:22nd July, 2013