The Judgment of the court was delivered by

S.B Sinha, C.J:— These writ appeals are directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge in WP Nos. 511, 539 and 676 of 2001 respectively whereby and whereunder the notification issued by the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad dated 15-1-2001 prohibiting the movement of Mini Door Cabs (seven seater auto rickshaws) within the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad is set aside.

2. The notification dated 15-1-2001 issued by the Commissioner of Police in purported exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Section 21(1)(b) of the Hyderabad City Police Act, 1348 Fasli (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) which is called in question before the learned single Judge reads thus:

In exercise of the powers conferred upon me under Section 21(1)(b) of Hyderabad City Police Act, I.P, Ramulu, IPS, Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad and Secunderabad do hereby notify for the information of the public in general and the 7 seater auto operators in particular, that the following restrictions are imposed on the movement of the 7 seater auto rickshaws for the maintenance of safe and free flow of traffic, prevention of danger, obstruction and inconvenience to the public.

The movement of 7 seater auto rickshaws is prohibited in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad for all the 24 hours and they should not enter the city beyond the following areas.

1. Lunger House.

2. Toli Chowki

3. Moghal kanala

4. Tadban (Bangalore Road - NH 7)

5. Raidurg Centre

6. Chandrayangutta X Roads.

7. Rajiv Gandhi Statue, Dilsukh Nagar/I.S Sadan X Roads.

8. Habsiguda X Roads

9. Lothukunta

10. Erragadda X Roads.

11. Old Airport, Bowenpally/Bowenpally Check post

12. Bollaram X Roads.

13. T.V Station, Ramanthapur.

The notification will not affect carriers involved in essential services declared by the Government from time to time.

This notification will come into force from 16-1-2001.

3. Section 21(1)(b) of the said Act reads as follows:

Power to make rules for regulation of traffic and for preservation of order:— The Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad may, from time to time, make rules not inconsistent with this Act in respect of the following. Such rules shall, in cases of clauses (b) and (c) be subject to the control of the Government and with regard be to remaining clauses, sanction of the Government shall be obtained prior to the enforcement of rules.

(b) regulating traffic of all kinds, in public street or public places, and regulating the use of streets and public places by persons walking, driving, cycling or accompanying or leading cattle with a view to prevent danger, inconvenience or obstruction to the public.

4. Two principal questions which arises for consideration in these appeals consequent upon declaring the said notification to be ultra vires by the learned single Judge by reason of the judgment impugned herein are:

(1) Whether regulation of traffic of all kinds would include prohibition?

(2) Whether for the purpose of examining the constitutionality of the impugned notification, this Court, exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can look into the reasons therefor?

5. The learned single Judge, inter alia, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Himatlal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedahad, (1973) 1 SCC 227 : AIR 1973 SC 87, held that - (a) having regard to the phraseology used in Section 21(1)(b) of the said Act, regulation would not include prohibition, (b) before issuing the afore mentioned notification, the Commissioner of Police ought to have given an opportunity of hearing to the operators and also ought to have obtained public opinion as also the expert opinion therefor and (c) there was no sufficient material for arriving at his satisfaction by the Commissioner to issue the impugned notification.

6. Mr. T. Anantababu, learned Advocate-General would submit that, in the first place, having regard to the restrictions imposed by reason of the impugned notification vis-a-vis the fact that the seven seater auto rickshaws can operate throughout the State, the same does not amount to imposition of any prohibition as the notification merely prohibits the playing of such vehicles within the boundaries of the twin cities only. Such restriction has been imposed keeping in view traffic congestion all over the city. In any event, Mr. Anantababu, submits that such prohibition is permissible having been in compass with the traffic regulation. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the decisions of Supreme Court in Bishambar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P, (1982) 2 SCC 542 : AIR 1982 SC 32, K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1985) 2 SCC 116 : AIR 1985 SC 660, Quarry Owners' Association v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 655, Smatha v. State of A.P, (1997) 8 SCC 191, and Deepak Theatre, Dhuri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1519. The learned Advocate-General would contend that as the impugned notification has been issued by way of subordinate legislation for the said purpose, neither any opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the operators nor any public opinion or expert opinion is required to be obtained. According to the learned Advocate-General, as the said notification does not suffer from any malice or lack of application of mind on the part of the Commissioner, the same could not have been set aside by the learned single Judge.

7. It was further submitted that the impugned notification does not impose any unreasonable restriction on the operators to run their vehicles as they are at liberty to operate their vehicles outside the areas notified in the impugned notification. Mr. Ananthababu also submitted that the residence of the owners or drivers of the vehicles in question is irrelevant for the purpose of a decision as to whether the vehicles should be allowed to ply within the twin cities or not.

8. Mr. E. Manohar, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners-respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the prohibition in movement of vehicles in the twin cities is explicit on the face of the notification. He would urge that having regard to the power conferred upon the Officer under the Hyderabad City Police Act, restriction would amount to prohibition as has been held by the Apex Court in Himatlal case (supra). Strong reliance in this connection has also been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tahir Hussain; v. The District Board, Muzaffarpur, Muzaffarnagar, AIR 1954 SC 630, and State Of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah., AIR 1967 SC 1189.

9. Mr. Manohar submits that the impugned notification has all of a sudden completely prohibited the use of the vehicles within the twin cities thereby causing immense hardship, prejudice as well as complete loss of livelihood to the operators and the owners apart from affecting their fundamental right to carry on lawful profession or trade guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

10. The learned Counsel submit that the reasons assigned by the Commissioner in support of the said notification are not germane for the purpose of passing of the said order. Our attention in this connection has also been drawn to the materials on record as has been noticed by the learned single Judge in paragraph 20 of the impugned judgment reported in 2001 (2) ALD 402. Mr. Manohar would further urge that no reason has been assigned as to why despite the fact that the number of three seater auto rickshaws plying in the twin cities are much more than the seven seater auto rickshaws, prohibition of the nature has been imposed only in respect of seven seater auto rickshaws.

11. Delegated legislation is a matter of necessity. There is no more characteristic administrative activity than legislation, said Wade and C.F Forsyth in their book on Administrative Law.

12. A wide general power, a wide regulatory power, can undoubtedly be conferred upon executive by way of delegated legislation. In certain situations, a regulation may also bring within its fold prohibition. However, it is considered that delegated legislation cannot alter or be contradictory to the statute authorising it and in the event of an irreconcilable conflict, the statute will prevail. Delegated legislation should not be repugnant to the general law and also should not be unreasonable.

13. Michael Allen, Brian Thompson and Bemadette Walsh in ‘Cases and Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law’ (1995, Lawman (India) Private Limited) has recognised the following as essential principles of rule of law.

1. All laws should be prospective, open and clear. Law cannot be retroactive.

2. Laws should be relatively stable.

3. The making of particular laws should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules.

14. The said principles required that law should be conform to the standards designed to enable it effectively to guide action.

15. The seven seater maxicab or omnibus or motorcab comes within the meaning of Section 2(22), 2(25) and 2(29) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Motor Vehicles Act’). Section 2(22) and 2(29) reads thus:

2(22): “maxicab” means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry more than six passengers, but not more than twelve passengers, excluding the driver, for the hire or reward;

2(25): ‘motorcab” means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry not more than six passengers excluding the driver for hire or reward.

2(29): “omnibus” means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver.

16. There is no dispute that the State has power to control road transport in terms of Section 67 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Chapter V of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with grant of stage carriage permits, contract carriage permits etc. Once permits are granted to the operators for the entire State, the permit holders have a fundamental right to carry on their trade or profession subject to reasonable restriction which may be imposed by a statute in the interests of the general public in terms of clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

17. Whether regulation would include prohibition or not would depend upon the nature of mischief the Legislature would seeks to remedy. It is a well settled principle of law that where a business or trade is inherently dangerous, such as trading in explosives or trafficking in women or tourism, the same may be totally prohibited. Trading in essential commodities may also attract the same principle.

18. But, outside the above exceptional categories, a total prohibition of the right to carry on a business may be regarded as an unreasonable restriction and greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Courts as held by the Apex Court in Assistant Controller of Customs v. Charandas Malhotra, (1971) 1 SCC 697 : AIR 1972 SC 689, Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430, Yasin Mohammad v. Town Area Committee, AIR 1952 SC 115.

19. There cannot, however, be any doubt that the Court has to balance such a right of the citizen vis-a-vis greater public or social interest sought to be ensured. (See Cooper, R.C v. Union of India ((1970) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1970 SC 564.)

20. With the aforementioned background, in the instant case, the validity of the Notification has to be considered. In Hyderabad, there are about more than 10 lakh vehicles and only about 2, 676 seven seater vehicles are there in comparison to 57,000 three seater auto rickshaws. The number of these vehicles would only come to 0.018% of the total vehicle population in the twin cities. In relation to later category, no restriction has been imposed. The restriction imposed by the Commissioner prohibiting the use of particular type of motor cabs caused all of a sudden hardship to the vehicle owners.

21. The permits have been granted to the members of the petitioner Union for the benefit of commuters. The Transport authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act grant such permits upon taking into consideration the requirement of the commuters of the city.

22. By reason of the said notification, a complete prohibition has been made as a result whereof except for certain reasons and certain areas, the vehicles cannot enter twin cities at all. The area of the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad is 168 sq. kilo meters. Indisputably, the said vehicles were being used as passenger vehicles throughout the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. By reason of the impugned notification dated 15-1-2001, the movement of such vehicles has been totally prohibited for all 24 hours within the twin cities. In the instant case, power could be exercised by the Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad for regulating the traffic. Although in a sense, regulation of traffic could include prohibition of entry of some type of vehicles in some public streets or some public places, total prohibition of the vehicles from being plied except at some peripheral areas appears to be unreasonable attracting the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. By reason of the said notification, the commuter public in general have totally been deprived of using a class of vehicles in relation whereto, the permits have been granted by the competent authority under the Motor Vehicles Act. The purpose for grant of such permit and the fact that the control in that regard had been taken over by the State under the Motor Vehicles Act had not been taken into consideration. The permits are granted under Section 73 of the Act which can be cancelled or suspended only in terms of Section 86 of the Act. Section 84 of the Act specifies the general conditions attached to the permits.

23. This although does not mean that for the purpose of regulating the traffic, some sort of restrictions cannot be imposed. Such restrictions can certainly be imposed having regard to the congestion of traffic at some places particularly having regard to the importance of the areas and other areas where schools and colleges are situated. But in the instant case, the restrictions on traffic have not been imposed in certain areas or within the school hours, but total prohibition has been imposed on entry of such vehicles within the boundaries of twin cities. The purported permission of the vehicles in question in some peripheral areas neither would serve the purposes of the commuters nor would fulfil the objects for which the permits have been granted inasmuch as by reason thereof, the commuters would not be able to take the benefit of the city cabs to reach their destinations within the main areas of the town and parts thereof.

24. In I.E Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited v. Union of India, 1988 Supp SCC 229 : AIR 1988 SC 515, it was held:

A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent Legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. That is because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It may also be questioned on the ground that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. In England, the Judges would say “Parliament never intended authority to make such rules. They are unreasonable and ultra vires”. The present position of law bearing on the above point is stated by Diplock L.J in Mixnam Properties Limited v. Chertsey UDC, (1964) 1 QB 214 thus:—

“The various grounds upon which subordinate legislation has sometimes been said to be void …………………..can, I think, today be properly regarded as being particular applications of the general rule that subordinate legislation, to be valid, must be shown to be within the powers conferred by the statute. Thus the kind of unreasonableness which invalidates a bye-law is not the antonym of reasonableness” in the sense of which that expression is used in the common law, but such manifest arbitrariness, injustice or partiality that a Court would say: ‘Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires ……….. If the Courts can declare subordinate legislation to be invalid for ‘uncertainty’, as distinct from unenforceable……………. this must be because Parliament is to be presumed not to have intended to authorise the subordinate legislative authority to make changes in the existing law which are uncertain…………………..”

74. Prof. Alan Wharam in his Article entitled ‘Judicial Control of Delegated Legislation: The Test of Reasonableness' in 36 Modern Law Review 611 at pages 622-23 has summarised the present position in England as follows:

“(i) It is possible that the Courts might invalidate a statutory instrument on the grounds of unreasonableness or uncertainty, vagueness or arbitrariness: but the writer's view is that for all practical purposes such instruments must be read as forming part of the parent statute, subject only to the ultra vires test.

(ii) The Courts are prepared to invalidate bye-laws, or any other form of legislation, emanating from an elected, representative authority, on the grounds of unreasonableness, uncertainty or repugnance to the ordinary law: but they are reluctant to do so and will exercise their power only in clear cases.

(iii) The Courts may be readier to invalidate bye-laws passed by commercial undertakings under statutory power, although cases reported during the present century suggest that the distinction between elected authorities and commercial undertakings, as explained in Kruse v. Johnson, might not now be applied so stringently.

(iv) As far as subordinate legislation of non-statutory origin is concerned, this is virtually obsolete, but it is clear from In re French Protestant Hospital (1951) Ch 567 that it would be subject to strict control.”

(See also H.W.R Wade: Administrative Law (5th Edn.) pp 747-748).

In India arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution. In India any enquiry into the vires of delegated legislation must be confined to the grounds on which plenary legislation may be questioned, to the ground that it is contrary to the statute under which it is made, to the ground that it is contrary to other statutory provisions or that it is so arbitrary that it could not be said to be in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.

That subordinate legislation cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice on which administrative action may be questioned has been held in Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur , Tulsipur, @ page-SC 543 (1980) 2 SCR 1111 : ((1980) 2 SCC 295 : AIR 1980 SC 882); Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCR-866 : ((1981) 2 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 1127) and in Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone. (1972) 1 WLR 1373. A distinction must be made between delegation of a legislative function in the case of which the question of reasonableness cannot be enquired into and the investment by statute to exercise particular discretionary powers. In the latter case the question may be considered on all grounds on which administrative action may be questioned, such as, non-application of mind taking irrelevant matters into consideration, failure to take relevant matters into consideration, etc., etc. On the facts and circumstances of a case, a subordinate legislation may be struck down as arbitrary or contrary to statute if it fails to take into account very vital facts which either expressly or by necessary implication are required to be taken into consideration by the statute or, say, the Constitution. This can only be done on the ground that it does not conform to the statutory or Constitutional requirements or that it offends Article 14 or Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It cannot, no doubt be done merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant circumstances which the Court considers relevant.

25. Thus, there cannot be any Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness that can be invoked in a case of this nature. The aforementioned conclusion is fortified by the fact that the Commissioner of Police himself in his counter affidavit stated that the impugned notification was issued upon arriving at the satisfaction on the following matters:

a) The number of accidents, which have occurred with loss of human life and injury is totally disproportionate to the number of mini cabs plying and warrants the conclusion that these vehicles are inherently unstable and constitute a serious risk to the safety of persons using the streets and public places.

b) The available information clearly discloses that these autos, though intended to be only contract carriages, are operating factually as stage carriages in violation of the law and the terms of their certificate of registration. This type of operation is interrupting the flow of traffic, because of parking of these vehicles at different bus junctions for indefinite periods. Their system of operations was causing unnecessary inconvenience to the public and users of other motor vehicles. They constituted a menace to pedestrians.

26. We, however, would like to make it clear that having regard to the growing needs of a living city, it is always open to the Commissioner of Police to regulate the traffic. While doing so, it is also permissible for the Commissioner to even prohibit the plying of traffic on selected roads having regard to the main activities that are carried on with reference to the road, with reference to the time or with reference to the speed of the vehicles. Indeed, pedestrianisation of certain areas is one of the devices for controlling the traffic as well as keeping the air pollution levels to the minimum. In such an event, there should be proper material before the Commissioner to prohibit traffic either on the ground that it is a National Highway and slow moving traffic is impermissible or for the reason that it is dangerous to allow such of the vehicles on such of the roads which the Commissioner feels it appropriate having regard to his powers referable to Section 21 of the Police Act.

27. The questions as to whether the vehicles are not roadworthy, unstable and constitute risk to the safety of the persons using streets and public places, do not fall within the purview of the said Act. The Commissioner has no jurisdiction to take into consideration the said fact inasmuch as it is for the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act to satisfy about the roadworthiness of the vehicles. The writ petitioners contend that the roadworthiness of the vehicles has been certified by Automobile Research Association of India that the same conforms the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as also the Central Motor Vehicles Rules. After satisfying about roadworthiness and compliance of all requirements thereunder, all registering authorities have also issued a circular dated 7-2-1996 to register such vehicles as motor cabs.

28. The vehicles in question also have fitness certificates. The fact that number of accidents which might have taken place, cannot itself be a ground for using of such vehicles, inasmuch as it is for the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act to consider about the roadworthiness and other necessary conditions. So far as the purported ground that these vehicles although are intended to be used as contract carriages, are being operated as stage carriages in violation of conditions of permit is concerned, in our view, the same also does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. It is for the transport authorities who are empowered under the Motor Vehicles to deal with such aspects of the matter. The Commissioner of Police in exercise of his power under Section 21(1)(b) of the said Act cannot therefore ban use of such vehicles for violation of the conditions of permit which is within the exclusive domain of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act.

29. So far as the third ground that the operation of such vehicles is interfering free flow of traffic because of parking of these vehicles, is concerned, the Regional Transport Authority is the appropriate authority in that regard and the parking slots ought to have been provided for in terms of Section 21(1)(c) of the said Act. Failure on the part of the appellants herein to allot parking slots for different types of vehicles cannot be a ground which merits invocation of the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the said Act as the same does not amount to regulation of traffic. It is not in dispute that before the learned single Judge, records have been produced. It was noticed by the learned single Judge.

30. To appreciate the contentions raised by the petitioners, I have gone through the entire records placed before me and it appears to me that the motivation for passing the impugned order prohibiting the seven seater motor cabs is occurrence of an accident on 22-6-2000 at about 2.30 p.m on the tank bund road, Hyderabad wherein four persons died on the spot and five persons sustained serious and grievous injuries when one of the types of over loaded seven seater motor cab carrying 12 passengers, bound for Secunderabad from Mehdipatnam, busted and its driver lost control, it collided with the RTC Bus on route 8C coming after the occurrence of the said accident, on 24-6-2000 the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of the APSRTC wrote a letter to the Government i.e, the State Road Transport Authority requesting to ban the registration of the seven seater motor cabs and to cancel the fitness certificates of the existing seven seater autos and alternatively requested to restrict the seven seater autos from plying within the Hyderabad city limits with immediate effect. On receipt of the above said letter, the State Government through Memo No. 9940.Tr. II(1)/2000-2, dated 20-9-2000 requested the Transport Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh to furnish his remarks in the matter immediately. When the matter is pending consideration before the Transport, Roads and Buildings Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, the Commissioner of Police, has taken up the matter and ascertained the views of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic, of all the four zones i.e, West, East, North and South, who are directly under his administrative control, with regard to the movement, of seven seater motor cabs in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. He has also taken into consideration the First Information Reports registered by various Police Stations in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad, in which accidents of the seven seater motor cabs are involved. Based on the opinion of the Deputy Commissioners of Police, Traffic, Hyderabad and on the basis of First Information Reports, the Commissioner has agreed to prohibit the movement of seven seater autos in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad, and directed to draft the impugned notification, on the lines of orders passed in Greater Mumbai by the Government of Maharashtra, prohibiting the entry of auto rickshaws in Greater Mumbai.

31. The aforementioned materials clearly suggest that one accident was the root cause for issuing the impugned notification. It is true that the power of delegated legislation can be exercised by statutory authority in different forms. The statutory competent authority is not required to comply with the principles of natural justice but ought to have obtained opinion of the experts in the field. A publication of the draft notification might have enabled the citizens to file objections thereby, the principles of natural justice may be complied with and the expert opinion may be obtained only when the statute provides therefor. Before such notification is issued, the provisions of the Chapter V of Motor Vehicles Act has also to be taken into consideration, the regulation being within the control of the State. The State Government has total control both under Chapter V of the Motor Vehicles Act as also under Section 21 of the said Act.

32. In Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 16 CLR 1, Dixon, J., observed:

The word ‘control’ in ‘an unfortunate word of such wide and ambiguous import that it has been taken to mean something weaker than ‘restraint’, something equivalent to ‘restriction’.

33. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless, (1987) 1 SCC 424, the Apex Court held:

Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.

34. Mr. Reed Dickerson in his book on “The Interpretation and Application of Statutes”, 1975 Edition, stated:

What is the significance of the context in which a message is read? It is highly improbable that any document, considered entirely apart from the culture that it presupposes, can convey meaning, except in another culture that shares some of the same elements. Indeed, to suppose an effective communication entirely apart from its cultural environment would be almost a self-contradiction. Obviously, a verbal communication must be expressed in the language appropriate to the culture in which the communication takes place. The essence of a language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even affect the conceptual matrix of established ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it belongs. For this reason, language has been called a “conceptual map of human experience.” As with any map, it has little or no significance apart from what it mirrors.

The underlying cultural elements that provide the materials of context include (1) the pervasive net work or grid of concepts presupposed by the language of that culture; and (2) the coordinate fund of habits, knowledge, values, and purposes that are shared by the great bulk of the speech community of which both author and audience are members and atleast some of which are taken of in each communication. Together, the factors make up the aggregate of relevant human expectations.

35. In Md. Faruk v. State of M.P, (1969) 1 SCC 853 : AIR 1970 SC 93, it has been held:

A law requiring that an act which is inherently dangerous noxious or injurious to public interest, health or safety or is likely to prove a nuisance to the community, shall be done under a permit or licence of an executive authority, it is not per se unreasonable and no person may claim a licence or permit to do that act as of right.

36. It is also well settled that laws imposing restriction on fundamental rights must be strictly construed. In Synthetics and Chemicals Limited etc. v. State of U.P, (1990) 1 SCC 109 : AIR 1990 SC 1927, the Apex Court observed:

It is well to remember that the meaning of the expressions used in the Constitution must be found from the language used. We should interpret the words of the Constitution on the same principle of interpretation as one applies to an ordinary law but these very principles of interpretation compel one to take into account the nature and scope of the Act which requires interpretation. A Constitution is the mechanism under which laws are to be made and not merely an Act which declares what the law is to be. It is also well-settled that a Constitution must not be construed in any narrow or pedantic sense and that construction which is most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its power, must be adopted. An exclusionary clause in any of the entries should be strictly and, therefore, narrowly construed. No entry, should, however, be so read as not to rob it of entire context. A broad and liberal spirit should, therefore, inspire those whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution, and the Courts are not free to stretch or to pervert the language of an enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory. Constitutional adjudication is not strengthened by such an attempt but it must seek to declare the law but it must not try to give meaning on the theory of what the law should be, but it must so look upon a Constitution that it is a living and organic things and must adopt itself to the changing situations and patterns in which it has to be interpreted.

37. For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that there is no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge in the impugned judgment. The writ appeals, therefore, subject to the observations made hereinabove, are, dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.