1. The question that arises in this writ appeal is whether a teacher or a member of the non-teaching staff employed in any private institution can be placed under suspension in contemplation of or pending departmental enquiry for a period more than 4 months under any circumstance in the teeth of the bar contained under sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the A.P. Education Act, 1982 (for short 'the Act'). Incidentally, the question whether the bar contained in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act is mandatory or directory only also arises. These questions arise for our consideration and decision in the following factual background.
2. The appellant was appointed as Head Master of the Krista Cement Works Employees Educational Society High School, the third respondent herein on 11-11-1982 and the post of Head Master is admitted to grant-in-aid. When the appellant was serving as Head Master of the third respondent-School, the Secretary and Correspondent of the School issued a composite proceeding dated 21-6-1999 alleging that the appellant did not disburse scholarship monies to the students fully and in time; that the appellant took monies ranging from Rs.350/- to Rs.450/- from the students towards the examination fee payable by them in excess of the prescribed fee; that the appellant demanded a sum of Rs.20,000/- from a lady Craft teacher as an extraneous consideration to continue her services and placing the appellant under suspension with effect from 23-6-1999 till further orders.
3. The appellant complaining that the Secretary and Correspondent of the third respondent-School is not the appropriate authority to place him under suspension pending enquiry, and that only the Executive Committee of Krista Cements Works Employees Educational Society (for short 'the Society') which is managing the third respondent-School is the competent authority to take any disciplinary action against him, and that his continued suspension beyond the period of two months is violative of the bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act filed Writ Petition No.2111 of 2000 in this Court praying for mandamus declaring the action of the third respondent in not reinstating the petitioner into service with effect from 23-8-1999 as illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional and violative of Section 79(3)(b) of the A.P. Education Act, 1982 and for a consequential direction to the third respondent to forthwith reinstate him into service and pay him full salary with effect from 23-8-1999 after duly sanctioning annual increment. The third respondent opposed that writ petition by filing a counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit, it was claimed that the Correspondent of the third respondent-School is the General Secretary of the Society. The Correspondent also claimed that after his election as General Secretary, he was nominated as Correspondent as provided under the bye-laws of the Society and his nomination as Correspondent was approved by the educational authorities. The Correspondent claimed that after he assumed the office of the Correspondent, he came to know that the appellant misappropriated huge amounts and that necessitated the framing of the charges against the appellant. The appellant refused to receive the charge-sheet. Therefore, notice of enquiry was also published in the newspapers. The enquiry was commenced on 15-8-1999 and it was completed on 30-9-1999. The Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report and the management of the School accepted the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer that the appellant is guilty of the charges and the same was reported to the Regional Joint Director of Education as well as District Educational Officer. In place of the appellant, an incharge Head Master was appointed and that appointment was approved by the educational authorities. Therefore, reinstatement of the appellant into service at this stage does not arise. The management of the School is ready and willing to pay subsistence allowance to the appellant but he refused to receive the same. Ultimately, the third respondent maintained that there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merit.
4. The learned single Judge after perusing the enquiry report placed before the Court was of the opinion that the departmental enquiry was not property conducted by the management, and no materials were placed before the Court to show that the appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges. The learned single Judge so opining quashed the enquiry proceedings from the stage of charge-sheet and directed the third respondent to conduct de novo enquiry into the charges from the stage of charge-sheet in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity to the appellant and directed the appellant to co-operate with the enquiry. The enquiry is directed to be completed within two months from the date of receipt of the order. The learned single Judge also directed the respondents to pay subsistence allowance to the appellant. Should it be noted at this stage itself that though the appellant sought mandamus declaring that the continued suspension of the appellant beyond the period of two months from 23-6-1999 is illegal and violative of the bar contained in Section 79(3)(b) of the Act and for a consequential direction to the third respondent to reinstate the appellant into service with effect from 23-8-1999, the learned single Judge has not dealt with this specific relief sought in the writ petition, but on the other hand, thought it appropriate to quash the enquiry proceedings from the stage of issuance of charge-sheet though that relief was not sought by the appellant. In the result, the suspension order passed against the appellant pending departmental enquiry with effect from 23-6-1999 still subsists. That is why the two questions to which reference is made in the beginning of the order arise for our consideration and decision.
5. In this appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellant did not press into service the contention that under bye-law 13(B)(v) of the byelaws of the society, the Executive Committee is the only competent authority to take any disciplinary action against the appellant, and, therefore, the suspension order passed by the Correspondent of the School is invalid though that ground is taken in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and in the memorandum of grounds of this writ appeal. Be that as it may, we do not find any merit in that contention. Bye-law 13(B) deals with powers and functions of the Executive Committee of the Society. Clause (v) of bye-law 13(B) confers the power on the Executive Committee to take disciplinary action against the teachers and employees of the Society including the power to impose fines upto a limit of Rs. 107 - on a report given by the Head Master. Suspension of an employee pending departmental enquiry is not a penalty and, therefore, not a disciplinary action. Whether any disciplinary action should or should not be taken against the appellant on the basis of the charges, it is for the Executive Committee to decide after receipt of the enquiry report, and after going through the procedural formalities prescribed under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and byelaws of the society. That stagers not yet reached. Byelaw 14(B) (a) of the Society provides that the Secretary will be responsible to control the entire works of the office of the Society and that of the Committee. There is no controversy that the appellant being the Head Master of the third respondent-School is under the direct administrative control of the Correspondent of the School, and in that view of the matter, and in our considered opinion, the power of control conferred upon the Secretary of the Society who is also the Correspondent of the School under the byelaws of the Society includes the power to place an employee under suspension pending departmental enquiry. We do not think it necessary to dilate this aspect further for as already pointed out supra this contention is not urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant before us in the course of argument though that ground is taken in the memorandum of grounds.
6. This leads us to the main contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the bar contained in sub-Section (3) of Section 79 of the Act is mandatory and, therefore, the continued suspension of the appellant beyond the periods specified under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (3) of Section 79 of the Act is ex facie illegal and unauthorised. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the third respondent-School placing reliance on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in MC. Rao v. Sarvodaya College, 1988 (1) ALT 651, would maintain that the bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act is only directory and since the charges levelled against the appellant are grave in nature, it is permissible for the disciplinary authority to continue the suspension of the appellant even beyond four months from the date of suspension in the light of the judgment of this Court in MC. Rao's case (supra). Sub-section (1) of Section 79 of the Act provides that no teacher or member of the non-teaching staff employed in any private institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 79 of the Act read thus:
(2) An inquiry under sub-section (1) shall be completed within a period of two months from the date of communication of charges against the employee.
(3)(a) No employee shall be placed under suspension except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct of such employee is contemplated.
(b) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not started and completed within that period, such employee shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as employee:
Provided that the competent authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months for a further period not exceeding two months, if in the opinion of such competent authority the inquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attributable to such employee.
7. Before dealing with the precise question whether the bar contained in subsection (3) of section 79 of the Act is mandatory or directory and the legal consequences that may flow from the breach of the bar, it is appropriate to note the views expressed by the Courts where the employers or the disciplinary authorities did not complete the departmental or domestic enquiry with promptitude and diligence and within a reasonable time. Although suspension of an employee in contemplation of or pending departmental enquiry is not a punishment, the suspended employee is always subjected to social ridicule, condemnation and humiliation, and he is looked down by persons known to him, friends and colleagues, kith and kin and he lives a life of tarnished image, infamy and agony during the period of suspension. Therefore, fairness-in-action requires that the employer of the disciplinary authority should complete the enquiry initialed against a delinquent employee with promptitude and diligence and without any undue delay. The power of suspension has to be exercised with circumspection, care and after due application of mind. The disciplinary authority must make a fair and proper assessment of the matter in the given circumstances and carefully scrutinise that prima facie there exists grave or compelling circumstances which in the light of the material available and collected during the preliminary investigation/enquiry would lead to the likelihood of imposition of major penalty on the employee. The proper judgment exercised by the disciplinary authority in this regard would prevent unnecessary harassment and humiliation to the suspended employee. Though the right of an employer to suspend a delinquent employee pending domestic enquiry is well-recognised in law, it has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Rules of service or the Standing Orders governing the employees. If after suspension enquiry is unduly delayed or prolonged without any justification, then, it may show that the suspension or the continued suspension of the employee is not bonafide. The delinquent employee who is placed under suspension in contemplation of enquiry or pending enquiry is entitled to ask on suspension that the matter should be investigated, and the enquiry initiated against him should be conducted and completed with reasonable diligence and within the reasonable period of time, and if such a principle of fair play in action is not recognised, then, it would imply that the disciplinary authority is vested with a totally arbitrary and unfettered power of placing its employees under disability and distress for indefinite duration. That is why the Courts in large number of cases where they found that there was inordinate delay in conducting and completing the departmental enquiries stepped in to command the disciplinary authorities to complete the enquiry within the specified time-frame or alternatively interfered with the suspension orders. This Court in P. Lingamurthy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, , speaking through one of us. (S.R. Nayak, J.) opined that the suspension order is bad if it is not followed by the charge-sheet within reasonable time and that it is unjust on the part of the employer to pass an order of suspension and then not to take any action for unduly long period.
8. In the light of the well settled position in law noted above, the competent Legislature in its wisdom has enacted subsection (3) of section 79 of the Act to protect the interest of the employees who may be placed under suspension in contemplation of or pending departmental enquiries against the possible arbitrary action of the employers in placing the delinquent employees under suspension for unduly prolonged period. In our considered opinion, the object of sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act is to command the disciplinary authority to conduct and complete the departmental enquiry against the delinquent employees, whether teaching or non-teaching, expeditiously and with promptitude and within a time-frame. This legislative objective should be kept in mind while considering the question whether the bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act is mandatory or directory only.
9. In ascertaining the effect of the failure to comply with the relevant duty, it is necessary to determine whether the duty intended by the Legislature is mandatory or merely directory. For this purpose, it may be relevant to consider whether the person affected and the person bound are the same, and whether the thing done under the enactment is beneficial or adverse to the person affected. Where the duty arises under a statute, the Court, charged with the task of enforcing the statute, needs to decide what consequence Legislature intended should follow from breach of the duty. In the instant case, Section 79 of the Act does not state anything about the consequence of the breach of the bar contained in subsection (3) of section 79. In other words, the statute is silent about the consequence flowing from the breach of the duty prescribed in sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act. Obviously, what is not thought of by the Legislature is not expressed in the statute. Yet the Court cannot avoid decision, and it is obligatory for the Court to reach a decision. It would be totally unreasonable to hold that in every case failure to comply with the relevant duty invalidates the thing done. So the Courts' answer has been to devise a distinction between mandatory and directory duties. Terms used instead of 'mandatory' include 'absolute', 'obligatory', 'imperative', and 'strict'. In place of 'directory', sometimes the term 'permissive' is used though such use has been criticised. (See Craies Statute Law 7th Edn. 1971 p61 n74.)
10. In Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edition, it is stated thus:
"When a statute requires that something shall be done, or done in a particular manner of form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, is the requirement to be regarded as imperative (or mandatory) or merely as directory (or permissive). In some cases, the conditions or forms prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the act or thing regulated by it, and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the neglect of them involving nothing more than liability to a penalty, if any were imposed, for breach of the enactment. An absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially."
It is not possible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is mandatory or merely directory. Lord Campbell L.C. in Liverpool Brough Bank v. Turner, (1860) 2 De G.F. & J 502 said :
"No universal rule can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed."
11. Lord Penzance in Howard v. Bodington, (1877) 2 PD 203, observed as follows:
I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject-matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory.
12. In Crawford Statutory Construction it is stated thus:
"It is well settled that the question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other."
13. The above passage from Crawford is quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Slate of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Shrivastava, , Stale of U.P. v. Baburam Upadhya, , State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, , Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel v. Agriculture Produce Market Committee, , Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan, , B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kitmar Bhowmik, and Owners and Parties Interested in M. V. "Vali Pero" v. Fernandas Lopez, . K. Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in Babu Ram Upadhya 's case (supra) opined:
For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature, the Court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.
14. In Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union Of India ., , it was held that if object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory. On the other hand, in Montreal Street Railway v. Normandin, AIR 1927 PC 142, referred to in Bishwanath Khemka v. Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 67, L. HazariMal Kuthialav. I.T.O., Special Circle, Ambala Cantt, , Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, , Razasu Buland Sugar Co., Ltd., Rampw v. Municipal Board, Rampur, , it was held that if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory. But all this does not mean that the language used is to be ignored but only that the prima facie inference of the intention of the Legislature arising from the words used may be displaced by considering the nature of the enactment, its design and the consequences flowing from alternative constructions.
15. If a provision is held to be mandatory, an act done in breach thereof will be invalid, but if it is directory the act will be valid although the non-compliance may give rise to some other penalty or legal consequence if provided by the statute as held by the Supreme Court in Draj Kuer (Ranil) v. Arnar Krishna Narain Singh (Raja), and in Rubber House v. Excellsior Industries Pvt., Ltd., .
16. Another mode of showing a clear intention that the provision enacted is mandatory, is by clothing the command in a negative form. In Crawford Statutory Construction, at page 523 it is said:
"Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. If that is so even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience."
K. SubbaRao, J., in M. Pentaiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, said:
"Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute imperative."
17. The use of word 'shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is mandatory or imperative as held by the Supreme Court in Manbodhan Lal Srivastava's case (supra) and in Baburam Upadhya's case (supra) and several other decisions to follow them, but, this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from such construction. There are numerous cases where the word 'shall' has, therefore, been construed as merely directory.
18. In the backdrop of the above well-settled principles governing the question whether an enactment is mandatory or merely directory, let us have a look at the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act. As held by Lord Campbell and approved by the Supreme Court, while construing an enactment as to whether it is mandatory or directory, the intent of the Legislature as well as the phraseology of the provision have to be borne in mind. It is also necessary to consider the nature and design of the statute and consequences which would follow from construing it in one way or the other. We have already considered and noticed supra the design and the objective of the enactment of sub-section (3) of Section 79. That is essentially to protect the interest of delinquent employees in the course of departmental/domestic enquiry. The objective is to avoid prolonged suspension of the delinquent employee in the course of departmental enquiry and to see that the departmental enquiry initiated against the delinquent employee is conducted and completed with promptitude and diligence. If that is the statutory objective and that objective is clothed in the unambiguous language used in sub-section (3) of Section 79, without any hesitation, we are inclined to hold that the bar contained in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act is mandatory and not merely directory. It is relevant to note that common law does not command that an employer should conduct and complete departmental enquiry within any specified or prescribed time-frame. Therefore, subsection (3) of section 79 confers a right or benefit on the delinquent employee which right or benefit is not otherwise available to him in common law. If that is so, where Legislation confers some right or benefit on a person, which he would not have in common law, the conditions laid down as to accrual of the right or benefit, unless purely formal, are mandatory as pointed out in Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (1984 Edition). Sub-section (3) is a regulatory enactment which lays down the procedure to be followed. If the procedure is mandatory, the failure vitiates the exercise of the statutory power. If the step is merely directory, the failure will not be that. Since we have held that enactment in subsection (3) is mandatory, it goes without saying that the impugned action is vitiated on account of the breach of the procedure and the bar contained in sub-section (3). In the instant case, admittedly, the appellant has been placed under suspension pending departmental enquiry beyond a period of four months. Secondly, the third respondent did not even obtain prior permission from the competent educational authority to extend the period of suspension beyond the period of two months as required under proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (3). Therefore, we hold that the continued suspension of the appellant after 23-8-1999 is invalid, being violative of the provisions of both clause (a) and clause (b) of subsection (3) of Section 79.
19. As already pointed out, the third respondent placed strong reliance on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in M.C. Rao's case (supra). In that case, the petitioner/delinquent while working as Upper Division Clerk in Sri Sarvodaya College, Nellore was placed under suspension by the proceedings dated 9-9-1997 pending enquiry into charges of misappropriation of huge funds and fabrication of records. The petitioner complaining that he was placed under suspension for more than a period of two months assailed the validity of his suspension on the ground that the impugned action was violative of clause (b) of subsection (3) of Section 79 of the Act. We have perused the judgment of the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge has, to begin with, stated the principles correctly in the following words.
".....The word "shall" used in clause
(a) of sub-section (3) of Section 70 would thus render a mandatory duty on the employer to intelligently exercise the power with circumspection on the grounds on which he/it wants to keep the employee under suspension. But such a suspension shall not remain in force for morel than a period of two months from the date of suspension. If such enquiry is not started and completed within the period of two months from the date of suspension, then without prejudice to such a contemplated enquiry or if the enquiry is in progress, the employee, on expiry of two months, shall be deemed to have been restored as employee. Thereby, normally the employee shall have a right to restitution into service on expiry of two months from the date of the order of suspension. The proviso gives power to the management to place the matter before the expiry of two months, before the competent authority for further extention for a period of two months and the competent authority is given power to extend for a further period of two months and that too for the reasons to be recorded in writing for such an extension. The authority also would extend the period of two months only in case where the delay in the enquiry was directly attributable to the conduct of the employee. It would thus be seen that if the employer, for reasons whatsoever could not initiate and complete the enquiry within two months from the date of suspension, the employee shall be deemed to have been restored to service."
Having stated the principle correctly, in the facts situation of that case and taking into account that grave misconduct of misappropriation of funds was alleged against the delinquent employee, the learned single Judge was pleased to observe thus:
"Keeping them on the back of my mind, I conclude unhesitatingly that whatever may be the reason for not completing the enquiry, (the emphasis is supplied by the Court), the interests of both the institution and the petitioner would be best served if a direction is given to the management to continue to pay the salary and allowances to the petitioner, instead of directing reinstating the petitioner into service as Upper Division Clerk in the College."
After necessary thought and reflection, and with respect, we could not persuade ourselves to lend our consensus and approval to the above view taken bv the learned single Judge. We say this because, though the learned single Judge has not stated that the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act are merely directory and not mandatory, it is very much implied in the decision of the learned single Judge that the provision was considered to be directory only and not mandatory. Secondly, when the proviso to clause (b) of subsection (3) of Section 79 empowers the competent authority to extend the period of suspension for a further period not exceeding two months only if in the opinion of such competent authority the enquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attributable to the employee, the Court cannot say that whatever may be the reason for not completing the enquiry, the employee is liable to be placed under suspension beyond four months if the charges levelled against the delinquent employee are grave in nature, and if such an interpretation is permitted, it would amount to the Court amending the statute and not interpreting the statute. Thirdly, it is relevant to note the legal fiction introduced in clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act. The legal fiction is that if the enquiry initiated against the delinquent employee is not started and completed within a period of two months as specified in clause (a) of sub-section (3), such employee shall be deemed to have been restored as employee. By force of this deeming provision, without any overt act on the part of the employer, the delinquent employee shall stand restored to his office if the enquiry contemplated is not started or completed within a period of two months. Restoration of the employee to his office entitle him to perform duties and functions and exercise powers and privileges attached to the office. When that is the legal fiction introduced in clause (b) of sub-section (3), if the view taken by the learned single Judge is taken to be correct, it will have the effect of obliterating the deeming clause enacted in clause (b) of sub-section (3) from the statute and such an interpretation, even and solely on the basis of first principles governing interpretation of statutes, is impermissible. It is too preliminary and trite to state that when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to lhat meaning irrespective of consequences as held by the Supreme Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India, . Tindal, CJ, in Sussex Peerage, case observed thus:
"If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver."
20. In State of U.P. v. Vijay Anand Maharaj, , the Supreme Court opined that when a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. If the language of an enactment is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, the results of the contraction are not a matter for the Court, even though they may be strange and surprising as held in London Brick Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, (1943) 1 All. ER 23, held in IRC v. Hinchy, (1960) I All ER 505.
21. The learned Judge has given a reason in support of the opinion handed down by him. The reason in that:
......if the employee facing grave charges like misappropriation or fabrication is permitted to continue in office, it would feed aggravation of crime with impunity to further escalate it with a bid to defeat the enquiry or in desperation make hay by falsification of account and defalcation of funds; it would not only inculcate indiscipline among the co-employees but also demoralise the administration causing resentment in the estimation of the general public.
The above reasoning cannot be a justification for the Court to virtually amend the statute when the statute is plain, precise, clear and unambiguous and does not admit more than one meaning, and such a course is impermissible having due regard to the principle Casus omissus. According to this principle, a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by Courts, as to do so will be Legislation and not construction as held by the Privy Counsel and the Supreme Court in large number of pronouncements starting with Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Lmussorie Electric Tramway Co., Ltd., AIR 1933 PC 63, Hiradevi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, , and the pronouncement in Dr Baliram Waman Hiray v. Mr. Justice B. Lentin, . Secondly, ignorance of the situation highlighted by the learned single Judge cannot be attributed to the Legislature which has enacted sub-section (3) of Section 79. It is not for the Court to question the wisdom of the Legislature. Interpretation of subsection (3) of Section 79 does not involve interstitial filling-in-function of the Court.
22. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal in part and declare that the continued suspension of the appellant after 23-8-1999 is invalid, being violative of provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 79 of the Act. The 3rd respondent is directed to restore the appellant to the post of Head Master in Krista Cement Works Employees Educational Society High School forthwith. It is made clear that the appellant is entitled to all the benefits, pecuniary or otherwise, flowing from this order. The parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal.