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Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions were heard together because they raised a common issue. WP No. 34387 of 1998 was filed by Nature Park Walkers Association (a registered society) seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari to call for and quash proceedings No. C3/1928/97 (dated 20-11-1998) on the file of the District Collector, Hyderabad. WP No. 35072 of 1998 sought to quash G.O.Ms No. 187, Environment, Forests, Science and Technology (For. III) Department, dated 3-12-1998 on the ground that it violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Background facts (as stated in the opinion): land formerly belonging to the Nizam vested in the State under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. By G.O.Ms No. 300 of 1990 an area of about Ac.95.00 was declared a natural park to be developed as a green park. Excess vacant land was allotted to the Forest Department under G.O.Ms No.957 (25-10-1991). The Nizam challenged that action by WP No. 4513 of 1991, which was dismissed (Govt. of A.P. v. H.E.H. The Nizam). The Association and others used the park for walks with passes valid until 31-3-1999. In 1994 the Forest Department proposed and implemented a closure of the park, prompting the Association to file WP No. 775 of 1994; a notification under Section 35(1) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 was issued on 23-9-1994 declaring the area a national park; the Association challenged that notification in WP No. 8609 of 1994. Those petitions (775/94 & 8609/94) were disposed of on 23-9-1997 (Nature Park Walkers Assn. v. State of A.P.) with directions.

Subsequently, the Wild Life Advisory Board was constituted (8-8-1997) and, on 8-12-1997, advised the Government to declare the area a conservation area. Pursuant to that advice, the Government issued G.O.Ms No. 187 dated 3-12-1998 under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act. The G.O. included three relevant clauses under the heading "Rights & Concessions," in particular clause (2) stating that "No other persons, organizations, institutions have any other rights or concessions in the National Park." The petitioner-Association challenged clause (2) as prohibiting entry despite passes valid until 31-3-1999.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notification (G.O.Ms No. 187 dated 3-12-1998) suffers from any infirmity warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether clause (2) of the G.O. (stating that no other persons, organisations, institutions have any rights or concessions in the National Park) is inconsistent with Section 28(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and thus without authority of law.
  3. Whether the prohibition on public entry into the park is inconsistent with Section 23(4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (the land having vested in the State to be disposed of to subserve the common good) and whether the declaration under Section 35 of the Wild Life Act can validly operate alongside Section 23(4).
  4. Whether the G.O. (and in particular clause (2)) violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, as alleged by the petitioner.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The area, being vacant land vested in the State under Section 23(4) of the 1976 Act, must be disposed of to subserve the common good; consequently the land should remain available for public use and cannot be turned into a zone prohibiting public access.
  • The notification under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act is liable to be declared void as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
  • Counsel relied on several authorities (Bhim Singh v. Union of India; Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India; T. Damodhar Rao v. S.O. Municipal Corporation; G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority) to argue that disposal of excess vacant land must strictly serve public purpose and common good — conversion or exclusion inconsistent with that mandate can be struck down; Bangalore Medical Trust was cited for the proposition that conversion of a public park to private use was struck down.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The State has the statutory competence under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act to declare an area a National Park by notification where it is necessary by reason of ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological or zoological importance for protecting, propagating or developing wildlife or its environment.
  • Upon declaration under Section 35, the provisions of Sections 27, 28, 30 to 32 apply as far as may be, and Section 28 empowers the Chief Wild Life Warden to grant permits to enter a sanctuary (and by application to a national park) subject to conditions and payment of fees; thus entry can be regulated by permits and conditions, and the State may legitimately restrict entry to protect wildlife and habitat.
  • The Collector's enquiry reported the presence of endangered species (specifically the Danaid Egg Fly listed in Schedule I) and described habitat dependencies (e.g., reliance on specific larval food plants that had been cleared). The respondents contended it was necessary to prohibit or restrict public entry in the conservation zone to protect such species, and that restrictions follow from the object of declaring a National Park.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govt. of A.P. v. H.E.H., The Nizam, Hyderabad (AIR 1993 AP 76) Recorded as the dismissal of the Nizam's challenge to earlier allotments/decisions (as part of factual history). The court used this to note prior litigation history and the dismissal of the Nizam's writ petition and Special Leave Petition.
Nature Park Walkers Assn. v. State of A.P., 1998 (3) ALD 111 Prior adjudication disposing WP Nos. 775/94 & 8609/94 with directions (background precedent in the litigation history). The court treated that decision as part of the procedural and factual background informing the present disputes.
Bhim Singh v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 166 (AIR 1981 SC 234) Principle that disposal of excess vacant lands must be strictly in accordance with Section 23(4) of the 1976 Act; the governing test is public purpose/community good; actions not subserving that purpose may be struck down. The court relied upon this authority to explain and apply the "common good" test to disposals/uses of vested vacant land and to support the proposition that state action must subserve public interest.
Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa, (1991) 4 SCC 54 (AIR 1991 SC 1902) Illustrates that conversion of a public park into private use (e.g., a private nursing home) can be struck down. The court referenced it to support the importance of preserving public parks and open spaces for public benefit and to underscore limits on alienating or defeating public use.
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 351 Cited by petitioner-counsel among authorities concerning environmental protection and related principles (no more specific rule stated in the opinion). The opinion records that this case was cited in support of the petitioner's submissions on disposal/usage and environmental concerns; the court used the collective authority to articulate the common-good principle.
T. Damodhar Rao v. S.O. Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad (AIR 1987 AP 171) Cited as an authority by counsel (no specific principle separately articulated in the opinion text). Included among the cases relied on by petitioner's counsel to support the argument regarding disposal for public purpose.
G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority, (1995) 5 SCC 762 Cited by counsel in the cluster of authorities addressing disposal and public purpose (no additional specific rule summarized in the opinion). The court noted it was cited; the decision formed part of the authorities relied upon to frame the common-good legal standard.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory provisions relied upon by the parties, primarily Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and Section 28 of that Act, together with Section 23(4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. The analysis proceeded in stages:

  1. Statutory scope of Section 35: The court noted Section 35 empowers the State Government to declare an area a National Park where, by reason of ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological or zoological importance, such declaration is needed to protect, propagate or develop wildlife or the environment. The declaration is by notification, and once made, certain other provisions (including Sections 27, 28 and 30–32) apply to a national park as they do to a sanctuary (Section 35(8)).
  2. Operation of Section 28: Section 28 permits the Chief Wild Life Warden to grant permits to enter or reside in a sanctuary (and by extension, subject to Section 35(8), a national park) for enumerated purposes and "subject to such conditions and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed" (Section 28(2)). The court concluded that Section 28(2) authorizes regulation and restriction of entry by permit and conditions, but does not authorise an absolute prohibition of all rights of entry.
  3. Validity of clause (2) of the G.O.: The court held that clause (2) in the notification — stating that "No other persons, organizations, institutions have any other rights or concessions in the National Park" — was inconsistent with Section 28(2), which contemplates regulated entry by permits subject to conditions and fees. Consequently clause (2) was "without authority of law." The court therefore struck down that clause insofar as it purported to prohibit entry in absolute terms.
  4. Interaction with Section 23(4) of the 1976 Act: The court acknowledged that vacant land vested in the Government under Section 23(4) must be disposed of to subserve the common good. It held that vesting under Section 23(4) does not deprive the Government of power to declare an area a National Park under Section 35; the provisions can operate simultaneously. However, any declaration under Section 35 must likewise subserve the common good and not be against public interest. The governing test remains whether the action serves the public purpose/community good; authorities cited (including Bhim Singh and Bangalore Medical Trust) support that principle.
  5. Article 21 and environmental/public health considerations: The court emphasized that preserving open spaces and providing "lung space" is part of the community need and relates to protection of life under Article 21. It held that an absolute prohibition on public entry into a green park violates Article 21 (right to life), because the public's ability to obtain fresh air and recreational benefit is part of that right — provided entry is regulated by reasonable restrictions.
  6. Practical direction: The court observed that many national parks and protected areas (examples given in the opinion) allow public entry subject to conditions and restrictions. Accordingly, it directed the respondents to finalize guidelines and conditions under Section 28(2) by 31-3-1999, to issue permits under those conditions (with members of the petitioner-Association eligible), and to maintain the existing practice of permitting public entry until such guidelines are finalized.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were disposed of in the terms indicated by the court. The core rulings were:

Clause (2) of the impugned notification (G.O.Ms No. 187) — to the extent that it purported to deny any rights or concessions to persons, organisations or institutions in the National Park and to prohibit public entry absolutely — is without authority of law.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The court declared that declaration of a National Park under Section 35 can be validly made alongside the vesting provisions of Section 23(4) of the 1976 Act, but such declaration must subserve the common good and cannot operate to defeat public interest.
  • The respondents were directed to finalise guidelines and conditions for entry under Section 28(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act and to issue permits in accordance with those conditions by 31-3-1999. Members of the petitioner-Association were held to be eligible for permits subject to those conditions.
  • Until the guidelines and conditions were finalised, the existing practice of permitting the public to enter the park was to continue.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Broader precedent: The court applied and reiterated established principles concerning the requirement that disposal or use of vested urban land must subserve the public good and that protection of the environment and provision of public "lung space" are matters connected to Article 21. The decision applied existing statutory interpretation and case-law principles rather than announcing a new legal doctrine.

    Nature Park Walkers Association, Hyderabad And Another v. State Of A.P, Hyderabad And Others

    1. These two writ petitions are disposed of by a common judgment as the issue involved is common in both the writ petitions.

    2. WP No. 34387 of 1998 is filed by Nature Park Walkers Association, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act for a writ or a direction in the nature of a writ of certiorari calling for the records in proceedings No. C3/1928/97, dated 20-11-1998 on the file of the District Collector, Hyderabad district and to quash the same. WP No. 35072 of 1998 is filed to quash G.O.Ms No. 187, Environment, Forests, Science and Technology (For. III) Department, dated 3-12-1998 as violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

    3. The facts, in brief, are as follows:

    Ac. 90-00 of land and Ac. 400.00 of land belonging to the erstwhile Nizam was taken over by the Government under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short ‘1976 Act’). Under G.O.Ms No. 300 of 1990 Ac. 95-00 was declared as natural park. The object of declaring it as natural park was to develop it as a green park. On 25-10-1991 under G.O.Ms No. 957, the excess vacant land was allotted to Forest Department to provide lung space. Aggrieved by the action of the respondents, the Nizam filed WP No. 4513 of 1991. The said writ petition was dismissed on 21-1-1992 Govt. Of A.P v. H.E.H, The Nizam, Hyderabad. of Hyderabad, AIR 1993 AP 76. Special Leave petition filed against the said judgment was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. The petitioner-Association was using the park both in the morning and in the evening during restricted hours. The land was taken over under 1976 Act and Ac. 23-00 was left for the personal use of Nizam. In the said park, there is a mosque and five times prayers are offered. In 1994 Forest Department proposed to close down the park for the public and gates were actually closed. Therefore the Association, the members of which were obtained passes valid upto 31-3-1999, filed WP No. 775 of 1994. Thereafter a notification was issued under Section 35(1) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 declaring it as wild life national park on 23rd September, 1994. The petitioner's Association challenged the said notification by way of WP No. 8609 of 1994. Both the writ petitions, namely, 775/94 & 8609/94 were heard by a learned single Judge and disposed them of on 23rd September, 1997 Nature Park Walkers Assn. v. State of A.P, 1998 (3) ALD 111, with certain directions. Thereafter, on 8-8-1997 Wild Life Advisory Board was constituted. On 8-12-1997 Board advised the Government to declare the area as conservation area. On the basis of the advice, the Government issued the impugned notification in G.O.Ms No. 187, Environment, Forests, Science and Technology (For. III) Department, dated 3-12-1998 under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The relevant portion of the G.O, for the purposes of disposing of these writ petitions reads as follows:

    “1. The right of way to enclosures as shown in the map kept in the office of Prl. Chief Conservator of Forests by the occupants or persons employed by the occupant of the enclosure land and dwellings is permitted subject to obtaining photo identity card and written permission from Chief Wild Life Warden or any other officer authorised by him.

    2. No other persons, organizations, institutions have any other rights or concessions in the National Park.

    3. For future requirement of road widening in the area as marked on the map and mentioned in the Schedule may be utilized by the user agency after construction of boundary wall before demolishing the existing boundary wall”.

    4. The petitioner-Association is aggrieved by the clause No. (2) as by virtue of the said clause, the petitioner-Association is prohibited from entering the park in spite of having passes upto 31-3-1999.

    5. The main argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner-Association along with others who are not members of the Association were using the park for their walk in the morning and evening. By virtue of the notification, they are prohibited from using the park. Under Section 23(4) of 1976 Act, all vacant lands acquired by the State Government under this Act shall be disposed of to subserve the common good on such terms and conditions as the State Government may deem fit to impose. Therefore the land now acquired under 1976 Act should be put to common good of the public and prohibition imposed prohibiting the public from entering the park is in violation of Section 23(4). The area acquired under 1976 Act has been included in the master plan. When once it is included in the master plan, it cannot be declared as National Park under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act. Counsel also submitted relying on Bhim Singh v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 166 : AIR 1981 SC 234, Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S Muddappa, (1991) 4 SCC 54 : AIR 1991 SC 1902, M.C Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 351, T. Damodhar Rao v. S.O Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad, AIR 1987 AP 171, Dr. G.N Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority, (1995) 5 SCC 762 that “the disposal of excess vacant lands must therefore be made strictly in accordance with the mandate of sub-section (4) of Section 23, subject to this, that in a given case such land may be allotted to any person, for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, any “industry” or for the other purposes mentioned in sub-section (1), provided that by such allotment, common good will be sub-served. The governing test of disposal of excess land being social good, any disposal in any particular case or cases which does not subserve that purpose will be liable to be struck down as being contrary to the scheme and intendment of the Act……….The touchstone is public purpose, community good and like criteria………but if the particular act of allotment is mala fide or beyond the statutory and constitutional parameters such exercise will be a casualty in Court and will be struck down”. Learned Counsel contended that in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S Muddappa (supra) conversion of a public park into a private nursing home was struck down by the Supreme Court.

    6. In view of the above, learned Counsel contended that the notification issued under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act is liable to be declared as void and violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

    7. While the learned Counsel for the respondents contended that under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act the State Government is competent to declare an area whether within a sanctuary or not by reason of its ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological or zoological association or importance as the National Park for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life therein or its environment. Where any area is entitled to be declared as National Park, the provisions of Sections 27, 28, 30 to 32 shall apply as far as may be in relation to a National Park as they apply in relation to a sanctuary. On receipt of report from the Collector, the matter was placed before the Wild Life Advisory Board constituted under Section 6 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act through G.O.Ms No. 90, Environment, Forests, Science and Technology Department, dated 8-8-1997 and the Wild Life Advisory Board unanimously recommended for declaring the KBR National Park as conservation area under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The Government after going through the entire record including the enquiry report submitted by the Collector, issued final notification under sub-section (4) of Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The object of declaring it as National Park is to preserve the ecological richness of a given area in totality and to reduce the biotic interference to the minimum. Since the declaration made under Section 35(4) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act is subject to Sections 27 to 32, it is open to the respondents to make regulations regulating the entry under Section 28 of the Act. Under Section 28 of the Chief Wild Life Warden is competent to impose restrictions restricting the entry of public in the conservation zone when once it is declared as such under Section 35 of the Act. Hence, the petitioner-Association cannot claim any right of use in the said area. Counsel also contended that the Collector on enquiry found that there are several endangered species found in the KBR National Park such as “The Danaid Egg Fly, a butterfly listed in Schedule 1 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act Schedule I contains species which are highly endangered or particularly valuable and which enjoy the highest protection under the provisions of this Act. This butterfly is known to use the Abutilon Sp. Plant as its larval food plant. This is one of the many shrubs that have been cleared to make additional pathways for the walkers. Without this plant, the butterfly will not survive, and without the butterfly, many other plants which rely on it for pollination will also become extinct in the area over time. The Danaid Egg Fly, listed in Schedule I deserves full protection which cannot be possible unless the area is notified and managed as a National Park under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, keeping in view the object of protecting Danaid Egg Fly, which is declared as a wild life, it is necessary to prohibit the entry of public in the conservation zone.

    8. The question therefore is whether the Notification suffers from any infirmity warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    9. The Notification is issued under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act (Act 53 of 1972). Section 35 reads as follows:

    “Section 35. Declaration of National Parks: (1) Whenever it appears to the State Government that an area, whether within a sanctuary or not, is, by reason of its ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological or zoological association or importance, needed to be constituted as a National Park for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life therein or its environment, it may, by notification, declare its intention to constitute such area as a National Park.

    (2) The notification referred to in sub-section (1) shall define the limits of the are which is intended to be declared as a National Park.

    (3) where any area is in tended to be declared as a National Park, the provisions of Sections 19 to 26 (both inclusive) shall, as far as may be, apply to the investigation and determination of claims, and extinguishment of rights, in relation to any land in such area as they apply to the said matters in relation to any land in a sanctuary.

    (4) When the following events have occurred, namely:

    (a) The period for preferring claims has elapsed, and all claims, if any, made in relation to any land in an area intended to be declared as a National Park, have been disposed of by the State Government, and

    (b) all rights in respect of lands proposed to be included in the National Park have become vested in the State Government. The State Government shall publish a notification specifying the limits of the area which shall be comprised within the National Park and declare that the said are shall be a National Park on and from such date as may be specified in the notification.

    (5) No alteration of the boundaries of a National Park shall be made except on a resolution passed by the Legislature of the State.

    (6) No person shall destroy, exploit or remove any wild life from a National Park or destroy or damage the habitat of any wild animal or deprive any wild animal of its habitat within such National Park except under an in accordance with a permit granted by the Chief Wild Life Warden and no such permit shall be granted unless the State Government, being satisfied that such destruction, exploitation or removal of wild life from the National Park is necessary for the improvement and better management of wild life therein, authorises the issue of such permit.

    (7) No grazing of any cattle shall be permitted in a National Park and no cattle shall be allowed to enter therein except where such cattle is used as a vehicle by a person authorised to enter such National Park.

    (8) The provisions of Sections 27 and 28, Sections 30 to 32 (both inclusive), and clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 33 and Section 34 shall, as may be, apply in relation to a National Park as they apply in relation to a sanctuary.”

    10. From a reading of Section 35, it is clear that the State Government is empowered to declare any area by reason of its ecological, faunal, floral importance as a National Park for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life therein or its environment by a notification. In exercise of the said power, the impugned notification is issued. The Section speaks of two objects, one is to protect, propagate or develop the wild life, (2) to protect, propagate or develop environment. In order to achieve this object, the notification is issued. Under sub-section (8) of Section 35 when once a declaration is made, the provisions of Section 27 and 28 will apply in relation to a National Park as they apply in relation to a sanctuary. Section 28 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 empowers the Chief Wild Life Warden to grant permits for certain purposes. The relevant section reads as follows:

    “28. Grant of permit:—(1) The Chief Wild Life Warden may, on application grant to any person a permit to enter or reside in a sanctuary for all or any of the following purposes, namely—

    (a) investigation or study of wild life and purposes ancillary or incidental thereto;

    (b) photograph;

    (c) scientific research;

    (d) tourism;

    (e) transaction of lawful business with any person residing in the sanctuary.

    (2) A permit to enter or reside in a sanctuary shall be issued subject to such conditions and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed.”

    11. Under Section 28(2) the Chief Wild Life Warden is authorised to issue permits to enter the conservation zone subject to such conditions and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. From a reading of Section 35 the declaration declaring a particular area as a National Park is to protect, propagate or develop wild life or environment. In other words Section 35 has twin purposes. One is protection of wild life and second is protection of environment. From a reading of the notification, it does not say that it is issued either for protecting the wild life existing in the park or for protection of the environment. At any rate since the power is there, the declaration may be either for protection of environment or for protection of wild life. Therefore, we proceed on the assumption that the declaration under Section 35 is not only for protection of wild life but also for the protection of environment.

    12. If once the notification is issued under Section 35 declaring it as a National Park under sub-section (8) of Section 35, provisions of Section 28 are applicable as they are applicable to a sanctuary. Under Section 28(2), which I have already referred to in the earlier paragraph, the Chief Wild Life Warden is conferred with the power to permit entry into the area declared as National Park subject to such conditions and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. In other words, when a declaration is made under Section 35 declaring a particular area as National Park, the authority is competent to restrict entry subject to certain conditions. However, no provision is brought to my notice prohibiting the entry into the Park. Therefore, the clause (2) mentioned in the notification under the heading “Rights & Concessions” stating that no other persons, organisations, institutions have any other right or concessions in the National Park is inconsistent with Section 28(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act. Therefore, clause (2) under the heading “Rights & Concessions” mentioned in the notification is without authority of law.

    13. Further under Section 23(4) of 1976 Act, the vacant land which vested in the Government shall be disposed of to subserve the common good. If the respondents are permitted to prohibit entry of public into the park, it would be inconsistent with Section 23(4) of 1976 Act.

    14. It is pointed out that the vesting of vacant land in the Government under Section 23(4) of 1976 Act does not take away the power of the Government to declare a particular area as a National Park to protect the environment or the wild life existing in that particular area. In my view the provisions can simultaneously operate in the same area. The vesting of vacant land enables the Government to declare it as a National Park in exercise of power under Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. However, the declaration of the park as a National Park is only to subserve the common good provided under Section 23(4) of the Act of 1976. Consequently though the Government has the power to declare it as a National Park under Section 35 for protecting the environment or wild life, such declaration should only to subserve the common good and it should not be against the interest of the public.

    15. It is now well settled that the governing test of disposal of excess land being social good, any disposal in any particular case or cases which does not subserve that purpose will be liable to be struck down as being contrary to the scheme and intendment of the Act. It is also settled that common good being the writing on the wall, any disposal which does not serve that purpose will be outside the scope of the Act and therefore lacking in competence in diverse senses. Bhim Singh's case (supra). Further, it is now well settled that preserving open spaces and reserving public parks and playgrounds is with a view to protecting the residents from ill-effects of urbanisation and for the benefit of the public at large for recreation, enjoyment, ventilation and fresh air (emphasis supplied) Bangalore Medical Trust case (supra). It is also well settled that the most vital community need is providing lung space by conserving the environment and reversal of the environmental degradation. Providing fresh air is also part of the community need which can be made with only by providing green belts and open spaces. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the respondents to provide lung space for the public. Meeting the needs of the public to protect their health by breathing fresh air is the responsibility of the Government as it is a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India under which right to life is protected. Therefore, any provision prohibiting the general public from entering the green park in my view violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, prohibition incorporated in the notification prohibiting the public from entering the green park is in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The entry of public in the green park does not in any way destroy the wild life or the environment that is in existence in the park, provided the entry is permitted subject to restrictions. In fact in Kaziranga Park in Assam where wild life exists, public are allowed to go round the park subject to certain conditions and restrictions and there is no prohibition prohibiting the public from entering the park. Similarly public are allowed in Nehru Zoological Park, Hyderabad, where wild animals are reared. In Dehradun public are allowed to visit National Corbett Park where wild life is protected. There are various parks declared as National Parks for the purpose of protecting the wild life and public are still allowed to enter subject to certain conditions and reasonable restrictions. In view of the above, the respondents are directed to finalise the guidelines before 31-3-1999 and issue permits subject to the conditions that they may prescribe under Section 28(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act. The members of the petitioner-Association are eligible for the grant of permits subject to the conditions that the respondents may impose. Till the guidelines and conditions for entry into the National Park are finalised/prescribed under Section 28(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, the existing practice of permitting the public to enter the park shall continue.

    16. In the result, the writ petitions are disposed of accordingly.

    17. No order as to costs.

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    Nature Park Walkers Association, Hyderabad And Another v. State Of A.P, Hyderabad And Others
    (Mar 22, 1999)