1. This writ petition raises a short but interesting question of law regarding the maintainability of a fresh application under S. 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act) during the pendency of an earlier reference under S. 10 of the Act in respect of the self-same industrial dispute. The facts leading to the writ petition in brief are as follows:
The petitioner is a company manufacturing jute twine and other allied products. The second respondent herein was employed as a twister in the petitioner's factory at Vizianagaram. On a charge that the second respondent participated in an illegal strike, he was subjected to a disciplinary enquiry and was dismissed from service by an order, dated June 17, 1975. The dispute was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Labour Court, Guntur, and the same was numbered as Industrial Dispute No. 43 of 1976. The same was, however, dismissed for default on March 14, 1978. The second respondent thereupon filed Industrial Appeal No. 77 of 1978, in the Labour Court for restoration of Industrial Dispute No. 43 of 1976, to file by setting aside the order of dismissal for default. As the Labour Court rejected the said application for restoration, the second respondent filed Writ Petition No. 234 of 1980. By order, dated October 26, 1984, this Court allowed the said writ petition and set aside the order of dismissal for default and directed the Labour Court to dispose of the industrial dispute expeditiously according to law within a period not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. In the meantime, a separate Industrial-cum-Labour Court was constituted at Vishakhapatnam, and a number of cases pertaining to Vishakhapatnam region including Industrial Dispute No. 43 of 1976 were made over to the Labour Court at Vishakhapatnam from the Labour Court, Guntur. Unfortunately in the process of transferring the records from the Labour Court, Guntur, to the Labour Court at Vishakhapatnam, the records relating to Industrial Dispute No. 43 of 1976, were misplaced and lost and they could not be traced inspite of all efforts. As there was no other alternative, the second respondent was advised by the Labour Court to file a fresh application under S. 2-A(2) of the Act for his reinstatement and accordingly the second respondent filed a fresh application under S. 2-A(2) of the Act questioning his removal from service and seeking reinstatement with back-wages. The petitioner thereupon raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the said application filed by the second respondent. After hearing both parties, the Labour Court, Vishakhapatnam, passed an order on April 1, 1989, taking on file the application filed by the second respondent under S. 2-A(2) of the Act leaving all questions open including the question of maintainability of the dispute under S. 2-A(2) of the Act. Pursuant to the said order, the application filed by the second respondent was numbered as Industrial Dispute No. 98 of 1989, on file of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Vishakhapatnam (first respondent). Aggrieved by the said order of the first respondent, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus restraining the first respondent from preceding further with Industrial Dispute No. 98 of 1989 and obtained interim stay of all further proceedings in Industrial Dispute No 98 of 1989, pending disposal of the writ petition.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that when once there was reference under S. 10 of the Act, it has to be adjudicated and there cannot be a fresh petition under S. 2-A(2) of the Act on the same cause of action, that the application under S. 2-A(2) of the Act is barred by Order 2, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code that if the records are lost, it is the duty of the Labour Court to trace them or to reconstruct them and without doing so, the Labour Court cannot permit the workman to file a fresh application under S. 2-A(2) of the Act, that the petitioner has filed the entire record relating to the domestic enquiry before the Labour Court and grave prejudice will be caused to the petitioner if a de novo enquiry is to be conducted after the lapse of so many years as it is well-nigh impossible to get evidence, that the petitioner cannot be penalised for the mistake of the Court and that, in any case, the petitioner cannot be mulcted with back-wages for the entire period for no fault of the petitioner and that the second respondent is guilty of laches and delay. In support of her contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Desk Raj Gupta v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow [1991 (1) L.L.N 965] and in Gujarat Steel Tubes, Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [1980 (1) L.L.N 230].
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the second respondent has contended that there is no legal bar for entertaining the fresh petition under S. 2-A(2) of the Act, that there is no question of res judicata because there was no adjudication on the earlier reference under S. 10 of the Act, that S. 2-A(2) of the Act, confers an independent right on the workman to move the Labour Court directly notwithstanding anything contained in S. 10, that the present application under S. 2-A(2) of the Act can also be treated as a continuation of the earlier reference under S. 10 and that even under S. 10 there is no bar for entertaining more than one reference and that the writ petition has no merit at all and it is filed solely with a view to drag on the proceedings and harass the poor workman. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent has cited decisions reported in Detergents India Ltd., Kodur v. Labour Court, 1993 (1) An. W.R 219; K. Rama Rao v. Chief Executive (Mills), Nellimarla Jute Mills [1993 (1) L.L.N 835], Jai Bhagwan v. Ambala Central Co-operative Bank, Ltd. [1983 (2) L.L.N 951], State of Maharashtra v. K.E Union [(1975) 4 SCC 841 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 635] and Orissa Cement, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1960-II L.L.J 91].
4. There is no controversy about the facts of the case. Admittedly the dispute relating to the removal of the second respondent from service was earlier referred for adjudication under S. 10 of the Act and the same was pending on the file of the Labour Court, Guntur, as Industrial Dispute No. 43 of 1976. Before the said reference could be adjudicated on merits as directed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 234 of 1980, the records were lost and they could not be traced. The second respondent was, therefore, obliged to move the Labour Court afresh under S. 2-A(2) of the Act. Sub-section(2) of S. 2-A of the Act was introduced by Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act No. 32 of 1987, with effect from July 27, 1987, and it reads as follows:
“2A(2) Notwithstanding anything in S. 10, any such workman as is specified in Sub-sec. (1) may, make an application in the prescribed manner, direct to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein; and on receipt of such application, the Labour Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter in the dispute as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and accordingly all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such dispute as they apply in relation to any other industrial dispute.”
5. A plain reading of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 2-Aof the Act makes it clear that the right conferred by the said sub-section to move the Labour Court directly is independent and distinct from the discretion vested in Government to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication under S. 10. Sub-section (2) of S. 2-A of the Act starts with a non obstante clauses that notwithstanding anything in S. 10, it is open to the workman to make an application direct to the Labour Court and on such an application being made, the Labour Court is bound to entertain the same and adjudicate the dispute. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, seeks to contend that S. 2-A(2) should be so construed as to make it applicable only to such cases where no reference is already pending under S. 10 of the Act. I am afraid this amounts to reading into the said sub-section something which is not there. There is no room for any ambiguity whatsoever in the language employed in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 2-A of the Act. As a matter of fact the very object of introducing Sub-sec. (2) to S. 2-A by Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act, 32 of 1987 is to avoid the delays involved in making a reference under S. 10 of the Act and to enable the workman to directly approach the Labour Court for adjudication. Sub-section(2) of S. 2-A further makes it clear that “On receipt of such application, the Labour Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter in the dispute as if it were a dispute referred to or pending of this Act…” (emphasis supplied). This shows that an application under Sub-sec. (2) of S. 2-A can be filed even in respect of a dispute which has been already referred to and pending before the Labour Court. The scope and ambit of this provision has been considered by this Court in the decision reported in Detergents India, Ltd. Kodur v. Labour Court (vide supra), wherein it has been held that the said sub-section confers a right on the workman to approach directly the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein without recourse to the Conciliation Officer\ Government as was obligatory prior to coming into force of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 2-A of the Act and that these rights are given to the workman notwithstanding anything contained in S. 10 of the Act. It was further held that the application under Sub-sec. (2) of S. 2-A of the Act is maintainable so long as the dispute is existing even though the dispute might have arisen due to dismissal, removal, discharge and retrenchment of the workman earlier to the introduction of the said sub-section and the question of retrospectivity does not arise in such cases. To the same effect is the decision reported in K. Rama Rao v. Chief Executive (Mills), Nellimarla Jute Mills (vide supra), wherein it has been further held that there is no period of limitation for challenging the order of dismissal before the forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act and the delay in challenging the order of termination can be taken into consideration for moulding the relief and that in appropriate cases, the Court may disallow back-wages from the date of illegal termination till the date of filing of the petition.
6. The learned counsel for the second respondent has placed great reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Bhagwan v. Ambala Central Co-operative Bank, Ltd. [1983 (2) L.L.N 951] (vide supra), in support of his contention that the pendency of the earlier reference under S. 10 of the Act is not bar for the maintainability of the fresh application under Sub-sec. (2) of S. 2-A of the Act. In that case, the Supreme Court, while dealing with a contention that it is not open to the workman to raise an industrial dispute without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal, observed that the existence or availability of another remedy is not a bar for raising an industrial dispute and that once a reference has been properly made to an Industrial Tribunal, the dispute has to be duly resolved by the Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal cannot refuse to adjudicate upon it on the ground that the workman had failed to pursue some other remedy. Though this decision is not directly in point, the above observations lend support to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent.
7. In State of Maharashtra v. K.E Union (vide supra), tike Supreme Court upheld the validity of a second reference of a connected dispute made to the Tribunal while the earlier reference was pending adjudication. This decision shows that there can be more than one reference under S. 10 in respect of the same dispute.
8. The two judgments of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, i.e, Desh Raj Gupta v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow [1991 (1) L.L.N 965] and Gujarat Steel Tubes, Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes. Mazdoor Sabha [1980 (1) L.L.N 230] (vide supra), do not throw any light on the present controversy as they deal with the question of back-wages. If ultimately termination of service is held to be illegal, it is always open to the petitioner to put forward all available objections with regard to the grant of back-wages by adducing necessary evidence in that behalf.
9. The decision of the Supreme Court in Orissa Cement, Ltd v. Their workmen (vide supra), cited by the learned counsel for the second respondent is also not very much relevant for the purpose of the present case as the same dealt with the question whether a finding given by the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal in an earlier proceeding under S. 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act operates as res judicata, in a subsequent reference made under S. 10 of the Act. It has been observed that the earlier finding of the Appellate Tribunal in the proceeding under S. 23 of the Act was no more than obiter and it cannot be pleaded in support of the bar of res judicata.
10. For the forgoing reasons, I have no hesitation in holding that the application filed by the second respondent under Sub-sec (2) of S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is maintainable and that the earlier reference of the same dispute under S. 10 of the Act is not a bar for its maintainability. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that earlier reference under S. 10 of the Act, i.e, Industrial Dispute No. 43 of 1976, which is not finally disposed and which is still pending cannot be simply abandoned or kept in abeyance and it has to be adjudicated finally on merits. I am of the view that the present application under Sub-sec. (2) of S. 2-A can be treated as a continuation of Industrial Dispute No. 43 of 1976, on the file of the Labour Court, Guntur, and disposal of the present Industrial Dispute No. 98 of 1989, on the file of the first respondent should be treated as a final disposal of Industrial Dispute No. 43 of 1976, as well.
11. Coming to the question of prejudice to the petitioner on account of the loss of the records and the long lapse of time, it is, no doubt, true that some prejudice is likely to be caused thereby to the petitioner, but on that ground, it is not possible to deny altogether the legal right conferred by Sub-sec. (2) of S. 2-A of the Act on the second respondent. As observed by the Labour Court, the second respondent is not, in any way responsible for the loss of the records. The hardships or prejudice, if any is common to both parties and it will be open to the petitioner to reconstruct the records and to adduce evidence afresh in the enquiry before the Labour Court. I, therefore, see no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
12. It is a matter of regret that an industrial dispute raised by a poor workman complaining of wrongful termination of services in the year 1975 could not be adjudicated on merits so far whatever be the reasons for the same. The first respondent is, therefore, directed to dispose of Industrial Dispute No. 98 of 1989 on merits in accordance with law expeditiously within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.