P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.:— The petitioners in this Contempt Case are the respondents in Letters Patent Appeal No. 239 of 1986 which was filed against the Judgment in a first appeal. That appeal arose out of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 28-1-1974 in respect of a building situate in premises No. 23-6-7 & 9, Shah-ali-banda, Hyderabad. The suit for specific performance was decreed by the appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, respondents herein filed the Letters Patent Appeal. Pending the Letters Patent Appeal, the appellants (respondents herein) filed an interim application to stay the execution of the decree in O.S No. 544 of 1975 on the file of II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, pursuant to the Judgment and decree dated 9-9-1986 passed in the appeal. A Division Bench of this court stayed the execution and further ordered as follows:

“However, the petitioners are directed not to alienate the house in question and also not to let out the same to tenants pending L.P.A No. 239 of 1986.”

2. This order was passed on 29-10-1986. It may be stated that on the date of passing of the order, respondents 3 and 4 were minors. It is not in dispute that they became majors by the date on which the alleged act of violation of the Court's order was committed. The present contempt case was filed on 5-10-1994 alleging that on 30-9-1994, on inspection from the neighbour's house, a major part of the building was without roof and only the walls stood. He further learnt that the 2nd respondent left the ‘palace’ and respondents 3 and 4 were residing in a corner room of the same bunglow. He caused publication of a notice in the newspapers-Deccan Chronicle and Siasat on 4th and 5th October, 1994. Immediately thereafter, this contempt case was filed alleging that the respondents by causing demolition of the building have flouted the order of this Court and committed contempt of Court, it is alleged that by virtue of the demolition, the antiquity and special features of the old palace are irretrievably lost.

3. In the counter affidavit sworn to by the 2nd respondent and filed on behalf of all the respondents, it is stated as follows, with reference to the averments In para-4 of the affidavit filed in the contempt case:

“The real facts are that the house in question which was very old one and was in dilapidated condition crumbled due to heavy rains in the month of August i.e, 30th August, 1994, when my two sons viz., respondents 3 and 4 were out of the house and I was in a pooja room, and my daughter-in-law was in her room adjacent to my room and my third son i.e, respondent No. 5 here in was also out side the house with his friends when suddenly the portion of the kitchen room and side wall collapsed having its impact on the middle floor and also on the pillar which cracked down due to the pressure and kitchen utensils and small tables were crushed under it. Then we decided to shift to a safer place along with necessary house-hold items including furniture and temporarily shifted to our relations' house at Secunderabad and then to the present address. However, my son shifted the other house-hold items in the rear portion which was a bit safe which consist of two bath rooms and chowkidar room which was safe and the items were dumped in the room. The entire roof of the house had fallen down due to natural calamity and is an act of God, which was beyond the control of the respondents.”

4. Thus, the stand taken in the counter-affidavit is that the building which was an old one collapsed due to heavy rains on 30-8-1994. In elaboration of this statement, it is averred that the collapse of a portion of the kitchen room and side wall had its impact on the middle floor and also on the pillar which cracked down due to pressure. The respondents then shifted to another place taking the house-hold items including furniture, keeping some articles in the rear portion.

5. After ordering notices in the contempt case, this court by an order dated 26-10-1994 appointed an Advocate-Commissioner to inspect the premises and report whether the house was pulled down or had fallen down because of natural calamities. The commissioner was also directed to report on the present condition of the house and also whether the doors and windows were available at the site. The Advocate-Commissioner got the permission of the court to take the assistance of a qualified Civil Engineer. Accordingly, the Commissioner took the assistance of Sri P. Seetaram Rao, B.E (Civil), retired Executive Engineer, P.W.D and a registered Valuer under the Wealth Tax Act. He submitted his observations as follows:

(1) ¾th of the premises which was without roof was pulled down by man power. It is not habitable. The front portion with wooden slab, one chowkidar's room, 2 bath rooms ad another small room are there with roof.

(2) The probable age of the building is about 80 years.

(3) The material is separated. Stones, marbles, doors and windows separated from the original place are lying-there.

6. The report of the qualified Engineer is categorical that the building was not in a fallen down condition but in a demolished condition and some of the material such as wooden doors and windows and rubble stones that came out from demolition were found heaped on the open space. He also reported that the building was demolished upto roof level and in some places upto lintel level. He also reported that some stone lintels over the openings of doors and windows on walls have cracked. But there was no brick work above them which shows that the brick work above the lintal were demolished. He confirmed the opinion of the Commissioner that the building in question was pulled down but did not fall down on account of natural causes.

7. Thus, it is evident from the commissioner's report backed up by the findings of a qualified Engineer that the respondents on their own pulled down the building and their defence that the building collapsed on its own on account of antiquity is false. There version that a portion of the kitchen room and side walls collapsed and had its impact on the middle floor and on the pillar cannot be believed. The collapse of a portion of the kitchen room and side wall, even if true, would not have brought about the collapse of ¾th of the premises, apart from the fact that the Engineer's report rules out the possibility of collapse in the natural course.

8. It is true that in the legal notice dated 1-10-1994, published in the newspaper of 4th and 5th October, 1994, the factum of demolition was not specifically mentioned. It was alleged therein that the respondents allowed certain third parties to trespass into the house and to remove valuable articles and commit other acts of vandalism. In the affidavit filed in support of the contempt petition, it is specifically stated that on 30-9-1994, the first petitioner noticed that a major part of the building was without roof but only the wails were remaining. To this extent, there is a contradiction in the version given in the legal notice and in the affidavit filed in contempt case. It may be that by 30-9-1994, the petitioners would not have noticed the demolition; otherwise, that fact would have been specifically mentioned in the legal notice instead of merely referring to acts of ‘vandalism’. But it is an undisputed and undeniable fact that the building was no longer existing by the date of filing the contempt petition. According to the respondents, the building collapsed on account of natural causes while according to the petitioners it was voluntarily pulled down by the respondents. It does not make material difference whether the petitioner had seen the condition of the premises on 30-9-1994 i.e, one day prior to the legal notice or he had noticed the same a few days later. Even if the petitioners' version of observing the condition of the building on 30-9-1994 is untrue, the contempt case cannot be thrown out on this short ground. When once the relevant facts are before this court, in whatever manner they have come to light, the court must act if a case of contempt is made out.

9. Thus, in the light of the evidence that the respondents pulled down the building, we have to see whether the respondents are guilty of violating this court's order passed in C.M.P No. 14776/86 in I.P.A 239/86 or they are otherwise guilty of contempt of court.

10. It is argued that assuming that there was an act of demolition, the respondents cannot be said to have violated the direction of this court not to alienate the property. This argument, based on a literal interpretation of the terms of the order, is nothing but over-simplification. The mere fact that there are no express words in the order restraining demolition of the building does not mean that the respondents (appellants in the L.P.A) were at liberty to put an end to the very subject-matter of the suit and appeal. It is not in dispute that there is a decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale which covers the building as well. The respondents have obtained stay of execution of the decree from this court; but for the stay, the sale deed conveying the title in the premises including the building would have been executed. Having obtained the stay, it is not open to the appellants to take the stand that they can do anything they please with the building. The order of stay is only a temporary ban on the execution of the sale deed and the transfer of title by. means of such sale deed. An interim order which was meant essentially to preserve status quo pending the appeal does not and cannot give in law a ‘carte-blanche’ to the party to exceed the limits of status quo and to do an act which removes the very subject-matter of the suit out of the reach of the decree holder. In other words, by obtaining an interim order staying the execution of the decree till the disposal of the appeal, the appellant cannot disable the decree-holder from realising the fruits of the decree, in case the appeal is dismissed. On the one hand, the appellant cannot secure stay against the execution and on the other hand, he cannot frustrate the decree. Whether or not the order granting stay of execution specifically mentions so, it is necessarily implicit in such interim order that the party who sought for stay will maintain status-quo as regards the subject-matter and will do nothing to extinguish the very subject-matter. To do so would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the court and amounts to an interference with the due course of justice. The fact that the Court specifically placed an embargo against the alienation and letting out the premises pending the appeal necessarily implies and reinforces the idea that the subject-matter of the decree should remain intact so that a sale deed could be executed in respect of that property depending upon her result of the appeal. When the alienation or leasing out itself is restrained, it necessarily prohibits the acts of destruction or the like which keep the property out of the reach of the decree-holder even after the dismissal of appeal. It is axiomatic that greater includes smaller. The restraint against alienation and letting out takes within its fold the obligation to keep the property intact, without removing or damaging it. If the respondents had felt any doubt and they had really an intention to abide by the order of the Court, the proper house for them would have been to place the relevant facts before the court and seek the clarification. They could have also sought the court's permission to demolish it, if such demolition was necessary in the interests of safety. Though according to the respondents, the building collapsed on 30-8-1994, they did nothing to apprise the court of the factual position till the contempt case was filed on 5-10-1994. This speaks volumes about the contumacious conduct of the respondents. Viewed from any angle, we are of the undoubted view that the respondents are guilty of Contempt of Court both under Section 2(b) and Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 and we are satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. They are, therefore, liable to be punished under Section 12 of the Act. The question then is as regards the quantum of punishment. In the normal course, we would have thought of imprisonment. But the 2nd respondent is an aged lady. Respondents 4 and 5 who were minors seems to have attained majority during the pendency of the appeal. Their juvenile age and indiscretion have obviously, prompted them to find an easy solution to the litigation. Further, we do not have any material as to the exact role played by each of the respondents in bringing about demolition of the building. The 3rd respondent need not, therefore, be singled out from others in the matter of awarding sentence.

11. In the circumstances, we impose a fine of Rs. 1000/- (Rupees One Thousand only) on each of the four respondents herein. The amount of fine shall be paid within a period of one week failing which steps will be taken under Rule 33 of the Contempt of Court Rules, 1980. The respondents should also pay to the petitioners Rs. 1,500/- towards costs in this Contempt Case. Respondent 3 to 5 who are present in the Court are made aware of this order. The contempt case is accordingly disposed of. The Commissioner will get at enhanced fee of Rs. 500-00 more which is payable by the petitioners.