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  • provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 (46 of 1973) and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (33 of 1976).12.
  • provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976),
  • SECTION 4 SICK INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES SPECIAL PROVISIONS ACT 1985
  • Sections 193, 228 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 196 of the India Penal Code. Section 15
  • Statutory Rules 1944 No. 42 this provision
  • ARTICLE 136 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 15(2) the Central Government
  • Section 17(2) read with Section 18
  • SECTION 169 COMPANIES ACT
  • Section 17 read with Section 18
  • Section 169 of the Company Act.
  • Companies Act under Section 16
  • Sub-section 3 of Section 17
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 (46 of 1973) and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (33 of 1976).12.
  • provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976),
  • SECTION 4 SICK INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES SPECIAL PROVISIONS ACT 1985
  • Sections 193, 228 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 196 of the India Penal Code. Section 15
  • Statutory Rules 1944 No. 42 this provision
  • ARTICLE 136 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 15(2) the Central Government
  • Section 17(2) read with Section 18
  • SECTION 169 COMPANIES ACT
  • Section 17 read with Section 18
  • Section 169 of the Company Act.
  • Companies Act under Section 16
  • Sub-section 3 of Section 17
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition challenges proceedings of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (the "first respondent" or "Board"/"BIFR") in relation to Delta Paper Mills Limited (the "second respondent" or "company"). The petitioner is one of the company's promoters. Relevant facts recorded in the opinion include:

  • Delta Paper Mills Limited was incorporated in 1975. The opinion lists a sequence of managing directors and states that there was no managing director at the time the writ petition was filed.
  • The company's Board of Directors numbered eight, six of whom were nominated by financial institutions; two were promoter-appointed (one of them, Mrs. B.H.K.K. Kasturi, was appointed as an additional director on 27-11-1994).
  • The company incurred losses and was declared a "sick industrial company" by the Board under Section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (the "Act").
  • On 30-10-1990 the Board suggested a rehabilitation package under Section 17(2) of the Act. The package did not succeed in reviving the company.
  • By order dated 23-2-1995 the Board (first respondent) appointed Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Limited (I.C.I.C.I.) as an Operating Agency under Section 17(3) to prepare a rehabilitation scheme. In the same order the Board directed that "no change of management should be made at this stage till the bench takes a view on the rehabilitation of the company."
  • Shareholders representing more than 10% requisitioned an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) to appoint Sri P.V. Narasimha Raju as Managing Director. Notices were issued for an EGM (dates noted in the opinion include 16-3-1995 as the initially convened date, and other parts of the record reference elections held on dates expressed as 15-6-1995 and 16-5-1995 — these are recorded in the opinion as they appear).
  • Some directors filed civil suits seeking injunctions to restrain the meeting; the suits were stayed. On 14-3-1995 the Board directed the Company Secretary not to conduct the meeting scheduled for 16-3-1995 and warned of imprisonment for violation; consequently the meeting on 16-3-1995 was not held.
  • The petitioner challenged the Board's 14-3-1995 proceedings by filing the present writ petition, arguing among other things that the Board lacked jurisdiction to restrain the holding of an EGM and that Section 169 of the Companies Act gave shareholders an absolute right to call an EGM.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (constituted under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985) has the power to restrain a company from effecting any change in the composition of its Board of Directors, including top managerial personnel, pending decision on rehabilitation of the company.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court's decision in L.I.C. of India v. Escorts Ltd. and on Section 169 of the Companies Act to contend that shareholders have an absolute right to convene an extraordinary general meeting; therefore the Board had no power to restrain the company from holding such a meeting.
  • Counsel for the petitioner argued that Section 32 of the Sick Industrial Companies Act (making its provisions prevail notwithstanding inconsistency with other laws) should apply only at the stage when a rehabilitation scheme is framed; because I.C.I.C.I. had been appointed but had not yet framed a scheme, the impugned proceedings were without jurisdiction.

Respondents' / Other Parties' Positions

  • A shareholder who filed a counter-affidavit supported the action of the first respondent, explaining that the Board had earlier suggested a package (30-10-1990), that the company had failed to revive, and that the Board by its order dated 23-2-1995 appointed I.C.I.C.I. as Operating Agency and directed that no change in management be effected while the rehabilitation process was pending.
  • The Operating Agency (by letter dated 9-3-1995) directed the company to obtain prior approval of the financial institutions for appointment of a Managing Director and to inform institutions of any change in board composition while the rehabilitation scheme was pending; the counter-affidavit also characterized the petitioner as a third party acting for the benefit of one director and suggested alternative remedies under the Act.
  • Sri P.V. Narasimha Raju, who was later elected (as recorded in the opinion) and impleaded, disputed the power of the Board to issue the impugned proceedings.
  • Mrs. Vijayakumar Raju (appointed a director on 27-11-1994) adopted the stance that the Board was competent to pass the impugned proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
L.I.C. of India v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264; AIR 1986 SC 1370 Cited by the petitioner to support the proposition that shareholders have rights (including calling EGMs) under the Companies Act which could not be curtailed by the Board. The court recorded that the petitioner relied on this decision but proceeded to analyse the Act's scheme and powers of the Board; the final decision rejected the petitioner's contention that the Board lacked jurisdiction to give directions in the circumstances (see court's reasoning and final holding regarding scope of Board's powers). The opinion does not state that Escorts decided the precise issue here; the case was invoked by the petitioner but the court addressed statutory scheme under the Act in preference to the petitioner's reliance.
Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) AC 275 Used for the negative proposition that features such as hearing witnesses on oath, having appeals, or giving decisions affecting rights do not by themselves make a body a court in the strict sense. The court cited Shell to support the analysis that the presence of certain attributes (e.g., hearings on oath, an appeal provision) does not automatically render a body quasi-judicial; this formed part of the court's inquiry into whether the Board exercises quasi-judicial powers.
Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309 Provides the Ministers' Powers Committee formulation distinguishing "judicial" and "quasi-judicial" decisions and listing requisites of a true judicial decision. The court used Cooper to frame the criteria for distinguishing judicial/quasi-judicial functions and applied those criteria when determining whether the Board's functions under the Act were judicial or administrative.
Rola Co. (Australia) Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (69 CLR 185) Explains that certain industrial/regulatory decisions lay down rules of conduct for the future and create new rights rather than ascertaining and enforcing existing rights; such bodies may not be exercising judicial power. The court relied on Rola Co. to support the view that the Board's role in framing schemes and prescribing future measures is regulatory/administrative (laying down rules for future conduct) rather than judicial adjudication of existing rights.
Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank (AIR 1950 SC 188) Holds that an industrial tribunal deciding disputes between employers and employees performs functions of a judicial nature and has characteristics of a court. The court discussed Bharat Bank to contrast situations where tribunals decide disputes over existing rights (judicial) with the Board's function under the Act; the court concluded that the Board's enquiry into sickness and framing of revival schemes is not the same as adjudication of disputes over existing rights and therefore is not quasi-judicial in the same sense.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps, expressed in the opinion text:

  1. Statutory framework: The court set out the relevant scheme of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 — identifying Section 4 (constitution of the Board), Sections 13–14 (procedure and judicial character of proceedings), Sections 15–17 (reference, inquiry, package and power to direct Operating Agency), Section 18 (powers of Operating Agency to prepare scheme including change of management), and Section 32 (provisions of the Act prevail notwithstanding inconsistency with other laws).
  2. Timing and scope of Section 32: The court rejected the petitioner's submission that Section 32 (non obstante provision) applies only after the scheme is framed. It concluded that the Board "enters the picture" the moment a reference is made under Section 15 and that Section 32 applies from the day on which a reference is made — i.e., the Act applies notwithstanding other laws from the first stage when the reference is filed.
  3. Inquiry into whether the Board exercises quasi-judicial powers: The court then examined whether the Board must be treated as exercising quasi-judicial powers (which could imply incidental or inherent powers). It reviewed authorities (Shell, Cooper, Rola, Bharat Bank) to clarify the distinction between judicial/quasi-judicial functions (adjudication of existing rights) and administrative/regulatory functions (laying down rules for the future).
  4. Characterisation of the Board's functions: On analysis, the court concluded that the Board's primary role on a reference under Section 15 is to ascertain whether a company is "sick" and to determine measures for revival — an administrative function of framing future-oriented measures. The Board may appoint an Operating Agency to inquire and prepare a scheme. Although the Board's proceedings are treated as "judicial proceedings" for certain penal and procedural purposes, the court found that those attributes do not convert the Board's core function into adjudication of existing rights.
  5. Scope of incidental powers: Section 18(1)(f) permits the Board, while framing a scheme, to exercise incidental, consequential or supplemental measures related to the measures specified in Section 18(a)–(e). The court emphasised that Section 18 (and hence the incidental powers in clause (f)) becomes relevant only when a scheme is actually being framed.
  6. Application to the impugned direction: Because the scheme had not yet been framed (the Operating Agency had been appointed and was in the process of preparing a scheme), the court concluded the Board had not yet entered the stage in which incidental or consequential powers under Section 18(1)(f) could be exercised. Consequently, directing the company "not to effect any change in the management" prior to framing a scheme was outside the scope of Sections 15, 16 and 17 and therefore beyond the Board's jurisdiction at that stage.
  7. Final legal deduction: The court determined that the impugned proceedings (the Board's direction restraining change in management prior to framing of a scheme) were without jurisdiction and had to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed; the impugned proceedings of the Board (the direction restraining the company from effecting any change in the composition of the Board of Directors including top managerial personnel at the pre-scheme stage) were held to be without jurisdiction.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The immediate consequence is that the court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned proceedings issued by the Board in the circumstances described.
  • The opinion explains that the Board's power to exercise incidental, consequential or supplemental measures under Section 18(1)(f) arises when a scheme is being framed; prior to that stage the Board's functions are administrative (ascertaining sickness and initiating the scheme-preparation process) and do not extend to issuing directions of the kind impugned in this case.
  • The court ordered no costs.
  • The opinion does not assert that it is establishing a broad new precedent beyond its application to the statutory interpretation and facts before it; it limits its pronouncements to the construction of the Act and the scope of the Board's powers at the pre-scheme stage.

    K. Sitarama Raju v. Board For Industrial And Financial Reconstruction New Delhi And Ors.

    1. The question involved in this writ petition is, whether the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction constituted under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) has the power to restrain the company from effecting any change in the composition of Board of Directors including top managerial personnel pending decision on the question of rehabilitation of the company?. The facts, in brief, are as follows:—

    2. The petitioner is one of the promoters of the second respondent-company, namely, Delta Paper Mills Limited. The company was incorporated in the year 1975 as the Public Limited Company under the Companies Act, Mr. Bh. Vijayalaanar Raju, was the Managing Director from 1975 till 10th May, 1985 and Mr. P.V Narsimha Raju was the Managing Director of the second respondent-company between May, 1985 and September, 1991, Mr. Bh. Vijayakumar Raju, became Managing Director from 28-9-1991 and continued till his death on 20-11-1994. There was no Managing Director for the respondent-company on the date of filing of the writ petition. The total number of the Directors are 8 out of which 6 were nominated by the Financial Institutions and Mr. P.V Narasimha Raju, was appointed by the share-holders and Smt. Bh. K.K Kasturi, wife of late Vijayakumar Raju, was appointed on 27-11-1994 by the Board of Directors as an Additional Director. The second respondent-company incurred losses and after the death of Mr. Vijayakumar Raju, mere was a total chaos in the management of the company which resulted in mismanagement and also pilferage of funds. On account of the accumulated losses of the company the company has been declared as sick industrial company by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under Section 15 of the Act. The first respondent initiated further proceedings under Section 17(2) of the Act On 30-10-1990 the first respondent directed the second respondent to make its net worth positive under Section 17(2) of the Act. However, the second respondent could not improve its position even after following the condition laid down by the first respondent and consequently the matter or rehabilitating the second respondent is again before the first respondent. Since the package paid under Section 17(2) did not work out the first respondent has decided to take action under Section 17(3) of the Act and directed the Operating Agency to prepare the scheme of rehabilitation by its order dated 23-2-1995. Since the second respondent was functioning without any Managing Director a Section of shareholders representing more than 10% of the paid up capital of the company have lodged a requisition on 1-2-1995 before the second respondent requesting to convene an Extraordinary General body meeting of the share-holders for the purpose of appointment of Sri P.V Narasimha Raju, as Managing Director of the company. On receiving the requisition the second respondent-company had issued a notice on 15-2-1995 convening the Extraordinary General body meeting on 16-3-1995. The notice was sent to all the share-holders of the company. However, some of the Directors filed civil suits in O.S.Nos 56 and 62 of 1995 before the Principal District Munsif, Bhimavaram, seeking injunction restraining the holding of the meeting. Against the orders of the Principal District Munsif, C.R.P Nos. 772 and 773 of 1995 were filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the suits were stayed. However, the first respondent on 14-3-1995 directed the Company Secretary of the second respondent not to conduct the meeting on 16-3-1995 and threatened the Directors with imprisonment if its orders are violated. Therefore, on 16-3-1995 the meeting was not held. The petitioner and the other shareholders came to know of the order passed by the first respondent on 16-3-1995 at 10-45 A.M through the notice of the Company Secretary of the company. Questioning the validity of the order dated 14-3-1995 the present writ petition was filed on various grounds.

    3. One of the share-holders of the second respondent-company got himself impleaded as he and his relatives who are also the promoters of the company hold 45,000 equity shares of Rs. 10/- each in second respondent-company. He filed a counter-affidavit stating that the first respondent has sanctioned the rehabilitation scheme for the revival of units by its order dated 30-10-1990. Since the second respondent failed to revive the company as per the package the first respondent reviewed its order, by order dated 23-2-1995 and appointed Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India limited as Operating Agency under Section 17(3) and (4) of the Act to prepare a scheme for rehabilitation and revival of the company. The first respondent directed the promoters to furnish all the necessary material along with the minutes of the general body meeting to the Operating Agency by 24-3-1995. Pending report by the operating Agency the first respondent directed “not to effect any change in the composition of the Board of Directors including top managerial personnel”. The Operating Agency by its letter dated 9-3-1995 directed the second respondent-company to obtain prior approval of the financial institutions for the appointment of the Managing Director. It was also directed that the second respondent should inform the institutions if there is any change in the composition of the Board of Directors for their approval since the company's rehabilitation scheme is pending with the first respondent; that the petitioner is a third-party who filed the above writ petition for the benefit of one of the Directors and, therefore, it is not in good faith and the petitioner has also have an alternative remedy under the Act and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable.; that one of the Directors filed a statutory appeal No. 38 of 1995 before the appellate authority and while admitting the same the said authority had not granted any stay and the appeal was posted on 2-6-1995. The second respondent-company constituted a Managing Committee consisting of Chairman and some of the Directors of the first respondent-company including representatives of financial institutions. Chief Executive Officer and Senior Vice President (Technical) in order to take a decision on all important problems. A full time Finance Director was also appointed on 6-5-1995 who happened to be a nominee of Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation in compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding. Therefore, there is no urgency for the appointment of Managing Director as the affairs of the company are conducted by various professional people under the Managing Committee constituted for that purpose. Once a reference is made under Section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, by virtue of Section 32 the provisions of the Act will prevail notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act. Therefore, the first respondent is competent to pass the impugned order. Further on a reference made under Section 15 an inquiry was conducted under Section 16 and the first respondent suggested a package by requesting the management of the company to make its net worth exceeds accumulated losses under Section 17(2) of the Act on 30-10-1990. Since the company failed to revive the way it was expected, the first respondent appointed the Industrial Credit Investment Corporation of India as Operating Agency under Section 17(3) and (4) of the Act to prepare a report on rehabilitation and reviving of the company as per guidelines. The Operating Agency was directed to examine the measures including the change of management, amalgamation of the company with other companies as stipulated under Section 18 of the Act. Since the matter is seized by the first respondent in view of Section 32 of the Act the question of holding general body meeting in accordance with Section 169 of the Companies Act does not arise. In other words, one of the share-holders supports the action of the first respondent directing the management not to effect any change of management till a view is taken on the rehabilitation of the company.

    4. Sri P.V Narasimha Raju, who was elected as the Managing Director of the second respondent-company in the extraordinary general body meeting conduct on 15-6-1995 got impleaded himself in the writ petition and filed a counter-affidavit disputing the power of the first respondent to issue the impugned proceedings.

    5. Mrs. Vijayakumar Raju, wife of late Vijayakumar Raju, who was appointed as a Director on 27-11-1994 also got impleaded as a party to writ petition. She also adopted the stand that the first respondent is competent to pass the impugned proceedings.

    6. Before referring to the issue raised by various parties the facts which are not disputed are as follows:—

    7. The Managing Director of the second respondent-company was Mr. Vijayarama Raju, who expired on 20-11-1994. There are 8 Directors of the Board of Directors, out of which 6 Directors are nominated by the financial institutions and out of the remaining 2 Directors are Mr. P.V Narasimha Raju, appointed by the share-holders and Mrs. B.H.K.K Kasturi, wife of late Sri Vijayakumar Raju, appointed on 27-11-1994 by the Board of Directors as an Additional Director. The second respondent has been declared as a sick industrial company by the first respondent under Section 15 of the Act The first respondent suggested a package for the purpose of reviving the second respondent-company under Section 17(2) of the Act However, the second respondent-company could not revive itself and, therefore, the first respondent by its order dated 23-2-1995 appointed Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Limited (I.C.I.C.I) as an Operating Agency and directed to prepare a scheme in Case No. 67 of 1989 in accordance with the provisions of the Act for the purpose of rehabilitating the second respondent-company. By the same order while appointing I.C.I.C.I as an Operating Agency on the representation made by Mrs. Vijayakumar Raju, stating that no Managing Director was appointed after the death of the Managing Director and the company proposing to hold extraordinary general body meeting on 16-3-1995 and also offering to bring funds for the purpose of rehabilitation which was opposed by the co-promoters, the Board directed that “no change of management should be made at this stage till the bench takes a view on the rehabilitation of the company.” Thereafter on 14-3-1995 on an application filed by Mrs. Vijayakumar Raju. on 13-3-1995 complaining that despite a direction issued by the Board not to make any change in the management, the company was proceeding with the holding of the extraordinary general body meeting for the appointment of the Managing Director, the bench passed the following order:—

    “The Bench has directed you and the Board of Directors of the company to ensure that the directions given by it at the hearing held on 23-2-1995, retraining the company from effecting any change in the composition of Board of Directors including top managerial personnel, should be strictly carried out and in case of failure to comply with the directions Shri B.K Satyanarayana Rao, Company Secretary who has convened the EGM or any member of the Board of Directors of the company holding the EGM contrary to the orders of the BIFR shall be liable for action.”—

    8. The petitioner challenges the above proceedings on the ground that the action of the first respondent is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in L.I.C of India v. Escorts Ltd. (1) (1986) 1 SCC 264 : AIR 1986 SC 1370. Counsel submitted that under Section 169 of the Companies Act it is an absolute right of the share-holders of the company to call for an extra-ordinary general body meeting and the action of the first respondent is contrary to Section 169 of the Company Act. The counsel also submitted that the first respondent has no power to restrain the company from holding the extraordinary general body meeting as the stage has not yet arisen. Section 32 of the Act, no doubt, says that the provisions of the Act have application notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act but it will be applicable only from the stage when the scheme is framed and not at the stage before framing of the scheme. Counsel submitted, in this case the first respondent appointed the I.C.I.C.I and the I.C.I.C.I has not yet framed the scheme and it is in the process of framing the scheme and, therefore, the impugned proceedings are without jurisdiction and are liable to be set aside.

    9. The question, therefore, is whether the first respondent is competent to issue the impugned proceedings directing the second respondent-company not to make any change in the management of the company.

    10. In order to consider the issue, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Act. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985 was constituted for the purpose of detecting the sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings and to determine preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures and for expeditious enforcement of those measures. Section 4 of the Act provides for apartment of a Board known as the “Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction” to exercise the jurisdiction and powers and discharge the functions and duties conferred or imposed on the Board by or under the Act. It consists of a Chairman and not less than two and not more than fourteen other Members, to be appointed by the Central Government. An appeal lies against the decision of the Board to the Appellate authority constituted under Section 5 of the Act The Appellate Authority consists of a Chairman and not more than three other Members, who is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court or who is or has been a Judge of the High Court for not less than five years, and a person who is or has been a Judge of High Court or has been an Officer not below the rank of Secretary to the Government of India or who is or has been a Member of the Board for not less than three years respectively. Section 13 provides for the procedure of the Board and the Appellate Authority. Under Section 14 the proceedings before the Board or the Appellate Authority are deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Section 193 and 228 and for the purpose of Section 196 of the India Penal Code. Section 15 provides for a reference to be made to the Board where an industrial company has become a sick industrial company by the Board of Directors of the company within sixty days from the date of finalisation of the duly audited accounts of the company for the financial year as at the end of which the company has become a sick industrial company for the purpose of determining the measures to be adopted for its revival. Under Section 15(2) the Central Government or the Reserve Bank or a State level institution or a Scheduled Bank is authorised to make a reference to the Board for determination of the measures to be adopted if it has reason to believe that any industrial company has become sick. On such reference having been made the Board has to make an inquiry under Section 16 for determinig whether any industrial company has become a sick industrial company. The Board is also competent to entrust the inquiry to an Operating Agency and requesting the Operating Agency to submit a report. The Board is also empowered to appoint a Special Director notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act under Section 16 pending inquiry into the sickness of the company either by itself or by the Operating Agency. Under Section 17 the Board is empowered to make suitable orders on the completion of the inquiry. Under Section 17(1) after making an inquiry under Section 16 if the Board is satisfied that a company has become a sick industrial company it shall after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances, decide by order in writing whether it is practicable for the company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time. The Board shall by order in writing and subject to such restrictions or conditions as may be specified in the order, give such time to the company as it may deem fit to make its net worth positive. Under Sub-section 3 of Section 17 if the Board decided under Sub-section (1) that it is not practicable for a sick industrial company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time and that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest to adopt all or any of the measures specified in Section is in relation to the said company it may, as soon as may be, by order in writing, direct any Operating Agency specified in the order to prepare, having regard to such guidelines as may be specified in the order, a scheme providing for such measures in relation to such company. Under Section 18 the Operating Agency has to prepare a scheme providing for various measures mentioned in the said Section. Under Section 32 me provisions of the Act and of any rule or scheme made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law except the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976), for the time being in force or in the Memorandum or Articles of Association of an industrial company or in any other instrument having no effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.

    11. The scheme of the Act is, therefore, in case of a sick industrial company, the Board of Directors of the company have to make a reference to the Board for the determination of the measures to be adopted for its revival. On a reference being made under Section 15 either by the Board of Directors or the Government or the Reserve Bank or the State Government or a public financial institution or a State level institution or a Scheduled Bank, the Board has to hold an inquiry or it may appoint an Operating Agency for the purpose of holding an inquiry to determine whether the company has become a sick industrial company or not. On such inquiry being made and on consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and the report submitted by the Operating Agency if the Board is of the view that the Company can be revived on its own a reasonable time should be given for making its net worth positive. This is known as package under Section 17(1) of the Act. If the company fails on its own or fails to make its net worth positive, within a reasonable time mentioned in the package, the Board has to appoint an Operating Agency for the purpose of preparing a scheme for its revival. The Operating Agency taking into account various circumstances has to suggest measures for its revival. One of the measures to be suggested by the Operating Agency under Section 18 is the change of management of the company. Under Section 14 of the Act the proceedings before the Board are judicial proceedings, and the provisions of the Act will apply under Section 32 of the Act notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force except the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 (46 of 1973) and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (33 of 1976).

    12. The facts narrated above disclose that a reference was made by the second respondent-Board to the first respondent and the first respondent after holding an inquiry under Section 16 of the Act found that the second respondent is a sick industrial company, suggested a package to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time by its order dated 30-10-1990. However, the second respondent-company could not reviewed itself and, therefore, by its order dated 23-2-1995 the first respondent revived its order and appointed I.C.I.C.L as the Operating Agency for the purpose of framing a scheme under Section 18 of the Act. While doing so, the Board directed the second respondent not to bring about any change in the management which was confirmed by its proceedings dated 14-3-1995. However, in spite of the directions issued by the first respondent not to effect any change in the management the shareholders called for an extraordinary general body meeting for the purpose of electing the Managing Director and, in fact the election was held on 16-5-1995 and Sri Narsimha Raju, one of the respondents who was sought to be impleaded was elected as Managing Director.

    13. From the facts referred to above, on a reference being made under Section 15 of the Act, the Board is seized of the matter. When the Board is seized of the matter by virtue of Section 32 the provisions of the Act will prevail notwithstanding anything contained in Section 169 of the Companies Act. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 32 will apply only after framing of the scheme under Section 17 read with Section 18 cannot be countenanced as the first respondent enters to the picture the moment a reference is made by the Board of Directors of the company under Section 15 or by any financial institutions referred to in Section 15(2) for determining the measures to be adopted for reviving the company. The interpretation sought to be placed that Section 32 is applicable only when a scheme is framed in accordance with Section 17(2) read with Section 18 by the Operating Agency cannot be accepted in view of the express language that “the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force. “On the facts of the instant case, a reference was made by the Board of Directors of the company, an inquiry was conducted and the first respondent found that the company is a sick company and suggested package and the company could not revive itself and therefore, the Board appointed I.C.I.C.I as Operating Agency. In other words, the company i.e, second respondent-company invoked the provisions of the Act by making a reference under Section 15 of the Act. The first respondent is seized of the matter when a reference is made under Section 15 of the Act. The Act is applicable from the day on which a reference is made under Section 15 of the Act i.e, the first stage. It does not say that the provisions of this Act shall have effect after framing of the scheme. If the intention of the legislature is to give effect to the provisions of the Act not with standing anything contained in any other law only after framing of the scheme then the Section would have been differently worded. On the fact of the language used in the Section it cannot be said that the provisions of this Act will have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other law only after framing of the scheme and not before that.

    14. The next question to be considered is, whether the Board is exercising quasi-judicial powers? I have already pointed that an appeal lies to the appellate authority from the decision of the Board under Section 25 of the Act. The Board or the Appellate Authority shall, for the purposes of any inquiry or for any other purpose under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying suits as well as appellate authority are conferred with the powers of the C.P.C, namely, summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath; the discovery and production of document or other material object producible as evidence; the reception of evidence on affidavit and requisitioning of any public record from any court or office; the issuing of any commission for the examination of witnesses and any other matter which may be prescribed I have already pointed out that under Section 14 of the Act the proceedings before the Board or the Appellate Authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and 228 and for the purpose of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. The question, therefore, is whether the Board can be held to be exercising quasi-judicial powers on the ground that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were made applicable for various purposes mentioned in Section 13(3) of the Act and that the proceedings before the Board are judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 228 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code and that an appeal lies to the appellate authority against any order of the Board. In this context a classic judgment in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2) (1931) AC 275 is relevant, wherein it was observed:—

    “1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. See REX v. Electricity Commissioners (1924, 1 KB. 171).”

    15. The above, no doubt are the negative propositions for the purpose of determining whether it is a Court or a Tribunal. The next decision is the judgment in Cooper v. Wilson (3) (1937) 2 KB 309. The relevant observations are as follows”—

    “In the Report of the Ministers' Powers Committee (Command Paper 4060 of 1932), p. 73 (s. III., para 3) an attempt was made to define the words “judicial” and “quasi-judicial”. “A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites:— (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law. A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2) but does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4) The place (4) is in fact taken by admmistrative action, the character of which is dtermined by the Minister's free choice.”

    16. The next decision to be considered is Rola Co. (Australia) Pvt. Ltd. v. The Common Wealth (4) 69 CLR 185. The brief facts of the case are as follows:—

    17. The Women's Employment Regulations set up a Women's Employment Board, with power to decide whether females may be employed on certain classes of work and to decide matters with respect, inter alia, to their hours and conditions of employment and their rates of pay. The Board's decision is to be binding on specified employers and employees and organizations of employees and upon being filed in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is to have effect as if it were an award or order of that Court. Regulation 5c in its original Form (as inserted into the Regulations by Statutory Rules 1943 No. 251) authorized Committees of Reference to determine, in relation to decisions of the Women's Employment Board, certain facts - namely, facts as to what females are or were employed on work specified in a decision of the Board and as to the nature of the work upon which they are or were employed. The regulation made the determinations of Committees binding on the employers and on females specified in the determinations, but by amendment made by Statutory Rules 1944 No. 42 this provision was replaced by a provision that a determination of committee should be deemed to form part of the decision of the Board in relation to which it was made. It was held that neither in its original form nor as amended did Regulation 5c purport to confer judicial power upon Committees of Reference. The observations made by the majority was:—

    “These considerations are not conclusive of the case. An industrial award lays down rules of conduct for the future. It does not purport to ascertain and enforce existing rights; it is directed to the creation of new rights.”

    18. The next decision to be considered is the judgment in Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank (5) AIR 1950 SC 188. The majority, after referring to the judgments in Shell Co. of Australia v. Fedral Commissioner of Taxation (2 Supra), Cooper v. Wilson (3 Supra) and Rola Co. (Australia) Pvt. Ltd. v. The Common Wealth (4 Supra) held that the industrial tribunal is directed within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The relevant observations are as follows:—

    “Such a dispute concerns the rights of employers and employees. Its decision affects the terms of a contract of service or the conditions of employment. Not only may the pecuniary liability of an employer be considerably affected by the adjudication of such dispute but it may even result in the imposition of punishments on him.”—

    “It is difficult to conceive in view of these provisions that the Industrial Tribunal performs any functions other than that of a judicial nature. The tribunal has certainly the first three requisites and characteristics of a Court as defined above.

    19. It follows from the above decision that the fact that the Board hears the witnesses on oath or that an appeal is provided against the order of the Board or because it gives decisions which affects rights of the parties does not make it a quasi judicial body. The Board ascertains on a reference made under Section 15 of the Act either by the financial institutions of the State or Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India or the Board of Directors whether a company is a sick company and determine the measures to be adopted for its revival. The Board may delegate the power to an Operating Agency to inquire into and report as to the sickness of the company. If, after making such an inquiry under Section 16 of the Act, the Board is satisfied that the company has become sick, it may give an opportunity to the company to made its net worth positive within a reasonable time. If the sick company fails to revive itself on the opportunity given by the Board the Board may appoint an Operating Agency to suggest measure of revival under Section 18 of the Act. The Operating Agency is appointed under Section 17(3) of the Act. One of the measures of revival is any change in the Board of Directors. Therefore, though no doubt, the Board comes into the picture only on an application made to it by the Board of Directors of the company or the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India or a State Government or a public institution or a State level institution or a Scheduled Bank, the Board does not decide any dispute between the institutions referred to above or the company as under Section 15 of the Act the object of reference is to ascertain whether the company is a sick within the meaning of the Act. As stated in the earlier paragraphs, it suggests a package for its revival to relieve it of its sickness and after it fails to revive itself on the package suggested by the Board the scheme is prepared. Therefore, the Board while determining whether a company is sick company does not exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial powers. In the language of the High Court of Australia, it lays down the rules of conduct for the future. It does not purport and ascertain and enforce existing rights. Perhaps it is directed to the creation of new rights. Therefore, the Board does not exercise quasi-judicial powers. If the Board does not exercise quasi-judicial powers the question of exercising implied or inherent power in the interest of the company does not arise. In other words, the Board exercises only an administrative function of ascertaining the sickness of the company and framing of a scheme for the purpose of its revival. However, under Section 18(1)(f) of the Act while framing a scheme for the purpose of reviving of the company the Board may exercise such incidental, consequential or supplemental measures as may be necessary or expedient in connection with or for the purposes of the measures specified in Clauses (a) to (e). As pointed out, Section 18 comes into the picture only when a scheme is framed Before the scheme is framed the question of exercising incidental, consequential or supplemental measures does not arise. Evidently on the facts of the present case, the scheme has not yet been framed. It is only in the process of framing the scheme. In the light of the view that the Board has only exercises administrative powers, namely, ascertaining the sickness of the company and suggests a package for its revival and appoints an Operating Agency for the purpose of framing a scheme, the Board cannot exercise any incidental or consequential or supplemental measure of directing the company not to effect any change in the management. Therefore, the impugned action is outside the scope of Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Act. Thus it follows from the above that the impugned proceeding is without jurisdiction. In the light of the above, there is no other alternative except to allow the writ petition.

    20. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.

    21. No costs.

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    K. Sitarama Raju v. Board For Industrial And Financial Reconstruction New Delhi And Ors.
    (Aug 14, 1995)